

EDITION 2026

PYQ Vault

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days

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DAY 50

Recent Developments in Foreign Policy — Part 2

· 8 questions

Day 50 of 50 — the final edition

Every question carries a Flow Snapshot — and a handwritten model answer on the channel; *“no PYQ will be unfamiliar.”*

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2017 · 10 marks

Has the recent Indo-Israeli relationships given a new dynamics to India's stand on Palestinian statehood?

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 1950 recognition / 1992 full ties → Palestine long read through the anti-colonial prism → Israel closeness changes the voicing, not the position | **R2** de-hyphenation as the pivot → two independent tracks, one unchanged principle → the new dynamics is one of forum

Body flow

principle intact (PLO 1974 → State of Palestine 1988 → pre-1967 borders + East Jerusalem) → instruments of continued support (US\$30m aid since 1995; Modi 2018 Ramallah) → multilateral voice still alive (Sept 2025 New York Declaration vote) → the shift: de-hyphenation = build with Israel, speak for Palestine elsewhere → Feb 2026 joint statement / Special Strategic Partnership drops the two-state formula → Res 2803 conditions statehood → **Pant** (adaptation) + **Gupta** (domestic anchor)

Counter-view

Haidar: the calibration reads as ambiguity, not balance → Arab normalisation has lowered the cost of pragmatism → support becomes more symbolic than substantive

Conclusion routes

R1 new dynamics in emphasis and instrument, not in principle
R2 statehood survives in India's votes but thins in its bilateral texts — the gap is the answer

India recognised Israel in 1950 but withheld full ties until 1992, reading Palestine through an anti-colonial prism. Closeness with Israel has since changed how India voices support for Palestinian statehood and not the position itself.

India recognised the PLO in 1974 & the state of Palestine in 1988, and still backs pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as capital. US \$30 million in aid since 1995 & Modi's 2018 Ramallah visit carry it forward. In September 2025 it voted for the General Assembly resolution endorsing the New York Declaration on two-state solution.

De-hyphenation lets India build with Israel while speaking for Palestine elsewhere. The February 2026 statement spoke of a just & durable peace, dropping two-state formula.

India also supported UNSC Resolution 2003, which conditions statehood. Harsh V. Pant calls this as adaptation. Kanchi Gupta calls that domestic opinion still anchors the commitment.

Suhasini Haidar finds the calibration ambiguous while Arab normalisation lowers its cost, leaving support more symbolic than substantive.

The new dynamics lies in emphasis, not principle. Statehood survives in India's votes but thins in its bilateral texts.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2018 · 20 marks

Do you think that India's capacity building role in Afghanistan has shrunk the strategic space for Pakistan there? Discuss.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 strategic depth = Pakistan's doctrine of a pliant Kabul as leverage vs India → India replied with capacity building, not arms → space narrowed but conditional | **R2** can soft/development power deny a rival strategic space? → yes, partly, but bounded by hard power

Body flow

\$3 bn footprint (Parliament, Salma Dam, 433 HICDP/34 provinces, ICCR students) → **Pant:** investment ties India to Afghan stability, goodwill Pakistan can't match → connectivity (Chabahar, Delaram-Zaranj, air corridors) bypasses Pakistan, cuts transit chokehold → **Sikri's** Kautilyan Mandal logic (friend of neighbour's neighbour) = structural check → [counter enters] → post-2021 reset resolves it: Pakistan's depth never arrived — Taliban reject Durand Line / shelter TTP / lean Iran-China → Islamabad fears encirclement, Kabul drifts to India → India's capacity-building capital → Muttaqi Oct-2025 visit + Kabul embassy upgrade → **Pant:** pragmatism not endorsement

Counter-view

soft/development power vs hard power — can goodwill deny strategic space when the rival holds ISI-Taliban links, the Haqqani nexus and geography? (**Jacob:** no Plan B; the 2021 fall shrank India's own space too)

Conclusion routes

R1 capacity building did shrink Pakistan's space, by denying it a monopoly and building goodwill that outlived regime change — not by displacing proxies | **R2** the decisive collapse of "strategic depth" came from the Taliban's own nationalism; India's development legacy is what let it profit

For decades Pakistan treated a pliant Kabul as "strategic depth" i.e. a friendly western frontier that would keep India out of Afghan affairs & give it leverage.

