Role of the Speaker and Anti-Defection Law in India- Explained Pointwise

The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, also known as the Anti-Defection Law, was inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to curb the growing menace of political defections which destabilized governments in the post-1967 era. However, in recent years, the issue has once again taken center stage due to partisan actions by Legislative Speakers, resulting in erosion of democratic values and legal safeguards.

What is the Tenth Schedule?

It addresses disqualification of MPs and MLAs for defection, a response to the political instability of the late 1960s when “party-hopping MLAs” toppled multiple state governments.

Key Provisions: Disqualification occurs if a member voluntarily relinquishes party membership, votes against party directives, or joins another party (for independents or nominated members after six months).

Evolution of Defection Law

What is the Significance and Importance of an Independent and Neutral Speaker?

1. Guardianship of Legislative Integrity: The Speaker is expected to promote institutional neutrality, rule of law and to act as a quasi-judicial authority under the Tenth Schedule, but when partisanship takes precedence, it jeopardizes constitutional morality. E.g. The 2020 Arunachal Pradesh defection case Supreme Court reiterated, “neutrality of the Speaker is critical to democratic stability”.

2. Timely Adjudication and Trust in Institutions: The 2023 Constitution Bench in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur reiterated that delays in disqualification proceedings violate the spirit of democracy.

3. Check on Political Horse-trading: The absence of an impartial Speaker allows post-election defections to the ruling party, as seen in Karnataka (2019) and Goa (2017).

4. Constitutional Expectation: The Speaker is expected to embody “propriety and impartiality,” as noted by a five-judge Constitution Bench in May 2023, ensuring the Tenth Schedule’s objective—to stabilize governments—is upheld.

5. Judicial Perspective: Justice Gavai’s observation that a speaker’s “indecision” cannot defeat the anti-defection law’s purpose emphasizes the need for neutrality. The Supreme Court’s invocation of Article 142 powers in cases of non-compliance further reinforces this.

What are the government Initiatives and institutional Developments?

1. All India Presiding Officers Conference (2021-2023): Discussed reforms in Speaker’s powers under the anti-defection law. Multiple officers expressed that “Speakers’ roles must be reviewed”.

2. 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003: Made merger provisions more stringent by raising the requirement to two-thirds of members for party mergers.

3. Supreme Court’s Role as Constitutional Guardian: Article 142 has been invoked to “ensure justice is not defeated by technicality or partisan silence” — SC has directed Speakers in Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Telangana to act within a “reasonable time frame.”

What are the challenges to the Autonomy and Integrity of Speaker’s Role?

1. Structural Partisanship & Political Capture: Speakers are elected by ruling parties and often act in a politically motivated manner. E.g. Maharashtra defection case (2022) where delay benefited defectors who joined the ruling coalition.

2. Procedural Vacuum & Legal Ambiguity: The Tenth Schedule is silent on timelines for deciding petitions. Exceptions include a “merger” where at least two-thirds of a party’s members agree, as amended by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 (up from one-third in 1985).

3. Limited Jurisdiction & Constitutional Boundaries: Courts cannot dictate the decision of the Speaker but can only ensure timely adjudication, limiting judicial recourse.

4. Legal Ambiguities: No definition of voluntary giving up membership and Whip’s authority vs. conscience vote conflicts. E.g. Average 2.3 years for disqualification decisions (ADR 2022 study), 68% cases decided after MLA’s term ended (PRS 2023).

5. Misuse of Delay to Influence Governance: Defectors are inducted as Ministers or enjoy influence before eventual disqualification. E.g. Defecting MLAs get ministerial posts in 71% cases (CMS 2021 study), only 12% of defectors lost subsequent elections (Trivedi Centre 2023).

6. Democratic Fatigue & Electoral Cynicism: Frequent defections with impunity undermine public faith in electoral processes.

7. Institutional Opacity & Role Ambiguity: No penalties or disciplinary procedures exist for Speakers who delay decisions.

8. Political-Electoral Engineering: Major parties like the have engineered mass defections post-elections in Goa, Manipur, and Madhya Pradesh. 

What should be the Way Forward?

1. Independent Tribunal Mechanism: Establish a neutral tribunal headed by retired judges to decide disqualification pleas, as recommended by Law Commission and NCRWC.

2. Statutory Timeline for Decision: Amend the law to provide a maximum of 60 days to decide defection cases.

3. Code of Conduct for Presiding Officers: Create binding norms and codes for neutrality and accountability.

4. Constitutional Remedy & Democratic Safeguard: Allow courts to intervene if decisions are unduly delayed, using Article 142 for enforcing timelines.

5. Public Accountability and Electoral Penalty: Launch civic education campaigns and promote electoral punishment for defectors.

6. Strengthening Intra-Party Democracy: Empower parties to uphold ideological integrity and reduce dependence on post-election deals.

7. Global Best Practices

• In UK and Canada, Speakers are strictly non-partisan and elected by a secret ballot across party lines.
• In South Africa, a Judicial Commission handles defection matters, not the Speaker.

8. Committees Recommendations

• The Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and Law Commission’s 170th Report (1999) recommended divesting the Speaker of adjudicatory powers under the Tenth Schedule.
• NITI Aayog and National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) have advocated for setting up an independent tribunal headed by a retired judge.