

EDITION 2026

PYQ Vault

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QUESTIONS

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YEARS OF PYQS

DAY 49

Recent Developments in Foreign Policy • **10 questions**

Every question carries a Flow Snapshot — and a handwritten model answer on the channel.
So that no PYQ will be unfamiliar.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2019 · 15 marks

Write a brief note on India's interests in West Asia.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI West Asia central to India's foreign policy → interests material before ideological **R2** four interests (energy / people / trade / defence) → pursued via a de-hyphenated, multi-aligned strategy, no bloc

Body flow

energy first (~88% crude, Gulf + Iran, Hormuz exposure — **Pant**/ORF) → diaspora + remittances (~9m in Gulf; safety → June-2025 evacuation) → trade & connectivity (Chabahar 2024 + INSTC → Central Asia; IMEC 2023 G20 → "Act West"/connectivity leadership; tied to a Saudi-Israel normalisation frozen by Gaza) → defence & three-pole logic (**Taneja**: Gulf economic / Israel technology / Iran neighbour) → all engaged without choosing = multi-alignment

Counter-view

strength = each pole accepts India's ties with the others; strain = one regional war forces every interest onto the table at once (IMEC frozen by Gaza already shows the fragility)

Conclusion routes

RI interests led by energy + diaspora, backed by trade, connectivity, defence, held together by multi-alignment **R2** "calibrated multi-alignment" (**Pant**): balance as the source of influence → real test = whether it holds as conflicts deepen

West Asia sits at the centre of India's foreign policy & India's interests there are material before they are ideological. They rest on energy, people, trade and defence, pursued through a de-hyphenated strategy of parallel ties with rivals rather than joining any bloc.

India imports close to 88% of its crude, much of it from the Gulf & Iran, which leaves it exposed to any disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. Haresh V. Pant treats this dependence as the outer limits of India's choices.

Around 9 million Indians work in the Gulf & their remittances support the domestic economy, so their safety shapes Indian diplomacy, as the evacuation of over 4000 nationals during the June 2025 war showed.

The 10-year Chabahar contract of 2024 opens a route to Central Asia through the INSTC. While the IMEC corridor, agreed at the 2023 G20 summit, serves India's "Act West" bid for connectivity leadership.

Kabir Taneja views the region as three poles: the Gulf economic, Israel a technology partner, Iran an extended neighbour, each accepting India's ties with the others. India engages all three without choosing, a balance Pant calls "calibrated multi-alignment."

Its strength is this mutual acceptance; its strain is that one regional war forces every interest onto the table at once, testing whether the balance holds as conflicts deepen.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2019 · 20 marks

Evaluate India's vision of a new world order.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI “new world order” from Bush 1991 (rule-based) → unipolarity fading into an Asian Century → India's answer: multipolar, shared power/responsibility, not a hegemon-swap **R2** reformist vision rooted in pluralist heritage → set against China's “Middle Kingdom” → rebalance the order, not replace it

Body flow

strategic autonomy recast, inaction → action (Jaishankar) → non-alignment → multi-alignment, interest not loyalty (**Raja Mohan**) → democratise world politics (**Avinash Kumar**) → G20 2023 (“One Earth, One Family, One Future,” AU entry, Global Biofuels Alliance, IMEC vs BRI) → Voice of the Global South → bridge West-South (**Bajpae**) → balancer → leading power

Counter-view

premise contested: bipolar US-China, multipolarity a “costly illusion” (**Rajagopalan**) → post-hegemonic / multiplex order (**Acharya**) → so multipolarity is description + goal → yet character reformist not revisionist: BRICS anti-hegemonic without a clean break (**Papa & Han**) → limits: China security dilemma + few real partners (**Farwa**), Global-South claim contested (Brazil, Indonesia)

Conclusion routes

RI coherent + distinctive vision → change through inclusion, not disruption **R2** verdict hinges on two tests → multipolarity proving more than aspiration + flexible autonomy maturing into consistent leadership at home

The phrase "new world order" entered use after George H.W. Bush's 1991 call for a rule-based system. As post-cold war unipolarity fades into an Asian century, India offers its own answer i.e. not one hegemon replaced by another, but a multipolar order where power & responsibility are more widely shared.

