

PSIR & GS-2

DAILY BRIEF

ABOUT THIS INITIATIVE

Briefs, scans the best academic platforms, national newspapers & leading think tanks to pick the most relevant articles & research. It converts them into crisp, high-impact points you can directly use in your mains answers.



PSIR OPTIONAL BY
Amit Pratap Singh
| ForumIAS |

SOURCES SCANNED TODAY



ARTICLE

O1

Safeguarding global trade through resilient maritime corridors : ORF

ARTICLE

O2

After abeyance — Indus Basin and the new water politics : NatStrat

ARTICLE

O3

After BRICS — navigating great power rivalries : Indian Express

Safeguarding Global Trade Through Resilient Maritime Corridors



[Home](#) / [Research](#) / [Essay Series](#) / [Expert Speak](#)

Safeguarding Global Trade Through Resilient Maritime Corridors

AUTHOR : LUISA RODRIGUEZ


Expert Speak Raisina Debates

Published on Sep 15, 2026

Add as preferred on Google



As climate disruptions and geopolitical tensions put maritime chokepoints under growing pressure, developing economies need stronger digital systems, infrastructure and contingency planning to build more resilient trade corridors



Author



Context

How few narrow sea passages carry most of the world's trade, and a disruption at any one of them falls hardest on countries that have no second route.

Facts

■ **Maritime transport** : carries 80 per cent of international merchandise trade by volume and more than 70 per cent by value.

■ **Strait of Hormuz** : carries 11 per cent of global trade and 34 per cent of seaborne oil exports.

■ **Landlocked developing countries** : pay transit costs 85 per cent above the world average, and Small Island Developing States connectivity is more than ten times lower than other states.

Analytical Crux

Maritime transport is the primary artery of global trade. A chokepoint closure is never one shock but it is two. The price shock reaches everybody and the routing shock reaches only those who cannot reroute. This is why the same closure means a higher freight bill in Europe and a food supply question in a Pacific island state. The cost of disruption is settled long before the disruption happens, by how many routes, ports and digital systems a country has already built. *A state already paying more in interest than on its schools cannot borrow its way through a four-month freight spike.* Resilience at sea is therefore a development question before it is a maritime one.

Verbatim Quotes

"Enhancing the resilience of global trade corridors requires a shift from reactive crisis response towards proactive structural measures."

– Luisa Rodriguez

After Abeyance: Indus Basin and the New Water Politics



Context

After the abeyance in April 2025, whether the Indus Waters Treaty can still govern water relations between India and Pakistan.

Facts

■ **Western Rivers :** *Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use; Eastern Rivers: Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, allocated to India for unrestricted use.*

■ **Treaty sets three stages :** *Permanent Indus Commission for "disagreement", Neutral Expert for "difference", and Court of Arbitration for "dispute".*

■ *Article IV(15) keeps territorial sovereignty over the rivers with India; the Treaty governs use of the waters, not ownership of the rivers.*

Analytical Crux

The Treaty outlived three wars because it was deliberately narrow i. e. water and rules only but no politics. The abeyance removes that insulation. The dispute runs on two tracks that never meet i. e. India treats the Treaty as suspended while Pakistan keeps invoking its machinery, and each side has a reason to hold its position rather than settle. What abeyance hands India is not water but time, the freedom to build the storage and regulation it never built while the Treaty shaped its design choices. Pakistan's stronger point has always been legal and moral rather than technical, which is why it argues in the Security Council instead of over pondage figures. However, a complete legal victory would leave groundwater depletion, irrigation losses and inter-provincial quarrels untouched and Pakistan's real water crisis is a domestic one.

Verbatim Quotes

"Securing access to water and ensuring water availability are not synonymous. A sustainable strategy requires capacity, credibility, and restraint."

– Uttam Kumar Sinha

After BRICS, it's time to navigate the realities of great power rivalries



RAJA MANDALA
BY C RAJA MOHAN

AFTER THE BRICS summit in New Delhi, global geopolitical attention shifts to Washington, where Chinese leader Xi Jinping is headed next week. If "multipolarity" was the theme song in Delhi, "bipolarity" will be the signature tune in Washington. The second meeting between presidents Donald Trump and Xi this year is part of an intensive series of exchanges. After Washington, Trump and Xi are likely to meet in Shenzhen, China, on the margins of the APEC summit. If the current buzz of a trilateral summit proves real, Russia's Vladimir Putin could join Trump and Xi there. The focus would then turn from a G2 to a possible G3 world. Further opportunities for great-power diplomacy could present themselves in Miami, where Trump hosts the annual G20 summit in December.

