

PSIR & GS-2

DAILY BRIEF

ABOUT THIS INITIATIVE

Briefs, scans the best academic platforms, national newspapers & leading think tanks to pick the most relevant articles & research. It converts them into crisp, high-impact points you can directly use in your mains answers.



PSIR OPTIONAL BY
Amit Pratap Singh
| ForumIAS |

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The UN's Long Road
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The Hindu

Daily Brief · Source Plan (Monday to Saturday)

Common Daily

The Hindu · The Indian Express · Deccan Herald · The Statesman

read every day, alongside the day's sources below

Day-wise Sources

Monday

ORF (Observer Research Foundation) · *Foreign Affairs* · *The Diplomat*

Tuesday

MP-IDSA · *EPW* (Economic & Political Weekly) · *Gateway House*

Wednesday

Firstpost · *South Asia Monitor* · *ICWA* (Indian Council of World Affairs)

Thursday

ORF · *Frontline* · *Bar & Bench* · *World Focus*

Friday

MP-IDSA · *Carnegie Endowment* · *VIF* (Vivekananda International Foundation)

Saturday

Firstpost · *Project Syndicate* · *The Economist*

As per relevance, articles from other relevant sources such as NatStrat, ThePrint and The Telegraph (India) will also be included.

Old world is crumbling: India is pushing to rewire the new global order

Firstpost



TRENDING | Essar steel plant in US RAF Fairford bomb plot US Most Wanted list Cornell University rape case World Heart Day

Old world is crumbling: India is pushing to rewire the new global order

As global power shifts eastward, India is championing multilateral reform while pursuing strategic autonomy



Context

As the UN enters its 81st year, Anil Trigunayat argues that post-1945 institutions no longer reflect a world whose centre has shifted to the South and East, and traces India's push for reformed multilateralism at the UNGA and BRICS.

Facts

- **UNSC campaign** : *India is seeking a non-permanent seat for 2028-29 alongside fundamental reform of the UN.*

- **The '4F' crisis** : *Jaishankar raised fuel, food, fertiliser and finance at the Partners for Multilateralism Summit.*

- **First India-V4 meeting** : *Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic backed UN reform and India's place on a reformed UNSC.*
- **New Delhi Declaration** : *at the 18th BRICS+ summit, Russia and China joined in supporting India's and Brazil's aspirations.*

Analytical Crux

The UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO and the WHO still carry the victor-and-vanquished mindset of 1945, while the politico-economic pivot has moved to the South and the East. The powers that framed the rules-based order now undermine it through unilateral action. Trump has defined a 'Donroe Doctrine' through actions against Venezuela, Canada, Mexico, Panama and Greenland, cut UN funding and walked out of agreements, and his G2 outreach to China risks a Cold War 2.0 of earmarked spheres. India responds with strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, sitting in both BRICS and the Quad and building platforms such as the ISA and CDRI. P4 support for India's permanent seat may be a ruse, since none of them wants an expanded Council with the veto. Therefore, India's task is to move reform into text-based negotiations and help the Global South shape rules instead of accepting rules set elsewhere.

Verbatim Quotes

"Reforms in the minds of some could be the perpetuation of the preferential power matrix of the P5 at the UNSC."

- Anil Trigunayat

Water Diplomacy Through Riverine Networks: The India-Nepal Mahakali Sambad Example

SOUTH ASIA MONITOR
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Water Diplomacy Through Riverine Networks: The India-Nepal Mahakali Sambad Example

Supported by the Transboundary Rivers of South Asia Programme (TROSA), this led to formation of grassroots networks, including the India-Nepal Joint Action Forum (INJAF) through which civil society organisations and local communities could raise common riverine concerns with officials in their respective countries. Many women in the community participate in these programs, leading to development of women's empowerment centres (Mahila Mandals).

 By Yubaraj Das | Sep 24, 2026



Context

Yubaraj Das argues that India-Nepal water diplomacy has focused too narrowly on states, and uses the Mahakali Sambad to show how cross-border community networks can build cooperation from below.

Facts

■ **Shared rivers** : about 60 rivers and rivulets cross the border; the Mahakali (Sarda in India) forms part of the boundary.

