

The Changing International Political Order

Day 33. The Cold War, its collapse, the unipolar moment, and the contest now under way — every phase, scholar and debate from the Foundation & OGP class, compressed for fast recall. **Revise → write a little → don't break the chain.**

Exam load, UPSC 2016–2024: **4 × 10-markers · 12 × 15-markers · 7 × 20-markers.**

"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." — **Francis Fukuyama**

PART A The Cold War Order · 1945–1991

1 The Order and Its Two Shifts

The **international political order** is the pattern of power, rules and relationships that governs how states behave at a given moment. Since 1945 that pattern has shifted twice over.



The question that runs through the unit: did the Cold War's end bring a **new order** — or a **new disorder**?

2 The Cold War: Meaning and Origins

An intense ideological, political and strategic rivalry between the USA and the USSR after the Second World War.

Meaning


- “Cold” because it never escalated into **direct military conflict** between the two superpowers — yet the whole world was shaped by their competition.
- Term first used by **George Orwell** (1945) for an “undeclared state of war”; popularised soon after by **Walter Lippmann** and **Bernard Baruch**.
- **Winston Churchill** (1946) gave it its imagery — the division of Europe as an “**Iron Curtain**”.

Origins

- No single start date; tensions hardened around 1945 as the wartime alliance broke down.
- Post-war shift from a **multipolar** to a **bipolar** system dominated by the USA and the USSR.
- Spheres of influence carved out in Europe at **Yalta** and **Potsdam**; Germany and Berlin divided into a Soviet-controlled East and a Western-controlled West.

3 Phases of the Cold War

Four movements, from confrontation to thaw and back to confrontation.



First phase (1945–62): confrontation and containment

- **Europe** — **Berlin Blockade** (1948–49): the USSR cut ground access to West Berlin; the Western **Berlin Airlift** supplied the city — the first major confrontation. **Marshall Plan** (1948): US aid to rebuild Western Europe; the USSR answered with **COMINFORM** and the **Molotov Plan**. **NATO** (1949): US-led mutual defence pact → the USSR formed the **Warsaw Pact** (1955). Containment formalised in the **Truman Doctrine** (1947). **Berlin Wall** (1961) — the Iron Curtain in concrete.
- **Asia** — **Korean War** (1950–53): North Korea crossed the 38th parallel with Soviet approval; the USA intervened under the UN banner; **Mao Zedong** sent Chinese troops to aid the North; stalemate at the 38th parallel. **Vietnam War**: rooted in Eisenhower's fear of the **domino effect**; the USA formed **SEATO**

(1954).

- **Middle East** — **Suez Crisis** (1956): **Gamal Abdel Nasser** nationalised the Suez Canal; Britain, France and Israel intervened; the USA and the USSR pressed them to withdraw — exposing the declining weight of the old European powers. The USA formed **CENTO**.
- **Latin America** — **Cuban Missile Crisis** (1962): Soviet missiles in Cuba brought the world to the brink. **Khrushchev** sought to protect **Fidel Castro** and offset US missiles in Turkey. The settlement: the USSR to remove its missiles from Cuba; the USA not to invade Cuba and, secretly, to withdraw its missiles from Turkey.

Cambridge histories of the Cold War read these episodes as proof that the superpowers were willing to fight through **proxy wars** (**Odd Arne Westad**), and that Berlin and Cuba dramatised the era's dangers (**James G. Hershberg**, **Douglas Little**).

Second phase: the crises

- Followed **Stalin's** death (1953) and the rise of **Nikita Khrushchev**.
- **Berlin Crisis** (1961): East Germany built the Wall to stop the exodus westward; **John F. Kennedy** chose not to confront the USSR militarily. Then the **Cuban Missile Crisis** (1962) — the peak of nuclear brinkmanship.

Third phase — Détente (1962/1969–1979)

- A thaw, as both sides recognised the costs of overstretch.
- **Charles de Gaulle** (France) and **Willy Brandt** (West Germany) sought better ties with the East; Brandt's **Ostpolitik** aimed to normalise relations with East Germany and the USSR.
- **Richard Nixon** and **Henry Kissinger** pursued détente with the USSR and opened relations with China, working the Sino-Soviet split (**Jussi M. Hanhimäki**).
- **Helsinki Accords** (1975): the West acknowledged Soviet control over Eastern Europe; the USSR accepted human-rights commitments.
- Arms control: **SALT** talks and the **ABM Treaty**.
- Détente was partial — proxy wars continued (1971 India–Pakistan war, Arab–Israeli wars).

The Sino-Soviet split

- USSR–PRC relations deteriorated in the late 1960s over ideology and strategy, producing border clashes (**Zhang Shu Guang**).
- The split opened the door to US engagement with China, shifting the balance of power (**Sergey Radchenko**).

New Cold War (1979–1989)

- Triggered by the **Soviet invasion of Afghanistan** (1979), read by the USA as expansionism.
- **Jimmy Carter** imposed sanctions; the USA boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
- The fall of South Vietnam (1975) had already signalled détente's failure and raised US domestic pressure to confront Soviet influence (**Fredrik Logevall**).
- **Ronald Reagan** took a hardline stance; his rhetoric and military build-up were read by the USSR as aggressive (**Beth A. Fischer**). Reagan combined two pressures — backing Islamic fighters against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and launching a renewed nuclear arms race.
- The fall of the **Berlin Wall** (1989) and the **Malta Summit** marked the end.

4 The Arms Race during the Cold War

Cause and casualty of the rivalry at once.

Definition

An **arms race** is the competitive acquisition and advancement of military capability among two or more powerful states.

The nuclear race

- The US use of the atomic bomb in 1945 opened the nuclear age and bred mistrust; the USSR tested its first bomb in 1949.
- The **missile gap** perception of the 1950s drove US spending.
- **Strategic Defence Initiative** (SDI / "Star Wars"), proposed by **Reagan** in 1983 — a space-based missile defence. Never realised, yet the USSR read it as a major threat and the race intensified.

Other examples

- **UK–Germany** (pre-WWI): naval race; the launch of **HMS Dreadnought** (1906) set off rapid expansion and fed the tensions behind the First World War.
- **India–Pakistan**: continuing missile competition and a persistent nuclear standoff in South Asia.

Assessment

- **Francis J. Gavin**: the race heightened tension but also built a **deterrent** that prevented direct superpower conflict.
- On balance the effects are negative — heavy economic cost, debt and dependency (worst for arms importers), heightened hostility, and a measurable rise in the risk of war. The strain of the race contributed to the collapse of the USSR, leaving the USA as sole superpower.

5 Interpretations of the Cold War

Who is to blame? Three schools, and the standard three-mark opening of any Cold War answer.

School	Holds responsible	Core argument
Traditionalist / Orthodox	USSR	Soviet conduct was driven by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of worldwide class struggle and the spread of international communism.
Revisionist	USA	Soviet expansion was defensive — a “ buffer zone ” against the West, and a weakened Germany to prevent future invasion.
Post-Revisionist	Both	Both pursued hegemonic ambitions; alternative readings stress miscalculation on both sides.

PART B Collapse, and the Unipolar Moment

6 The End of the Cold War and the Disintegration of the USSR

The events of 1989 have been described as “**an earthquake**” in world politics — demonstrations, strikes and the fall of governments in rapid succession across Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's reforms (1985)

- **Mikhail Gorbachev** introduced **glasnost** (openness — political liberalisation, freer debate) and **perestroika** (restructuring — limited market incentives to revive a sluggish economy).
- Unintended effect: the new freedom ignited demands for autonomy. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) declared independence, followed by Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Internal reasons for disintegration

- **Historical** — communism was forcibly imposed forty years earlier under **Stalin**; the absence of democratic processes alienated citizens.
- **Cultural** — failure to compete with the West in consumer culture, the third industrial revolution and information technology. West German television had a strong effect in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; Western pop culture pulled the young.
- **Political** — economic failure eroded the legitimacy of ruling parties; authoritarian governance bred resentment; hardship unified workers, intellectuals, youth and underground organisations against the elite; regimes grew hesitant to use force against dissent.
- **Economic** — pervasive failure to match capitalist living standards; technological lag stalled growth.