Many of these multilateral gatherings, such as BRICS, APEC, and G20, are routine annual affairs. Despite the political glamour attached to these events in Delhi, significant collective progress in these meetings is rare. But these forums are useful venues where critical bilateral meetings take place. The highlight of the Delhi BRICS summit, for example, was the attempted reset of India-China relations by Prime

Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi. What gives the multilateral summits some salience this year is the churn in great-power politics triggered by Trump's disruption of US foreign policy, relations with allies and rivals, and the American approach to the burdens of international order. Underlying that churn is the more important structural change in the distribution of global power in favour of China and America.

Both BRICS and the G7 are increasingly marked by the overwhelming economic weight of a single power — China in the first and the United States in the second. China accounted for less than half of BRICS' combined GDP when the original BRIC forum with four members was formed in 2006. Despite subsequent enlargement to eleven members, China now accounts for roughly three-fifths. Whether we like it or not, Beijing continues to outgrow BRICS in economic size and geopolitical influence.

The G7 has seen a comparable shift. America now accounts for close to three-fifths of the group's nominal output, against less than two-fifths three decades ago. Japan's stagnation, Europe's weaker growth and demographic pressures, and American advantages in energy, capital markets and artificial intelligence have widened the gap. Trump's willingness to turn harshly on America's closest partners — whether Canada or Britain in the Anglosphere or NATO and the EU — rests, in part, on this expanding American economic preponderance.

Does China's dominance in BRICS and America's preponderance in the G7 mean we are headed to a G2 world? Not necessarily. But it

is quite evident that the world economy is developing a G2 structure, dominated by America and China. Washington and Beijing are the only states with the scale to shape global economic order, technology standards, and supply chains. They are also deeply interdependent. Each seeks to reduce vulnerability to the other, but neither can readily escape the other's market, technology, capital or industrial capacity.

The Trump-Xi meetings this year are not likely to herald a US-China condominium. Their disputes over trade, technology and Taiwan are too deep. But they are based on the recognition that Washington and Beijing must manage their rivalry through sustained high-level contact. The nature of that management, however, has implications for the rest of the world.

Unlike the clear pattern in the global economic order, the situation on the strategic front is more complex. Although economically diminished, Russia retains enough military power, geographical reach and diplomatic weight to influence the balance between the two giants across Eurasia. Unsurprisingly, Moscow has drawn Beijing closer than ever before, while Trump has made an American overture to Russia. This does not mean that the US can easily detach Russia from China. Trump's Russian play is complicated by the conflict between Moscow and Europe over Ukraine. Progress in Trump's peace initiative in Ukraine, however, could set the stage for a US-Russian rapprochement, and a G3 summit as well as Putin's presence at the G20 meeting. Unlike the G7, the G20 includes China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Ara-

bia, South Africa and other consequential non-Western powers. Unlike BRICS, it includes the US, Europe and Japan.

The changing distribution of power has helped America and China loom larger than ever before in the G20. Differences between the US and China at the G20 finance ministers' meeting in Washington this month prevented the forum from issuing a joint statement, with China objecting to language on trade surpluses and export-led growth. When the US and China disagree, they undermine the hope that the G20 is capable of collective action on the economic front. But bilateral deal-making between Washington and Beijing could also come at the expense of other actors in the G20.

India might want a multipolar world, but we are not there yet; arguably, we might even be moving away from it. For now, Delhi must deal with the intensifying great game — whether it is G2 or G3 — that is set to define the future of the international order. Organisations like the APEC, BRICS, EU, G7 and NATO don't shape the world order. They operate within the parameters set by great-power politics. With the BRICS party over in Delhi, the Indian foreign policy elite needs to wake up from its self-indulgent reverie and pay attention to the changing global distribution of power and the geopolitical realignment between America, China, and Russia.

The writer is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is also a distinguished professor at the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, and the Korea Foundation Chair at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi.

Context

The world economy is settling into an America-China structure, and India's talk of multipolarity has run ahead of the facts.

Facts

■ **Trump and Xi** : meet again on the margins of the APEC summit, and if Putin could join, turning a G2 into a G3.

■ **G20 at Miami** : includes China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, and unlike BRICS it also includes the United States, Europe and Japan.

■ **Russia** : though economically diminished, retains military power, geographical reach and diplomatic weight across Eurasia and drawn closer to Beijing.