S. Jaishankar has redefined strategic autonomy from a choice of inaction into a choice of action. C. Raja Mohan traces India's move from Nehruvian non-alignment to multi-alignment i.e. engaging rival powers by interest, not loyalty.

Avinash Kumar views this as an effort to democratise world politics. Its clearest expression came with the 2023 G20 presidency: the theme "One Earth, One Family, One Future",

the African Union's entry, the Global Biofuels Alliance & IMEC countering the Belt & Road. Convening the Voice of Global South, India casts itself in Chietigj Bajpaa's reading as a bridge West & South, moving from balancer to leading power.

Rajesh Rajagopalan holds that a bipolar US-China order makes multipolarity a costly illusion i.e. "the sooner India gives up its fantasies about multipolarity, the better". Amitav Acharya sees a post-hegemonic, multiplex world, leaving India to treat multipolarity as both description & goal. Its character, though, stays reformist, not revisionist.

Michaela Papa & Zhen Han calls BRICS as anti-hegemonic without a clean break.

Uma Farwa points to a security dilemma with China & few real partners and Brazil & Indonesia contest India's claim to speak for the Global South.

India's vision is coherent and distinctive, seeking change through inclusion rather than disruption. Its success will turn on whether flexible autonomy matures into consistent leadership backed by a cohesive democracy at home.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2020 · 20 marks

“The war in Afghanistan is crucial from the point of view of India’s national security. If the Americans withdraw and jihadis emerge with a sense of triumphalism, India will face increasing onslaught of terrorism”. Comment

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI fear is well-founded → Afghanistan on NW approaches + 1990s Kabul as terror nursery → but must the prediction follow? **R2**

Body flow

Afghanistan = India’s security buffer → US exit + triumphant Taliban did happen → so test the determinism, not the concern

why Afghanistan matters (buffer, radical ideology, drugs, ISI proxies / **Chadha**: stable Afghanistan curbs terror) → trigger arrived (Aug 2021 pullout; **Narayanan**: US left it worse; stronger, self-financing Taliban 2.0) → the straight line bends: Taliban-ISI-jihadi front fractures → Kabul-Islamabad open war over TTP & Durand Line (“Indian proxy” jibe) → threat changes actor: ISKP (**Routray**), anti-Taliban + anti-India, Voice of Khurasan incites Indian youth → India’s reply: no recognition, no retreat → aid + UNSC 2593 + Muttaqi’s Oct 2025 Delhi visit post-Pahalgam

Counter-view

danger is still real: ISI proxies (LeT/JeM) persist, Taliban 2.0 stronger, ISKP active → **Happymon Jacob**: soft power alone, no Plan B → Taliban-Pakistan friction offers only limited relief

Conclusion routes

RI security stake genuine; threat real but reshaped in source & form → India now shapes the outcome, not merely suffers it **R2** concern valid, prediction not deterministic → risk managed by calibrated engagement — neither recognition nor retreat

Afghanistan sits on India's north-western approaches, and the 1990s showed how a Taliban-run Kabul can incubate anti-India terror. Whether a US exit & jihadi triumphalism must produce an onslaught on India, though, needs closer scrutiny.

Afghanistan matters to Indian security on several counts. As a buffer against threats from the north & a possible concentration point for radical ideology, drug money & safe havens for anti-India groups run through ISI proxies. Vivek Chadha holds that a stable Afghanistan helps curb terrorism and extremism.

M.K. Narayanan argues that Washington left Afghanistan worse than it found it, with Kabul collapsing & a stronger, self-financing Taliban 2.0 taking over almost bloodlessly.

The assumed Taliban - ISI - Jihadi front has fractured. Kabul & Islamabad are now in open conflict over the TTP & Durand Line, with Pakistan even branding Afghanistan an Indian proxy.

Bibhu Prasad Routray, argues that the Islamic state - Khorasan hostile to both the Taliban & India, is the gravest regional threat. Its voice of Khorasan openly incites Indian Youth.

