{"id":330982,"date":"2025-03-27T17:45:44","date_gmt":"2025-03-27T12:15:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/?p=330982"},"modified":"2025-03-27T17:45:44","modified_gmt":"2025-03-27T12:15:44","slug":"national-judicial-appointments-commission-njac-explained-pointwise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/national-judicial-appointments-commission-njac-explained-pointwise\/","title":{"rendered":"National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC)- Explained Pointwise"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">India&#8217;s judiciary, often described as the <\/span><b>guardian of the Constitution<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, plays a crucial role in upholding the rule of law, ensuring justice, and acting as a check on the executive and legislature. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">There are ~<\/span><b>12,000 courts &#8211; 1 Supreme Court, 21 High Courts, 3,150 District Level Courts, 4,816 Munsif \/ Magistrate Courts, and 1,964 Magistrate II Courts<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Judicial appointments in them are governed <\/span><b>by Articles 124 to 147<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> for the <\/span><b>Supreme Court and 214 to 231 for the High Courts<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, reflecting the centrality of an independent judiciary in the constitutional scheme.<\/span><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 100%;text-align: center\"><strong>Table of Content<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 100%\"><a href=\"#h1\">What are the constitutional provisions regarding Judicial appointments in India? What has been the history of evolution of the present system of appointment in India?<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"#h2\">Why the NJAC Needs Reconsideration?<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"#h3\">What are the Significance and Challenges of Having an NJAC?<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"#h4\">What are the Significance and Challenges of the Collegium System?<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"#h5\">What are the core Challenges facing the Indian Judiciary?<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"#h6\">What Should be the Way Forward?<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h2><strong><a id=\"h1\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000\">What are the constitutional provisions regarding Judicial appointments in India? What has been the history of evolution of the present system of appointment in India?<\/span><\/strong><\/h2>\n<table style=\"height: 210px;width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid;background-color: #f9fade\">\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"height: 30px\">\n<td style=\"width: 100%;height: 30px\" colspan=\"2\"><strong>Constitutional Provisions of Judicial Appointment<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 150px\">\n<td style=\"width: 21.4859%;height: 150px\"><strong>Article 124 (2)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 78.5141%;height: 150px\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Every Judge of the Supreme Court<\/span> shall be <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">appointed by the President<\/span> by warrant under his hand and seal <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">after consultation<\/span> with such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for that purpose. In the case of <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice<\/span>, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 30px\">\n<td style=\"width: 21.4859%;height: 30px\"><strong>Article 217<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 78.5141%;height: 30px\">Every Judge of a High Court shall be <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">appointed by the President<\/span> by a warrant under his hand and seal <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">after consultation<\/span> with the<span style=\"color: #ff0000\"> Chief Justice of India<\/span>, the <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Governor of the State<\/span>, and, the <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Chief Justice of the High Court<\/span> except in case of his\/her own appointment.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><span style=\"color: #000000\"><strong>Historical Battle between Executive and Judiciary over appointments<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid;background-color: #ffe8e8\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 22.1888%\"><strong>Colonial Rule<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 77.8112%\">During the Colonial rule, the Judicial appointments were <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">dominated by the executive branch<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 22.1888%\"><strong>Consitutional Debates<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 77.8112%\">The framers of the Indian Constitution, were <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">concerned about the potential for executive overreach in the appointments<\/span>. They sought to create a <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">balanced system of Judicial appointment<\/span> to ensure judicial independence. Art 124(2) and Art 217 were aimed at balancing the powers of executive and judiciary in safeguarding judicial appointments.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 22.1888%\"><strong>Judicial Interventions<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 77.8112%\">A series of rulings by the Supreme Court of India in the First, Second, and Third Judges case, led to the establishment of collegium system in India. The Judiciary gained a significant role in appointing judges, thereby reducing the executive&#8217;s influence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><span style=\"color: #000000\"><strong>First, Second and Third Judges Case<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<table style=\"height: 210px;width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid;background-color: #edf5df\">\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"height: 60px\">\n<td style=\"width: 28.2128%;height: 60px\"><strong>First Judges Case (1981)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 71.7872%;height: 60px\">SC in the First Judges case ruled that <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">consultation<\/span> under Art 124 <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">does not mean concurrence<\/span>. The president in not bound by the CJI&#8217;s advice.