Analytical Crux

Summits are where great-power bilateralism gets transacted. Washington and Beijing are the only states with the clout to shape global economic order, technology standards, and supply chains. China is about three-fifths of BRICS output and America is about three-fifths of the G7's. The failure to agree a G20 statement shows that when the two largest economies disagree, collective action stops; and when they agree, the bargain is struck over everyone else's head. The caution for India is self-description, because multipolarity is being recited as a description of the present when it is still an aspiration. The working position for Delhi is to operate in the space between two giants rather than to celebrate a distribution of power that has not arrived. Therefore, India might want a multipolar world, but we are not there yet and we might even be moving away from it.

Verbatim Quotes

"Organisations like the APEC, BRICS, EU, G7 and NATO don't shape the world order. They operate within the parameters set by great-power politics."

– C. Raja Mohan

- PSIR 2026, Paper II: What is UNCLOS? Explain its salient features.
- GS 2026, Paper II: “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.
- PSIR 2025, Paper II: Global South-sensitive model of globalization would prevent the danger emanating from overcentralized globalization. Discuss.
- PSIR 2025, Paper II: India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US’ offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.
- PSIR 2024, Paper II: Discuss the potential role that India could play as the leader of the Global South in realising the goal of establishing a new international economic order in the 21st century.

FOUNDATION COURSE · FOR MAINS 2027

PSIR Optional Foundation **2027**

Political Science & International Relations · UPSC Civil Services, Mains

Not just a foundation course — a complete journey, from your first class to the final stage.

STARTS **21 SEPTEMBER** · ONLINE | OFFLINE

CHOOSE YOUR PLAN

Crucible

THE CORE COURSE · YOUR MODE

- ✓ **100 core sessions** — full Paper I & II
- ✓ **PSIR Dynamics** — both phases, till Mains
- ✓ **Class notes, quote bank** & enrichment
- ✓ **One-to-one mentorship**, all year
- ✓ **Online · Offline · Hybrid** — your choice
- ✓ **PSIR Test Series** — available as add-on

FLAGSHIP

Magnus

THE COMPLETE JOURNEY · ONE FEE

Everything in Crucible, and—

- ✓ **+25 PSIR Praxis sessions** — GS, Essay & Ethics
- ✓ **Full PSIR Test Series** — included
- ✓ **OGP Advanced** for Mains 2027 — free
- ✓ **OIGP Interview Guidance** — free
- ✓ **Any mode** — one fee, switch anytime

ADMISSION & ENQUIRY

Call / WhatsApp 93117 40432

Faculty channel · t.me/psirbyamitpratap

Amit Pratap Singh

PSIR FACULTY 

PSIR OPTIONAL · UPSC CIVIL SERVICES MAINS

PSIR DYNAMICS

THE CURRENT LAYER OF BOTH PAPERS

2027 BATCH

BEGINS

SATURDAY, 5 SEPTEMBER 2026

INSIDE EVERY SESSION

- | | | |
|----|-----------------------------|--|
| 01 | CONTEXT | Where the development comes from, and what it follows. |
| 02 | THE RECORD | Dates, official wording, and the document it came from. |
| 03 | THE ANALYSIS | The argument it raises, and the positions taken on it. |
| 04 | THEORY & VERBATIM QUOTATION | The concept on the syllabus, in the scholar's own words. |
| 05 | FURTHER QUOTATIONS | More lines to cite, each one carrying its source. |
| 06 | PRACTICE QUESTIONS | On the theme, at 10, 15 and 20 marks. |



PSIR OPTIONAL • COHORT 6

PSIR TEST SERIES 2027

400+ QUESTIONS • 4 LAYERS OF TESTS

O-AWFG

BALANCED

05 SEPTEMBER

35

DAILY ANSWER
WRITING TESTS

2

OPTIONAL
SIMULATORS

O-AWFG PRIME

MOST INTENSIVE

05 SEPTEMBER

35

DAILY ANSWER
WRITING TESTS

8

REVISION
TESTS

2

FULL-LENGTH
TESTS

2

OPTIONAL
SIMULATORS



PSIR DYNAMICS
CLASSES

ATS

EXAM REALISM

06 SEPTEMBER

4

SECTIONAL
TESTS

6

FULL-LENGTH
TESTS

2

OPTIONAL
SIMULATORS

CONTENT BLUEPRINT ♦ MODEL ANSWERS ♦ EXPERT EVALUATION ♦ PERSONALISED MENTORSHIP

TO ENROL OR FOR GUIDANCE, CALL

93117 40432

AMIT PRATAP SINGH

PSIR FACULTY ♦