

PSIR OPTIONAL · UPSC CSE

EDITION 2026

# PYQ Vault

**560**

questions

**50**

days

**10**

years of PYQs

**DAY 22**

**Indian Federalism** · 11 questions

Every question carries a Flow Snapshot — and a handwritten model answer on the channel.

“No PYQ will be unfamiliar.”

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2016 · 10 marks

The philosophy and administration of the distribution of powers between Centre and State is required to be re-assessed.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

- R1** distribution of powers = hallmark of Indian federalism → reconciles national unity with local autonomy
- R2** Centre-tilt justified by Partition / princely integration / fissiparous fears → those conditions no longer hold

Body flow

**Austin:** design as a blend of centralisation + decentralisation → tilt rooted in 1947 context → conditions changed since 1950 → education / environment / health / migration / digital need joint action → over-centralisation weakens State initiative → administrative friction: Governor, central agencies, GST → **Kothari:** centralisation under single-party dominance

Counter-view

reassessment ≠ weakening the Union → corrective is consultation, not dilution of central authority

Conclusion routes

- R1** Sarkaria / Punchhi / NCRWC + Bommai converge → States gain flexibility in non-national matters, Union intact
- R2** recalibration, not rupture → balance restored within a cooperative federal spirit

The distribution of powers is the hallmark of Indian federalism, and it tries to reconcile national unity with local autonomy. Granville Austin calls it as a deliberate blend of centralisation and decentralisation.

The original tilt towards the centre was justified by partition, the integration of princely states. Those conditions explained the philosophy, they no longer fully hold. Reassessment is needed because social & economic conditions have changed since 1950. Education, environment, health, migration and digital governance now demand joint action, while excessive centralisation weakens state initiative.

On the administrative side, the Governor's role, central agencies and the working of GST have created friction & raised questions of state autonomy.

Rajni Kothari criticised the centralisation that single-party dominance produced. Reassessment, however, does not mean weakening the Union; the corrective lies in consultation.

The Sarkaria Commission, Punchhi Commission and the NCRWC, along with S.R. Bommai, suggests the way forward: more flexibility for states in non-national matters, within a cooperative federal spirit.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2017 · 10 marks

Indian federation has moved from cooperative federation to competitive federation

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** claim only partly true → cooperation supplemented, not replaced

**R2** **Austin's** cooperative base intact → competition added as a new layer

Body flow

**Austin:** cooperative Centre-State partnership (Finance Commission, ISC, GST Council) → 1991 reforms + NITI Aayog replaces Planning Commission  
→ **Kincaid:** rivalry for investment → instruments (NITI indices, Ease of Doing Business, Aspirational Districts, Smart Cities) → **Panagariya:** spur to governance

Counter-view

**Rao:** competition widens the richer-poorer State gap

Conclusion routes

**R1** shift is of degree, not replacement → **Watts:** systems move between both modes

**R2** India's real direction is competitive-cooperative federalism

India has added a competitive layer to its federalism, but it has not abandoned cooperation. Granville Austin described Indian federalism as cooperative, built on a Centre-state partnership.

It works through the Finance Commission, Inta-State council and GST council. Competition grew after the 1991 reforms and deepened once NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission.

John Kincaid views competitive federalism as rivalry among governments for scarce benefits such as investment.

States compete through NITI Aayog indices, Ease of doing business rankings, the Aspirational Districts Programme and the Smart Cities Mission. Arvind Panagariya calls this as important for better governance.

Maram Govinda Rao argues that it can widen the gap between richer and poorer states. The shift is therefore one of degree, not replacement. Ronald L. Watts views that federal systems move between cooperative and competitive modes. India's real direction is competitive - cooperative federalism.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2018 · 10 marks

Implementation of GST and NEET is a major challenge to Indian Federalism.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** both reforms push national uniformity over State discretion → that is the federal challenge

**R2** GST and NEET pull power upward → fiscal and education-health autonomy narrowed

Body flow

GST removes States' indirect-tax power → destination-based design, manufacturing States fear revenue loss → delayed compensation + irregular Council meetings → mistrust → **Patnaik**: fiscal autonomy weakened, dependence deepened → NEET's uniform entrance vs education (Concurrent) + health (State) → Tamil Nadu: ignores school inequality + reservation → **Garga Chatterjee**: States lose power to shape health workforce

Counter-view

challenge of method, not federalism → **Jaitley** "pooled sovereignty" + GST Council's two-thirds State weight show cooperative design

Conclusion routes

**R1** GST and NEET test federalism, do not break it → equity, consultation, stronger Inter-State Council restore balance

**R2** core tension is national uniformity vs State autonomy → resolved through consultation, not centralisation

Both reforms replace State-level discretion with national uniformity and there lies the federal challenge. GST removed the States' independent power over most indirect taxes.