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 120px\">\n<td style=\"width: 28.2128%;height: 120px\"><strong>Second Judges Case (1993)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 71.7872%;height: 120px\">SC overruled its previous decision in the First Judges case and <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">asserted that<\/span> &#8216;<span style=\"color: #ff0000\">consultation<\/span>&#8216; meant &#8216;<span style=\"color: #ff0000\">concurrence<\/span>&#8216;. The CJI is required to formulate its advice based on a <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">collegium of judges<\/span> consisting of CJI and two senior most SC- judges.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 30px\">\n<td style=\"width: 28.2128%;height: 30px\"><strong>Third Judges Case (1998)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 71.7872%;height: 30px\">SC <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">expanded the collegium to a five member body<\/span> to include the CJI and the four senior most judges of the court after the CJI. This <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">further entrenched judicial control over appointments<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><span style=\"color: #000000\"><strong>NJAC Act and the Judicial Respose<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid;background-color: #d7f5f2\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 28.012%\"><strong>99th Constitutional Amendment Act 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 71.988%\">The NJAC was proposed to be an <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">independent Commission to replace the Collegium System<\/span> to appoint Judges to the higher Judiciary.<br \/>\n<strong>Membersip-<\/strong> It was to be a six member body consisting of<br \/>\n(a) The <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Chief Justice of India<\/span> as the ex-officio Chairperson<br \/>\n(b) <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Two senior-most Supreme Court Judges<\/span> as ex-officio members<br \/>\n(c) The <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Union Minister of Law and Justice<\/span> as ex-officio member<br \/>\n(d) <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">Two eminent persons<\/span> from civil society. (The eminent persons were to be nominated by a committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India, Prime Minister of India and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha. One of the eminent persons was to be nominated from SC\/ST\/OBC\/minorities or women)<br \/>\n<strong>Veto Power-<\/strong> The Act <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">empowered any 2 members of the NJAC to veto a recommendation<\/span> if they did not agree with it.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 28.012%\"><span style=\"color: #333333\"><strong>Fourth Judges Case (2015)<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 71.988%\">The Supreme Court declared the 99th Amendment Act and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional. Supreme Court struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) and reaffirmed the collegium system. SC held that NJAC <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">impinged on the independence of the Judiciary<\/span> and <span style=\"color: #ff0000\">undermined the basic structure<\/span> of the Constitution.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h2><b><a id=\"h2\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000\">Why the NJAC Needs Reconsideration?<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n<p><b>1. Judicial Primacy Retained: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The NJAC preserved judiciary\u2019s primacy (3\/6 judicial members), while <\/span><b>introducing checks and diverse inputs<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Could have been &#8220;read down&#8221; to retain constitutionality instead of outright striking it down <\/span><b>(as suggested by Fali Nariman).<\/b><\/p>\n<p><b>2. Democratic Mandate: 543 members of Parliament<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> voted for it (barring one dissent).<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Passed by <\/span><b>16 state assemblies<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> indicating <\/span><b>federal consensus<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> and <\/span><b>public mandate<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> for reform.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>3. Global Comparisons: UK, South Africa, and others<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> employ mixed models involving judiciary, executive, and civil society not unilateral control.<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #000000\"><b><a id=\"h3\"><\/a>What are the Significance and Challenges of having an NJAC?<\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<table style=\"width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.8888%\"><b>Significance<\/b><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.1112%\"><b>Challenges<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.8888%\"><b>Transparency &amp; Accountability<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Multi-stakeholder model reduces opacity. <\/span><b>Justice Verma &amp; ARC supported <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">participatory appointments.<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.1112%\"><b>Threat to Judicial Independence<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Violation of Doctrine of <\/span><b>Stare Decisis<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> i.e. respect for precedent. Inclusion of the executive violates separation of powers. In <\/span><b>SC AoR Assn. v. Union of India (2015)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> struck down NJAC.