

PSIR & GS-2

DAILY BRIEF

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Briefs, scans the best academic platforms, national newspapers & leading think tanks to pick the most relevant articles & research. It converts them into crisp, high-impact points you can directly use in your mains answers.



PSIR OPTIONAL BY
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From G7 to D10 — why democracies should name their coalition : ORF

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
What's in a name? Nomenclature diplomacy and geopolitics : SAM

ARTICLE

O3

Pakistan's westward turn — strategic depth or overstretch

From G7 to D10: Why the World's Democracies Should Finally Name Their Coalition



Context

The world's leading industrial democracies have been meeting as a group of ten at every G7 summit without admitting that they form a coalition. This arrangement should be named DIO and India's annual invitation turned into a permanent seat.

Facts

The ten together command : *roughly 60 per cent of global GDP.*

India : *attended the G7 outreach for seven consecutive years since 2019.*

The DIO idea : *US State Department policy-planning staff around 2008 → Atlantic Council 2014 → Boris Johnson 2020 on 5G and Huawei.*

Analytical Crux

India's difficulty with the G7 is that its place is renewed each year by invitation and its access depends on who holds the chair rather than on any settled rule. The resistance to naming the DIO does not come from India; it comes from continental Europe. They fear that a named bloc would harden the world into camps and complicate cooperation on problems that respect no ideology, and an unpredictable United States has made that fear stronger. However, the informality looks like flexibility only in calm weather: once trade, technology and finance are used as instruments of coercion, an unnamed coalition stops being a diplomatic convenience and starts being a place to hide.

Verbatim Quotes

"In a world where trade, tech and finance are increasingly turned into instruments of coercion, the answer is not fewer coalitions but clearer ones."

– Ajay Bisaria

What’s in a Name? Nomenclature Diplomacy Says Much About Changing Geopolitics

What's in a Name? Nomenclature Diplomacy Says Much About Changing Geopolitics

By removing the 'Indo' prefix from Indo-Pacific the US implicitly acknowledges that it no longer unilaterally defines the eastern strategic landscape. Regional organisations like BRICS continue to redefine the lexicon of 'rules-based order' to insulate themselves from western domination.

 By Tanuj Samaddar | Sep 13, 2026

Context

The American decision to drop the 'Indo' prefix from its Pacific Command, alongside the growing weight of BRICS, signals that Washington no longer defines the eastern strategic landscape on its own.

Facts

The 'Indo' prefix : added in 2018 and removed on 16 June 2026 – reverted to United States Pacific Command, USPACOM.

New Development Bank : reduces BRICS dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions and mitigates exchange-rate risk by prioritising local currency financing.

Department of Defense renamed Department of War, September 2025; Gulf of Mexico renamed Gulf of America, January 2025.

Analytical Crux

A name is a claim, and withdrawing a name is the withdrawal of a claim. 'Indo-Pacific' was never a description of water; it was an assertion that the Indian and Pacific oceans form one theatre and that India carries weight inside it. Dropping the prefix therefore costs Washington nothing operationally, but it tells every capital in Asia where American attention sits. The growth of BRICS as a buffer against sanctions and extra-territorial jurisdiction means the lexicon of the 'rules-based order' is written in more than one place. Therefore, the retraction of expansive American nomenclature alongside the rise of regional clusters of power hints at the gradual end of the unipolar geopolitical order.

Verbatim Quotes

"For centuries, geography provided the grammar of strategy. The theatre of war extends as much into the realm of cognitive manipulation and narrative engineering as it does into that of conventional armed conflict."

– Tanuj Samaddar

Pakistan’s westward turn — strategic depth or overstretch

Pakistan’s westward turn — strategic depth or overstretch

The defence cooperation agreement signed by Pakistan and Kuwait on August 27, 2026, is the latest manifestation of Pakistan’s rapidly expanding strategic footprint in West Asia. The agreement assumes greater significance when viewed alongside Pakistan’s membership of the Saudi Arabia-Türkiye-Pakistan defence arrangement and its recent role as an intermediary between Iran and the United States.

Enduring links
Pakistan’s West Asian orientation has deep historical roots. From its inception, it attempted to combine its South Asian geopolitical identity with that of a major Muslim power. During the Cold War, Pakistan, Iran and Türkiye were linked through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and subsequently through the Regional Cooperation for Development.

The decisive turn towards the Arab world came after Pakistan’s defeat and dismemberment in 1971. It sought to compensate for its diminished position in South Asia by emphasising its Islamic identity, symbolised by the Islamic summit held in Lahore in 1974. Pakistan simultaneously developed extensive military relationships with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies.

What is new, therefore, is not Pakistan’s involvement in West Asia but its increasing institutionalisation. The Makkah Agreement of August 7 stipulated that an armed attack against one member would be regarded as an attack against all. The three countries moved quickly to give the arrangement institutional substance. At the August 31 meeting in Istanbul, their Foreign and Defence Ministers and military chiefs decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, with a Pakistani serving as its first Secretary-General for three years. They also agreed to strengthen military interoperability and pursue defence-industrial cooperation, including



Mohammed Ayoob
University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Michigan State University, and the author of ‘From Regional Security to Global IR’ (2024)

Pakistan’s expanding West Asian role brings influence and opportunity, but also strategic risks

joint technology development and production.