India has neither recognised nor retreated, choosing calibrated engagement. Humanitarian aid, insistence on UNSC resolution 2593, & Amir Khan Muttuqi's October 2025 Delhi visit after the Taliban condemned Pahalgam. **Happyman Jacob cautions that soft power alone, without a Plan B, cannot secure Indian interests.**

The security stake is genuine; the terror threat is real but reshaped in source & form. India today works to shape that outcome rather than simply suffer it.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2020 · 15 marks

Critically examine the role of India in shaping the emerging world order.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI unipolar moment over → not multipolar but multiplex (**Acharya**) → judge India against this → reformist bridge, agenda-setter not rule-maker **R2** emerging order = many consequential actors + issue-specific leadership + rising Global South → read India through this lens → bridge, not rule-writer

Body flow

multi-alignment as instrument → **Raja Mohan** (non-alignment → multi-alignment: Quad + BRICS + SCO + Russia) → Jaishankar (autonomy: inaction → action) → **Bajpae** (bridge West-Global South, reformist not revisionist) → concretes: UNSC reform, I2U2, IMEC, AU into G20, “One Earth, One Family, One Future”

Counter-view

aspiration outruns capacity → **Jain** (“leading power” claim) vs **Farwa** (transactionalism → China security dilemma → “lack of real partners”) → in a multiplex order leadership earned issue-by-issue → China gap + contested Global-South stewardship (Brazil, Indonesia) → balancer, not pole

Conclusion routes

RI India shapes by mediating West-South, not by writing rules **R2** balancer → leading state only if flexible autonomy matures into consistent leadership

The unipolar moment has passed, but the order replacing it is not simply multipolar. Amitav Acharya argues it is better read as a multiplex world i.e. many consequential actors, issue-specific leadership, and a rising Global South - not a redistribution of poles.

India shapes the emerging order as a reformist bridge, but as an agenda-setter more than a rule-maker. India's chosen instrument is multi-alignment. C. Raja Mohan traces the move from non-alignment to multi-alignment: simultaneous Quad, BRICS and SCO membership with unbroken Russia trade. S. Jaishankar redefines strategic autonomy from the "choice of inaction" into the "choice of action".

Chittigj Bajpayee describes the resulting posture, India as a "bridge between the West & the Global South", reformist rather than revisionist.

Its "One Earth, One Family, One Future" presidency framing India as an advocate for the South.

Purnendra Jain notes India seeks to be a "leading power", but Ume Farwa warns that transactionalism erodes credibility. India confronts a security dilemma with China & a "lack of real partners." In Acharya's multiplex order, leadership is earned issue by issue; India's China gap & contested Global South stewardship from Brazil & Indonesia keep it a balancer, not a pole.

India shapes the emerging order by mediating between West and South, not by writing its rules. Moving from balancer to leading state depends on converting flexible autonomy into consistent leadership.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2021 · 10 marks

How does the recent takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban impact India's strategic interests?

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI Aug 2021 takeover undid two decades of Indian statecraft in one stroke → **Menon's** "test case" for India's leading-power claim **R2** one reversal struck security, connectivity and regional balance together → costly on every front

Body flow

~US\$3bn + goodwill exposed → security first: ISI proxies (LeT/JeM), ISIS-K, narcotics → **Happymon Jacob**: soft power insufficient, no Plan B → Chabahar / Delaram-Zaranj strained → China + Pakistan gain room for hostile Kabul axis → Taliban-Pakistan friction reopens space → **Saraswat**: Taliban transaction-minded, Islamabad rift = India's opening → Muttaqi's Oct 2025 Delhi visit + "no Afghan soil against India" + Kabul embassy upgrade

Counter-view

Katju: engagement buys leverage but risks legitimising the regime

Conclusion routes

RI serious near-term reversal, yet core security and connectivity interests protected **R2** calibrated engagement without recognition → impact contained, not permanent

The Taliban's return in August 2021 undid two decades of Indian statecraft in a single stroke. Shivshankar Menon treats Afghanistan as a test case for India's claim to be a leading power, making the reversal costly on every front.