■ **Treaty limits** : the Mahakali Treaty (1996) framed cooperation, yet disputes over water rights and Pancheshwar persist.

■ **Mahakali Sambad** : a TROSA-supported dialogue that created the India-Nepal Joint Action Forum and women's centres (Mahila Mandals).

■ **Local results** : pilgrim rafting across the river, and women-led curbs on liquor and tree-planting against erosion.

Analytical Crux

IR has traditionally placed states at the centre, and water diplomacy has stayed at the inter-state level. A network lens shifts attention to how people identify shared problems and act together. Communities on both banks face the same erosion, pollution, sand mining, weak early warning and unannounced water releases. The Mahakali Sambad brought them together with civil society and local governments, and women's centres turned small initiatives such as pilgrim rafting into cross-border projects that drew in officials from Parshuram Municipality and Champawat district. The case also reveals a gendered dimension that state-centric analysis misses. *Such programmes depend on donor funding and can run out of resources over time. Therefore, states need to institutionalise and sustain these networks, so that cooperation at the micro level survives tension at the state level and water diplomacy in South Asia becomes localised.*

Verbatim Quotes

"Understanding the struggles of communities demands close attention to the mundane, both epistemologically and methodologically against the traditional IR paradigm."

– Yubaraj Das

The American ‘Seasaw’ and the Indo-Pacific Reconfiguration



The American ‘Seasaw’ and the Indo-Pacific Reconfiguration

Dr. Stuti Banerjee | 24 September 2026

Abstract: *The Indo-Pacific construct is being reconfigured amid a reduced and unpredictable American policy outlook under the across the region are increasingly looking at the United States as one significant partner among several, rather than as the singl regional order.*

In June 2026, the United States Defence Department announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) would offi Pacific Command (USPACOM).i11 (The US Pacific Command was renamed the US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 during President

Context

Dr Stuti Banerjee argues that an unpredictable US outlook under Trump is reconfiguring the Indo-Pacific, as regional states come to treat Washington as one significant partner among several.

Facts

■ **Name change :** *in June 2026 the Pentagon said USINDOPACOM would revert to US Pacific Command, its name before 2018.*

■ **China reframed :** *the NSS 2025 and NDS 2026 no longer call China a 'strategic competitor', as the 2022 documents did.*

■ **Mixed signals :** *strains with India, a threat to bomb Oman and scaled-back exercises with South Korea, while the Philippine alliance was reaffirmed.*

■ **Regional networks :** *the Australia-India-Japan and Australia-India-Indonesia trilaterals work without dependence on the US.*

Analytical Crux

The US now stresses bilateral trade deals and leader-level engagement with China over coalition-building, and Trump has advocated a Group of Two with Beijing as a peer. The Indo-Pacific will still endure because its weight is structural. The region accounts for close to 40 per cent of global GDP and holds critical sea lanes and supply chains. Geography and shared concerns about China keep regional states engaged with each other, and their minilaterals also meet Washington's demand for burden-sharing. No regional framework can yet replace American extended deterrence over Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, Washington remains the most consequential external actor on hard security, while its centrality in the region's economics, diplomacy and institution-building shrinks within a more polycentric architecture.

Verbatim Quotes

"The countries of the region are increasingly diversifying their partnerships, treating the United States as a critical but no longer central partner in Indo-Pacific relations."

- Stuti Banerjee

Ghosts of 1945 are being recruited in US–China contest over Asia

Ghosts of 1945 are being recruited in US-China contest over Asia



RAJA MANDALA
BY C RAJA MOHAN

WORLD WAR II and its expansive impact on the Subcontinent is largely forgotten by India's strategic community. But its ghosts still shape Asia's great-power politics. They surfaced last week when US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Washington.

In India, there has been little attention to the affirmation of Trump and Xi that the US and China were victorious allies during World War II. References to history are rarely innocent. The past is interpreted and reinterpreted to serve the politics of the present.