External reasons

- **Role of the USSR** — Gorbachev's reforms; revocation of the **Brezhnev Doctrine** (no longer using force to prop up communist regimes); withdrawal of the Soviet military guarantee.
- **Role of the West** — moral support to opposition movements; the expectation of Western aid.
- **Demonstration effect** — success in one country inspired the next, producing a chain reaction.

Dissolution

- **Gorbachev**, General Secretary of the CPSU and President of the USSR, resigned on **25 December 1991**, transferring the Soviet nuclear codes to Russian President **Boris Yeltsin**; the Soviet flag over the Kremlin was replaced by the Russian flag.
- The **August 1991 coup** against Gorbachev hastened the collapse; the republics formed the **Commonwealth of Independent States** (CIS).
- The USSR split into **fifteen** independent republics.

Assessment of the collapse

- **Archie Brown**: Gorbachev's reforms unintentionally accelerated the collapse.
- **Alex Pravda**: internal economic crisis and nationalist movements drove the dissolution.
- **Combined cause**: economic hardship + cultural exposure + political repression + the demonstration effect, with Gorbachev's removal of the fear of Soviet intervention as the decisive trigger.

7 The Fall of the Communist Governments

Six regimes, six routes out — the detail that separates a good answer from a general one.

Country	How the regime fell
Poland	Prolonged resistance by Solidarity (Lech Wałęsa), backed by the Catholic Church; August 1989 saw Eastern Europe's first non-communist government.
Hungary	Change driven by elite power struggles; borders opened (September 1989), letting East Germans flee West; a multiparty system

	adopted.
East Germany (GDR)	Mass exodus and peaceful protest; the Berlin Wall fell (November 1989); the entire government resigned.
Czechoslovakia	The peaceful Velvet Revolution ; the dissident playwright Václav Havel elected President (December 1989).
Bulgaria	Slow, gradual change; the party ousted Todor Zhivkov ; rise of the Union of Democratic Forces.
Romania	Nicolae Ceaușescu resisted reform; a violent revolution; Ceaușescu and his wife were executed on 25 December 1989.

8 Effects and Consequences of the End of the Cold War

The structural consequences.

- Birth of **unipolarity** — the USA as sole superpower.
- A shift toward a **multi-centric order** and an enhanced role for the United Nations.
- Rise of **terrorism and non-state actors** as global challenges, epitomised by 9/11.
- Spread of liberalisation, democratisation and open competition, alongside calls to democratise the UN Security Council.
- The world entered a system widely called the **New World Order** — read variously as the “end of history”, a unipolar age, or the dawn of peace; many feared instead a **new world disorder**.

For developing states — the ledger

- **Gains** — autonomy from superpower proxy conflict; transition to market economies opening trade and investment; reduced global military spending; a wave of political liberalisation as Soviet-backed authoritarian regimes lost their patron; new UN, IMF and World Bank memberships; a genuine **choice of development model** instead of a forced capitalist–communist binary.
- **Costs** — dependence on a dominant USA; neo-liberal conditionalities forcing markets open; loss of Soviet trade ties, aid and preferential routes producing hyperinflation, GDP decline and brain drain in former satellites.
- **Centrifugal forces unleashed** — the removal of the external threat released ethnic, racial and religious conflict: the break-up of Yugoslavia and bloodshed among Serbs, Croats and Muslims; Kosovo (1999); **Huntington’s** “clash of civilizations” prediction.
- **Varied by country** — depending on prior dependence on the USSR: Lithuania and Latvia turned West successfully; Armenia and Tajikistan struggled. Net effect: a mixed and more turbulent order.

9 Images of the Post-Cold War Order: Order or Disorder?

Seven models competed to characterise the new system. Learn each with its critic.

Model	Thesis	Criticism
End of History Francis Fukuyama	“The End of History?” (1989), expanded into <i>The End of History and the Last Man</i> (1992): Western liberal democracy may be the endpoint of ideological evolution and the final form of government. The Cold War’s end was the end of communism — disproving Karl Marx’s prophecy that communism would replace capitalism.	Jacques Derrida rejected the glorification of capitalism. Democratic peace theorists, by contrast, supported Fukuyama.
Three-bloc geo-economics Walter Russell Mead, Jeffrey Garten, Edward Luttwak, Lester Thurow	Geo-economics has replaced geopolitics: three competing blocs — a Japan-led Pacific Rim, a US-led Western Hemisphere (around NAFTA), and a German-centred Europe. Thurow predicted one bloc would “own the twenty-first century” as Britain owned the nineteenth and the USA the twentieth.	Joseph Nye : the model “runs counter to the thrust of global technological trends” — firms will resist confinement to a third of the market, and small states need a global system to guard against larger neighbours.
Revitalized balance of power Henry Kissinger	Realist traditionalists foresaw a return to multipolarity among the USA, China, Russia and Europe. Kissinger foresaw a gradual decline of America’s relative power and a return to interest-based foreign policy without an overriding ideological threat.	Joseph Nye : a false analogy to the nineteenth century. Richard Rosecrance questioned traditional balance-of-power thinking and warned of US–Japan friction.
Clash of Civilizations Samuel P. Huntington	1993: conflict in the new world will be neither primarily ideological nor economic but cultural , running along civilizational fault lines . Gained prominence after 11 September 2001.	The rise of ISIS, its caliphate under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi , and Sunni–Shia conflict point to clashes <i>within</i> civilizations, not only between them.
The Unipolar Moment Charles Krauthammer	The Cold War’s end left the USA as sole superpower in a “ unipolar moment ” — one that would pass, but could last decades. Sustainability tied to leadership in the Military Technical Revolution (MTR) / Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) , demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991.	Krauthammer himself expected multipolarity “in time” — see §15.
Zones of Peace and Turmoil Max Singer & Aaron Wildavsky	<i>The Real World Order</i> splits the world into a Zone of Peace (Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, Australasia — about 15% of population, where democracies do not fight one another) and a Zone of Turmoil (former Soviet states and most of Asia,	Robert D. Kaplan , <i>The Coming Anarchy</i> (1994): scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease undermine social order in these regions.

The Global Village Marshall McLuhan

Coined in *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962) and *Understanding Media* (1964): telecommunications contract the world and spread technologies, values and lifestyles. **Thomas L. Friedman**, *The World Is Flat*: technology and globalisation have levelled the competitive field.

Counter-trend: “**America First**” under **Donald Trump** revived talk of an “End of Globalization”.

New World Order vs New World Disorder

- The phrase was first floated by **Gorbachev** at the UN (December 1988); President **George H. W. Bush** gave it detail in his September 1990 *Towards a New World Order* speech — US-led rule of law, US–Soviet partnership, collective security.
- Critics dismissed it as a catchphrase without strategic content: cooperation reflected Soviet weakness and the personal Bush–Gorbachev rapport.
- The Cold War had suppressed ethnic and regional tensions by maintaining the image of an external threat; its end unleashed centrifugal forces — Yugoslavia, Chechnya (1994).
- Andrew Heywood**’s verdict: the “**liberal moment**” in world affairs turned out to be the “**unipolar moment**” — the order’s real meaning was the removal of any challenger to the USA.


10 The Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Unipolar Moment

The first major international crisis in West Asia after the Cold War — and the proving ground of US primacy.