Manufacturing states feared revenue loss under its destination-based design. The delayed compensation and irregular council meetings increase mistrust. Prabhat Patnaik argues that GST weakens fiscal autonomy and deepens state dependence on the Centre.

NEET created a single medical entrance, though education sits in the concurrent list and health remains largely a state subject. Tamil Nadu argued that uniform exam ignores unequal school systems, reservation policies and social realities.

Garga Chatterjee shows that State entrance exams let states shape their own health workforce, which NEET takes away. But the challenge is one of method, not of federalism itself. Arun Jaitley defended GST as "pooled sovereignty" and the GST Council gives states two-thirds of the voting weight.

GST and NEET therefore test federalism rather than break it. Equity, consultation and a stronger Inter-State Council can restore the balance.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2018 · 15 marks

Discuss asymmetrical federalism in India.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** asymmetry = different units, different powers/status under one Constitution → contrast with symmetry → not a flaw but a device

**R2** India blends common framework (symmetry) + special arrangements (asymmetry) → tool to accommodate deep diversity

Body flow

**Watts:** political asymmetry (size/population/weight) vs constitutional asymmetry → vertical/horizontal, de jure/de facto → Indian forms: Art 370 (pre-2019), Art 371 series, Fifth & Sixth Schedules, UTs with legislatures (Delhi, Puducherry) → rationale: equal treatment of unequal regions breeds injustice → **Austin** (hold together a plural society) + **Kymlicka** (differentiated citizenship)

Counter-view

**Tarlton** (separatism) + **Barry** (two classes of citizenship) → **Govinda Rao:** transparent asymmetry serves nation-building, discriminatory asymmetry harms unity

Conclusion routes

**R1** functional device, not a defect → sound when constitutional, transparent, negotiated

**R2** harmful when politicised / arbitrary → its worth depends on how it is used

Asymmetrical federalism means that different constituent units enjoy different powers, status or autonomy under the same Constitution, unlike symmetrical federalism where all units are treated alike.

India combines both: a common framework for all states, alongside special arrangements for particular states, regions and tribes. This asymmetry is not a flaw but a deliberate method of accommodating deep diversity.

Ronald L. Watts separates political asymmetry, rooted in size, population and weight, from constitutional asymmetry, where the Constitution assigns unequal powers.

The rationale is that equal treatment of unequal regions can itself produce injustice. Granville Austin saw Indian federalism as designed to hold together a highly plural society. Will Kymlicka defends differentiated citizenship to protect minorities.

Charles Taylor argues that asymmetry may encourage separatism and Brian Barry fears it creates two classes of citizenship. Manam Govinda Rao accepts transparent asymmetry for nation-building but rejects discriminatory arrangements made for short term politics.

Asymmetry therefore is a functional device i.e. sound when constitutional and negotiated, harmful when politicised.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2019 · 10 marks

Despite constitutional mandate the Inter-State Council has not come of age. Discuss.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** Art. 263 mandate (inquire → discuss → recommend) → yet no maturation since its 1990 birth under Sarkaria

**R2** meant to be the principal federal forum → has not grown into one

Body flow

root cause is *design* → exists only by Presidential Order → executive can alter its structure → recommendations bind no one → politics widens the gap → Congress dominance (party channels settle disputes) → coalitions (regional parties bargain directly within Union) → sectoral bodies (GST Council, NITI Aayog) absorb its core work → secretariat under Home Ministry → no autonomy or expertise → meetings rare (2006–2016 gap) → **Rekha Saxena** → poor record, almost no amendment or enactment

Counter-view

not beyond repair → Punchhi Commission → statutory status, regular meetings, permanent secretariat

Conclusion routes

**R1** reactivated on these lines → gives cooperative federalism real substance

**R2** the constitutional mandate is intact → only political will and a structural fix are missing

Article 263 gave the Inter-State Council a clear mandate i.e. to inquire into disputes, discuss matters of common interest, and recommend coordinated policy.