Since returning to power, Trump has invoked America's wartime cooperation with both Russia and China. His critics see these references as a way to justify his leader-level outreach to Vladimir Putin and Xi that is unsettling US allies in Europe and Asia. For Putin, the memory of victory supports Russia's claim to a leading role in European security and the restoration of the "Yalta System" led by the US and the Soviet Union that shaped the European and global order. For Xi, it strengthens Beijing's effort to present China as a victor of 1945 and undermine the "San Francisco System" of US alliances that defined the post-War Asian order.

The US-China wartime partnership is a historical fact, but it needs qualification. Washington's ally in the war was the Republic of China (RoC) led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) that now endures in Taiwan. The People's Republic of China (PRC), led by Mao Zedong, emerged only in 1949. That distinction lies at the heart of Taipei's response. Taiwanese officials have accused Beijing of using "narrative diplomacy" to undermine the historical identity of Taiwan.

Tokyo's response reflected deep political unease. Imperial Japan was the wartime adversary against which America and China cooperated: it is now Washington's principal Asian ally. Prime Minister Sanae Takachi spoke to Trump after his meeting with Xi. Japan's foreign ministry said Trump explained the talks in detail, and the two reaffirmed their alliance and strategic coordination on China. Tokyo sought reassurance without making its concern an open quarrel with Washington. Recalling China and America as victorious partners, with Japan as the defeated aggressor, gives Beijing the political ammunition to challenge Tokyo's present defence policies. The irony is difficult to miss. Japan is ramping up its defence spending to cope with the massive military

earlier consensus to remove them. The strategy is about pushing Japan onto the political defensive. The Trump-Xi declaration on World War II also raises questions about the future of America's San Francisco System, built around the 1951 peace settlement with Japan. That system placed Japan at the centre of Washington's regional strategy. Beijing's invocation of the wartime alliance is part of the Chinese push to build a different dynamic among the three countries, nudge America towards a "China-First" policy in Asia and weaken the US-Japan alliance.

Beijing's argument also reflects a change in the Chinese Communist Party's account of the war. During the Mao era, the subject was awkward: Chiang's Nationalist armies bore much of the conventional fighting against Japan. From the 1980s, the war became central to a narrative of Japanese aggression and China's "century of humiliation". China presented itself chiefly as a *victim*. Under Xi, China has increasingly presented itself as a *victor*. Commemorations, parades and school textbooks emphasise its place among the powers that defeated Japan and founded the United Nations. Harvard historian Rana Mitter has shown how this changing memory supports

China's claim to the apex of global hierarchy. Victimhood asks the world to acknowledge suffering; victory offers a claim to authority in shaping the order that followed.

Where is India in this debate over 1945? Barely visible. But Delhi is surely concerned. At a Russia-India-China foreign ministers' meeting in June 2020, Subrahmanya Jaishankar reminded his counterparts that 2.3 million In-

dians had served under arms and another 14 million had participated in war production. Indians fought from North Africa and Italy to Southeast Asia. The Indian Army's stellar role in rolling back imperial Japan's armies in Burma and Southeast Asia has largely been forgotten. Jaishankar argued India received little recognition when the victors shaped the post-war order. He called it an uncorrected "historical injustice".

The source of that injustice, however, has deep roots at home. India's national movement was divided in responding to World War II. Congress opposed Britain's decision to involve India without consulting Indians and later launched the Quit India movement. The Communists shifted from opposing the War to supporting it after Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Subhas Chandra Bose sought German and Japanese help to secure Indian independence. These differences have made it hard for India to incorporate the great sacrifice of its soldiers into an accepted account of the war or its claim to be at the heart of global governance.

In teaching itself and talking about the evolution of modern India's engagement with the world, the Indian elite pays little attention to the politics of World War II, its impact on the Partition of the Subcontinent, and the post-war marginalisation of India in the global pecking order. That, arguably, is one reason for the nature of Indian discourse on foreign policy that relies on abstract concepts rather than history and geopolitics.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is a professor at the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University

Context

The Trump–Xi affirmation that the US and China were victorious allies in World War II drew little notice in India. C Raja Mohan argues that the memory of 1945 is being put to work in reshaping Asia's order.