Genesis

- An old territorial dispute: Iraq (a British mandate from 1920) questioned Kuwait’s legitimacy from the start; clashes over the **Bubiyan** and **Warba** islands and the **Rumaila** oil field.
- After the costly **Iran–Iraq War** (1980–88), Iraq emerged with a strong army but a wrecked economy and heavy debts; oil-rich Kuwait looked like the solution.
- Iraq accused Kuwait and the UAE of exceeding OPEC quotas and depressing oil prices. **Michael Brecher** notes the clear evidence that Iraq initiated the crisis to extract concessions.
- Saddam Hussein** misread US signals, assuming Washington — which had backed Iraq against Iran — would not intervene.

From invasion to ceasefire, in seven months



Impact

- USA** — enhanced prestige; superpower status confirmed; the **RMA** demonstrated; precedents set for future intervention.
- Iraq** — Saddam survived, but faced sanctions, internal Kurdish and Shia uprisings, and isolation.
- International relations** — unprecedented cooperation between former Cold War adversaries; **collective security** under UN auspices.
- Region** — Iran exploited Iraq’s weakness; Arab states wrestled with siding with the West against a fellow Arab state.

11 American Triumphalism and the Declinist Thesis

The mood of the 1990s, and the counter-argument that arrived with it.

Triumphalism

- The USA claimed credit for the USSR’s collapse and the victory of capitalism. **Fukuyama**’s “end of history” and **Krauthammer**’s “unipolar moment” expressed the mood.
- Neoconservatives **William Kristol** and **Robert Kagan** argued for perpetuating US primacy; **Thomas Friedman** equated globalisation with Americanisation.
- The **11 September 2001** attacks intensified it — **George W. Bush** declared a **Global War on Terrorism** (GWOT).
- Limits emerged: the 2008 financial crisis undermined faith in free-market capitalism; prolonged wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria exposed the limits of US power.

The declinist thesis

- Robert Pape**: the USA faces unprecedented decline — a falling share of global output, accelerated by mismanaged policy.
- The thesis is not new (it surfaced during the Cold War and again in the 1970s) but gained fresh traction with the rise of the emerging economies.

12 The Concept of Power in International Relations

Every polarity and hegemony answer opens here.

Working definition

Power is a state's ability to influence the actions and policies of other states, drawn from socio-cultural, political, economic and military capability. Realists hold that states seek power both to influence others and to resist the negative effects of others' interactions.

Scholarly conceptions

- **Hans J. Morgenthau** (1948): international politics is a “**struggle for power**”; power politics is inevitable.
- **Kenneth Waltz** (1979): a bipolar system is the most stable order, as national interests align with bloc interests.
- **Robert Gilpin** (*War and Change in International Politics*): states build structures to advance their interests and seek to alter the system as those interests evolve.
- **John Mearsheimer** (offensive neorealist): a hegemon continually strengthens itself and weakens rivals to dominate its region.
- **Robert Dahl** (1957, *The Concept of Power*): power is **relational, multidimensional** and without permanency.
- **Joseph Nye** and **Robert Keohane** (1977, *Power and Interdependence*): **asymmetrical interdependence** is itself a power resource.

“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” — **Robert Dahl**

Classification

- By nature — **hard power** (military, economic coercion) and **soft power** (culture, values, attraction — **Nye**).
- By sphere of influence — global, regional and sub-regional powers.

Tier	Marks of the tier
Global / great power	Worldwide influence with both hard and soft power. Paul Kennedy (1987): a great power's strength varies with the historical and political environment. Martin Wight : a “ dominant power ” can create, define and monopolise international conflicts.
Regional power	Major share of regional GDP and trade; dominant military, political and cultural influence — e.g. India, Brazil.
Sub-regional power	Smaller-scale influence over neighbours, aspiring to regional status — within the Middle East, South Asia, East Africa.

Kenneth Waltz's five requirements of a great power:

Population & territory Resource availability & mobilisation Economic output Political stability Military strength & reach

13 Polarity in the International System

The distribution of power determines the system's **polarity**.

System	Structure and example
Unipolar	One state dominates with unmatched economic, military and cultural influence. Monteiro's three features — an anarchic system (no superior authority); no balance of power (no comparable rival); states interact without overarching control. Example: post-Cold War US dominance; France held a near-hegemonic position from 1792 to 1815 under Napoleon.
Bipolar	Two dominant states or blocs; states align with one pole; zero-sum, competitive dynamics. Example: the Cold War.
Multipolar	Multiple significant powers; competition to fill vacuums; no single hegemon. Post-Cold War example: China, Russia, India, the EU.

The stability debate

Which structure keeps the peace?

BIPOLARITY IS STABLE

Two poles, clear deterrence, less miscalculation

Kenneth Waltz · John Mearsheimer
John Lewis Gaddis — the Cold War as the “**Long Peace**”

MULTIPOLARITY IS STABLE

Alliances and limited wars absorb the shocks

Hans Morgenthau · E. H. Carr
Classical realists — powers gain through alliances and limited wars that threaten no one directly

India's stated position: support for a multipolar order underpinned by international law and respect for sovereignty (**Harsh Vardhan Shringla**).

14 Emerging Centres of Power

The Cold War's end brought a decline of bipolarity, a rise of globalisation, the growth of non-state actors and a redistribution of power to new states.

Robert J. Guttman: a twenty-first-century superpower needs economic and military strength, market and technological prowess, a young educated workforce, and a global vision.

Centre	Capability	Strategy & strain
China	Population ~1.4 billion; GDP ~\$17.8 trillion (~16.8% of world GDP); the world's "global factory"; largest armed forces; second-highest military spending.	String of Pearls (ports from China to Africa); the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Russia	Largest country (~17 million sq km); ~30% of the world's natural resources; major energy exporter; second-largest nuclear arsenal.	Influence in Central Asia and the former Soviet space; active in Syria; annexation of Crimea (2014).
India	Second most populous, with a young workforce; GDP ~\$3.08 trillion; fastest-growing major economy; fourth-largest armed forces.	Act East Policy ; the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) with Japan; the Quad .
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — ~40% of global population, ~29.3% of global GDP.	The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Strain: divergent national interests; economic and strategic asymmetry, above all China's dominance.
European Union	27 states; ~15% of global trade; one of the three largest trade players; integrated market and currency; largest contributor to humanitarian aid.	Strain: Brexit and internal cohesion; the absence of a unified military.

15 Multipolarity, Bipolarity and the New Bipolarity

Three readings of the order now forming.

Towards a multipolar order

- **Charles Krauthammer** himself predicted that multipolarity would come "in time", with great powers coequal to the USA and a structure resembling the pre-WWI era.
- Trends: the rise of emerging powers (China, Russia, India, Japan, the EU; regional players such as Iran, South Korea, Australia); the shift of power from West to East — "from the USA to the BRICs", sometimes called the '**Asian century**'.
- China is the most significant rival — cheap labour, manufacturing dominance, growing military and soft power. Russia's re-emergence rests on energy and military assertiveness.

Scholarly assessments

- **Megan Dee:** an emerging multipolar world — shrinking borders, new power brokers, diffuse power; the West can no longer dictate; the wealth of the USA, Europe and Japan wanes while the Global South (China, India, Brazil) rises.
- **Bekir Ilhan:** the US pullback created a "**false perception**" of multipolarity — Russia and China are not yet peer competitors; Russia's conventional weakness stands exposed in Ukraine, and China's power-projection capacity remains limited.
- **Ashok Kumar Behuria:** "**Multipolarity is what the states make of it**" — it opens windows of strategic autonomy for weaker states to multi-align, but a long, fuzzy transition lets powerful states manipulate norms; outcomes depend on each state's power potential, geography, demography, resources and quality of leadership.

The concept of 'multipolar disorder'

- Neorealists warn that multipolarity tends toward instability and chaos.
- **John Mearsheimer** criticised the end of Cold War bipolarity, warning of a "**back to the future**" scenario — the multipolar orders that produced the two World Wars let ambitious powers pursue expansion while balances stayed fluid. More actors → more possible conflicts → higher uncertainty and a sharper **security dilemma**.
- Pessimists on the US–China transition note that declining hegemons rarely adjust peacefully, while rising powers seek politico-military weight to match economic dominance — the basis for potential Sino-US conflict over Taiwan, Tibet, human rights and resource rivalry.

