Need for UN reforms
Need for Reform
| Head | The evidence | Scholar |
|---|---|---|
| Institutional | Structural weakness, above all in the Security Council. The P5 veto is used to create logjams — Russia’s veto over Ukraine | Richard Falk — the dominance of Western liberal democracies within the UN framework perpetuates historic power imbalances |
| Peace and security | Council paralysis through the decade-long Syrian Civil War, as competing US and Russian interests blocked resolutions; failure to prevent the Rohingya crisis once the warning signs were clear | Michael Barnett (Empire of Humanity) — the UN has worked reactively rather than building preventive capacity, prolonging suffering |
| Climate and global governance | UNFCCC and conferences such as COP28 gather all nations, but outcomes fall short; Paris commitments remain partly unfulfilled as major emitters (China, the US, the EU) resist proportionate burden-sharing | Jeffrey Sachs — reliance on voluntary pledges rather than binding commitments limits the UN’s capacity to handle existential crises |
| Development and inequality | The MDGs cut extreme poverty, but the SDGs struggle with low finance and global economic shocks; COVID-19 deepened inequalities as the UN could not ensure equitable vaccine distribution | — |
| Representation and legitimacy | The P5 still reflects post-1945 geopolitics. India, Brazil and South Africa, with growing global weight, remain outside permanent membership; India’s consistent peacekeeping record and climate leadership through the International Solar Alliance mark it as a deserving candidate | Anne-Marie Slaughter and Thomas G. Weiss — the UN must reflect current power realities. Edward Luck (UN Security Council: Practice and Promise) — credibility depends on adapting membership to geopolitical and demographic shifts |
| Reform and resistance | The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document called for a more representative Council, but members found no unanimity; the main obstacle is the P5’s unwillingness to dilute the veto. The UN also stays dependent on major contributors — the US paid 22% of the regular budget in 2022 | Thomas Weiss — meaningful reform cannot occur amid such entrenched interests without changing the equation on equitable burden-sharing |
| Technology and new threats | Cyber threats and artificial intelligence outpace current frameworks; there is no comprehensive UN treaty on cyber governance, and COVID-19 exposed the WHO’s inability to mobilise timely global responses | Ian Goldin — the UN must be proactive and innovative, working through strengthened multilateral cooperation |
Restructuring — Scholarly Positions
A global debate on restructuring has run since the Security Council’s Heads of Government met on 31 January 1992. The aim: a UN — and above all a Council — that is more democratic, effective and responsive to a changing world, since its tasks now reach almost every field of human activity.
| Scholar | Position |
|---|---|
| Miguel Ruiz-Cabañas Izquierdo | Three efforts matter as the UN looks to its next 75 years: a worldwide antiviral consortium, safeguarding biodiversity, and stronger early-warning systems inside UN institutions |
| Harsh V. Pant | Maintaining the status quo is no longer an option; if reform fails, India may look for solutions elsewhere, reshaping New Delhi’s relationship with the UN — and India would not be alone |
| Tiejun Yu | Great-power rivalry still shapes world politics and the order remains one of nation states, so structural and functional reform will be a long process filled with grievances; even so, it gives states a public forum whose legitimacy no other body can replace |
| John Ikenberry | Supports a more inclusive structure that accommodates new powers and regional organisations such as the African Union and ASEAN, in keeping with a multipolar world |
| Samantha Power | The UN should adopt a more assertive posture on humanitarian and human-rights concerns, and put such policies into practice |
| Shashi Tharoor and Kofi Annan | Stress the necessity of UNSC reform; the African Union’s demand for representation and the G4 proposals for permanent membership show how urgent it has become |
| Joel Ng | Legitimacy must be restored in fact and in perception, through two elements — effectiveness and representation. The UN should become more representative across its whole structure, not only the Council; people and ideas from the East and South remain under-represented, and agencies must deliver public goods and earn credit for it |
Proposed Models for Council Reform
| Model | Who | The demand |
|---|---|---|
| Ezulwini Consensus — African Union, 2005 | Africa’s only unified plan | Strong continental representation for Africa |
| G4 | Brazil, Germany, India, Japan | Backing one another’s bids since the late 1990s; expand the categories of membership and reform working methods. Brazil and India are also in L69. The G4 has twice reopened the reform debate in the past decade |
| L69 | Forty-two developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific — eleven African Union states, eleven CARICOM nations and two CARICOM observers | “United by a common cause — to achieve, lasting and comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council.” Backs a non-permanent seat for small island developing states in every region |
| CARICOM | The Caribbean grouping, increasingly active | A 2013 communiqué called for a non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing States in all regions and backed the African position. Its draft resolution proposes six new permanent seats — two for Africa (decided by Africa), two for Asia, one for Latin America and the Caribbean, one for Western Europe and other states — elected by the General Assembly |
| Uniting for Consensus (UfC) | Argentina, Canada, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Turkey and others | Grew from a “coffee club” of Italy, Spain, Mexico and Pakistan alarmed at the G4’s momentum, believing neither the G4 nor their own regions would represent their national views |
“Africa is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council, even though it is opposed in principle to the veto.”