Facts

- **A needed qualification :** *America's wartime ally was the Republic of China, now in Taiwan; the PRC emerged only in 1949.*
- **Tokyo's unease :** *PM Sanae Takaichi spoke to Trump after the summit, and the two reaffirmed their alliance.*
- **Enemy state clauses :** *China opposes removing these obsolete UN Charter clauses aimed at Japan, Germany and Italy.*
- **India's forgotten role :** *2.3 million Indians served under arms and 14 million in war production, as Jaishankar noted in June 2020.*

Analytical Crux

The memory of 1945 is being put to present use. For Putin it supports a 'Yalta System' in Europe, and for Xi it presents China as a victor that can undermine the 'San Francisco System' of US alliances in Asia. Beijing's narrative casts Japan as the defeated aggressor turning to militarism, putting Tokyo on the defensive just as it raises defence spending against China. It aims to nudge Washington toward a 'China-First' policy and weaken the US-Japan alliance built on the 1951 settlement. Under Xi, China has moved from presenting itself as a victim to presenting itself as a victor. *India is barely visible in this debate, though its army rolled back imperial Japan in Burma and Southeast Asia. Therefore, the national movement's divisions over the war, and the elite's neglect of its politics, have left India unable to turn that sacrifice into a claim to the heart of global governance.*

Verbatim Quotes

"Victimhood asks the world to acknowledge suffering; victory offers a claim to authority in shaping the order that followed."

- C Raja Mohan

The United Nations’ long road to restoring trust

The United Nations’ long road to restoring trust

As world leaders gathered in New York for the high-level week of the 81st United Nations General Assembly, they debated an increasingly urgent question: trust. This year’s theme, chosen by wide-ranging consultations, was: “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: a UN that delivers for all” – with “restoration” suggesting a collapse of trust. The world has historically been a low-trust society. Mistrust between nations has fuelled conflict throughout history. The UN was hence established after the Second World War to make the actions of nation-states more predictable, by creating a space for dialogue and an elaborate scaffolding of international law. The game of thrones would still be played, but with some rules. The UN has been one of humanity’s greatest achievements precisely because of its ability to build and channel trust between nations.

Surveys about the UN
But over the past three decades, that ability has frayed. Where once UN staff designed and seeded “trust-building” approaches between conflicting parties as part of peacebuilding, today the organisation is in a place where it needs to restore trust in its own approaches. Two surveys conducted last year by Edelman Trust and Pew found that both trust in and favourability towards the UN had declined in the countries surveyed. A new poll by the non-profit UN Foundation found that 52% of respondents feel the UN is struggling to deliver results and want deep structural reform. Well over half believe that it has struggled to enforce international law and protect human rights, and that it is dominated by a few powerful countries. Another poll by the Rockefeller Foundation and Focaldata suggests that only 58% think that the UN can lead efforts to solve global problems, potentially a historic low for the organisation. There are at least four reasons for this situation. First, the persistent



Raja Karthikeya
Adjunct Fellow,
Takshashila
Institution

The UN, one of humanity’s greatest achievements, needs to confront its deepening crisis of trust

deadlock in the UN Security Council (UNSC) has eroded the General Assembly’s trust in the UNSC, so much that a resolution was passed (A/76/262) requiring the UNSC’s permanent members to explain each new use of veto to the Assembly. Second, questions persist about the integrity and oversight of the UN’s internal processes ranging from recruitment, procurement to allocation of resources. When high-profile controversies such as a procurement scandal in Afghanistan (2013) or sexual exploitation and abuse cases involving peacekeepers (2017) or contracts for non-existent housing projects in Ghana and India (2021) broke out in the UN, the blame was placed on individuals but systemic accountability was seldom addressed. Consequences for individual malfeasance have been limited.

Financial muscle is a factor
Third, a few countries have come to prevail over the UN system on the strength of their financial contributions. They wield influence through advocacy for their nationals to be recruited into the system, extra-budgetary grants for cherry-picked UN programmes or a combination of the two. For instance, a 2024 report of the UN’s highest financial oversight body (ACABQ) pointed out that in one UN agency, eight out of nine technical experts recruited were sponsored by a single government. In such a case, can the policies recommended to a beneficiary country by the entity be deemed completely neutral? The UN development system’s transparency about its own programme spending too is increasingly limited to these donor governments and not to the public of their beneficiary countries. When it comes to preventing conflict, a fear of upsetting these powerful countries – which in turn could affect contributions as well as individual careers – has made the UN bureaucracy increasingly risk-averse and hesitant.