Way forward — managing the transition

- The USA's established approach has been to **accommodate** likely rivals out of enlightened self-interest — as with post-1945 Japanese reconstruction and European integration, and largely toward China, India and Russia.
- This encourages emerging powers to **bandwagon** (join the US-led trading and financial system) rather than **balance**, and makes a "USA versus the Rest" conflict less likely — rivals worry as much about each other as about the USA.
- The US drift back to multilateralism improves its ability to manage shifting balances while preserving cooperation.

New bipolarity and Cold War 2.0

- A new bipolarity centres on **supporters and opponents of the order** — not ideology, but dissatisfaction with the order's failure to meet needs.

- **Cold War 2.0** (gaining traction under **Donald Trump**) is the US–China rivalry — economics, military build-up and the contest for the Indo-Pacific.

Basis	Cold War 1.0	Cold War 2.0
Similarities	Two principal contenders · nuclear deterrence · competing military alliances (NATO, and now the Quad and AUKUS) · proxy involvement.	
Ideology	Capitalism vs communism — a systemic clash	Reduced ideological tension — China has embraced capitalism
Economics	Minimal US–USSR trade	Deep interdependence — about \$660 billion in US–China trade
Theatre	Europe	Asia and the Indo-Pacific
Appetite for war	Superpowers fought through proxies	China is less willing or able to enter direct armed conflict

- **The reframing that scores:** bloc politics has shifted to **nexus politics** — Russia poses a military challenge, China an economic one, forming an “**anti-US nexus**” within a multipolar framework.
- **John Ikenberry** and **Joseph Nye**: this phase is more complex than the original Cold War — marked by interdependence and multipolarity rather than ideological confrontation. **Kishore Mahbubani** stresses strategic diplomacy.

The rise of China

- Frame with the line attributed to **Napoleon Bonaparte**: “Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.”
- **Drivers:** post-Cold War growth above 10% a year for a decade; WTO entry (December 2001) taking China from “factory of the world” to a leader in advanced technology; the 2008 slowdown in the West accelerating the shift in the Asian balance.
- **Instruments:** a modernised military across land, sea, air, space and cyber; the String of Pearls; the BRI/OBOR; **debt-trap diplomacy** (term coined by **Brahma Chellaney**, 2017).
- **Realist reading:** a rising power in an anarchic system converts economic strength into military might — a recipe for conflict.
- **Asian implications:** China perceived as a threat by India, Japan, Taiwan and several South-East Asian states; assertiveness in the South China Sea (Spratly and Paracel Islands, artificial islands); smaller states caught between trade with Beijing and resisting its sovereign claims; debt concerns in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar.
- **India’s dilemma** (**C. Raja Mohan**): China’s rise and the US response together present India its “**greatest geopolitical opportunity and biggest diplomatic challenge since independence**” — securing the land frontier (Galwan, 2020) while checking China in the Indian Ocean.
- **Containment responses:** Obama’s ‘**pivot to Asia**’ (2012); the **Quad**; partnerships with Vietnam and Indonesia; the US pledge to defend Taiwan.


Russia’s resurgence — a ‘Greater Russia’?

- **The case for:** Russia re-emerged as an **energy superpower**, using oil and gas over Eastern Europe and the “near abroad”; the 2008 war with Georgia; annexation of Crimea (2014); the invasion of Ukraine (2022) as a direct challenge to NATO’s eastward expansion; nationalism and a wish to restore a Soviet-era sphere; alignment with China to counterbalance the USA and NATO.
- **The limits of the analogy:** Russian military spending lags far behind NATO’s; much equipment is Cold War-era; long, exposed borders create vulnerability; the Ukraine “blunder” exposed conventional weaknesses (**Bekir Ilhan**). A semi-developed industrial base reliant on energy and arms exports cannot sustain a Soviet-scale project — Russia acts as the **military complement** to China’s economic challenge, a division of labour.
- **Systemic effect:** Russian conduct accelerates Cold War 2.0 and nexus politics, and a slide toward a contested multipolarity rather than a restored bipolar empire.
- **The line to write:** the expansionism is real and revisionist, but a literal “Greater Russia on Soviet lines” overstates Russian capability — **intent outruns means**.

PART D Hegemony and the Liberal Order

16 American Hegemony and Its Decline

Know the arc, the theories and the constraints.



Two perspectives on hegemony

- **Realist** — hegemony is a **power imbalance**: one state advantaged over the rest (**Tessman** and **Wolfe**).
- **Liberal** — the system a hegemon creates can persist even after the hegemon declines (**Robert Keohane**).

Geopolitical theories

- **Alfred T. Mahan** — who controls the sea controls the world.
- **Halford Mackinder** — the future belongs to land power.
- **Nicholas Spykman** — the decisive power controls the **Rimland** (land + ocean): India, China.

Power transition and the Thucydides Trap

- **Hegemonic Stability Theory**: the order's stability rests on the hegemon; the decline of *Pax Americana* opens space for transition.
- **A. F. K. Organski (Power Transition Theory)**: periods of hegemony are followed by periods of conflict.
- **Graham Allison's "Thucydides Trap"**: a rising power threatening an established one creates a high risk of war.
- **Brahma Chellaney** warns the "G-2" order is a trap, forcing countries to choose between a transactional USA and a predatory China; moderates like **Ryan Hass** and **Mira Rapp-Hooper** find no consensus on the outcome.

Gramscian and neo-Gramscian hegemony

- Hegemony is not only material (military): it has an **ideational / ideological** component realised discursively — the hegemon achieves its goals through **consent**, not only coercion.
- **Antonio Gramsci's** distinction — leadership based on consent versus leadership based on force — was anticipated by **Thucydides** on the Peloponnesian War; the *Prison Notebooks* inspired the IR application.
- **Neo-Gramscians**: the hegemon's leadership is central to the spread of capitalism and bourgeois economic interests; globalisation becomes a "**new geography of power**" produced by US hegemony. Liberals and neo-Gramscians agree, surprisingly, on the weight of ideas and institutions in entrenching hegemony.
- **Explanatory value**: it explains why the USA could not simply impose its will in Iraq despite military supremacy. **Critical limit**: the framework underplays raw military competition and power transitions — use it to complement, not replace, realist analysis of capability.

Constraints on hegemony

- **Material / strategic** — the rise of China: autonomous, assertive, competing for technology, markets and global value chains, especially after 2008.
- **Economic** — instability in the US-led political economy; deficit spending; **de-dollarisation** pursued by China, Russia, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
- **Regional** — Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East; India's economic rise; Iran defying sanctions; the Saudi tilt toward China.
- **Institutional** — rival institutions (AIIB, NDB); China's expanding weight across the UN system (four of fifteen specialised agencies, the WHO, the FAO, the Human Rights Council); China as the largest creditor in Africa and a leading partner in Latin America.
- **Ideational** — erosion of the legitimacy and appeal of the liberal order; the "**alliance deficit**" — China courts allies while transactional US leadership strains them (**Mira Rapp-Hooper**).
- **Which will intensify**: the technology and supply-chain rivalry with China; de-dollarisation; institutional competition; the contest over Taiwan and the Indian Ocean. The most durable constraint is a peer competitor in technology and economics — not any single regional flashpoint.

The counterweights

- **Andrew Hurrell**: US power has a contradictory regional impact — the Cold War's end freed the USA from geopolitical constraints, making it less tolerant of alternative orders and more willing to intervene.
- **Lee Hsien Loong**: Asian states see the USA as a resident power and China as a reality on the doorstep, and do not wish to be forced to choose; China is "**far from a Potemkin village**" or the tottering Soviet command economy.
- **Fareed Zakaria**: even in decline, US power remains unrivalled in many spheres — its capacity to adapt will decide the future of its hegemony.