India answered not with arms but with capacity building, and that choice did narrow Pakistan's room. Though the gain rested on the security environment. India's footprint was large & non-military. Nearly \$3 billion built the Afghan Parliament, the Salma Dam and 433 High impact community development projects across all 34 provinces, with 14000 Afghan students studying in India through the ICCR.

According to Haresh V. Pant, this investment tied India to Afghan stability & won goodwill Pakistan could not match.

Rajiv Sikri calls this through Kautilya's Mandala logic, the friend of one's neighbour's neighbour making India-Afghanistan a structural check on Pakistan.

Happyman Jacob cautions that goodwill alone cannot protect Indian interests & lacked a backup plan. Pakistan kept the harder levers, ISI links with the Taliban, the Haqqani network & geography. When Kabul fell in 2021, India's own space shrank.

The Taliban reject the Durand Line, shelter the TTP & lean toward Iran & China, leaving Islamabad fearful of strategic encirclement as Kabul drifts toward India. Two decades of capacity building gave India durable re-entry.

Muttagi's October 2025 visit and the upgrade of the Kabul mission to an embassy, framed around development and capacity-building. As Pant argues, this is pragmatism, not endorsement.

India's capacity building thus did shrink Pakistan's strategic space not by displacing its proxies, but by denying it a monopoly and building goodwill that outlived regime change.

The decisive collapse of that depth, though, came from Taliban's own nationalism, which its development legacy let India exploit.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2020 · 15 marks

Identify the key sectors of cooperation between India and Israel since 2014. Examine their significance in strengthening the bilateral ties between the two countries.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 2014 as inflection → discreet, defence-heavy ties turn public and broad-based | **R2** Modi 2017 (first PM) + Netanyahu 2018 → cooperation widens past arms → two democracies / knowledge economies

Body flow

defence backbone (Barak-8 / Spyder / Phalcon AWACS / Heron → largest arms market → RAW-Mossad + terrorism convergence post-Oct 2023; **Kumaraswamy**: defence the real substance) → agriculture & water developmental face (≈35 CoEs → drip irrigation / desalination → food-water security) → technology newest pillar (satellites → Feb 2026 Special Strategic Partnership → AI, cyber) → trade & connectivity (\$200m → ~\$3.6bn 2024-25, 2nd-largest Asian partner, FTA under negotiation → Haifa Port / I2U2 / IMEC)

Counter-view

significance real but bounded → still defence-heavy → **Kanchi Gupta**: Palestine-statehood commitment holds → closeness stops short of alliance

Conclusion routes

R1 sectors do separate work (capability + development + innovation + connectivity) → breadth made ties resilient, steady through Gaza war | **R2** breadth, not any single deal → strengthened ties + anchored India's autonomy in a volatile West Asia

The year 2014 turned a discreet, defence-heavy relationship into a public & broad-based one. Modi's 2017 visit, the first by an Indian PM, & Netanyahu's 2018 return widened cooperation beyond arms.

Two democracies & two knowledge economies gave the ties economic & technological depth. Defence & security remain the backbone. The Barak-8, Spyder, Phalcon AWACS & Heron drones have made India Israel's largest arms market. While RAW-Mossad intelligence sharing & a shared view on terrorism grew closer after October 2023.

P.R. Kumaraswamy calls defence, not the publicly emphasised agriculture & technology, as the real substance of the partnership. Agriculture & water give the ties a developmental face.

Technology is the newest pillar i.e. satellite launches, and, since the Feb 2026 Special Strategic partnership, AI and cyber security.

Trade rose from \$200 million in 1992 to about \$3.6 billion in 2024-25, making India Israel's second-largest Asian partner, with a FTA now under negotiation. Haifa port, I2U2 & IMEC push the relationship toward regional connectivity.

Each sector does separate work i.e. capability, development, innovation & connectivity which together kept the ties steady through the Gaza war. Kanchi Gupta cautions that India will not drop its support for Palestinian statehood, so closeness stops short of alliances.

Sectoral breadth, not any single deal, has strengthened the relationship & anchored India's autonomy in a volatile region.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2022 · 20 marks

How does India-Israel bilateral ties reflect the autonomy of India's foreign policy choices?