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.8888%\"><b>Checks nepotism- Ends<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> judges-only coterie. <\/span><b>Law Commission 230th Report flagged<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> favoritism in collegium<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.1112%\"><b>Eminent Person Ambiguity<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 No clear criteria for selection. <\/span><b>Vidhi Legal <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">raised concern over vagueness<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.8888%\"><b>Public Trust &amp; Legitimacy<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Wider representation increases public confidence. <\/span><b>CPR and Second ARC<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> advocated inclusive models<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.1112%\"><b>Politicisation Risk<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Eminent persons may be politically affiliated.\u00a0 <\/span><b>PRS Legislative Research<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> flagged possible <\/span><b>executive packing<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.8888%\"><b>International Best Practices<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Aligns with systems in UK, South Africa.<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.1112%\"><b>No SOP or Safeguards<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 NJAC lacked operational clarity. No tie-break or dispute-resolution rules defined in the Act.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.8888%\"><b>Balanced Power Structure<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Judiciary, Executive, Civil Society involved. Supported by <\/span><b>Justice Venkatachaliah Commission (2002).<\/b><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.1112%\"><b>Basic Structure Violation<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 NJAC viewed as undermining judicial primacy<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h2><b>\u00a0<span style=\"color: #000000\"><a id=\"h4\"><\/a>What are the Significance and Challenges of the Collegium System?<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n<table style=\"width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.7679%\"><b>Significance<\/b><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.2321%\"><b>Challenges<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.7679%\"><b>Judicial Independence<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 No executive role ensures autonomy. Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973), Second Judges Case (1993).<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.2321%\"><b>Opaque Process<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 No criteria or transparency. <\/span><b>Law Commission 214th Report &amp; Justice Chelameswar<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> criticized lack of records or reasons<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.7679%\"><b>Institutional Continuity<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Judges best assess competence. Justice Lodha: \u201cJudges know the court better.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.2321%\"><b>Uncle Judge Syndrome- Nepotism &amp; favouritism<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> in selections seen as biased. <\/span><b>Law Commission 230th Report <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">highlighted the <\/span><b>\u201csons and nephews\u201d<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> pattern.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.7679%\"><b>Stability<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 No political turnovers affect appointments.\u00a0 Third Judges Case (1998) institutionalized collegium to prevent arbitrary decisions<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.2321%\"><b>No Accountability<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 No review of decisions. Justice Kurian Joseph and others demanded internal reform and feedback mechanisms<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.7679%\"><b>Constitutional Backing<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Upheld by Supreme Court. NJAC Verdict (2015): Collegium protected under Basic Structure<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.2321%\"><b>Vacancies &amp; Delays<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Leads to huge backlogs. 30% HC posts vacant in 2024; many files pending with Centre<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 45.7679%\"><b>Guards Against Politicisation<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Purely judicial selection. No \u201cpolitical loyalty test\u201d like in some Western democracies<\/span><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 54.2321%\"><b>Inconsistent Standards<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 Merit often overlooked, reversals without explanation. Justice Ruma Pal called it \u201cmysterious and arbitrary.\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #000000\"><b><a id=\"h5\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000\">What are the core Challenges facing the Indian Judiciary?<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<p><b>1. Judges Appointing Judges Dilemma: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The <\/span><b>Collegium System<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> lacks transparency, criteria, and accountability.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">No formal procedure\/reasons for selection\/rejection are made public, which affects <\/span><b>public trust<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> and raises concerns of <\/span><b>elitism and nepotism<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>2. Justice Delayed is Justice Denied<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">: Over <\/span><b>70,000 cases are pending before the Supreme Court<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, <\/span><b>60 lakh in High Courts<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, and more than <\/span><b>4 crore in subordinate courts<\/b> <b>(NJDG, 2024).<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> Causes include inadequate judge strength, procedural delays, frequent adjournments, and lack of judicial infrastructure. <\/span><b>India has only 21 judges per million population (against the Law Commission\u2019s recommendation of 50).