NATO as a tool of hegemony?

- **Origins** — NATO (1949) was a US-led mutual defence pact to contain the USSR; the USSR answered with the Warsaw Pact (1955).
- **The 'tool' reading** — NATO institutionalised US military leadership in Europe, held the trans-Atlantic order together and outlived the Cold War; eastward expansion extended US influence into the former Soviet space; the Russia-Ukraine war is read partly as a contest over that expansion; NATO sustains US primacy and discourages European strategic autonomy.
- **The counter-view** — alliance as accommodation, not only coercion: US support for European integration and post-1945 reconstruction encouraged allies to bandwagon rather than balance. European unease at being dragged into US confrontations (the EU's wish for a '**Sinatra Doctrine**'); diversified supply chains and an independent China policy; burden-sharing tensions as transactional US demands that Europe fund its own security strained the alliance.
- **The balance** — NATO is both a genuine collective-defence alliance and a vehicle of US strategic leadership: it perpetuates hegemony **partly by consent**, not only by command.

17 Theorists of United States Power

The 1970s–80s debate — recession, oil and exchange-rate crises, European integration, Japan's rise — produced two camps that still frame every hegemony answer.

Scholar	Camp	Argument
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Robert Gilpin	Decline	A hegemon is essential to a liberal economy and international order; the USA led out of enlightened self-interest and integrated Western Europe and Japan under capitalism. Its hegemony is fragile because it rests on the dollar, multinational corporations and nuclear weapons; by the 1970s its economic dominance was declining (annual growth of only 0.8% in 1970 against 3% in the post-war period). US power is in a “state of disarray”.
Robert O. Keohane	Decline	US hegemony declined as Europe integrated and Japan rose; future US leadership will be shaped by China’s rise, domestic partisan conflict, recession, the effectiveness of multilateral institutions, Iran, the Middle East and global democratisation. The order a hegemon builds can persist after its decline.
Joseph Nye	Decline	Even at its height (a third of global product, a huge nuclear arsenal) the USA could not prevent the “loss of China”, the spread of communism in Eastern Europe, the Korean stalemate, defeat in Vietnam or the survival of Castro. Pioneer of soft power — attraction and influence through culture, values and policies.
Immanuel Wallerstein	Decline	US decline began after 1967 through political-cultural change and economic stagnation; he foresaw the breakdown of non-proliferation, the rise of multiple small nuclear powers, multiple centres of power, the end of the dollar’s dominance and a multi-currency system.
Stephen Gill	Continuity	US hegemony has not declined but transformed through globalisation; its ideological and cultural aspects have grown more powerful — structural power .
Susan Strange	Continuity	US structural power — the strongest military, leading oil and aircraft industries, dominance of services, control of international credit, the dollar’s predominance and the education system — keeps US global dominance intact despite setbacks.

18 The Liberal World Order and Its Challengers

Who is the revisionist — and can the order absorb the shock?

China as a revisionist power?

- **Xi Jinping** has modernised the military and pursued assertive policies in the East and South China Seas, appearing to reject both the territorial status quo and the role of international law.
- **Episodes:** the 2012 **air defence identification zone** over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; manoeuvring the Philippines out of Scarborough Shoal; artificial-island construction in the South China Sea; oil drilling near the Paracel Islands.
- **China’s counter-claim:** it is a **status quo power** defending long-standing territory, while the **United States is itself revisionist** — having spent decades overturning the status quo by spreading liberalism, free markets and US influence.

Attacks on the liberal order — the rise of fascism

- Nationalism, isolationism and xenophobia have risen for years, accelerated by the pandemic; governments in Hungary and the Philippines used the crisis to assume emergency powers.
- Barriers to movement, inward turns and the scapegoating of rivals raise the possibility of international conflict; climate-driven displacement in the Global South compounds the strain; fascism is read as a “cult” born of the dislocation after the First World War.

Will democracies prove resilient?

- As the Great Depression produced both fascism and a renewed liberal democracy, the pandemic may break political systems out of stasis and force overdue reform.
- Crisis rewards professionalism and exposes incompetence — a beneficial selection effect — and may spur renewed cooperation among scientists and public-health officials even as politicians play the blame game.

A new realist order

- **John Mearsheimer** projects three orders: a **thin international order** (arms control, the global economy, some attention to climate) and two **thick bounded orders** — one US-led, one China-led — concerned mainly with security competition.
- The bounded orders will resemble the Soviet-led and US-led Cold War orders, with China replacing the USSR; the three great powers (USA, China, Russia) will still negotiate arms-control limits.

How to strengthen the order — two answers

- **The liberal-order school:** renewal of American leadership is essential; existing institutions (IMF, World Bank) will evolve; new institutions (NDB, AIIB) should be engaged constructively and shaped to reinforce, rather than replace, liberal norms.
- **The alternative:** the solution is not to hope for “more enlightened US leadership” but to build a multipolar world together.

America First and the Chinese Dream

- **America First** — a nationalist, unilateralist US foreign policy from 2016: “patriotism” in place of “globalism” (2018 UN speech); withdrawal from the TPP; blocking the WTO’s dispute mechanism; scrapping the JCPOA; pressure on allies to fund their own security — a return of **mercantilism** (**Charles Krauthammer**; **Thomas Wright**).
- **Chinese Dream** — Xi’s project (from 2013) of national rejuvenation and the return of the “Middle Kingdom”: a China-centric globalisation — trade liberalisation, the AIIB to rival Bretton Woods, the BRI/OBOR, and **A2/AD** in Asian waters to build regional hegemony.
- **Systemic effect** — the decline of *Pax Americana* creating space for power transition; talk of a New Cold War and the Thucydides Trap (**Graham Allison**);

the Quad and the Indo-Pacific as balancing responses.

- **Risks and balance** — protectionism and nativism from the USA; Chinese revisionism rewriting multilateral rules despite the claim of a “peaceful rise”; the **G-2 trap** (**Brahma Chellaney**). Moderates (**Ryan Hass**, **Mira Rapp-Hooper**) stress that the contest reshapes, but does not settle, the order.

PART E The Nuclear Order, NAM and India

19 The Arms Race, Nuclear Order and Disarmament

Nuclear weapons still shape power politics, alliances and regional security after the Cold War.

The persistence of deterrence

- **Thomas Schelling**: coercion as the credible “**power to hurt**”.
- **Mutually Assured Destruction** (MAD) as a “**balance of terror**”, resting on **second-strike capability** and the **nuclear triad**, and extended to allies (Japan, South Korea) through **extended deterrence**.
- **Kenneth Waltz**: nuclear weapons helped keep the Cold War “cold” — a logic many realists apply to great-power restraint after 1991.
- **Henry Kissinger**: reliance on deterrence assumes rational actors, which is unsafe.
- **Morton Kaplan**’s “**unit veto**” system projects a world where each actor can destroy every other.

Disarmament

Definition

Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of military forces and weapons through cooperation, treaties and oversight. Four components: reduction in quantity; formal negotiation and treaties; focus on weapons and tools; an oversight body. The United Nations has mediated disarmament since the 1960s through resolutions, committees and monitoring.

Armaments make war physically possible and politically probable; disarmament can reduce tension and redirect spending to human welfare. The **Arms Trade Treaty** seeks to prevent transfers that enable rights violations.