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 autonomy = freedom of decision, not standing apart → Israel ties the sharpest live test | **R2** India deepens Israel while holding Arab/Iran/Palestine → simultaneity, not closeness, proves autonomy

Body flow

de-hyphenation, separate tracks judged on merit → **Taneja**: balancing/hedging/mediating in a fraying order + **Sebastian**: engaging all sides → 1950 recognition / 1992 full ties / Modi 2017 by choice, not bloc → issue-based cooperation for payoff (Barak-8, 27 CoEs, Haifa, IMEC/I2U2) → **Hameed**: bilateral → minilateral → Jaishankar: most-trusted partner set inside a multipolar world of autonomous decision-centres → autonomy under pressure (Palestine aid, settlement votes, June 2025 abstention, Global South) → **Gupta**: Palestine anchoring + **P.P. Singh**: strategic neutrality in 2025 crisis

Counter-view

de-hyphenation as drift from Palestine solidarity toward Israel reciprocity (peer-reviewed) → **Haidar**: abstentionism ambiguous → US-Israel tilt vs genuine independence

Conclusion routes

R1 values-based partnership converted into strategic asset while retaining freedom to decide | **R2** in a fracturing order, calibration is autonomy's proof, not its erosion

Strategic autonomy means freedom of decision i.e. choosing partners on India's own terms, not standing apart. India-Israel ties are the sharpest test of this freedom.

India has deepened them while keeping its Arab, Iranian & Palestinian ties intact. India engages Israel & Palestine on separate tracks & judges each on merit. Kabir Taneja calls India's West Asia posture as autonomy through balancing, hedging & mediating as the western-led order weakens.

Bejoy Sebastian calls it engaging all sides, safeguarding room to manoeuvre. India recognised Israel in 1950 but withheld full ties until 1992.

The cooperation itself is issue-based, chosen for developmental pay off. Barak-8 air defence, 27 CoEs spreading Israeli water technology across 21 states, the Haifa Port stake & IMEC and I2U2 corridors. Sameena Hameed frames this shift from bilateral dealing to multilateral connectivity.

S. Jaishankar calls Israel India's most trusted & innovative partner, yet at Munich in 2026 located such ties within a multipolar world of many independent centres of decision. Autonomy holds under pressure.

Kanchi Gupta notes India's continued backing for Palestinian statehood, & Brigadier P.P. Singh finds its strategic neutrality in the 2025 Iran-Israel crisis shielded its gains.

Recent peer-reviewed scholarship sees de-hyphenation drifting from solidarity with Palestine toward reciprocity with Israel, and Suhosini Haidar finds such abstentionism ambiguous, closer to a US-Israel tilt than to genuine independence.

India turns a values-based partnership into strategic asset while keeping its freedom to decide. In a fracturing order, that calibration is autonomy's working proof and not its erosion.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2023 · 15 marks

What are the challenges and limitations in India - Iran relations?

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 civilisational depth (Nehru, *Discovery of India*) → cordial but never strategic → the gap is the challenge | **R2** ancient cultural + Shia/Parsi bond → promise high, delivery capped → why?

Body flow

master constraint = US-Iran hostility (IAEA 2005-06 / ACU route 2010 / IPI abandoned / oil near-halt post-2019) → US-Israel-Gulf tilt breeds Iranian distrust → Chabahar as proof: 2024 deal → immediate US sanctions threat → 2018 waiver withdrawn Sept 2025 → grudging six-month exemption → hostage to US goodwill + trade deal → **Agarwal** “sub-par engagement” → direct irritants (Khamenei on Kashmir, Article 370, Farzad-B) + Afghanistan/Taliban divergence → China partnership + Russia treaty crowd India out

Counter-view

ties still indispensable (energy + Central Asia corridor) → **Pant:** balance = source of influence → caution read as strength

Conclusion routes

R1 but **Mattoo:** neutrality becoming a luxury as camps demand loyalty → limits persist, capped by the US factor | **R2** **Anita Inder Singh:** India “on the tightrope” → useful yet below strategic potential

India & Iran share civilisational depth. J.L. Nehru, in *Discovery of India*, observed that few peoples have been as closely related in origin and history.

But the relationship has stayed cordial without ever reaching a strategic partnership. The master constraint is US-Iran hostility, which has repeatedly forced India's hand. The IAEA votes against Iran (2005-06), the end of rupee-based Asian clearing Union route (2010), the abandonment of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, and the near halt of Iranian oil imports after 2019. India's deepening ties with US, Israel & the Gulf feed Iranian distrust.