But the new arrangement is already confronting Pakistan with the contradictions inherent in its expanding West Asian role. Renewed Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia created the first serious test of the Makkah pact. The Houthis’ recent capture of Mocha port and Perim island have further added to their capability to choke off Saudi shipping through the Bab al-Mandab. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed by Iran, a frustrated Saudi Arabia may re-launch a full-fledged war against the Houthis. This could create a major dilemma for Pakistan especially if Riyadh decides to invoke the collective-defence provision of the Makkah agreement.

Pakistan wants to be Saudi Arabia’s security partner, Türkiye’s strategic ally, Iran’s friend and interlocutor, Washington’s useful intermediary, and an increasingly important security provider to the Gulf monarchies. These roles are compatible when regional tensions are manageable. They become irreconcilable when they are not.

What it means for India

For India, Pakistan’s westward turn presents both a challenge and a potential relief. A Pakistan embedded in a network of West Asian security relationships may acquire defence in depth. Saudi financial resources, Turkish defence technology and Pakistan’s expanding relationships with Gulf militaries can theoretically increase Islamabad’s resilience in a confrontation with India. Türkiye is already Pakistan’s most vocal major supporter on Kashmir. Pakistan’s nuclear status also enhances its strategic value to Arab states concerned about an increasingly unstable regional order because of nuclear-armed Israel’s aggressive policies.

But strategic depth can easily become strategic overstretch. Pakistan’s security establishment has

historically concentrated overwhelmingly on India. A Pakistan increasingly required to devote diplomatic, military and intelligence resources to Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Yemen and the Red Sea may have fewer resources to concentrate on India.

The current Saudi-Houthi confrontation and the distinct possibility of it spawning a war clearly demonstrate the danger of Pakistan’s strategic overstretch. The deeper Pakistan becomes embedded in West Asian security arrangements, the harder it will become to remain aloof from the region’s conflicts. If the Houthi-Saudi confrontation escalates, Islamabad may eventually have to choose between honouring the credibility of its collective-defence commitments and maintaining its carefully cultivated relationship with Tehran, the Houthis’ principal ally.

India should therefore resist interpreting Pakistan’s growing West Asian role in purely negative terms. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf states have major economic and strategic relationships with India that they are unlikely to sacrifice for Pakistan. New Delhi should continue deepening these relationships as a counter to Pakistan’s expanding footprint in West Asia.

The consolidation of Pakistan’s West Asian relationships undoubtedly provides it with greater strategic depth vis-à-vis India. But those very relationships expose it to some of the world’s most combustible rivalries. For India, therefore, Pakistan’s westward turn contains a paradox. A Pakistan more deeply embedded in a West Asian security structure may in theory look strategically stronger. But a Pakistan entangled in mutually contradictory West Asian commitments will soon discover that it could be indefinitely stuck in a quagmire of its own choosing. It is far more difficult to get off the tiger than to get on it.

Context

Pakistan has been signing defence agreements across West Asia, and this expanding footprint either gives Islamabad real depth against India or ties it to quarrels it cannot afford.

Facts

Pakistan-Kuwait : defence cooperation agreement on 27 August 2026.

Saudi Arabia-Turkey-Pakistan : trilateral defence cooperation framework stipulated that an armed attack against one member would be regarded as an attack against all.

Pakistan-Saudi Arabia : strengthen military interoperability and pursue defence-industrial cooperation, including joint technology development and production.

Analytical Crux

Pakistan's move west is old, but what is new is that it has been put on paper, with a secretariat, a Secretary-General and a mutual-defence clause. The issue is that commitments of this kind are free until they are invoked, and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are already asking the first question. If Riyadh calls, does Islamabad answer?

These roles are compatible when regional tensions are manageable; they become irreconcilable when they are not. For India the way forward is neither alarm nor complacency. A Pakistani army that must spread its attention across Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Yemen and the Red Sea has less of it to spend on India, while the Gulf states have deep economic and strategic stakes in India that New Delhi should keep deepening. Therefore, the deeper Pakistan becomes embedded in West Asian security arrangements, the harder it will become to remain aloof from the region's conflicts.

Verbatim Quotes

"What is new, therefore, is not Pakistan's involvement in West Asia but its increasing institutionalisation. But strategic depth can easily become strategic overstretch."

— Mohammed Ayoob

UPSC LINK

- GS 2026, Paper II: “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.
- PSIR 2025, Paper II: Would you agree with the contention that India’s inclination to lean on a ‘more aggressive hyper-realist posture’ has gained a new momentum in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist strike? Comment.
- GS 2025, Paper II: “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?
- PSIR 2024, Paper II: “India and USA have become such strong strategic partners that they need not become formal allies.” Comment.
- PSIR 2024, Paper II: “India has of late, chosen to debunk non-alignment in its pursuit of multi-alignment.” Comment.
- PSIR 2024, Paper II: Discuss the rationale behind replacing the “Asia-Pacific” strategy with the new term “Indo-Pacific” strategy.

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| 02 | THE RECORD | Dates, official wording, and the document it came from. |
| 03 | THE ANALYSIS | The argument it raises, and the positions taken on it. |
| 04 | THEORY & VERBATIM QUOTATION | The concept on the syllabus, in the scholar's own words. |
| 05 | FURTHER QUOTATIONS | More lines to cite, each one carrying its source. |
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