Nearly US \$ 3 billion in projects & hard-won goodwill stood exposed. Security worries returned first - ISI linked proxies like the LeT and JeM, ISIS-K & narcotics - and Happyman Jacob cautions that soft power alone cannot protect India when Delhi holds no Plan B. Chabahar & the Delaram-Zaranj route to Central Asia came under strain, while China and Pakistan gained room for a hostile axis in Kabul.

Taliban - Pakistan friction then reopened space. Deepika Saraswat reads the Taliban as transaction - minded, the rift with Islamabad as India's opening. Amir Khan Mutlagi assumed that Afghan soil would not be used against India, & India's upgrading of its Kabul Mission to embassy status marked a clear recovery.

Vivek Katju cautions that such contact risks legitimising the regime. Still, calibrated engagement without recognition has let India protect its security and connectivity interests a reversal contained, not permanent.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2022 · 10 marks

Discuss the role of public diplomacy in the enhancement of India's global standing.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI define public diplomacy → **Nye**: instrument converting attraction → standing → India's "leading power" claim **R2** a rising India needs legitimacy, not just capacity → attraction as the low-cost route to standing

Body flow

Nye's frame → **Thussu**: Buddha to Bollywood, appeal largely society-generated → ICCR institutionalises heritage into goodwill → recent delivery: vaccine diplomacy + Voice of Global South + G20 "One Earth, One Family, One Future" / Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam → bridge West-South → low-cost influence + UNSC/governance-reform case

Counter-view

Ian Hall's limits of government action → state amplifies but cannot manufacture attraction (springs from society) → credibility needs delivery to match rhetoric + cohesive image at home

Conclusion routes

RI public diplomacy widens standing as a low-cost multiplier → complements, does not replace, hard capacity **R2** standing grows only when projection meets performance → attraction sustained by credibility

Public diplomacy is a state's effort to inform and win over foreign publics, building influence through attraction rather than force. Joseph Nye treats it as the instrument that converts soft-power appeal into standing, & for India it now underpins the claim of being a "leading power".

India's appeal, as Daya Kishan Thussu shows, runs from Buddha to Bollywood its pluralism, yoga, cinema & vast diaspora. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations institutionalises this, turning heritage into goodwill through scholarships & cultural programmes abroad.

Vaccine diplomacy during the pandemic, the Voice of Global South summits, and the G20 theme "One Earth, One Family, One Future", rooted in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, present India as a bridge between the West & the Global South. Such goodwill sustains influence at low cost, as in Afghanistan, and strengthens its case for UNSC & governance reform.

According to Ian Hall, government action has limits: the state can amplify attraction but not manufacture it, since much of it springs from society. India's standing therefore grows only when projection is matched by consistent delivery and a cohesive democratic image at home.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2022 · 15 marks

Discuss India's vision of a New World order in the 21st century.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 "Asian Century" / Indo-Pacific pivot → multipolar order, no fresh hegemon or bipolar bloc → pluralist heritage vs China's "Middle Kingdom" **R2** thesis-first: multipolar + reformist → built on strategic autonomy and multi-alignment → then locate in the "Asian Century"

Body flow

autonomy + multi-alignment → Jaishankar (inaction → action; engage US/Russia/EU/ASEAN by interest) → **Raja Mohan** (non-alignment → multi-alignment; power diffuses) → balancer → leading state → UNSC reform / IMEC / I2U2 / Global South / G20 (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam) → **Bajpae** (bridge West-Global South; reformist, not revisionist)

Counter-view

is it truly multipolar? → **Rajagopalan** (bipolar US-China; costly illusion) → **Acharya** (post-Western, multiplex; no single dominant power) → India's multipolarity = goal as much as description

Conclusion routes

R1 reformist agency → multi-alignment steers a diffusing order toward inclusion → convert flexible autonomy into consistent leadership **R2** multipolarity still aspiration as much as fact → India's task is to realise it → change through inclusion, not disruption

The 21st century is widely read as the "Asian century" with the Indo-Pacific as its pivot & India a central player. India's vision of a new world order is multipolar.

It seeks to widen strategic space without a fresh hegemon or a rigid bipolar bloc, reflecting a pluralistic heritage that stands apart from China's "Middle Kingdom" outlook.