The instruments

Instrument	Status and the point to make
NPT (1968; in force 1970)	The core of the non-proliferation regime. George Perkovich : India and Pakistan remain non-signatories because they are not recognised as nuclear-weapon states; the 1995 indefinite extension is seen as discriminatory by such states.
CTBT (1996) & FMCT	The CTBT is not in force; the FMCT remains stalled — both blocked largely by US and other nuclear-weapon-state resistance.
GICNT (2006)	Coordinates against nuclear terrorism by non-state actors.
The Obama push	The Prague speech (2009); UNSC Resolution 1887 ; four Nuclear Security Summits.
Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty / TPNW (2017)	The first legally binding comprehensive prohibition, yet to enter into force — all major nuclear powers absent.
New START (2010)	The cornerstone of US–Russia arms control, set to expire in 2026 — the sharpest present worry for the future of arms control.
India’s policy (post-1998)	Credible minimum deterrence · No First Use · assured command and control · reliable delivery vehicles.
Civil society	The Pugwash Movement (Nobel Peace Prize).

John Simpson: the non-proliferation agenda has not worked sufficiently after the 1990s — Iran and North Korea continue to pursue capability; a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory process is needed for non-proliferation in the short term and disarmament in the long term.

The contemporary nuclear order

- Renewed nuclear competition between the USA and Russia, both modernising arsenals.
- New domains complicate the old idea of an arms race: **hypersonic missiles**, **cyber** capabilities and **AI** for defence.
- China’s expanding arsenal adds a third major actor; regional races persist — India–Pakistan; Iran–Saudi Arabia in West Asia.

Why a nuclear-free world remains distant

- Moral authority has limited effect on states like Iran and North Korea.
- Great-power unanimity is fragile — China has no plans to scrap its weapons.
- Technical verification of warhead elimination is hard.
- A perverse risk: disarmament could turn conventional wars nuclear again, and a weakened US nuclear umbrella could push Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Gulf states to reconsider their non-nuclear status (**George Perkovich** and **James Acton**).

The Korean Peninsula

- North Korea is a self-declared nuclear power; ICBMs able to reach the US mainland shift the regional balance and undermine the perceived invulnerability of the USA; extended deterrence loses credibility as Seoul and Tokyo doubt the umbrella and move toward self-reliance.
- **“The North Korea Paradox” (Max Fisher)**: US relative strength is paradoxically a weakness — knowing it would lose a full conflict, North Korea’s only option is rapid escalation to nuclear use, which constrains US choices.
- **Singapore Summit** (June 2018): the first meeting of sitting US and North Korean leaders; a joint statement on security guarantees, new relations and denuclearisation. Symbolic diplomacy versus substantive progress (**Scott Snyder**); critics warned symbolism is insufficient without concrete steps (**Daryl Kimball**, Arms Control Association); no clarity on the actual process of denuclearisation (**Sue Mi Terry**).
- **Collapse**: the 2019 **Hanoi Summit** failed over sanctions sequencing; North Korea resumed missile tests in 2019 (**Victor Cha**). The summit elevated North Korea’s stature without meaningful concessions, at a cost to US non-proliferation credibility (**Bruce Klingner**).
- **The China factor**: the only power able to rein in Pyongyang is China — but US–China rivalry makes Beijing likely to keep the North as a **strategic buffer**; recall the earlier failure of the Six-Party Talks.
- **Way forward (Frank Aum)**: a functionalist **“peace by pieces”** approach — an end-of-war declaration first, then NPT re-entry, IAEA safeguards and CTBT ratification. Incremental denuclearisation, global sanctions and US–China cooperation; all-or-nothing approaches will fail.

Why disarmament has stalled

- **The gains to recall**: Cold War strategic parity produced SALT, the ABM Treaty, the hotline and later START — the largest arms-control reductions in history; the non-aligned helped bring about the **Partial Test Ban Treaty** (1963).
- **The reversal**: renewed US–Russia competition and modernisation; New START undermined as it nears expiry; great powers taking sides in regional conflicts.
- **Regional conflict as disruptor**: the Russia–Ukraine war has dismantled the very mechanisms that enabled détente — parity, dialogue and institutions — making fresh cooperation harder than in the 1970s. West Asia: Iran’s programme, Saudi–Iran tensions and external arms supplies; Israel treats Iran’s ambitions as existential. South Asia: the India–Pakistan standoff and periodic missile tests.
- **The balance**: bloc alignment and treaty erosion have jeopardised past progress, but India’s No First Use and credible minimum deterrence show that restraint remains possible; a verifiable, non-discriminatory, cooperative framework is the way forward.

20 The Non-Aligned Movement

NAM emerged after the Second World War to give the newly independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America an alternative to Cold War alignment; eighteen summits were held between 1961 and 2012.

What non-alignment is — and is not

- **Georg Schwarzenberger**: distinguishes non-alignment from isolationism, non-commitment, neutrality, neutralization, unilateralism and non-involvement — it means specifically staying out of **military alliances**, above all Cold War ones.
- **George Liska**: traditional isolationism or neutrality differs from non-alignment, which opposes **all** alliances, including those among other states.
- **U Nu** (Burma): non-alignment as neutralism — staying uninvolved in the East–West ideological struggle.

Concept	Content
Neutrality	Non-involvement in actual wars; a neutral can become a belligerent.
Neutralization	A permanent status of non-participation in war — e.g. Switzerland.
Non-alignment	Non-involvement in the Cold War rivalry — not permanent neutrality, but independence of foreign policy and avoidance of military alliances that compromise sovereignty.

Western scholars often equate non-alignment with neutrality; the comparison misleads — non-alignment arose in a different context, with distinct principles.

Bases of non-alignment

- **Negative basis** — an anti-military-alliance policy: to avoid Cold War entanglement, to protect national security (alliances can provoke adversaries), and to preserve sovereignty.
- **Ideological independence** — developing systems suited to one’s own context rather than wholesale Western capitalism or Soviet communism.
- **Economic development** — aid without strings: India’s **Bokaro Steel Plant** (Soviet help after the US Congress refused) and Egypt’s **Aswan Dam** (Soviet support after the West withdrew) preserved non-alignment.
- **Independence of judgment** — judging each issue on its merits, case by case (**U Nu**, **Kwame Nkrumah**).

Sovereignty, peace and conflict resolution

- **Enhances sovereignty** — an independent foreign policy reinforces autonomy, and non-alignment promotes equality among nations against the hierarchy of alliances. **Limits sovereignty** — by prioritising peaceful coexistence, non-aligned states accept restraint in the interest of global stability.
- **Peace** — NAM goes beyond national interest to promote peace actively: recognising the catastrophic potential of nuclear war, supporting disarmament, trusting the UN. It helped bring about the **Partial Test Ban Treaty** (1963), and non-aligned states often mediated disputes from a neutral stance.
- **As a technique of conflict resolution** — it avoids taking sides and may suspend moral judgment to facilitate peace: at the Belgrade Conference, **Nehru** appealed to both the USA and the USSR to halt nuclear tests without naming who began them. **Critique**: this can appear to equate aggressor and victim,

undermining justice; credibility requires genuine impartiality.

Evolution into a movement

- Genesis in the **Bandung Afro-Asian Conference** (1955) — where the term “Third World” was coined and **Nkrumah** used “neo-colonialism”.
- First summit at **Belgrade** (1961); founders **Jawaharlal Nehru**, **Gamal Abdel Nasser**, **Sukarno** and **Josip Broz Tito**.
- Institutionalisation through regular summits and standing committees; leadership later passed from the founders to Zambia, Tanzania and Cuba.
- The agenda evolved: anti-colonialism and anti-racialism → the **New International Economic Order** (NIEO) in the 1970s → disarmament in the 1980s.

Achievements

- **Decolonisation and anti-imperialism** — strengthened liberation struggles and pressured colonial powers; the UNGA declared decolonisation a key objective in 1960.
- **Transformation of the system** — new sovereign states gave voice to the marginalised and reformed the dynamics of the UN General Assembly.
- **Advocacy of the NIEO** — highlighting the North–South divide and demanding fairer trade, technology transfer and South–South cooperation; the NIEO push (Algiers, 1970s) against new protectionism such as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (1973).
- **Peace and disarmament** — instrumental in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963); consistent advocacy of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
- **Against racialism and apartheid**, and support for the Palestinian cause; opposition to the Suez Crisis (1956).
- **Cultural and informational initiatives** — a non-aligned news pool to reduce reliance on Western media.
- **Indira Gandhi** called NAM “**the largest peace movement of history**”; **John Foster Dulles** dismissed its independence of judgment as “**immoral**” — equidistance was itself the contribution, a coalitional move by weaker states refusing to take sides.

