{"id":341232,"date":"2025-06-24T13:37:28","date_gmt":"2025-06-24T08:07:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/?p=341232"},"modified":"2025-06-25T10:27:20","modified_gmt":"2025-06-25T04:57:20","slug":"psir-power-50-day-19-capsule-salient-features-of-indian-constitution-practice-qs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/psir-power-50-day-19-capsule-salient-features-of-indian-constitution-practice-qs\/","title":{"rendered":"PSIR Power 50 \u2013 Day 19 Capsule: Principal Organs of Government + Practice Qs"},"content":{"rendered":"

Hello aspirants,<\/p>\n

Today\u2019s revision capsule of PSIR optional preparation covers \u201cPrincipal Organs of Government. There are 5 ten-mark, 13 fifteen-mark, and 2 twenty-mark questions <\/strong>in the last 12 years PYQs<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT \u2014 STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONING & KEY DEBATES<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

    \n
  1. WHY INDIA CHOSE A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Point<\/strong><\/td>\nDetails & Scholars<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Strategic decision<\/strong><\/td>\nGranville Austin<\/strong> \u2013 parliamentary form would weld India\u2019s diversity into \u201ca single, inclusive democratic framework,\u201d rebutting Penderel Moon\u2019s<\/strong> fear of failure in a heterogeneous society.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Universal adult suffrage<\/strong><\/td>\nEnsured no communal \/ property electorates.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Against presidentialism<\/strong><\/td>\nAssembly worried about authoritarian drift & federal friction.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Role of Rajya Sabha<\/strong><\/td>\nN. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar<\/strong>: forum for \u201csecond thought\u201d; not a replica of US equal-state Senate. W. H. Morris-Jones<\/strong>: justification lies more in deliberation than \u201cstate rights.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

     <\/p>\n

      \n
    1. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE (Art. 79<\/em>)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Component<\/strong><\/td>\nComposition & Unique Powers<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      President of India<\/strong><\/td>\nSummons\/prorogues, dissolves LS; assent\/return; issues ordinances; acts on aid & advice<\/strong> (Cabinet).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Lok Sabha<\/strong><\/td>\nDirect election; 5-yr tenure; money bills originate here<\/strong>; only House that can topple govt via no-confidence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Rajya Sabha<\/strong><\/td>\nIndirect election + 12 nominated; permanent body<\/strong>; Art 249 (State-List legislation) & Art 312 (All-India Services); cannot unseat govt; offers continuity & federal voice.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

       <\/p>\n

        \n
      1. PRESIDING OFFICERS & NEUTRALITY<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
          \n
        • Speaker, Lok Sabha<\/strong> \u2013 dignity, impartiality, certifies money bills, stays till successor.<\/li>\n
        • Vice-President \/ RS Chairperson<\/strong> \u2013 presides over Rajya Sabha with non-partisan expectation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

           <\/p>\n

            \n
          1. LAW-MAKING FLOW<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
              \n
            1. Introduction<\/strong> (Minister \/ Private Member)<\/li>\n
            2. First\u2013Second\u2013Third Reading<\/strong> \u2192 Committee reference (Select \/ Joint) or circulation.<\/li>\n
            3. Deadlock?<\/strong> President may call joint sitting<\/strong> (Art 108).<\/li>\n
            4. Money Bill<\/strong> \u2013 Speaker\u2019s certificate<\/strong>; RS only recommends; 14-day rule.<\/li>\n
            5. Presidential assent<\/strong> or reconsideration.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

               <\/p>\n

                \n
              1. PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES & EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                Freedom of speech, immunity from legal action & civil arrest.<\/em>
                \nTools: Question Hour, Debates, Adjournment Motion, Call Attention<\/strong> + ultimate sanction no-confidence<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

                 <\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. COMMITTEE SYSTEM \u2013 EXPERT OVERSIGHT<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                  Committee<\/strong><\/td>\nFunction & Observers<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Estimates Committee<\/strong> (LS only)<\/td>\nScrutinises spending; Asok Chanda<\/strong>: rationalises expenditure.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Public Accounts Committee<\/strong><\/td>\nAudits expenditure; Morris-Jones<\/strong>: \u201cdeterrent against waste.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Committee on Public Undertakings<\/strong><\/td>\nMonitors PSUs; early critique by Indrajeet Gupta<\/strong>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                  Departmentally-related Standing Committees<\/strong> (post-1989)<\/td>\nContinuous subject oversight; blend of British & US practice.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                   <\/p>\n