The vision rests on strategic autonomy & multi-alignment. S. Jaishankar redefines autonomy from a choice of inaction into a choice of action, engaging the US, Russia, the EU & ASEAN by interest rather than loyalty. C. Raja Mohan traces India's move from non-alignment to multi-alignment as power diffuses across many centres.

India thus aims to rise from a balancer to a leading state. It presses UNSC reform, Builds IMEC & I2U2 & champions the Global South, its G20 theme "One Earth, One Family, One Future" rooted in Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.

Rajesh Rajagopalan holds the system is bipolar, led by US & China, and calls multipolarity a costly Indian illusion.

Amitav Acharaya offers a subtler reading : a post-Western, multiplex order with no single dominant power. For India, this leaves multipolarity as much a goal as a description of the present.

India's vision is therefore reformist agency, using multi-alignment to steer a diffusing order toward inclusion. Its success turns on converting flexible autonomy into consistent leadership.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2025 · 10 marks

Would you agree with the contention that India's inclination to lean on a 'more aggressive hyper-realist posture' has gained a new momentum in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist strike? Comment.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 "hyper-realist" = **Bajpai's** strand → security from military strength / use of force, not institutions → Pahalgam + Sindoor gave it clearest momentum in declared posture **R2** Pahalgam strike → Sindoor + "new normal" → force-first signalling → does the hyper-realist strand now have fresh momentum?

Body flow

Modi's "new normal" (retaliate on own terms / no nuclear blackmail / no terrorist-sponsor distinction) → strikes deep in Punjab + IWT in abeyance → **Tarapore**: restraint → cost-imposition (degrade, not just threaten) → **Jacob**: doctrinal innovation, terror strike = act of war, calls nuclear bluff

Counter-view

momentum in posture, not settled doctrine → **Awasthi**: "half-completed revolution," no codification → force stayed calibrated → strategic autonomy held (resisted mediation)

Conclusion routes

R1 real momentum, but firmer realism within calibrated tradition → not wholesale conversion **R2** hyperrealism ascendant in rhetoric + cost-imposition → yet bounded by calibration + autonomy → deepening, not displacement

The label "hyper-realist" belongs to Kanti Bajpai's reading of Indian strategic thought, where hyper-realists told that security flows from military strength & readiness to use force, not from institutions or restraint.

The Pahalgam attack of April 2025, & the Op. Sindoor strikes that followed, gave this strand its clearest momentum yet in India's declared posture. The evidence is direct. Modi's "new normal" promised retaliation for any terror attack on India's terms, rejected "nuclear blackmail", & erased the line between terrorists & the states that sponsor them. India struck deep inside Pakistani Punjab & held the Indus Waters Treaty in Abeyance.

Azhan Tarapore reads this as a move from restraint to steady cost-imposition, degrading terror capacity rather than merely threatening it. Happymon Jacob goes further, calling it a doctrinal innovation that treats a terror strike as an act of war & calls Pakistan's nuclear bluff.

Soumya Awasthi calls it a "half-completed revolution" that still lacks codification. The force stayed calibrated, & India guarded its strategic autonomy by resisting outside mediation.

The hyper-realist strand has gained real momentum, but as a firmer realism within India's calibrated tradition, not a wholesale conversion.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2025 · 15 marks

India maintains strong ties with countries that will assure a free and open Indo-Pacific and guarantee greater connectivity with rest of the world. Analyze.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 Indo-Pacific = pivot of world politics → India answers through partnerships, not alliances → frame = strategic autonomy **R2** India's own maritime vision: SAGAR → MAHASAGAR (2025) → sets the free-and-open frame

Body flow

maritime leg: Quad (US–Japan–Australia), Malabar + maritime domain awareness → France, Vietnam, ASEAN centrality (Act East) → open sea-lanes without treaty → connectivity leg: IMEC vs Belt and Road → Chabahar bypasses Pakistan → MAHASAGAR “trade for development”, inclusive alternative to BRI → links to Europe, Gulf, Global South

Counter-view

does partnership-without-alliance actually deliver? → **Tarapore**'s zone balancing (capacity-building short of alliance) vs **Rajagopalan**'s evasive balancing (satisfies neither China nor partners) → **Bajpae**: risk of a “second-tier” role as AUKUS hardens

Conclusion routes

R1 balancing without alliance → secures sea-lanes + connectivity while refusing entanglement → autonomy in practice **R2** the free-and-open order depends on converting flexible autonomy into consistent delivery

The Indo-Pacific has become the pivot of world politics, sharpened by China's rise & US-China rivalry & India secures a free and open order there through flexible partnerships rather than alliances.

