

PSIR & GS-2 Daily Brief

About this initiative : Briefs, scans the best academic platforms, national newspapers & leading think tanks to pick the most relevant articles & research. It converts them into crisp, high-impact points you can directly use in your mains answers.

PSIR
Optional by
Amit Pratap
Singh
| ForumIAS |



Article - 1

Influence of India's basic structure doctrine on commonwealth: Bar & Bench

Article - 2

Operation Sindoor's key lesson : Future conflicts will not resemble past: IE

Article - 3

INMSS 2026 - What India's new maritime strategy means : IDSA

Article - 1 : Influence of India's basic structure doctrine on commonwealth

1:51 PM

Bar and Bench



Sign in Subscribe X YouTube Facebook LinkedIn

Latest Legal News News ▾ Dealstreet Viewpoint ▾ Columns ▾ Interviews ▾ Law School ▾

1 Columns

Influence of India's basic structure doctrine on Commonwealth constitutionalism

Courts across the world are not merely borrowing the basic structure doctrine; they are integrating it with established constitutional principles recognised by the Privy Council.



Context India's basic structure doctrine, developed in Kesavananda Bharati, has influenced Commonwealth courts in protecting the identity of written constitutions.

Facts

■ It protects constitutional supremacy, rule of law, judicial review, separation of powers & democracy.

■ Guyana, Belize & Lesotho adapted the doctrine in their constitutional settings.

Analytical Crux

The basic structure doctrine, an Indian judicial innovation has become a comparative constitutional tool. It shows that Parliament's power to amend is democratic, but not sovereign to destroy the core identity of the Constitution. Commonwealth courts have not copied India's doctrine, they have mixed Indian reasoning with Privy Council principles like rule of law, separation of powers and judicial independence.

Verbatim Quotes

"Courts are not borrowing the basic structure doctrine; they are integrating it with established constitutional principles recognised by the Privy Council."

"The Privy Council's jurisprudence, which articulated structural principles in colonial contexts, serves as a bridge between imperial constitutional law and contemporary constitutional adjudication."

Operation Sindoor's key lesson: Future conflicts will not resemble the past

A YEAR after Operation Sindoor, it is possible to move beyond the immediacy of events and assess its deeper strategic meaning. Op Sindoor was more than a successful response to provocation. It marked the maturing of India's ability to employ calibrated force under a nuclear overhang, while retaining control over escalation. In doing so, it offered a template for the management of sub-conventional conflict in a complex, multi-domain environment.

The most striking feature of Sindoor was not the scale of force employed, but the discipline with which it was applied. India chose not to be drawn into a wider conventional conflict, despite having both the capability and the provocation to do so. Instead, it demonstrated a doctrine of aggression blended with restraint — precise, time-bound, and politically directed. This was not a restraint born of hesitation, but of strategic confidence. The message was clear: India could escalate, but chose not to. Yet, credible retribution against the perpetrators, rather than territorial ambition, defined the operation. This was a carefully chosen strategy from a spectrum of available options.

For Pakistan, this posed a dilemma it was ill-prepared to handle. Its strategic culture remains anchored in binary responses to either escalate conventionally or retreat into denial. Sindoor forced it into a grey zone where neither option was viable. Its military response lacked coherence, constrained by both surprise and capability gaps in handling limited, multi-domain operations. Its attempts to compensate through information warfare only diluted its credibility, as exaggerated claims failed to withstand scrutiny. More

significantly, Pakistan's repeated invocation of the nuclear threat appeared increasingly formulaic, even fatigued. Nuclear signalling, once a potent deterrent, risks losing salience when overused without corresponding credibility.

India, by contrast, demonstrated mastery over escalation control. Without overt signalling, it maintained a posture of readiness that was understood, if not articulated. The operation reaffirmed that limited conflict remains possible — even effective — within a nuclearised environment, provided political intent, military capability, and communication are aligned. The stability-instability paradox, long debated in the South Asian strategic conversation, found a contemporary expression in Operation Sindoor.

