Unpacking China’s game plan

Source: The Hindu

Relevance: After the 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese forces, keeping an eye on the Chinese movement becomes very important.

Synopsis:

China is upgrading defence infrastructure in the Tibetan plateau to nullify the disadvantages that its airpower has in comparison to the Indian airpower. This would afford them a layered air defence setting and affect the balance of power in the medium to long term.

Background:

• Aviation websites are abuzz with reports of a rapid up-gradation of aviation infrastructure in Tibet. 
  • Upgradation of airfields, construction of hardened aircraft shelters, new runways, aprons, underground storage and tunneling into mountainsides, etc. is happening at a rapid pace.
• China realised its shortcomings in airpower during the 2020 clash in eastern ladakh.
  • India did not yield any ground and actually occupied vantage points in the south Pangong Tso area to balance out some sectoral disadvantages. 
  • This firmness was backed by deterrent Indian Air Force (IAF) firepower, and it was clear to the Chinese that they were on a weak wicket in the air.

Deterrent power of IAF:

• The IAF is equipped and trained for offensive action. In all the previous conflicts the IAF conducted aggressive strikes, besides providing active close support to ground forces. 
• The odd exception was the 1962 India-China conflict where the IAF’s substantial strike potential was nullified by a political decision to not use it. 
• The equipment accretion profile is a pointer to the offensive role as seen by the acquisition of Jaguars, Mirage-2000, Sukhois, and now the Rafale. Seen from the prism of airpower doctrine, this points to India’s strategy of deterrence by punishment: don’t mess with us, as we have the means and power to hurt you.

Reasons behind China’s weak airpower in 2020 clash:

• Indian Air Force’s (IAF) aircraft enjoys the advantage of a string of airfields all along the foothills of the Himalayas. They are at low altitudes which permit carrying of a full armament load.
• Chinese airfields in Tibet were few, widely spaced out, and hence not mutually supportive. There were gaps in the air defence structure too, that the IAF would utilise to interdict targets in the rear. 
• Most Tibetan airfields are at altitudes above 10,000 ft, severely restricting the payload of People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) aircraft. 

Way Ahead:

• The air defence up-gradation drive is surely being monitored, but that is not enough. If status quo ante on the ground is not obtained soon, it may be too late a year or two from now. 
• The future talks should be aimed at a skillful counter of dubious Chinese intentions. India’s posture and demands at the talks must reflect its understanding of China’s game plan.