The May 2024 ten-year contract met an immediate US sanctions threat; the 2018 waiver's withdrawal in September 2025, & the 6 month exemption granted soon after. **Rajeev Agarwal** calls Iran "conspicuous in its sub-par engagement" with India.

Ayatollah Khamenei's remarks linking Kashmir with Yemen & Bahrain, Iran's response to Article 370, the stalled Farsad-B gas-field dispute. Divergence over Afghanistan, where Iran's Taliban outreach complicates coordination. China's long-term partnership & Russia's new treaty crowd India out of Iranian projects.

Still, the relationship stays indispensable for energy & a corridor to Central Asia. Haresh V. Pant holds that balance is the source of Indian influence. But Amitabh Mattoo cautions that neutrality is becoming a luxury as rival camps demand loyalty.

India remains, in Anita Inder Singh's phrase, "on the tightrope".

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2024 · 20 marks

Critically examine the continuity and change in India's Palestine policy in the wake of the ongoing Israel-Hamas War.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 war didn't break the policy → exposed two layers already there (declared position stable / weight + method moving)

R2 continuity in the two-state creed → change in how far India will spend on it → moral solidarity to interest-led balancing

Body flow

Continuity: anti-colonial ethos / Gandhi 1938 → PLO 1974 → State of Palestine 1988 → two-state / pre-1967 / East Jerusalem → aid + hospital + scholarships through the war → Oct-2023 formula (condemn terror + concern for civilians) → Change: 1992 Israel opening + post-Oslo → “symbolic not substantive” → de-hyphenation (Modi 2017) → uneven voting (Dec-2024 yes → June-2025 abstain / Asia outlier) → legal caution (out of Genocide proceedings while Bhandari sits with the ICJ majority) → refusal to ban Hamas

Counter-view

the multi-alignment debate → **Pant** (balance = essence of influence) vs **Mattoo** (autonomy a stress test) + dependence read vs **D'Souza** (holds, but nears its limit if war drags)

Conclusion routes

R1 creed survived, will to spend political capital has not → hedged instrument of a multipolar strategy | **R2** two-state principle intact, effort behind it visibly lighter

The October 2023 war did not break India's Palestine policy; it exposed two layers within it. What shifted was the weight India gave the cause & how it showed support i.e. a move from moral solidarity to interest-led balancing.

India's stand grew from an anti-colonial ethos. Mahatma Gandhi in 1938 saw the land as belonging to the Arabs as England did to the English. India recognised the PLO in 1974 & the State of Palestine in 1988, & backs a two-state solution on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem. Aid, a super-speciality hospital & scholarships ran through the war, and India met the October attack with its old formula, condemning terror while voicing concern for civilians.

The 1992 opening to Israel & the post-Oslo turn had made support for Palestine more symbolic than substantive.

India stayed out of the Genocide Convention proceedings even as India's own Judge Dalveer Bhandari sat with the ICT majority, and refused Israeli requests to ban Hamas.

Harsh V. Pant calls it as calibrated multi-alignment, arguing that balance is not survival but the source of India's influence. Amitabh Mattoo is wavier, treating strategic autonomy as a stress test, not a settled doctrine, and read its Gaza silence as dependence, not autonomy.

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza takes the middle view i.e. the balance holds, but nears its limit if the war drags on. The creed has survived but the will to spend political capital on it has not.

India's Palestine policy is now a hedged instrument of its multipolar strategy. The two-state principle intact & the effort behind it visibly lighter.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2025 · 20 marks

India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US' offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 two refusals = one doctrine → Jaishankar's "choice of action"

R2 "time-tested" ≠ static → non-alignment → multi-alignment (Raja Mohan) → issue-based, not ideological (Gokhale)

Body flow

Kashmir: Simla 1972 bilateralism → Trump's May 2025 mediation declined, US role unacknowledged → Quad/defence ties still deepen → Ukraine: non-interference pillar (Galwan / Crimea 2014 / Ukraine 2022) → Western sanctions → discounted oil, 2nd-largest buyer, ~600% trade → **Pant**: sharpest test + structural room from US-China rivalry

Counter-view

Tellis: refusal to choose undermines security → pick Washington vs China → **Jacob**'s rejoinder: "what is the alternative?" but energy/manufacturing/defence dependence caps autonomy → 2025 50% tariffs as the live test

Conclusion routes

R1 autonomy = deliberate action, not passive neutrality | **R2** real agency, but exercised within structural limits, not above them

The "time-tested" description hides an evolution from Nehruvian non-alignment to what C. Raja Mohan terms multi-alignment.

