The strategy of conflict

The strategy of conflict

Context

India-Pakistan Kashmir dispute: Violence at the border increasing

What has happened?

• More than 633 ceasefire violations (CFVs) by Pakistan have been reported by New Delhi
• Pakistan reported 415 CFVs by India which have claimed 20 civilian lives
• The calibre of weapons used on the border have also graduated from short-range personal weapons to 105 mm mortars, 130 and 155 mm artillery guns and anti-tank guided missiles.

The Question asked

Is this sheer mindless violence, or is there a strategy behind this violence? And if there indeed is a strategy, is it a carefully calibrated one and what are its likely outcomes?

Three Strategies

Ever since the ceasefire agreement (CFA) of 2003, New Delhi seems to have followed three broad strategies to deal with the violence on the J&K border—

• ‘talks over bullets’,
• ‘talks and bullets’, and
• ‘disproportionate bombardment’

These have identifiable costs and benefits associated with them.

‘Talks over bullets’ strategy

Relative calm in Kashmir from 2003 till 2008, PM Modi’s visit to Lahore which resulted in period from December 2015 to February 2016 which hardly witnessed any CFVs

• Benefits: Engagement with Pakistan and quiet on the border are strongly correlated.
• Downside:New Delhi feels that it tried the strategy of peace and talks several times in the past and failed to get a positive response from Pakistan.
• Effect:This has led to a great deal of bitterness in India.
• Analysis: The costs of ‘talks over bullets’ strategy, in New Delhi’s calculation, seem to outweigh the benefit

‘Talks and bullets’ strategy

To engage in talks while proportionately responding to Pakistani provocations e.g. period from 2010 to 2012

Benefits:

• Both talks and firing persisted, though at moderate levels
• Very little risk of escalation, fewer casualties and limited destruction.

Downsides: Major Political costs;

Analysis:The political costs of not upping the ante against Pakistan seemed to outweigh its military benefits

‘Disproportionate bombardment’ strategy

Disproportionate bombardment of the Pakistani side using high calibre weapons while not showing any desire for talks, negotiations or concessions, and shunning Pakistani suggestions thereof

Example:India’s reported rejection, in January, of a Pakistani proposal for a meeting between the two Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs), saying it first wanted to see a drop in infiltration levels is a direct outcome of this strategy

Benefits

• Surprisingly few questions being asked of the government about the rising civilian and military casualties.
• The ‘we kill more than they do’ argument, combined with the ‘surgical strikes’ narrative, creates a powerful political discourse laden with potential electoral benefits for the ruling dispensation in New Delhi.

Costs:

• The disproportionate bombardment strategy could potentially escalate to worrying levels — a rising toll could reverse popular support for the current muscular approach
• More killing and destruction would also steadily shrink the space available for negotiated outcomes with Pakistan.
• Finally, the current media frenzy surrounding the border violence and the associated nationalist sentiments could become a worry for the government if and when it wishes to negotiate with Pakistan.

Pakistan’s three-fold strategy

• Keep the violence on the border carefully calibrated without upping the ante
• Seek meaningful talks on Kashmir to turn down the rhetoric on Kashmir and infiltration into J&K
• Propose tactical measures to reduce violence on the borders such as DGMO talks and reduction in the calibre of weapons, without giving up its claims and interests in Kashmir

A mismatch

Whereas India is looking for an end to cross-border infiltration and Pakistani involvement in Kashmir in return for an end to shelling on the border, Pakistan is desirous of a resolution of or meaningful talks on Kashmir in return for calm borders and cracking down on anti-India terror groups in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The two sides must therefore try and find a via media between these two differing sets of expectations if they wish to bring down the violence on the J&K border that is increasingly spiraling out of control