But since its creation in 1990 on the Sarkaria Commission's recommendation, it has not grown into the principal federal forum it was meant to be. The council exists through a Presidential Order, so the Union executive can alter its structure and its recommendations bind no one.

Politics deepened this weakness. Under Congress dominance, party channels settled disputes; under coalitions, regional parties bargained directly within the Union government.

Sectoral bodies like the GST Council and NITI Aayog absorbed its core work.

Its secretariat, placed under the Home Ministry, lacks autonomy and expertise and meetings stayed rare i.e. a long gap ran between 2006 and 2016.

According to Rekha Saxena, the council's record has been poor, with almost no amendment or enactment flowing from its recommendations. The Punchhi Commission urged statutory status, regular meetings and a permanent secretariat.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2020 · 10 marks

Comment on the Mechanism for settling inter-state disputes in 150 words.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** divided powers/interests → disputes built into the system → Constitution offers judicial + extra-judicial mechanisms

**R2** federalism breeds conflict by design → Constitution responds through courts, tribunals and councils

Body flow

Article 131 (SC exclusive original jurisdiction, legal not political) → Article 262 (Parliament, river water disputes, ousts Court, ISWD Act 1956 tribunals) → Article 263 Inter-State Council advisory + Zonal Councils / NITI Aayog / mediation / GST Council → rationale: many disputes political, not merely legal

Counter-view

water tribunal system the weak link → delay in constitution + award, weak enforcement, Article 136 appeals despite Article 262 bar → **Nariman:** innovative experiment that failed in performance

Conclusion routes

**R1** mechanism layered but uneven → needs basin-wide, cooperative reform

**R2** 2019 Bill (permanent tribunal, Disputes Resolution Committee) only partly repairs the gap

India's federal design divides powers and interests and disputes between governments are built into the system. The constitution answers with both judicial and extra-judicial mechanisms.

Article 131 gives the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction over legal disputes between the Union and states or among states.

Article 262 allows Parliament to provide for adjudication of inter-state river water disputes. The Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 created tribunals for this purpose.

Article 263 makes the Inter-State Council an advisory forum, backed by Zonal Councils, NITI Aayog, mediation and the GST Council. However, they suffer delay in constitution and in delivery, weak enforcement and Article 136 appeals despite the Article 262 bar.

Fali Sam Nariman called these tribunals an innovative experiment that failed in performance. The mechanism is layered but uneven and needs the basin-wide, cooperative reform the 2019 Bill partly attempts.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2020 · 20 marks

Does the functioning of the federalism in India tend to make it appear as a unitary state in practice.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** federal in structure, strong Union bias → bias shows in functioning → **Wheare** "quasi-federal"

**R2** **Wheare's** formulation: unitary state with subsidiary federal principles → set appearance-vs-reality frame

Body flow

constitutional tilt (Art 1 Union of States, Arts 2–3, residuary powers, Union List, emergency, Art 356, Governor, single citizenship, AIS) → practice sharpens → political (**Kothari**, Governor, 356) → fiscal (GST, CSS, conditional grants; **M.G. Rao** on cesses) → administrative (central agencies; Kashmir, farm laws, COVID disaster law) → **Mehta's** "vanishing act / grin" worry

Counter-view

only appears unitary, never becomes one → **Bommai** (basic structure, limits 356), State List, dual polity, judiciary, rigid amendment → **Morris-Jones** bargaining federalism in coalition politics

Conclusion routes

**R1** unitary look in practice, sharpest in crises → appearance ≠ reality

**R2** negotiated, resilient federation → federal spirit strained, not erased

The Indian Constitution is federal in structure but carries a strong Union bias. KC Wheare therefore called India "quasi-federal", and described it as "a unitary state with subsidiary federal principles rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary principles."

Article 1 makes India a "Union of States" and Parliament can alter State boundaries under Article 2 and 3. Residuary powers, Union List dominance, emergency provisions, Article 356, a centrally appointed Governor, single citizenship and All India Services all strengthen the centre.

Rajni Kothari linked centralisation to party dominance and the urge to impose uniformity, seen in the political use of the Governor and Article 356. Fiscally, GST, centrally sponsored schemes and conditional grants bind states.