S. Jaishankar has redefined strategic autonomy from a "choice of inaction" into a "choice of action".

Vijay Gokhale separates sharply from old ideological non-alignment. Kashmir & Ukraine are two applications of one doctrine. On Kashmir, India treats third-party mediation as a breach of the bilateral principle settled by the Shimla Agreement of 1972. When Donald Trump repeatedly offered to mediate after the May 2025 conflict, New Delhi firmly declined & acknowledged no US role in ending confrontation, holding that Kashmir must be settled bilaterally. It guarded that bilateral frame even as defence & Indo-Pacific ties with US deepened through the Quad.

On Ukraine, non-interference has long been the steady pillar with Moscow. Russian silence over Galwan matched by India's neutrality on Crimea in 2014 & Ukraine in 2022.

Harsh V. Pant calls this the sharpest test of autonomy under Modi, while noting that US-China rivalry & US's need for India widen Delhi's room.

Ashley Tellis argues that a refusal to choose undermines India's security, and that Delhi is better served by a privileged partnership with US to contain China. Happyman Jacob, in "what is the alternative?" concedes that dependence on imported energy, manufacturing & defence supplies narrows the very room for manoeuvre that autonomy promises. Trump's 50% tariffs in 2025, which India called "unjustified", expose the constraint.

Strategic autonomy, then, is a deliberate choice but one exercised within hard structural limits, not above them.

PREVIOUS YEAR QUESTION

UPSC 2025 · 20 marks

India's reluctance to perceive any 'existential threat' inevitably made the multilateral path to nuclear security a 'default option' until it decided to cross the nuclear Rubicon in 1998. Identify and analyze some of the major reasons behind this shift in India's position on the nuclear question.

FLOW SNAPSHOT — how the answer moves

Intro routes

R1 multilateral path = "default," not conviction → no acute existential threat → capability latent since the 1966 signal / 1974 Smiling Buddha | **R2** four decades of restraint → what changed by 1998 was the reasons, not the capability → three pressures converge

Body flow

dual programme (civilian + covert), difficult neighbourhood → Reason 1 security: China's arsenal grows + Pakistan covert (**Jaswant Singh**) → Reason 2 discriminatory order hardens: NPT 1995 indefinite + CTBT 1996 → permanent exclusion → "nuclear apartheid" (**Oak**, current) → Reason 3 status + domestic politics: nuclear-weapon-state declaration + great-power recognition

Counter-view

Perkovich: security not the whole story → domestic democratic politics + prestige drove a break no comparable state made → synthesis: external pressure + internal ambition together

Conclusion routes

R1 aftermath measured, not reckless → No First Use + credible minimum deterrence (**Sethi**) → responsible weaponisation | **R2** 1998 = declaration of a long-latent capability, once the multilateral option ceased to serve India's interests

For nearly 4 decades India treated disarmament & restraint as a default, not a settled conviction. A state that saw no immediate danger to its survival could keep capability latent and lean on the multilateral route.

The programme was dual i.e. civilian & quietly military shaped by a difficult neighbourhood since Nehru. Indira Gandhi's 1966 signal about "other competencies", & Operation Smiling Buddha in 1947, showed the capability existed while the decision to weaponise stayed on hold. What changed by 1998 was not the capability but the reasons for holding it back.

The regional balance turned against India as China's arsenal grew & Pakistan moved covertly toward the bomb. Jaswant Singh held that the rise of China & continued strains with Pakistan made the 1980s & 1990s a troubling period, leaving restraint hard to sustain.

The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 & the CTBT of 1996 threatened to freeze India permanently outside the nuclear club & close the disarmament path it had championed. This was the "nuclear apartheid" grievance. Niranjana Chandra Sekhara calls that India still presses this critique of a regime that legitimises 5 arsenals while denying others the same right.

Declaring India a nuclear-weapon state carried the pull of great-power recognition. George Perkovich argues that security was not the whole story, & domestic democratic politics and the desire for prestige drove a break from restraint that no comparable state had shown.

Manpreet Sethi views India's posture through No First Use & credible minimum deterrence. The Rubicon of 1998 declared what had long stayed latent, once the multilateral option no longer served India's interests.

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