<\/b><\/p>\n<p><b>3. Lack of Transparency and Accountability: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Judiciary is exempt from <\/span><b>RTI disclosure<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, though <\/span><b>CJI is a public authority under RTI<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">There is no clear <\/span><b>code of conduct or performance appraisal<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> for <\/span><b>judges, unlike bureaucrats or legislators.<\/b><\/p>\n<p><b>4. Judicial Corruption and Ethical Deficit: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Allegations against sitting judges <\/span><b>(e.g., Justice P.D. Dinakaran, Justice Soumitra Sen, Justice Verma)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> reveal disciplinary gaps.<\/span><b> Impeachment proceedings<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> are rare and cumbersome<\/span><b>.<\/b><\/p>\n<p><b>5. Executive-Judiciary Tussles and Judicial Overreach: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The judiciary has often been accused of <\/span><b>encroaching into the executive\u2019s domain<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, leading to friction.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Cases like <\/span><b>Arun Gopal v. Union of India (2022)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> raised concerns over excessive interference in policy matters <\/span><b>(e.g., environmental regulations, administrative orders).<\/b><\/p>\n<p><b>6. Underrepresentation and Lack of Diversity:<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> Only<\/span><b> 12% representation of women<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> (as of 2024).<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">There is poor representation from <\/span><b>SCs\/STs\/OBCs and minorities<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, violating the constitutional spirit of <\/span><b>social justice (Article 15, 16)<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>7. Insufficient Judicial Infrastructure: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">According to the <\/span><b>India Justice Report 2023<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, many courtrooms are still without proper Wi-Fi, digitization, or sitting facilities for judges and litigants.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Delayed computerization has undermined the potential of <\/span><b>e-Courts Phase II and III<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #000000\"><b><a id=\"h6\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #000000\">What Should be the Way Forward?<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/h2>\n<p><b>1. Revisiting the NJAC judgment<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">: Reconsideration by a <\/span><b>larger Constitutional Bench<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, as was done in Second Judges case. Justice Kurian\u2019s regret and other observations indicate scope for change.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>2. Judicial Appointments Bill 2.0<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">: vise NJAC to preserve independence while ensuring transparency. Include clear criteria, fixed timelines, and institutional records.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>3. Public and Parliamentary Oversight<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">: Set up a <\/span><b>Judicial Appointments Oversight Committee<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> to ensure due process. Strengthen Parliamentary debate on appointments.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>4. Transparency via Digitization<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">: While live-streaming may not be feasible, recorded minutes and reasoned decisions must be published.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>5. All India Judicial Services (AIJS)\u2013 <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Several experts have argued for establishment of AIJS to improve the quality of judges in the lower Judiciary. This should be consulted and implemented post consensus among all stakeholders.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>6. Judicial Appointments Secretariat<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">: As proposed by the <\/span><b>Justice Venkatachaliah Commission<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> \u2013 provide logistical and data support to Collegium.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>7. Time-bound Clearance Mechanism: <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Mandate decisions within <\/span><b>3 months<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> from both Collegium and executive, to reduce pendency and avoid institutional standoffs.<\/span><\/p>\n<table style=\"width: 100%;border-collapse: collapse;border-style: solid\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 100%\"><strong>Read more<\/strong>&#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/opinion\/columns\/justice-varma-case-supreme-court-must-revisit-njac-9908106\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Indian Express<\/a><br \/>\n<strong>UPSC Syllabus- GS 2<\/strong>&#8211; Issues Related to Judiciary<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India&#8217;s judiciary, often described as the guardian of the Constitution, plays a crucial role in upholding the rule of law, ensuring justice, and acting as a check on the executive and legislature. There are ~12,000 courts &#8211; 1 Supreme Court, 21 High Courts, 3,150 District Level Courts, 4,816 Munsif \/ Magistrate Courts, and 1,964 Magistrate&hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/national-judicial-appointments-commission-njac-explained-pointwise\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC)- Explained Pointwise<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10367,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[130],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-330982","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-7-pm","entry"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","views":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/330982","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10367"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=330982"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/330982\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=330982"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=330982"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=330982"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}