J. Bandyopadhyaya’s assessment: NAM accelerated decolonisation; formed an international force against imperialism, racism and hegemonism; universalised the international system (turning weaker states from objects into subjects); advocated a new order based on equality; prevented polarisation; and promoted communication over power. **Jürgen Dinkel**: NAM shaped both the North–South conflict and South–South relations, and permanently expanded the ensemble of actors in international relations.

21 NAM: Relevance, Soft Balancing and Non-Alignment 2.0

Carry both columns, then take a position.

- The end of bipolarity raised doubts about NAM’s purpose in a unipolar world.
- **The continuing rationale**: it opposes domination by any single superpower and advocates a multipolar order; it addresses globalisation-driven inequality, terrorism, environment and UN reform.
- **V. N. Khanna**: NAM’s future lies in being an **economic movement** bridging the North–South divide — it remains vital as long as global inequalities persist.

Critics of relevance	Defenders of relevance
Hans Köchler : NAM was relevant only in the bipolar Cold War; with one dominant power its objectives are redundant, many members now depend on the USA, and it has no charter, statute or secretariat.	T. V. Paul : despite its shortcomings NAM acted as a limited soft-balancing mechanism — “ naming ” and “ shaming ” were its tools; it deserves partial credit for ending colonialism, containing proliferation and reducing bipolar tension; there is space to resurrect the Bandung spirit.
Chris Alden and Marco António Vieira : NAM produced few results and faded with Western collective action and falling commodity prices — anachronistic ideologically, structurally and economically.	M. K. Narayanan : it is premature to pronounce NAM dead — it could be used to counter China’s “not so peaceful” rise and to champion transnational issues.
C. Raja Mohan : NAM is in a “ state of coma ” — a crisis of identity and relevance; for him it was idealistic and largely irrelevant even before the Cold War’s end.	K. Harikumar : NAM is a vital platform for South–South cooperation. Shashi Tharoor : though the name negates a choice no longer on the table, NAM has widened its objectives to resist the hegemony of the sole superpower and assert members’ independence.
Harsh V. Pant : NAM was prudent when India lacked power; it is now a “ dying organisation ” and India should not stick to old shibboleths. Competition from more effective groupings — G-7, ASEAN, SCO, BRICS — handles trade and economic issues that NAM does not.	T. P. Sreenivasan : NAM stood for freedom of judgment and action, and remains valid whether there is one bloc or two. S. Jaishankar : non-alignment belonged to a specific era, but the independence of action enshrined remains a continuity in Indian foreign policy — a rejection of non-alignment is not a rush to alignment; India will not join an alliance system.

Structural weaknesses to name in a critique

- No charter, statute or secretariat; over 100 members by 1990, making consensus difficult and the agenda diffuse; bilateral disputes raised on a collective platform.
- Fracture, not only size: from **Colombo (1976)** through the **Havana Conference (1979)**, serious splits along regional and ideological lines; internal camp following toward the USA or the USSR.
- The contradiction between “respect for human rights” and “non-interference”; the inability to prevent the India–Pakistan wars or resolve Palestine; little European representation.

Non-Alignment 2.0

- *Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty-First Century* — a **Centre for Policy Research** publication (March 2012), written over fourteen months by **Sunil Khilnani**, **Rajiv Kumar**, **Pratap Bhanu Mehta**, **Prakash Menon**, **Nandan Nilekani**, **Srinath Raghavan**, **Shyam Saran** and **Siddharth Varadarajan**, with inputs from NSA **Shivshankar Menon** and others.

- **Core idea:** identify the principles to make India a leading global player while preserving **strategic autonomy**; in a world no longer split between two powers, non-alignment means managing complicated, shifting coalitions rather than settled alliances.
- It drew fire — critics accused it of resurrecting the buried ghost of non-alignment.

The 17th NAM Summit

- Held on **Margarita Island, Venezuela** (2016); theme **“Peace, Sovereignty and Solidarity for Development”**; a **21-article final declaration** demanding an equitable world order fair to developing nations.
- **Key articles:** strengthening NAM and the international order; the right to self-determination; a world free of nuclear weapons; protection of human rights; condemnation of unilateral coercive measures and of terrorism; the centrality of international law and the UN Charter; a just solution on Palestine, with the Israeli occupation named a destabilising factor.
- **Reform agenda:** a more democratic UNGA and Security Council; transparency in appointing the Secretary-General; the 2030 Agenda and SDGs; climate change; South–South cooperation; reform of the international financial architecture.
- NAM is a forum of about **120 developing states** not formally aligned with any major bloc — after the UN, the largest grouping of states. Yet **C. Raja Mohan**’s “movement in a state of coma” expresses the persistent doubt.

How to strengthen NAM

- **Premise:** the institutional framework still functions — it needs reshaping and re-energising, not reinvention.
- **Symbolic** — genuine multilateral partnerships; a positive, forward-looking agenda. **Structural** — specialised, role-based functionaries; institutional capacity; a permanent secretariat and coordination mechanisms. **Policy** — a proactive, target-based approach; more frequent summits and deliberation, including Track-II diplomacy; reform from a loose grouping into a results-oriented organisation (**S. Jaishankar**).
- **Substantive agenda:** terrorism, climate justice, UN reform, protection of international law, elimination of WMDs, the SDGs.
- **For India:** a platform to assert soft power and lead smaller states; to gather South-East Asian support against Chinese assertion in the South China Sea; to enable Afro-Asian cooperation.

NAM and India’s soft power

- **Joseph Nye** on **soft power**: influencing others’ preferences through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion — “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries — admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness — want to follow it.”
- **NAM’s normative ethos:** sovereignty, non-interference, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, peaceful coexistence — values that match India’s foreign-policy objectives (**Havana Declaration**, 1979).
- **Lehmann:** lacking economic and military capability after independence, India chose non-alignment as an instrument to exercise considerable international soft power.
- **Stature:** India’s advocacy of a multipolar order and sovereign equality raises its standing (**Rajiv Sikri, C. Raja Mohan**); leadership within NAM gave it a platform on disarmament, peace and development. South–South cooperation as soft power — development partnerships, the International Solar Alliance, ITEC and cultural diplomacy built on shared anti-colonial histories.
- **Balance:** critics argue relevance has waned and India should look elsewhere; balancing NAM principles with evolving interests is hard — yet the normative ethos still amplifies India’s image as a principled, autonomous actor.

22 India and the Emerging World Order

India has traditionally supported a **multipolar order** over a bipolar or unipolar one, underpinned by international law and respect for sovereignty (**H. V. Shringla**, CICA, 2021).

- **Why the preference** — unease with balance-of-power games and arms races, and a civilisational self-image as a moral power unwilling to play second fiddle. India practises **contingent balancing** (**Pratap Bhanu Mehta**) — reaching out to the USA after 1962, signing the 1971 treaty with the USSR when interests required.
- **Determinants of engagement** — primacy, though contested, in South Asia and SAARC; the rise of China and the Indo-Pacific; energy and trade interests in ASEAN, West Asia and Central Asia; growing reach into Africa and Latin America.
- **The vision** — **strategic autonomy** and flexibility: multiple cooperative partnerships rather than binding alliances. A multipolar order would normalise such complexity and keep India out of any single power’s sphere (**Ummu Salma Bava**).
- **India’s role** — pressing for fair representation and UN Security Council reform; using its IT-driven economy and young workforce; positioning itself as a responsible nuclear power. **P. R. Shankar** sees a rising India, drawing on its non-alignment experience, as a potential **“bridge and balancing”** third pole between the USA and China.
- **The framing to write** — non-alignment has matured into **strategic autonomy**: India seeks engagement with all major players in an interdependent world, working through “shifting and variable coalitions rather than settled alliances” (**S. Jaishankar**; *Non-Alignment 2.0*).

