The Governor

India is federal with a strong Centre; the state executive operates under Part VI. States have no separate constitutions or citizenship; a uniform parliamentary model; the Governor as nominal head; the CM and Council as the real executive; an integrated judiciary; Centre’s influence through Arts 249, 257, 356 and emergency provisions.

Articles: 153 (Governor for each state), 154 (executive power), 155 (appointment by President), 156 (pleasure of President), 157 (qualifications), 159 (oath), 161 (pardon), 163 (aid, advice & discretion), 164 (CM & ministers), 200 (assent/reservation), 213 (ordinances), 356 (report on breakdown).

The office of Governor is “acutely controversial”.

Granville Austin

The Governor is “a Constitutional sentinel and a vital link between the Union and the State.”

Sarkaria Commission

“He is the representative not of a party; he is the representative of the people as a whole of the State. It is in the name of the people that he carries on the administration.”

B.R. Ambedkar

B.R. Ambedkar also held that the Governor “has no functions which he can discharge by himself” and must follow ministerial advice in all matters. Appointment debate: the Assembly rejected an elected Governor (a direct mandate could clash with the elected ministry; risk of rival authority; need for a Union link); K.M. Panikkar and H.N. Kunzru feared the Governor might become an agent of the Centre.

Powers: Executive — appoints CM and ministers, Advocate General, SPSC members; Chancellor of state universities; governs during President’s Rule. Legislative — summons/prorogues/dissolves the legislature; assents to/returns Bills; reserves Bills for the President; ordinances. Financial — recommends Money Bills; Contingency Fund advances; State Finance Commission. Judicial — pardon under Art 161 (not death sentences, unlike the President); appoints district judges in consultation with the High Court.

Removal: Art 156 — holds office during the President’s pleasure. In B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010): the Governor is not an employee of the Centre; removal cannot be arbitrary or mala fide; reasons need not always be disclosed but a valid reason must exist. The Sarkaria Commission urged that a five-year tenure not be disturbed except for rare and compelling reasons; the Punchhi Commission criticised the arbitrary pleasure doctrine and recommended an opportunity to defend the position.

Governor’s Discretion & Recent Role

Article 163 allows discretion only where the Constitution requires — not general; it must be reasoned, cautious, in good faith and constitutionally limited. Main areas: appointment of CM in a hung Assembly (H.M. Seervai warns that inviting a minority group first can help it attract defectors through ministerial promises); the floor test (S.R. Bommai requires a floor test, not subjective assessment); dismissal of a ministry that has lost majority and refuses to resign (M.V. Pylee — justified if the CM compromises national unity); reservation of Bills (Art 200); President’s Rule report (Art 356); legislative sessions where the CM avoids the Assembly; special responsibilities (Sixth Schedule, Arts 371A–H).

Cases narrowing discretion

• Samsher Singh (1974) — generally acts on ministerial advice · S.R. Bommai (1994) — floor test; Art 356 reviewable · Rameshwar Prasad (2006) — report reviewable if mala fide · B.P. Singhal (2010) — not Centre’s agent · Nabam Rebia (2016) — reason, good faith, caution · Jagdambika Pal (1999) — invite the likely-majority leader · B.R. Kapur (2001) — follow constitutional law · TN Governor case (2025) — delayed assent cannot become an indefinite pocket veto.

Commission recommendations

• ARC (1968) — objective report · Rajamannar (1971) — safeguard Arts 356/357; no Centre’s agent · Sarkaria (1988) — 356 a last resort, warning first, non-partisan Governor from outside the State, CM consultation · Venkatachaliah / Justice Chelliah (2002) — 356 only after exhausting alternatives · Punchhi — amend 355/356, time-limit for assent, fixed tenure, removal safeguards · NCRWC — selection committee incl. PM, Home Minister, Speaker, concerned CM.

Role in recent times

Contested gubernatorial conduct: Uttarakhand (2016) — K.K. Paul’s President’s-Rule recommendation before a trust vote, overturned by the High Court; Goa (2017) — Mridula Sinha invited the BJP coalition though Congress was single largest; Manipur (2017) — Najma Heptullah invited the BJP first; Karnataka (2018) — Vajubhai Vala gave a long period to prove majority, shortened by the Supreme Court, Yeddyurappa resigned before the floor test; Maharashtra (2019) — Bhagat Singh Koshyari’s President’s-Rule recommendation and an early-morning swearing-in; Tamil Nadu — delay in assent; West Bengal and others — public confrontations raising questions of constitutional morality.

A.G. Noorani traces the office partly to colonial Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935; Rajni Kothari saw the Governor as a potential instrument of the Centre; Granville Austin warned that partisan actions weaken federal autonomy; Subhash Kashyap argues the Governor should be discreet and dignified; Sujit Choudhry supports clearer guidelines and inclusive selection.

UPSC 2015 · — · UPSC 2016 · 15m — Discretionary powers of the Governor / role in recent times. (2015 marks not stated in source.)

Chief Minister, State Council & Lieutenant Governors

Chief Minister & State Council of Ministers

The CM is the real executive head; the Governor appoints the leader commanding an Assembly majority. Functions: forms the ministry, allocates portfolios, leads the Council, coordinates administration, communicates with the Governor, manages the majority, interacts with the Union. In national parties the high command often influences selection; regional parties allow stronger local choice (Tamil Nadu, UP, Bihar). Balveer Arora and R.L. Goyal note the Union often influences removal through the Governor. Tenure: office during the Governor’s pleasure, but practically only while enjoying a majority (S.R. Bommai — floor test). Developmental role: CMs shaped Five-Year Plans through the National Development Council. The Council is collectively responsible to the Assembly; in practice caste/region/religion and coalition balance shape it; a strong CM can reduce the Council to a rubber stamp, a weak majority empowers ministers.

Lieutenant Governors

Article 239 — Union Territories are administered by the President through an Administrator; the LG is an administrator, not a state constitutional head (Delhi, Puducherry, Andaman & Nicobar).

Governor

• Head of state · Part VI · acts generally on the Council’s advice · limited discretion under Art 163.

Lieutenant Governor

• Represents the President in a UT · Centre has a stronger role · powers vary by UT.

Delhi: Article 239AA — the Assembly cannot legislate on public order, police and land; the LG has a greater role on these. The Supreme Court held the LG must act with constitutional morality, cannot act whimsically, and cannot mechanically refer every decision to the President. Puducherry: Article 239A — the Madras High Court held that Article-239AA-type restrictions are not imposed in the same manner. Andaman & Nicobar: no legislature; the LG functions mainly as administrator.

Delhi Services Ordinance, 2023 — concerns: disrupts the “triple chain of accountability”; gives Centre/LG greater control over services; weakens the elected government; raises Article-239AA questions; may need a constitutional amendment if the legislative domain is altered. Madhav Khosla — posts like the LG exist to handle grave constitutional crises with fairness, not to replace elected governments; Subhash Kashyap — no entity in a democracy can be supreme.