Maram Govinda Rao argues that cesses and surcharges subvert promised devolution. Pratap Bhanu Mehta describes Indian federalism as a "vanishing act, leaving only the gain."

India only appears unitary ; it does not become unitary . S.R. Bommai made federalism part of the basic structure and limited Article 356. The state list dual polity , independent judiciary and rigid amendment survive.

William Harrison Morris-Jones called it bargaining federalism, where states bargain hard during coalition politics. India therefore wears a unitary look in practice, sharpest in crises, but the federal spirit is strained, not erased.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2021 · 15 marks

Do you think that there has been a gradual shift in the basis on which the demands for the creation of new States have been raised in different regions of India? Explain.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** no single basis → ground steadily shifted → **Tillin's** four phases

**R2** statehood demands not static → basis evolves region to region → frame the answer as a phased shift

Body flow

Phase 1 (1950s–60s) language / SRA 1956 / **Guha** "master stroke" preventing balkanisation → Phase 2 (1970s–80s) ethnicity & tribal identity / North-East, Gorkhaland, Bodoland → Phase 3 (1990s) political economy / **Kohli** / liberalisation & resource control / Chhattisgarh → Phase 4 (this century) development, governance, neglect / Telangana, Vidarbha, Bundelkhand, Purvanchal / **Yadav** → marginalised assertion for power & development

Counter-view

shift not clean → **Jaffrelot**: political timing & ruling-party calculation decide actual creation → **Mahendra Prasad Singh**: smaller States ≠ automatic better governance

Conclusion routes

**R1** basis moved from language/identity → development/viability

**R2** shift is real but cumulative → older claims persist alongside the new

Demands for new states have not rested on one basis; the ground has steadily shifted. Louise Tillin's *Remapping India* helps trace this movement across four phases.

The 1<sup>st</sup> phase, in the 1950s and 1960s was linguistic. The states Reorganisation Act, 1956 redraw boundaries on language. Rama Chandra Guha called it a master stroke because it prevented balkanisation.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> phase, in the 1970s & 1980s turned on ethnicity & tribal identity. It is seen in the reorganisation of the North-East and in the Gorkhaland and Bodoland demands.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> phase, in the 1990s, shifted to political economy. Atul Kohli links liberalisation and resource control to new states such as Chhattisgarh.

The 4th phase, in this century, rests on development, governance and regional neglect as in Telangana, Vidarbha, Bundelkhand & Purnanchal. Yogendra Yadav calls these as the assertion of marginalised regions for power and development.

However, Christophe Jaffrelot stresses that political timing & ruling party calculation often decide when a state is actually created. Mahendra Prasad Singh argues that smaller states do not automatically ensure better governance.

The basis has moved from language and identity towards development and viability, though older claims rarely disappear.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2022 · 15 marks

Discuss the composition and functions of the Inter-State Council. To what extent has this body been successful in achieving its objectives?

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** ISC as the chief institution of cooperative federalism → Art 263, set up 1990 on Sarkaria recommendation

**R2** shared-rule forum under Art 263 → President establishes it when public interest requires

Body flow

composition: a rare body uniting Union, States, UTs → PM as chair + State CMs + UT CMs with legislatures + Administrators of other UTs + Governors under President's Rule + six Union Cabinet Ministers → functions under Art 263: inquire into and advise on inter-State disputes → discuss subjects of common interest → recommend coordination of policy and action

Counter-view

(success limited) → non-permanent Presidential Order → advisory, non-binding → infrequent meetings, 2006–2016 gap → weak secretariat under Home Ministry → bypassed by party channels, GST Council, NITI Aayog → **Saxena**: abysmal performance

Conclusion routes

**R1** institutionally important but operationally underused

**R2** Punchhi reforms — statutory status, regular meetings, permanent secretariat — to give it real weight

The Inter-State council is chief forum designed to give institutional shape to cooperative federalism. Article 263 empowers the President to establish it when public interest requires.

It was set up in 1990 on the Sarkaria Commission's recommendation. Its composition makes it one of the few bodies where the Union, States and Union territories sit together. The PM chairs it, joined by CM of all states, CM of UTs with legislatures, Administrators of other UTs, Governors of States under President's rule and 6 Union Cabinet ministers.