23 Regional Flashpoint: Myanmar

On **1 February 2021** the military — the **Tatmadaw** — launched a coup, declared the November 2020 election invalid and imposed a state of emergency.

- Nationwide protests met a brutal crackdown — arrests of elected leaders and journalists, live fire on demonstrators.

- **Deep roots:** Myanmar has been mired since independence (1948) in one of the world's longest civil conflicts; resistance forces — ethnic organisations and the **People's Defence Force** — control large parts of the territory; the economy has contracted.
- **Regional spillover:** refugee outflows, illegal gambling, drugs, human trafficking and scam operations; the **Rohingya** crisis strains Bangladesh (Cox's Bazar) and others; statelessness raises the risk of radicalisation.
- **The ASEAN test:** a softer line than the West, mindful of China; consensus-based, non-interference diplomacy makes unanimous action hard. Indonesia and Malaysia are most willing to speak out, while Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam largely follow China's lead — the crisis challenges ASEAN's **centrality** and credibility.
- **For India:** Myanmar is a strategic **land-maritime gateway** to South-East Asia. The crisis has stalled connectivity projects and development assistance; tens of thousands of displaced people shelter across India's north-eastern states, with pressure on border management (FMR, fencing).
- **Way forward:** humanitarian assistance, support for the displaced, regional stability, and quiet channels of dialogue with and between the junta and the opposition, including armed ethnic groups.

24 Where the Order Stands

From the bipolar discipline of the Cold War, through a brief and contested unipolar moment, to a still-forming order whose shape is disputed. Three readings now compete.



- Power is shifting from the trans-Atlantic to the **Indo-Pacific**.
- The liberal order built under American leadership is being contested by rising and revisionist powers.
- The instruments of the previous era — alliances, deterrence, multilateral institutions and the non-aligned idea of strategic autonomy — are all being reworked for new conditions.
- Whether the transition is managed peacefully will depend, as **Andrew Heywood** and others suggest, less on structure than on the quality of **statecraft** — accommodation over confrontation, multilateralism over unilateral assertion, and the capacity of middle powers like India to keep their autonomy in a contested world.

PART F Recall and Practice

25 Power Quotes

"The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural." — **Samuel P. Huntington**

"A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." — **Robert Dahl**

"Multipolarity is what the states make of it." — **Ashok Kumar Behuria**

The "liberal moment" in world affairs turned out to be the "unipolar moment". — **Andrew Heywood**

"A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries — admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness — want to follow it." — **Joseph Nye, on soft power**

The Non-Aligned Movement is a "movement in a state of coma". — **C. Raja Mohan**

A. F. K. Organski · Aaron Wildavsky · Alex Pravda · Alfred T. Mahan · Andrew Heywood · Andrew Hurrell · Antonio Gramsci · Archie Brown · Ashok Kumar Behuria · Bekir Ilhan · Bernard Baruch · Beth A. Fischer · Brahma Chellaney · Bruce Klingner · C. Raja Mohan · Charles Krauthammer · Chris Alden · Daryl Kimball · Douglas Little · E. H. Carr · Edward Luttwak · Fareed Zakaria · Francis Fukuyama · Francis J. Gavin · Frank Aum · Fredrik Logevall · Georg Schwarzenberger · George Liska · George Orwell · George Perkovich · Graham Allison · H. V. Shringla · Halford Mackinder · Hans J. Morgenthau · Hans Köchler · Harsh V. Pant · Henry Kissinger · Immanuel Wallerstein · J. Bandyopadhyaya · Jacques Derrida · James Acton · James G. Hershberg · Jeffrey Garten · John Foster Dulles · John Ikenberry · John Lewis Gaddis · John Mearsheimer · John Simpson · Joseph Nye · Jussi M. Hanhimäki · Jürgen Dinkel · K. Harikumar · Karl Marx · Kenneth Waltz · Kishore Mahbubani · Kwame Nkrumah · Lee Hsien Loong · Lehmann · Lester Thurow · M. K. Narayanan · Marco António Vieira · Marshall McLuhan · Martin Wight · Max Fisher · Max Singer · Megan Dee · Michael Brecher · Mira Rapp-Hooper · Monteiro · Morton Kaplan · Nandan Nilekani · Nicholas Spykman · Odd Arne Westad · Paul Kennedy · P. R. Shankar · Prakash Menon · Pratap Bhanu Mehta · Rajiv Kumar · Rajiv Sikri · Richard Rosecrance · Robert D. Kaplan · Robert Dahl · Robert Gilpin · Robert J. Guttman · Robert Kagan · Robert O. Keohane · Robert Pape · Ryan Hass · S. Jaishankar · Samuel P. Huntington · Scott Snyder · Sergey Radchenko · Shashi Tharoor · Shivshankar Menon · Shyam Saran · Siddharth Varadarajan · Srinath Raghavan · Stephen Gill · Sue Mi Terry · Sunil Khilnani · Susan Strange · T. P. Sreenivasan · T. V. Paul · Tessman · Thomas Friedman · Thomas Schelling · Thomas Wright · Thucydides · U Nu · Ummu Salma Bava · V. N. Khanna · Victor Cha · Walter Lippmann · Walter Russell Mead · William Kristol · Winston Churchill · Wolfe · Zhang Shu Guang

27 How UPSC Has Asked It

The Cold War and its collapse

- UPSC 2016 · 15m** Examine in brief the rise and fall of the Cold War.
- UPSC 2016 · 15m** Discuss the positive and negative impacts of the Soviet Union's disintegration on developing nations.

Polarity, China and Russia

- UPSC 2019 · 15m** Identify the benefits of a multi-polar world.
- UPSC 2022 · 10m** The bipolar structure of the world is more stable than the multipolar one. Comment.
- UPSC 2022 · 20m** Critically examine the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a great power and its implications on the Asian political order.
- UPSC 2024 · 10m** The expansionist tendencies of the current Russian regime indicate its intentions for the realisation of a Greater Russia on the lines of the Soviet era. Comment.

American hegemony and the liberal order

- UPSC 2021 · 15m** Critically examine the decline of the United States of America as a hegemon and its implications for the changing international political order.
- UPSC 2023 · 15m** Discuss the various constraints on American hegemony today. Which of these are likely to become more prominent in the future?
- UPSC 2024 · 20m** "The Gramscian theory of hegemony provides many valuable insights into the nature of global power." Comment.
- UPSC 2018 · 15m** Discuss the consequences of Trump's "America First" and Xi's "Chinese Dream" on world politics.

The nuclear order and the Non-Aligned Movement

- UPSC 2016 · 15m** Discuss the evolution of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period.
- UPSC 2018 · 20m** Discuss the significance of the Non-Aligned Movement as a unique contribution of the non-Western world to world politics.
- UPSC 2023 · 20m** "During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement tried to become a 'Third Force' in world politics, but failed because it was too large and unwieldy." Discuss.

28 Today's Practice

1. **UPSC 2024 · 20m** "The Gramscian theory of hegemony provides many valuable insights into the nature of global power." Comment.
2. **UPSC 2021 · 15m** Critically examine the decline of the United States of America as a hegemon and its implications for the changing international political order.
3. **UPSC 2022 · 10m** The bipolar structure of the world is more stable than the multipolar one. Comment.

Model answers drop tonight on the Telegram channel — @psirbyamitpratap. Every point above is developed at length in your **Foundation & OGP** class notes and handouts — revise it, then write. **Don't break the chain.**

See you tomorrow with Day 34 — Evolution of the International Economic System.