Equally important was the execution. In just a few years, the Indian armed forces have adapted to multi-domain operations without compromising their conventional edge. Operation Sindoor reflected a level of jointness that went beyond coordination to integration. Cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and precision strike systems were brought together in a manner that compressed decision-making timelines and enhanced effectiveness. This integration did not replace conventional strength; it layered new capabilities atop it, creating a more agile and responsive force structure.

The role of civil-military convergence stood out starkly. Sindoor was not merely a military operation. It was a whole-of-government effort. Political clarity enabled operational flexibility. Diplomatic engagement ensured



SYED ATA HASNAIN

that India's actions were understood internationally as measured and necessary. Economic stability was maintained, with minimal disruption to markets and civilian life. Narrative management, though not flawless, was significantly more coherent than in earlier crises. Yet, the operation also revealed chinks that merit attention — particularly the need for faster, institutionalised communication frameworks and deeper inter-agency integration that does not rely on personalities.

The Pahalgam attack that preceded Sindoor was intended to reinsert Pakistan into the Kashmiri consciousness and to project its continuing relevance. It sought to disrupt a narrative of normalcy built around economic revival, tourism, and declining local recruitment. A year later, that objective appears to have failed. Local recruitment into militancy remains limited, and the economic momentum in the Valley continues. Broader Indian society's engagement through investment, connectivity, and opportunity has played a role in stabilising the environment. A return to pre-Covid levels of terrorism in Kashmir appears unlikely, though complacency would be misplaced.

Jointness must be deepened, technologies continuously integrated, and decision-making processes further streamlined. Above all, the delicate balance between aggression and restraint must be preserved — not as a slogan, but as a practised doctrine

The nature of the threat, however, is evolving. While local human resources for militancy may have diminished, this cannot be assumed across the border. Pakistan retains the ability to externalise manpower, and emerging technologies are lowering the threshold for disruption. Terror financing, though under greater scrutiny, is also adapting. The shift from traditional channels to hybrid models — including digital and crypto-based mechanisms —

poses new challenges. In a global financial environment marked by flux, these channels could facilitate the reconstitution of proxy support networks. This will require sustained monitoring and adaptive responses from agencies such as the National Investigation Agency.

Operation Sindoor also underscores a broader lesson: Future conflicts will not resemble the past. They will be shorter, sharper, and fought across domains that blur the line between war and peace. Urban centres, digital infrastructure, and societal cohesion may become as significant as traditional battlefields. The ability to absorb shocks, maintain normalcy, and control narratives will be as critical as military success.

For India, the challenge now is one of sustainability. Sindoor has set a benchmark, but its lessons must be institutionalised. Jointness must be deepened, technologies continuously integrated, and decision-making processes further streamlined. Above all, the delicate balance between aggression and restraint must be preserved — not as a slogan, but as a practised doctrine.

The legacy of Operation Sindoor, therefore, lies not just in what it achieved, but in what it revealed. It showed that India can act with precision without losing control, that it can send a decisive message without inviting uncontrolled escalation, and that it can align its instruments of national power in pursuit of clear strategic objectives. In an environment where provocations will persist and conflicts will evolve, that may be its most enduring contribution.

The writer is Governor of Bihar and former commander of India's Srinagar-based Chinar Corps

Context Operation Sindoor

as India's model of calibrated force, where military aggression was combined with restraint under a nuclear shadow.

Facts

The stability - instability paradox found a contemporary expression in Operation Sindoor.

Multi-domain operations included cyber, electronic warfare, ISR & precision strikes were integrated.

Analytical Crux

India's security response has moved from retaliation to controlled coercion. Operation Sindoor shows that limited military action is possible under a nuclear shadow, if political intent, military capacity and communication remain aligned. The operation also proves that future security will not be about soldiers and borders; cyber, narratives, diplomacy, markets and social stability will also matter.

