Lessons from Doklam:

Lessons from Doklam:

Context

• Several significant questions remain unanswered about the terms and conditions of the resolution of the Sino-Indian military stand-off at Doklam, it provides New Delhi and Beijing an opportunity to reflect over what went wrong and rejig this important bilateral relationship.
• The upcoming visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China to attend the BRICS summit will provide the two sides such an opportunity.

Lesson learnt

• The most self-evident lesson from the Doklam stand-off is that we inhabit a ‘self-help’ world wherein China is a world power.
• India is on its own and would have to fend for itself in case of a clash with China, a country with which every major state in the international system has a robust economic relationship.
• None of the major powers unambiguously and unreservedly supported India’s position on Doklam.
• In fact, even Bhutan kept a studied silence through the latter part of the stand-off.
• New Delhi, therefore, must carefully review the scenarios and consider its options before upping the ante.
• Moreover, regarding Doklam, instead of inviting military attention to itself and trapping itself in a conflict with Beijing, New Delhi could have convinced Thimphu to be more vocal about Bhutan’s territorial rights.
• Doklam stand-off is that China is unlikely to respect India’s ‘special relationships’ with its neighbours.
• India has long enjoyed a special status in the South Asian region and often treated it as its exclusive backyard.
• With China expanding its influence in the region and competing for status and influence, the ‘middle kingdom’ considers South Asia, with India in it, as its periphery.
• China uses economic incentives and military pressure to do so.
• India’s traditional policy towards South Asia, of limited economic assistance topped with a big brother attitude, will need to undergo fundamental transformation to retain its influence.
• India should consider all odds and evaluate the merit of the cause before making military commitments.
• Indian political parties cannot make any domestic gains by whipping up nationalist passions against China.
• India needs to engage China diplomatically to resolve outstanding conflicts rather than engage in a war of words, or worse, threaten to use force.
• India needs to realize the importance of cooperating with China on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) while getting China to do so on various India-led regional projects. It cannot be a zero-sum game.

What next?

• It is high time, therefore, that the two countries appointed dedicated high-ranking officials to discuss the boundary issues in a more sustained and result-oriented manner.
• It is necessary for India to devise a strategy to engage a resurgent China, also a significant neighbour, in the days ahead.
• There is also an urgent need to adopt a multi-pronged strategy to deal with Beijing.
• India needs to engage China a lot more at several levels: diplomatically, politically, multilaterally and economically.
• The upcoming BRICS summit in the Chinese city of Xiamen is a good occasion to initiate a dedicated backchannel with Beijing given the high potential for future disagreements.