{"id":349549,"date":"2025-11-08T19:14:05","date_gmt":"2025-11-08T13:44:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/?p=349549"},"modified":"2025-11-12T21:47:08","modified_gmt":"2025-11-12T16:17:08","slug":"tackling-maoist-insurgency","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/tackling-maoist-insurgency\/","title":{"rendered":"Tackling Maoist Insurgency"},"content":{"rendered":"

UPSC Syllabus: <\/strong>GS-3-Internal security<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/h2>\n

India has sharply weakened the Maoist movement through a combined push on security<\/strong>, development<\/strong>, and rights<\/strong>. Still, the core grievance\u2014inequality and deprivation<\/strong> in tribal, forest, and remote districts\u2014persists. Leadership losses, mass surrenders, and falling violence<\/strong> mark clear gains. But unless gaps in education, health, nutrition, land, and livelihoods<\/strong> close, the ideological spark<\/strong> may endure. The task now is to lock in security gains<\/strong> while delivering tangible improvements<\/strong> that reach every settlement. Tackling Maoist Insurgency.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Tackling<\/p>\n

Maoist insurgency in India<\/strong><\/h2>\n

It began after Naxalbari (1967)<\/strong> and is driven by Maoist ideology that seeks to undermine the state through armed rebellion<\/strong> and parallel structures. It claims to fight for the marginalised<\/strong>, especially tribal communities, but employs violence, extortion, infrastructure sabotage, and recruitment<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

It spread across the \u201cRed Corridor\u201d<\/strong>\u2014Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Kerala, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, and parts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Security forces, public assets, and democratic processes have been routine targets.<\/p>\n

Current status of Maoist Insurgency<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Leadership weakened:<\/strong> Maoist leadership has been decimated, and the People\u2019s Liberation Guerrilla Army is severely weakened.<\/p>\n

Cadre losses and surrenders:<\/strong> This year till October 29<\/strong>, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)<\/strong> records 333<\/strong> Maoists killed, 398<\/strong> arrested, and 1,787<\/strong>surrenders.<\/p>\n

Territorial contraction:<\/strong> The number of LWE-affected districts<\/strong> has shrunk to 11<\/strong> (MHA<\/strong>), marking a sharp contraction of operational space.<\/p>\n

Violence trend:<\/strong> Incidents fell from 1,936 (2010)<\/strong> to 374 (2024)<\/strong> (\u201381%<\/strong>). Deaths fell from 1,005 (2010)<\/strong> to 150 (2024)<\/strong> (\u201385%<\/strong>).<\/p>\n

Gains happened:<\/strong> These gains reflect an integrated and holistic approach<\/strong> led by the Centre and signal the potential of police and CAPFs<\/strong> to defeat an insurgency.<\/p>\n

Underlying concerns<\/strong><\/h2>\n
    \n
  1. Core grievances:<\/strong> People joined the Maoists to defend marginalised communities. Injustice from inequality, deprivation, and political exclusion still shapes daily life. Without redress, anger remains. Security gains alone cannot fix these social deficits. People want fair access to services and dignity.<\/li>\n
  2. Uneven development: <\/strong>Growth is strong but uneven. Rural, tribal, and forest areas lack steady access to land, schools, health care, and livelihoods. India ranks lowest in the G20 in per-capita GDP and in PPP terms. The Gini coefficient shows only modest change. Many benefits fail to reach remote hamlets.<\/li>\n
  3. Poor human development: <\/strong>Many LWE districts trail state and national averages. Malkangiri\u2019s HDI is 0.37<\/strong> against Odisha\u2019s 0.579<\/strong>. In Gadchiroli, about one-third<\/strong> of under-five children are stunted or wasted, and over 60%<\/strong> of women of reproductive age are anaemic. Roads, banks, ITIs, and Eklavya schools exist, yet education, health, and nutrition outcomes remain weak.<\/li>\n
  4. Tribal rights and resource pressure: <\/strong>Tribal regions carry the costs of mining and projects. Forest Rights Act implementation is slow<\/strong>. Weak rights delivery breeds distrust.<\/li>\n
  5. Risk of ideological return:<\/strong> If injustice and exclusion continue, organised mobilisation may surface again, possibly in altered forms.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Government response<\/strong><\/h2>\n
      \n
    1. Security<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n