India’s China problem: Tawang clash: Sixty years on, why doesn’t India have a China-specific strategy?

Source: The post is based on the article “Tawang clash: Sixty years on, why doesn’t India have a China-specific strategy?” published in the Indian Express on 21^st November 2022.

Syllabus: GS – 2 – India and its neighbourhood relations.

Relevance: About India’s China problem.

News: This year marks the 60th anniversary of the 1962 India-China War. The recent clash between Indian troops and PLA soldiers in the vicinity of Tawang should serve as a harsh reminder of the close call that Arunachal Pradesh (then known as the North-Eastern Frontier Agency or NEFA) had in 1962.

About the 1962 China-India war

The Chinese PLA advanced along two axes 500 miles apart — Tawang and Walong. They overran NEFA in three weeks. Later, China declared a ceasefire and PLA troops withdrew 20 km behind the McMahon Line.

Due to faulty intelligence and military incompetence, the Indian army faced challenges.

Why India’s China problem is worrying?

1) Despite India’s advancement in military capabilities in the past 60 years, China has seen phenomenal economic, technological and military growth and competes with the USA for the global “pole-position”, 2) China has imposed a huge economic burden on India’s defence budget by forcing the “counter-mobilisation” of 50,000-60,000 extra Indian troops, 3) India’s post-Covid financial situation and depressed GDP growth rates will not permit any significant hike in defence expenditure, 4) India’s liabilities with the “pay and pension” system makes modernisation and re-equipment of the armed forces not possible, 5) India’s defence budget at present is 2.1% of the GDP. Schemes like Agnipath and bans on the import of military hardware do not save instant money and do not bring instant self-reliance, and 6) India not only lacks a China-specific strategy, but also a national security strategy (NSS).

How India can solve India’s China problem?

a) Resumption of robust economic growth is the only solution for India’s “guns vs butter” dilemma. For this, India should work on effective savings by cutting down on wasteful/non-essential government expenditure, reducing vote-garnering subsidies, or disinvesting/monetising idle assets, b) India must acquire absolute clarity about China’s larger objectives and work on military to seek tactical advantage, c) India’s diplomatic policy should shift from “reactive” to “proactive” and start working on reducing Sino-Indian trade deficit of $70 billion, d) India should canvass international opinion via the UN, G20 and other international forums to pressurise China to come to the negotiating table, and e) The Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement is now 30 years old, so the government should rework on that agreement to control present aggression.