Its functions flow from Article 263 i.e. to inquire into and advice upon disputes between states, discuss subjects of common interest and recommend better coordination of policy & action.

Its success, however, has been limited. The Council is non-permanent resting on a Presidential Order and its recommendations are only advisory. Meetings have been infrequent, with a long gap between 2006 and 2016. It lacks a permanent secretariat and sits within the Home Ministry.

Party channels and later the GST Council and NITI Aayog, took over its space. Rekha Saxena observes that its performance has been abysmal, with little flowing from its recommendations.

It therefore remains institutionally important but operationally underused. The Punchhi Commission's call for statutory status, regular meetings and a permanent secretariat.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2023 · 20 marks

Does the actual working of Indian federalism conform to the centralizing tendencies in Indian polity? Give reasons for your answer.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1** federal in form, but Centre-tilted by design → actual working confirms the tilt

**R2 Wheare's** "quasi-federal" → Partition / integration / secession / uneven development explain the strong Union

Body flow

constitutional bias (residuary powers, Union List, emergency, Art. 356, Governor, boundary power under Arts. 2-3) → political centralisation (**Kothari** → one-party dominance; Indira era misuse of 356, Emergency, Governor) → fiscal centralisation (GST, CSS, conditional grants; **Govinda Rao** on cesses/surcharges) → administrative centralisation (AIS, central agencies, Governor's discretion; **Mehta's** "vanishing act")

Counter-view

conformity not complete → **Bommai** limits 356, judiciary guards basic structure → **Morris-Jones's** bargaining federation → coalition politics + regional parties + GST Council bargaining

Conclusion routes

**R1** conforms, but not wholly → federal spirit stressed, not destroyed

**R2** dynamic balance of centralisation and federal resistance

The Indian Constitution is federal in form but tilts towards the Centre by design. KC Wheare called India "quasi-federal" - a unitary state with subsidiary federal principles.

The reasons lie in Partition, national integration, secessionist fears and uneven development, which pushed the framers towards a strong Union.

This bias shows in residuary powers with the Union, a dominant Union list, emergency provisions, Article 356, the centrally appointed Governor and Parliament's power over state boundaries. Rajni Kothari linked centralisation to one-party dominance and the attempt to impose uniformity.

States' dependence has grown through GST, centrally sponsored schemes and conditional grants. According to Maham Govinda Rao, raising non-divisible cesses and surcharges subverts promised devolution and erodes fiscal federalism.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta describes Indian federalism as "a vanishing act, leaving only the grin." S.R. Bommai limited Article 356 & the judiciary protects federalism as part of the basic structure.

William Harrison Morris-Jones calls India as a bargaining federation, where states negotiate hard, especially under coalition politics; regional parties have periodically reduced central dominance and the GST Council institutionalises fiscal bargaining.

The actual working does conform to centralising tendencies, but not wholly. The federal spirit is under stress, not destroyed. Therefore India remains a dynamic balance of centralisation and federal resistance.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2025 · 15 marks

The recent developments in Indian Politics has not eroded the true spirit of federalism in India. Critically examine this statement with the help of appropriate examples.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

**R1 Elazar's** "self-rule + shared rule" test → developments strain but do not erase spirit

**R2** federalism as India's multi-level device for diversity → "not eroded" claim must be tested against recent practice

Body flow

self-rule/shared-rule benchmark → fiscal-political pressures: GST compensation, NEET/farm laws, Governor delays, central agencies, scheme conditionalities → **Stalin's** NEET/NEP/GST critique → **Mehta** "vanishing act... grin" → reads as recentralisation

Counter-view

resilience holds the spirit → S.R. Bommai caps Art. 356 → GST Council institutionalises bargaining → regional parties/coalitions sustain negotiation → judiciary guards basic structure → asymmetry + State welfare innovation → **Mustafa**: regional aspirations strengthen unity

Conclusion routes

**R1** statement holds with qualification → spirit strained, not destroyed

**R2** survival rests on consultation, fiscal fairness, constitutional restraint → a negotiated, resilient federation

Federalism, in Daniel J. Elazar's words, means "self-rule plus shared rule" i.e. autonomy for the units alongside their participation in common decisions. In India it is also a multi-level structure for managing diversity.