Verbatim Quotes

“ Nuclear signalling, once a potent deterrent, risks losing salience when overused without corresponding credibility.”
- Syed Ata Hasnain

“ The ability to absorb shocks, maintain normalcy and control narratives will be as critical as military success.”
- Syed Ata Hasnain

Article - 3 : INMSS 2026 - What India's new maritime strategy means



MANOHAR PARRIKAR INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES

मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

INMSS-2026: What India's New Maritime Strategy Means

May 06, 2026 | Issue Brief



Abhay Kumar Singh

Research Fellow (SS)

Commodore Abhay Kumar Singh (Retd) is a Research Fellow at...

Context INMSS - 2026

as India's mature and realistic maritime strategy, focused on competition, partnership, risk and limited resources.

Facts

INMSS-2026 is India's third public naval strategy after 2007 (Freedom to Use the Seas) and 2015 (Ensuring Secure Seas).

Maritime Domain Awareness includes Underwater Domain awareness, Seabed domain & space / near-space domain awareness.

INMSS-2026 uses a Ends - Ways - Means - Risks framework.

Analytical Crux

INMSS - 2026 is not about unlimited naval ambition; it is about disciplined maritime realism. India's maritime interests are widening, but the Navy understands that resources, platforms and specialist capabilities remain finite. Modern maritime power includes grey-zone threats, AI, cyber, undersea infrastructure, partnerships and whole-of-nation coordination.

Verbatim Quotes

"In this sense, the trajectory from 2007 to 2026 is one from access to security to competition management." — Abhay Kumar Singh & R. Vignesh

"Its significance lies not in doctrinal innovation but about India's continuing effort to scale maritime power without strategic overreach." — Abhay Kumar Singh & R. Vignesh

- **2025 GS-II: “Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.”**
- **2025 GS-III: “Why is maritime security vital to protect India’s sea trade? Discuss maritime and coastal security challenges and the way forward.”**
- **2024 GS-II: “Discuss the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Maldives for India with a focus on global trade and energy flows. Further also discuss how this relationship affects India’s maritime security and regional stability amidst international competition?”**
- **2023 GS-II: “Compare and contrast the British and Indian approaches to Parliamentary sovereignty.”**
- **2023 GS-II: “Sea is an important Component of the Cosmos’ Discuss in the light of the above statement the role of the IMO (International Maritime Organisation) in protecting environment and enhancing maritime safety and security.”**

PSIR & GS2 Daily Brief

The Programme in Political Science and International Relations emphasize research, critical thinking, and enhances interdisciplinary understanding. It provides comprehensive coverage in structured key way for strategic advantage in upsc.

PSIR OPTIONAL FOUNDATION

The program focuses on Comprehensive coverage of the topic mentioned in PSIR Syllabus supplemented with regular handouts.

Upcoming Batch: 6th July, 2026

OGP (OPTIONAL GUIDANCE PROGRAM)

Focus will be on conceptual clarity and building the ability of the candidates to interlink static portion with current developments.

Upcoming Batch: 9th June, 2026

PSIR DYNAMICS

The program focuses on Current-Relevant dedicated classes cover national and international developments, integrated with PSIR syllabus.

Upcoming Batch: 22nd June, 2026

ATS (AUGMENTED TEST SERIES)

ATS sharpens structure, presentation, and depth converting effort into higher score.

Upcoming Batch: 26th April, 2026

O-AWFG (ANSWER WRITING FOCUS GROUP)

The answer writing program creates discipline and enhances skills. It helps students develop structure, articulation, coherence, and approach.

Upcoming Batch: 20th April, 2026

O-AWFG PRIME

The test series program enhances speed, flow and dynamic understanding of the subject.

Upcoming Batch : 20th April, 2026

PYQ Mastery Series

The series focuses on PYQ practice anchored in conceptual clarity and contemporary relevance.

Upcoming Batch: 22 June, 2026

Contact for Mentorship - 9311704432

Telegram: @ | Website: <https://academy.forumias.com/>

Note: Edit program names/offerings as per the latest ForumIAS schedule.