Surge in terror attacks in Jammu

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Source- This post on the Surge in terror attacks in Jammu has been created based on the article “What explains the surge in terror attacks in Jammu?” published in “The Indian Express” on 17 July 2024.

Why in the news?

It has been observed that there has been a surge in terror attacks in Jammu. The rise in attacks highlights gaps in the security infrastructure in regions like Doda, Poonch, and Rajouri, which had seen peace for many years.

Recent Attack Statistics

i) 2022: Three attacks, six security force personnel killed, 14 militants killed, 11 civilians killed.

ii) 2023: Three attacks, 21 security force personnel killed, 20 militants killed.

iii) 2024: Six attacks so far, 11 security force personnel killed, five militants killed, 11 civilians killed.

Factors Contributing to the Surge

1. Complacency and Reduced Proactive Operations

i) Prolonged peace and a more active focus on the Valley may have led to complacency in counter-insurgency efforts in Jammu.

ii) Reduction in proactive operations due to lower alertness compared to the Valley.

2. Troop Reduction and Increased Responsibility

i) Troop reduction in 2021, with forces moved to the Line of Actual Control, increased the area of responsibility for each battalion.

ii) Approximately 4,000 to 5,000 troops, mostly involved in counter-terror duties, were moved out of the area.

3. Attacks Near International Border

i) Recent attacks in the Kathua-Samba region indicate a trend of targeting areas close to the International Border.

ii) These areas fall under the Army Western Command, which does not engage in counter-terror operations, requiring additional troops who need training and familiarization.

4. Strategic Shift by Militants

i) Jammu has become a new focal point for militant operations against security forces, following changes to J&K’s constitutional status in 2019 and increased activity in Eastern Ladakh.

ii) Infiltration along the International Border is easier than the Line of Control, with Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba cadres leading attacks.

5. Deployment Patterns and Intelligence Gaps

i) Deployment patterns changed after militancy ebbed in 2007, leading to thin deployments and gaps in intelligence.

ii) Effective border management is crucial to handle increased militant activity and to prevent regrouping of militants in Kashmir.

6. Technology Dependence and Reduced Ground Intelligence

i) Increased reliance on technology has reduced the ground-level connection, impacting operational intelligence.

ii) Efforts are needed to reorient operations towards basic counter-insurgency measures, emphasizing ground intelligence.

7. Lack of Human Intelligence

i) The increase in terror violence is linked to a lack of human intelligence feeding security forces.

ii)  Developing these networks will take time, and nearly all recent attacks in Jammu have been carried out by foreign terrorists using dense forest cover for infiltration.

8. Motivational Incentives: The centralization of police powers has delayed motivational incentives for forces, such as promotions, reducing the drive to develop human intelligence.

9. Sophisticated Equipment and Narco-Terrorism

i) Militants are using advanced equipment like night-vision glasses and M4 rifles.

ii) Increased instances of narco-terrorism, facilitated by people and drones, have generated funds for terror activities and local distribution.

iii) Drones transporting drugs, explosives, weapons, and money have been intercepted by security forces.

UPSC Syllabus: Internal Security

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