Judged against this test, recent developments have strained federal practice but not erased its spirit. GST compensation disputes, the NEET and farm-laws controversies, Governors delaying assent to State Bills, central agencies pressing opposition-ruled states, and the conditionalities attached to centrally sponsored schemes have deepened fiscal and political dependence.

M.K. Stalin's sustained criticism of NEET, the NEP and GST reflects this state anxiety over autonomy. Pratap Bhanu Mehta describes Indian federalism as "a vanishing act.... leaving only the grin."

However, S.R. Bommai limits the misuse of Article 356; the GST Council institutionalises regular fiscal bargaining; regional parties and coalition politics keep negotiation alive. The judiciary guards the basic structure. Faizan Mustafa argues that recognising regional aspirations strengthens, rather than weakens, unity.

The statement therefore holds with qualification. The federal spirit is under stress, not destroyed; its survival rests on consultation, fiscal fairness and constitutional restraint.

# Indian Federalism — the trend

13 questions over 2015–2025 · marks span 10 / 15 / 20

| Theme                                                 | PYQ years & marks       |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Distribution of powers — reassessment                 | 2016 / 10m              |
| Cooperative federalism                                | 2015 / 10m              |
| Cooperative → competitive federation                  | 2017 / 10m              |
| Contested areas in Centre–State relations             | 2015 / 15m              |
| GST & NEET as a federal challenge                     | 2018 / 10m              |
| Asymmetrical federalism                               | 2018 / 15m              |
| Inter-State Council (working / composition & success) | 2019 / 10m · 2022 / 15m |
| Mechanism for settling inter-state disputes           | 2020 / 10m              |
| Unitary appearance & centralising tendencies          | 2020 / 20m · 2023 / 20m |
| Changing basis of new-State demands                   | 2021 / 15m              |
| Recent developments & the true spirit of federalism   | 2025 / 15m              |

## Three questions

- 1 The recent developments in Indian politics have not eroded the true spirit of federalism in India. Critically examine with appropriate examples.

UPSC 2025 · 15 MARKS

- 2 Does the actual working of Indian federalism conform to the centralizing tendencies in Indian polity? Give reasons.

UPSC 2023 · 20 MARKS

- 3 Do you think there has been a gradual shift in the basis on which demands for new States have been raised in different regions of India? Explain.

UPSC 2021 · 15 MARKS

*Read the capsule → write the same day → don't break the chain.*

PSIR OPTIONAL · FOR MAINS 2026

# ATS 2026

AUGMENTED TEST SERIES

**BATCH 3**      **05 JULY**

**BATCH 4**      **19 JULY**

**BATCH 5**      **26 JULY**

TEST SERIES INCLUDES

- ◆ **Sectional + Full-Length Tests + Simulators**
- ◆ **In-depth discussion with Model Answers**
- ◆ **One-to-one expert evaluation & mentorship**

TO ENROL OR FOR GUIDANCE, CALL

**93117 40432**

**AMIT PRATAP SINGH**

PSIR FACULTY · FORUMIAS

PSIR OPTIONAL · FOR MAINS 2027

# OCP 2027

OPTIONAL GUIDANCE PROGRAMME

COMMENCES

## 6 JULY 2026

BATCH 1 · ONLINE & OFFLINE

PROGRAMME INCLUDES

- ◆ 35 live classes – entire PSIR syllabus
- ◆ 35 Daily Answer-Writing Tests
- ◆ Full-Length Tests with Model Answers
- ◆ One-to-one evaluation & mentorship

TO ENROL OR FOR GUIDANCE, CALL

## 93117 40432

AMIT PRATAP SINGH

PSIR FACULTY · FORUMIAS

*PYQ VAULT · DAY 22 · INDIAN FEDERALISM*

# *All 11 questions — PDF + handwritten answers*

The complete Day 22 set — every PYQ with its Flow Snapshot and the handwritten model answer — in one PDF on the channel, free.

*Download on Telegram*

*@psirbyamitpratap*

560 questions · 50 days · ten years of PYQs — nothing left out

*Tomorrow — Day 23. Don't break the chain.*

— POWER 50 · DAY 22

# Get the full Day 22 capsule

12 pages — every concept, scholar and approach in Indian Federalism, compressed for fast recall. **Model answers drop tonight.**

*Join on Telegram / @psirbyamitpratap*

Free · full PDF + tonight's model answers on the channel

---

*Tomorrow — Day 23*