                  STATE LEGISLATURES<\/strong><\/p>\n

                  Mirror Parliament.<\/em> Some bicameral (Legislative Council) \u2013 often questioned for cost\/utility. Governor<\/strong> may reserve Bills \u2192 President<\/strong> can withhold indefinitely (union check).<\/p>\n

                   <\/p>\n

                    \n
                  1. BASIC STRUCTURE & PARLIAMENTARY LIMITS<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    After Kesavananda Bharati (1973)<\/strong> Parliament\u2019s power is not sovereign; Supreme Court\u2019s judicial review<\/strong> ensures Constitution prevails.<\/em><\/p>\n

                     <\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION SHIFT<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                      From elite lawyers <\/em>\u2192<\/em> agriculturists, OBCs, SC\/STs; women still under-represented.<\/em> Populism & whips sometimes dilute deliberative quality.<\/p>\n

                       <\/p>\n

                        \n
                      1. ANTI-DEFECTION LAW (Tenth Schedule, 1985; 91st Amendment 2003)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                        <\/td>\nKey Points<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        Purpose<\/strong><\/td>\nHalt \u201cAaya Ram, Gaya Ram\u201d; secure party discipline & mandate.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        Speaker as adjudicator<\/strong><\/td>\nPolitical head + quasi-judicial role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        Kihoto Hollohan (1992)<\/strong><\/td>\nUpheld Schedule; struck Para 7<\/strong> bar; judicial review = basic structure<\/strong>; decision of Speaker first \u279c later court review.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        Natural justice cases<\/strong><\/td>\nA.K. Kraipak (1969)<\/strong>, Tulshiram Patel (1985)<\/strong>, Jagjit Singh (2006)<\/strong> applied to Speaker\u2019s orders.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        Practical controversies<\/strong><\/td>\nNabam Rebia (2016)<\/strong>; Manipur episodes; \u201cresort politics.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        Reform proposals<\/strong><\/td>\nDinesh Goswami Committee, 170th Law Commission<\/strong> \u2013 shift adjudication to President\/Governor on ECI advice<\/strong> (model of Art 103). SC<\/strong> suggests independent tribunals; narrow law to survival votes; set 3-month timeline.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                         <\/p>\n

                          \n
                        1. PARLIAMENT\u2019S ENDURING CENTRALITY<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          Despite executive assertiveness, partisan frictions, low productivity and gender gaps, Parliament remains<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

                            \n
                          • The apex democratic forum,<\/li>\n
                          • The keystone of federal\u2013unitary balance (via Rajya Sabha),<\/li>\n
                          • The guardian of accountability through its committee network, and<\/li>\n
                          • The visible symbol of an ever-widening, still-evolving Indian electorate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                            Ensuring robust debate, timely committee scrutiny and impartial anti-defection adjudication will decide whether this \u201chybrid creation\u201d meets the framers\u2019 aspiration for a vibrant, equitable, forward-looking<\/strong> republic.<\/p>\n

                             <\/p>\n

                             <\/p>\n

                            THE EXECUTIVE SYSTEM IN INDIA<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

                             <\/p>\n

                              \n
                            1. ADOPTING THE EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                              <\/td>\nKey Points<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                              Constituent Assembly options<\/strong><\/td>\nBritish Cabinet, Swiss elected executive, American presidential model.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                              A.K. Ayyar<\/strong><\/td>\nWarned \u201can infant democracy cannot afford\u201d chronic executive-legislature conflict.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                              Jawaharlal Nehru<\/strong><\/td>\nWanted ministerial governance & legislative supremacy over any presidential activism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                              Granville Austin<\/strong><\/td>\nParliamentary choice aimed at \u201cstrength with democracy.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                              K.M. Munshi<\/strong><\/td>\nOverlapping membership \u2192 stronger, more effective government.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                              Outcome<\/strong><\/td>\nParliamentary executive: President = nominal head; Council of Ministers<\/strong> (CoM) + Prime Minister<\/strong> (PM) wield real power.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                               <\/p>\n

