{"id":36068,"date":"2018-11-01T13:23:41","date_gmt":"2018-11-01T07:53:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.forumias.com\/?p=36068"},"modified":"2020-11-04T12:25:41","modified_gmt":"2020-11-04T06:55:41","slug":"malabar-naval-exercise-powerplay-in-the-indo-pacific-region","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/malabar-naval-exercise-powerplay-in-the-indo-pacific-region\/","title":{"rendered":"Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.livemint.com\/Opinion\/YLTJRierevnhWvDNsDsLJM\/Malabar-naval-exercise-Powerplay-in-the-IndoPacific-region.html\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: (Live Mint, Editorial)<\/span> (Malabar Exercise \u2013 An Indo-Pacific Powerplay)<\/p>\n<p><b>Context:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The 2017 Malabar exercise was the 21st edition of the exercise and conducted from 10 to 17 July 2017. This edition involved navies from India, USA and Japan.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This exercise focused on Aircraft Carrier operations, Air defense, Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), Surface warfare, Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS), Search and Rescue (SAR), joint and tactical procedures.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Background:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Exercise Malabar is a trilateral naval exercise involving the United States, Japan and India as permanent partners.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Originally a bilateral exercise between India and the United States, Japan became a permanent partner in 2015.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Current Situation:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The \u201cMalabar\u201d naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal came to an end by second week of July, 2017.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The exercise ended with a drill involving Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the US flat-top Nimitz, and Japan\u2019s new helicopter carrier, the JS Izumo.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Signal to China:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The expansive scope and complexity of the engagement led many to portray Malabar 2017 as a maritime response to China\u2019s aggression in Dokalam where the Indian Army and People\u2019s Liberation Army troops remain locked in a tense stalemate.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">With over 20 ships, including two submarines and over 100 aircraft and helicopters involved in complex maneuvers, the strategic messaging to China seemed more than clear.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Notably, Indian commentators cast Malabar as a strategic precursor to a more proactive sea-denial strategy aimed at challenging People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Signal from China:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the run-up to Malabar, the media had reported a \u201csurge\u201d in Chinese naval presence in the sub-continental littorals.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">PLAN units prowling India\u2019s near-seas reportedly included the Luyang III class destroyers, hydrographic research vessels, and an intelligence-gathering ship, Haiwingxing, presumably to keep track of naval ships taking part in the trilateral exercises<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Indian analysts seemed more distressed by the reported presence of a Chinese conventional submarine in the Indian seas, confirmed by the docking of the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Chongmingdao<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, a submarine support vessel, in Karachi last month.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Implications of Malabar Exercise:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises in Malabar is a sign of India\u2019s growing willingness to leverage its maritime partnerships in Asia to counter PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Most of the focus was on exercises involving P-8I and P-8A reconnaissance aircraft, MiG-29K fighters and Japanese ASW helicopters, lending credence to accounts that an Indian \u201csea-denial\u201d strategy was at work in the Bay of Bengal.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>International Relations over Sea-Waters:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Modern-day trading nations regard the oceans as a shared global common, with equal opportunity rights for all user states.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Thus, unless a sea-space is a site of overlapping claims (as in the case of the South China Sea) or a contested enclave in a geopolitically troubled spot (as the Persian Gulf), no coastal state ever actively denies another the use of the high seas.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This balance only changes during war, when navies seek to block adversaries from entering critical sea spaces in the contested littorals.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">During peace-time operations, however, maritime forces enjoy assured access to the seas that lie beyond national territorial waters.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>India\u2019s Concern:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The idea that Indian naval power can prevent Chinese warships and submarines from accessing India\u2019s near-seas is flawed.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Given Beijing\u2019s key role in the politics and geo-economics of the Indian Ocean region, a peacetime plan to deny its warships entry into India\u2019s surrounding seas is unlikely to succeed<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">With the PLAN expanding its diplomatic engagements along the Indian Ocean rim, many regional states have been welcoming of Beijing\u2019s maritime initiatives and investments in the Indian Ocean.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">India\u2019s plans to constrain Chinese naval power in South Asia are bound to meet with regional opposition.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In recent years, the PLAN has sought to project power in the Indian Ocean region through a constant naval presence in India\u2019s near-seas.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">By refusing to accept the Indian Ocean as an Indian backwater, it has made successful inroads into India\u2019s geopolitical sphere of influence.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Strategies for India:<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Firstly, India too must now resort to a strategy of counter-power projection by expanding the scope of its naval deployments in the South China Sea, long considered a Chinese preserve.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Secondly, by gradually expanding security presence along the critical sea lanes of the Western Pacific, the Indian Navy must plan to use the South China Sea\u2019s geopolitically sensitive spaces for the strategic power projection.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Thirdly, China\u2019s vulnerability in its near-seas must be taken advantage of by India.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Finally, to challenge PLAN incursions into the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy must plan for counter-presence in China\u2019s near-seas, where Beijing cannot prove a territorial infringement, and yet feel the pinch of a perceived violation of its political sphere of influence.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region: (Live Mint, Editorial) (Malabar Exercise \u2013 An Indo-Pacific Powerplay) Context: The 2017 Malabar exercise was the 21st edition of the exercise and conducted from 10 to 17 July 2017. This edition involved navies from India, USA and Japan. This exercise focused on Aircraft Carrier operations, Air defense,&hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/malabar-naval-exercise-powerplay-in-the-indo-pacific-region\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":61,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[555],"tags":[1334],"class_list":["post-36068","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-test-1","tag-ir_2","entry"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","views":{"total":0,"cached_at":1700772402,"cached_date":1704880794},"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36068","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/61"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36068"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36068\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36068"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36068"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36068"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}