Ezulwini Consensus, 2005
Reforms Undertaken So Far · Guterres’s Three Pillars
- Membership → expanded from 51 founding members to 193, mostly during 1960s decolonisation.
- Security Council → non-permanent members raised from 6 to 10 in 1963; recurring intergovernmental meetings on working methods and representation.
- New agencies and programmes → UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, among others.
- Human rights → the Human Rights Council replaced the Commission on Human Rights in 2006.
- Sustainable development → the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs replaced the MDGs.
- Development coherence → North–South negotiations on a New International Economic Order in the 1970s; Kofi Annan’s coherence reforms in the 1990s.
Soon after taking office, Secretary-General António Guterres announced wide changes across three areas, with three internal review teams overseeing each.
| Pillar | Content |
|---|---|
| Development system | Restructured for coherence and delivery |
| Peace and security architecture | Redesigned in five elements (below) |
| Management — the Secretariat | Administrative reform of the UN’s own machinery |
The five elements of the peace-and-security redesign
- Creating a Department of Political and Peace-building Affairs and a Department of Peace Operations.
- A single political-operational structure under Assistant Secretaries-General with regional responsibilities, reporting to the Under-Secretaries-General for Political and Peace-building Affairs and for Peace Operations.
- A Standing Principals’ Group of these two Under-Secretaries-General, under the Secretary-General’s chairmanship.
- Strengthening priority areas for coherence across the peace and security pillar.
- Several non-structural changes in the pillar’s day-to-day work.
Kofi Annan’s “In Larger Freedom” (2005)
Two routes to a 24-member Council — Annan stated no preference.
- PLAN A — Six new permanent members + three new non-permanent members. Total: 24 members
- PLAN B — Eight seats in a new class on renewable four-year terms + one non-permanent seat. Total: 24 members
In 2005 the Secretary-General urged consensus on expansion, offering the two options without stating a preference.
The direction of reform is clear: a Council that reflects contemporary power, protects legitimacy through representation and effectiveness, and adapts to new security challenges. Major-power rivalry means the process will be slow, but the forum the UN sustains has no substitute.
Reform of the United Nations
14.1 Need for reform
Reform is natural to any institution that means to stay relevant. Over fifty years, Cold-War strategic influences have declined, UN membership has grown almost fourfold, and expectations have risen.
Only reformed multilateralism with a reformed United Nations at its centre can meet the aspirations of humanity.
Narendra Modi, 75th UN General Assembly
14.2 Structural reforms — organ by organ
| Organ | Reform sought |
|---|---|
| UNGA | Stronger coordination with the Security Council to improve implementation of decisions. |
| UNSC | Reform of membership and veto to make the Council more representative, democratic and accountable. |
| ECOSOC | Streamline to avoid duplication and coordinate economic and social initiatives. |
| Trusteeship Council | Reconsider its functions or assign new roles managing the global commons. |
| Secretariat | Reduce corruption, improve efficiency, raise representation of developing countries. |
14.3 Functional reforms
- Expand the Council: in 1965 it grew from 11 to 15, with no change in permanent members, and has been frozen since — undermining its representative character. An expanded Council would carry more authority and legitimacy.
- Shyam Saran — expand permanent membership to include India, Brazil and South Africa, with greater African and Asian representation.
“If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”
Kofi Annan
14.4 Reform of the veto
A single veto blocks a resolution regardless of international support — Russia vetoed a resolution demanding it halt its attack on Ukraine. A means to override the veto is needed. Richard Gowan, in “Veto Power at the United Nations: Framing the Debate”, argues the P5 veto must be reformed for more effective decision-making.
14.5 Financial & institutional reforms
- Funding — Rakesh Sood (former Ambassador to France) on the need for sustainable, predictable funding; dependence on member contributions affects independent functioning.
- Outdated Charter — monistic sovereignty, and Germany and Japan still described as ‘enemy states’. Dag Hammarskjöld called the organization a ‘Weird Picasso abstraction’ for its size and complexity.
- Divergent working methods (a non-representative UNSC beside a decentralized UNGA), peacekeeping training and accountability, and effective SDG implementation.
14.6 Reforms for new challenges
António Guterres — new challenges need new solutions; the world has a surplus of multilateral challenges but not enough multilateral answers, which makes both strengthening and structural reform necessary. Sushma Swaraj held that the UN, for all its flaws, remains the most important platform for dialogue, and warned that a UN unwilling to reform will erode its own legitimacy and meet the fate of the League of Nations.
14.7 The Pact for the Future (2024)
Adopted by consensus at the Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024. Action 39 commits states to reform the Council; Action 40 backs the intergovernmental negotiations ‘without delay’. It changed no seat and no vote, and on the veto goes only as far as limiting its scope and use. India’s reading is sharper — Modi called reform ‘the key to relevance’, while Ambassador P. Harish told the Assembly the Pact ‘definitely falls short’ on Council expansion.
Challenges Ahead of the UN
- Peace & security — conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia need sustainable solutions. Terrorism — stronger counter-terror effort and cooperation. Nuclear proliferation — non-proliferation and disarmament among nuclear-armed states.
- Non-conventional — climate change (collective mitigation), a growing population (pressure on resources, food and health), the refugee crisis, and pandemics (the COVID-19 lesson on health cooperation).