                                \n
                              1. THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                <\/td>\nDetails & Scholars<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                Constitutional position<\/strong><\/td>\nMirror of British Crown; Dr. B.R. Ambedkar<\/strong>: a \u201cceremonial device\u201d \/ seal.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                Election<\/strong><\/td>\nIndirect; formula by N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar<\/strong> for equitable state weight.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                Formal powers<\/strong><\/td>\nAppointments, summoning Parliament, Article 111 assent<\/strong>, Article 123 ordinances<\/strong>, clemency (Art 72<\/strong>), Emergency provisions 352\/356\/360<\/strong>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                Scholarly views<\/strong><\/td>\nAmbedkar<\/em>, M.C. Setalvad<\/strong>, A.K. Ayyar<\/strong>: cabinet supremacy. Paul R. Brass<\/strong>: efficacy depends on PM\u2019s trust. Walter Bagehot<\/strong>: may \u201cadvise, encourage, warn,\u201d not govern.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                 <\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                1. THE PRIME MINISTER (PM) \u2013 \u201cLuna inter stellas minores\u201d (William Harcourt)<\/em><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                  Power \/ Function<\/strong><\/td>\nIllustrations & References<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Forming Ministry<\/td>\nEntire CoM resigns on PM\u2019s exit.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Portfolio allocation<\/td>\nA. Lawrence Lowell<\/strong>\u2019s \u201cmismatched blocks\u201d analogy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Chairing Cabinet & Committees<\/td>\nCoordinates policy, mediates disputes.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Article 78<\/strong> link to President<\/td>\nSole channel of Cabinet decisions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Parliamentary leader<\/td>\nControls agenda, seeks confidence, may advise Lok Sabha dissolution<\/strong>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Foreign policy face<\/td>\nSummits & negotiations carry PM\u2019s imprint.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Evolution of styles<\/td>\nNehru \/ Indira Gandhi<\/strong> \u2192 \u201cprime ministerial government\u201d & kitchen cabinet; Lal Bahadur Shastri<\/strong> \u2192 consensual; Atal Bihari Vajpayee \/ Manmohan Singh<\/strong> \u2192 coalition constraints (noted by James Manor, D.N. Panandikar, G.K. Mehra<\/strong>).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  K.T. Shah<\/strong> caveat<\/td>\nExcessive concentration may erode accountability.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                  Overall status<\/td>\nPrimus inter pares<\/strong> yet bounded by party, Parliament, President, press & public.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                   <\/p>\n

                                    \n
                                  1. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (CoM) & ITS TIERS<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                    \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                    Feature<\/strong><\/td>\nDetail<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                    Three-tier structure<\/strong> (1950, Gopalswamy Ayyangar<\/strong>): Cabinet Ministers \u2192 Ministers of State \u2192 Deputy Ministers.<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                    Collective responsibility<\/strong><\/td>\nCore parliamentary convention.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                    Cabinet \u2192 inner \/ kitchen cabinets<\/td>\nHeight under Indira Gandhi<\/strong>; powerful PMO noted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                    Coalition era (1989-2009)<\/td>\nQuotas for allies diluted homogeneity; instability toppled govts (United Front etc.).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                    Cabinet sizes<\/td>\n22 (early Nehru) \u2192 31 (Indira 1971) \u2192 32 (Rajiv 1984) \u2194 inclusivity vs efficiency.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                     <\/p>\n

                                      \n
                                    1. THE BUREAUCRACY \u2013 FROM ICS TO IAS<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                      Scholar \/ Source<\/strong><\/td>\nObservation<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                      Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel<\/strong><\/td>\nSaw IAS as \u201csteel frame\u201d for unity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                      Jawaharlal Nehru<\/strong> (Autobiography)<\/td>\nColonial mindset persisted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                      Max Weber<\/strong> principles<\/td>\nCompetitive entry, hierarchy, permanence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                      Chakrabarty & Bhattacharya; Sudarshan; Trivedi; Potter; Rudolph & Rudolph; Paul R. Brass<\/strong><\/td>\nPaternalistic, ill-equipped for socio-economic transformation; issues of corruption & politicisation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                      Fifth Pay Commission (1997)<\/strong> & Second ARC (Veerappa Moily)<\/strong><\/td>\nDownsizing, transparency, RTI, Citizens\u2019 Charters.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                      Rajiv Gandhi<\/strong> quote<\/td>\nPaternalist model obsolete for development.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                       <\/p>\n