Fourth, though the bulk of the UN’s programme delivery is in the Global South and trust in the UN is higher in the Global South (UN Foundation poll), only a fraction of the decision-making power rests with the Global South. Developing nations, which account for 84% of the world’s population, hold only 44% of UN civil service leadership positions. Only a third of the UN leadership in Africa is African. Only two-fifths of the cities in which various UN entities have headquarters are cities in the Global South. When, as part of a cost-cutting measure, thousands of posts were moved out of New York and Geneva in 2025, cities in the Global South (except those mentioned) got a miss despite their cost advantages.

Reverse the shrinking space
The UN commendably delivered global humanitarian assistance and protection in 2025-26 to 98 million people, or roughly 1.1% of the world population. But aid effectiveness and the proportion of funds transferred to local actors remains an issue. In wars such as Ukraine, Gaza and Iran, the UN made tactical interventions such as keeping grain exports flowing through the Black Sea, or preventing an oil spill in the Red Sea, but could not build on the goodwill thus earned to create mechanisms for the belligerents to sit and talk. Taking the initiative to facilitate peacemaking has become untenably centralised at the highest rungs of the organisation’s bureaucratic ladder. It is time that the UN moved to enhance its transparency and remake its ties with the people of the world, and not just the governments. The United Nations is more than an inter-governmental organisation. It reflects the best of humanity’s hopes for itself. The “transformation” that the 81st General Assembly aims for, would indeed have to start, by restoring trust.

Context

The 81st UNGA met under the theme 'Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: a UN that delivers for all'. Raja Karthikeya argues that the UN, once a builder of trust between nations, must now restore trust in itself.

Facts

■ **Falling confidence** : 52% in a UN Foundation poll say the UN struggles to deliver; only 58% (Rockefeller-Focaldata) think it can lead.

■ **Veto initiative** : resolution A/76/262 requires permanent members to explain each new veto to the General Assembly.

■ **Financial muscle** : a 2024 ACABQ report found eight of nine technical experts in one agency were sponsored by one government.

■ **Global South deficit** : developing nations have 84% of the world's population but hold only 44% of UN civil service leadership posts.

Analytical Crux

The UN was built to make state conduct predictable through dialogue and international law, and its value lay in building trust between nations. Over three decades that ability has frayed. Security Council deadlock has eroded the Assembly's trust in the Council. Scandals over procurement, peacekeeper abuse and phantom housing contracts ended with individual blame and little systemic accountability. Major donors shape recruitment and programmes, making the bureaucracy risk-averse, while the Global South, where most programmes run and trust is highest, holds little decision-making power. The UN kept grain moving through the Black Sea and prevented an oil spill in the Red Sea, but failed to turn that goodwill into talks between belligerents. Therefore, the 'transformation' the 81st UNGA seeks must begin with transparency and with ties to the people of the world as well as their governments.

Verbatim Quotes

"The United Nations is more than an inter-governmental organisation. It reflects the best of humanity's hopes for itself."

- Raja Karthikeya

- GS Paper II, 2015: Discuss the impediments India is facing in its pursuit of a permanent seat in UN Security Council.
- PSIR Paper II, 2026: Does power transition theory reflect the dynamics of US-China relations?
- GS Paper II, 2021: The USA is facing an existential threat in the form of a China, that is much more challenging than the erstwhile Soviet Union. Explain.
- GS Paper II, 2020: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is transforming itself into a trade bloc from a military alliance, in present times. Discuss.

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| 02 | THE RECORD | Dates, official wording, and the document it came from. |
| 03 | THE ANALYSIS | The argument it raises, and the positions taken on it. |
| 04 | THEORY & VERBATIM QUOTATION | The concept on the syllabus, in the scholar's own words. |
| 05 | FURTHER QUOTATIONS | More lines to cite, each one carrying its source. |
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