Its guiding vision is SAGAR, widened in March 2025 to MAHASAGAR. India's strong ties run through the Quad with the US, Japan & Australia, expressed in the Malabar exercise & maritime domain awareness and extend to France, Vietnam & ASEAN centrality under the Act East Policy. Together they help secure open sea-lanes without any treaty commitment.

The IMEC answers China's BRI, Chabahar opens Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan & MAHASAGAR ties maritime security to "trade for development" as an inclusive alternative to Beijing's model. Such corridors widen India's links to Europe, the Gulf & the Global South.

Anzan Tarapore reads India's method as zone balancing — building partners' capacity to check China short of alliance. Rajesh Rajagopalan is sceptical, holding that this evasive balancing "can neither balance China adequately nor accommodate it sufficiently." Cheitigj Bajpae adds that as AUKUS takes on harder tasks, India risks becoming "a second-tier member."

India's design is balancing without alliance : it secures sea-lanes & connectivity while refusing permanent entanglement. The order it seeks will depend on turning flexible autonomy into consistent delivery.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2025 · 10 marks

For India, a multipolar world order would also mean a multipolar Asia. Comment.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

RI Cold War binaries dissolved → power diffused across many actors → India answers by multi-alignment (US, Russia, Europe, ASEAN — interest, not loyalty) → stake: world & Asia are one proposition **R2** Jaishankar → multipolar world “feasible only by a multipolar Asia” → global multipolarity empty if one power masters the region → stake the link

Body flow

world & Asia one proposition for India → China’s rise unbalances the region, narrows India’s choices (AIIB / expanded SCO / NDB) → India presses a multipolar Asia to secure interests vs China → design = equal distribution of power & responsibility → three elements: Asian security ↔ global security + India’s UNSC claim / shared decision-making (major & minor powers) / inclusivity not exclusivity (room for US) → shared leadership among India, China, Japan

Counter-view

is a multipolar Asia feasible? → **Rajagopalan**: China outweighs India or any Asian combination → Asia tilts to US-China bipolarity, India leans on the US → **Raja Mohan**: “myth of multipolarity” as a bipolar order forms

Conclusion routes

RI link holds as India’s purpose, not a guarantee → multipolar Asia a project, not an automatic yield of global multipolarity **R2** build it via India’s own rise + countervailing coalitions → India seeks a larger role in the diffusion of power while checking Chinese dominance

The world has moved from Cold war binaries to one where power sits with many actors. India reads this as an opening, responding through multi-alignment, engaging US, Russia, Europe & ASEAN by interest, not loyalty.

A multipolar world means little to India if a single power dominates its region. China's rise unbalances Asia's structure & narrows India's choices; the AIIB, an expanded SCO & the NDB marks its rising stature. India presses for a multipolar Asia to secure its interests against China.

The design rests on an equal distribution of power and responsibility. Three elements follow: the diffusion of power links Asian security to global security & strengthens India's claim at the UNSC;

major & minor powers share decision-making; and inclusivity, not exclusivity, leaves room for the US. India promotes shared leadership among itself, China and Japan.

Rajesh Rajagopalan argues China is "already wealthier & stronger than India or any combination of other Asian powers", pushing Asia toward US-China bipolarity & India toward US alignment. C. Raja Mohan sees a "myth of multipolarity" even as a bipolar order forms.

The link holds as India's purpose rather than a guarantee. A multipolar Asia must be built through India's own rise & countervailing coalitions - India seeking a larger role in the diffusion of power while checking dominance.

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