                                        \n
                                      1. PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETIONARY POWERS \u2013 TEXT vs PRACTICE<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                        Constitutional Articles labelled \u201cpower\u201d, \u201cpleasure\u201d, \u201csatisfaction\u201d, \u201cassent\u201d<\/strong><\/td>\nJudicial constriction<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                        Art 72<\/strong> pardon<\/td>\nMaru Ram (1980)<\/strong>, Kehar Singh (1989)<\/strong> \u2013 must heed Council advice.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                        Art 111<\/strong> assent<\/td>\nPresident may withhold \/ return (Dr. Rajendra Prasad on Hindu Code Bill). Stronger than US veto.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                        Art 123<\/strong> ordinances<\/td>\nCourts (e.g., R.C. Cooper 1970<\/strong>) insist on ministerial advice; recent Presidents refuse ordinances\u2014reclaiming discretion.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                        Emergency 352 \/ 356<\/strong><\/td>\nState of Rajasthan 1977<\/strong>, S.R. Bommai 1994<\/strong>: limited but existent discretion.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                        Article 74<\/strong> debate<\/td>\nWord \u201cfunctions\u201d vs \u201cpowers\u201d: earlier Ram Jawaya Kapur 1955<\/em>, Samser Singh 1974<\/em> blur the distinction; 42nd Amendment broadened \u201cshall act in accordance with advice\u201d for functions only.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                        Natural-justice angle<\/strong><\/td>\nPresident\u2019s oath (Art 60) & immunity (Art 361) imply independent role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                         <\/p>\n

                                          \n
                                        1. ANTI-DEFECTION, SPEAKER & ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW PRINCIPLES<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                          Element<\/strong><\/td>\nKey Mentions<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                          Tenth Schedule 1985; 91st Amendment 2003<\/strong> \u2013 curb \u201cAaya Ram, Gaya Ram\u201d.<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                          Kihoto Hollohan 1992<\/strong><\/td>\nUpheld Schedule; struck Para 7 bar; Speaker\u2019s decision first, then judicial review<\/strong> (basic structure).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                          A.K. Kraipak 1969; UOI v Tulshiram Patel 1985; Jagjit Singh 2006<\/strong> \u2013 natural justice applies.<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                          Nabam Rebia 2016<\/strong>, Manipur, resort politics \u2192 Speaker delays & bias.<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                          Reform ideas<\/strong>: Dinesh Goswami Committee<\/strong>, 170th Law Commission<\/strong>, SC call for independent tribunal \/ ECI model<\/strong>, 3-month timeline; scope only for survival votes.<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                           <\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                          1. CABINET SYSTEM \u2013 HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                            \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                            Phase<\/strong><\/td>\nSalient Traits & Names<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Interim Govt 1946<\/strong><\/td>\nNehru\u2019s pledge to Lord Wavell for collective responsibility.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Nehru era<\/strong><\/td>\nFrom \u201cnational\u201d cabinet to dominant PM but collegial fa\u00e7ade.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Lal Bahadur Shastri<\/strong><\/td>\nConsensus-driven primus inter pares.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Indira Gandhi (1966-77, 1980-84)<\/strong><\/td>\nPrime-ministerial ascendancy, kitchen cabinets, CoM in \u201ccoma\u201d.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Rajiv Gandhi<\/strong><\/td>\nContinued centralisation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Janata experiment (Morarji Desai 1977)<\/strong><\/td>\nFactionalism eroded collective responsibility.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Coalition decade 1989-2009<\/strong><\/td>\nUnited Front, NDA, UPA \u2013 quota cabinets; outside support; diluted unity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Institutions under Manmohan Singh<\/strong><\/td>\nNAC<\/strong> (Sonia Gandhi), GoMs\/E-GoMs<\/strong> \u2013 parallel policy channels.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                            Narendra Modi (2014-)<\/strong><\/td>\nAbolished then revived GoMs\/E-GoMs; reasserted formal cabinet primacy with strong PM role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                             <\/p>\n

                                              \n
                                            1. KEY ARTICLES, CASES & CONCEPTS<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                              Articles:<\/strong> 53, 60, 61, 72, 74(1), 78, 85, 86, 87, 103, 108, 111, 112, 115, 118(3), 123, 124(2)(3), 127, 128, 148, 240, 249, 258, 263, 304, 352, 354, 356, 359, 360, 366(22).<\/p>\n

                                              Cases:<\/strong> Ram Jawaya Kapur 1955; R.C. Cooper 1970; U.N.R. Rao 1971; Samser Singh 1974; Maru Ram 1980; Kehar Singh 1989; A.K. Kraipak 1969; UOI v Tulshiram Patel 1985; Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan 1964; State of Rajasthan 1977; S.R. Bommai 1994; Jagjit Singh 2006; Kihoto Hollohan 1992; Nabam Rebia 2016.<\/em><\/p>\n

                                              Committees \/ Commissions:<\/strong> Machinery of Government Committee 1918; Gopalswamy Ayyangar<\/strong>; Fifth Pay Commission 1997; NCRWC 2000; Dinesh Goswami Committee; 170th Law Commission; Second ARC (M. Veerappa Moily).<\/p>\n

                                              Concepts & Phrases:<\/strong> collective responsibility; primus inter pares; \u201ckeystone of the arch\u201d; kitchen cabinet; \u201cmigration of power\u201d; \u201cprime ministerial government\u201d; \u201cluna inter stellas minores\u201d; \u201cAaya Ram, Gaya Ram\u201d; parliamentary secretaries; cabinet vs CoM; natural justice (nemo judex in causa sua \/ audi alteram partem); basic structure doctrine; judicial review; Right to Information; Citizens\u2019 Charter.<\/p>\n

                                               <\/p>\n

                                              The State Executive in India\u2019s Federal Framework<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

                                               <\/p>\n

                                               <\/p>\n

                                                \n
                                              1. Why the State Executive looks \u201cfederal-unitary hybrid\u201d<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                                Core Design Choice<\/strong><\/td>\nExam-worthy words<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                Twin Goals<\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cUnity & integrity of a diverse nation\u201d<\/em> vs.<\/strong> \u201clocal self-government for shaping one\u2019s own future.\u201d<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                Centre\u2019s Over-ride Levers<\/strong><\/td>\nArt. 257 (Union directions), Art. 249 (Parliament can legislate on State List), plus Emergency claws\u2014gives Delhi a \u201cwatchful-eye\u201d role in CM selection.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                No State Constitutions<\/strong><\/td>\nUnlike the U.S., Indian States share one<\/strong> parliamentary template (Part VI) to blunt \u201cseparatist tendencies.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                Yet not classical unitary<\/strong><\/td>\nStates elect Assemblies & run executives; courts stay unified outside this discussion.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                                 <\/p>\n

                                                  \n
                                                1. Governor \u2014 nominal head, real flash-point<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                  Granville Austin<\/strong> brands the office \u201cacutely controversial.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

                                                  Why appointed, not elected<\/strong><\/p>\n

                                                  Constituent Assembly Debates (1948 vol 8):<\/em> an elected Governor risked \u201cdual power\u201d conflict; nomination preserves unity.<\/p>\n

                                                  Normal vs. Discretionary Arsenal<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                                  Article \/ Power<\/strong><\/td>\nNormal Operation<\/strong><\/td>\nWhen Controversy Erupts<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                  Art 154<\/strong><\/td>\nExecutes, appoints, or ordinances on CoM advice<\/strong>.<\/td>\n\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                  Art 161<\/strong><\/td>\nReprieve\/commute sentences (not death or court-martial).<\/td>\n\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                  Art 163 (Discretion)<\/strong><\/td>\nAct without<\/strong> advice where Constitution so directs.<\/td>\nHung House, odd bills (Art 200), breakdown report (Art 356).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                                  \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

                                                  Four discretionary zones<\/strong><\/p>\n

                                                    \n
                                                  1. Hung Assembly CM choice<\/strong>
                                                    \nH. M. Seervai<\/em> warns a first-invited minority may \u201cbecome majority by luring defectors.\u201d<\/li>\n
                                                  2. Dismissing CM\/Ministry<\/strong>
                                                    \nAfter S.R. Bommai (1994)<\/strong> majority must be floor-tested, yet M. V. Pylee<\/strong> allows dismissal if CM \u201ccompromises national unity.\u201d<\/li>\n
                                                  3. Session gamesmanship<\/strong>
                                                    \nGovernor can summon\/prorogue\/dissolve<\/strong> to foil avoidance of no-confidence; may edit the address.<\/li>\n
                                                  4. Reserving Bills<\/strong>
                                                    \nSends a State bill to the President if it dents national interest or High-Court turf.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                     <\/p>\n

                                                      \n
                                                    1. Chief Minister \u2014 real power, but with Delhi strings<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                                      <\/td>\nGround Reality<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                      Appointment<\/strong><\/td>\nIn national parties, Delhi high command<\/em> often decides the nominee\u2014erodes State autonomy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                      Coalition leverage<\/strong><\/td>\nExample: Jharkhand 2006<\/em>, Governor steered independent Madhu Koda<\/strong> to CM post.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                      Tenure rule<\/strong><\/td>\n\u201cPleasure of Governor\u201d = Assembly majority<\/strong>; Bommai makes floor test mandatory.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                      Cabinet size cap<\/strong><\/td>\n91st Amendment (2003) \u25ba max 15 %<\/strong> of Assembly strength.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                      Development role<\/strong><\/td>\nNational Development Council gave CMs big say in Five-Year Plans. Nehru\u2019s letter tradition shows Centre\u2013State dialogue ideal.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                                      Update: CMs now sit in NITI Aayog\u2019s Governing Council<\/strong>, GST Council, Zonal Councils, Inter-State Council. NDC \u2013 defunct<\/p>\n

                                                       <\/p>\n

                                                       <\/p>\n

                                                        \n
                                                      1. Council of Ministers \u2014 collective in theory, CM-centric in fact<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                        Balveer Arora & R. L. Goyal<\/em> observe removals are \u201cusually Union-directed via Governor.\u201d<\/strong>
                                                        \n\u2022 Cabinets mirror caste-religion-region mosaic \u2192 inclusivity vs.<\/strong> competence trade-off.
                                                        \n\u2022 Strong CM = Council becomes rubber-stamp; weak CM\/strong satraps = Council re-asserts.<\/p>\n

                                                         <\/p>\n

                                                          \n
                                                        1. Governor\u2019s Role \u2014 14 constitutional pegs, per Supreme Court<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                                          Function<\/strong><\/td>\nKey Case \/ Clause<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                          \u201cVital link\u201d Union\u2013State<\/strong><\/td>\nB. P. Singhal v UoI (2010) 6 SCC 331)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                          Must heed CoM advice unless Constitution says otherwise<\/strong><\/td>\nArt 163; BR Kapur v State of TN (2001) 7 SCC 231<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                          Independent head, not GoI employee<\/strong><\/td>\nCourt dictum: holds office \u201cduring President\u2019s pleasure\u201d<\/em> but not subordinate.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                                           <\/p>\n

                                                            \n
                                                          1. Recap<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                                              \n
                                                            • Executive<\/strong> \u2013 appoint CM, dismiss on loss of majority, top constitutional posts, act solo in emergency.<\/li>\n
                                                            • Legislative<\/strong> \u2013 assent, return once, reserve (even money) bills<\/strong>, speak to House, ordinances.<\/li>\n
                                                            • Financial<\/strong> \u2013 recommend money bills, Contingency Fund taps.<\/li>\n
                                                            • Judicial<\/strong> \u2013 local pardons; consulted for High-Court appointments.<\/li>\n
                                                            • Discretionary<\/strong> \u2013 Hung House choice, dissolution advice, Art 356 report, bill reservation, emergency counsel.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                                                               <\/p>\n

                                                                \n
                                                              1. Misuse Timeline and example<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                                                  \n
                                                                1. Uttarakhand 2016<\/strong> \u2013 Governor K. K. Paul\u2019s pre-vote Art 356; HC quashed, govt restored.<\/li>\n
                                                                2. Goa 2017<\/strong> \u2013 Mridula Sinha picked BJP though Congress largest.<\/li>\n
                                                                3. Manipur 2017<\/strong> \u2013 Najma Heptulla ditto.<\/li>\n
                                                                4. Karnataka 2018<\/strong> \u2013 Vajubhai Vala gave BJP extra time; SC cut it.<\/li>\n
                                                                5. Maharashtra 2019<\/strong> \u2013 Dawn-time swearing-in under Bhagat Singh Koshiyari.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                                   <\/p>\n

                                                                    \n
                                                                  1. Judiciary & Commissions: guard-rails against partisanship<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                                                    Body \/ Case<\/strong><\/td>\nGuideline<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    S.R. Bommai (1994)<\/strong><\/td>\nArt 356 only for \u201cnear-impossibility of governance.\u201d<\/em> Judicial review allowed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    Nabam Rebia (2016)<\/strong><\/td>\nGovernor\u2019s discretion must<\/strong> rest on \u201creason, good faith & caution.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    Administrative Reforms Commission 1968<\/strong><\/td>\nGovernor\u2019s 356 report must be objective & independent<\/strong>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    Rajamannar 1971<\/strong><\/td>\nScrap or safeguard 356\/357; Governor mustn\u2019t be Centre\u2019s agent.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    Sarkaria 1988<\/strong><\/td>\nArt 356 a \u201clast resort\u201d;<\/em> issue prior warning.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    Justice Chelliah 2002<\/strong><\/td>\nExhaust all other options before 356.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                                                    Punchhi 2010<\/strong><\/td>\nAmend 355\/356 to narrow Centre\u2019s hand.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

                                                                     <\/p>\n

                                                                      \n
                                                                    1. Reform Menu<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n