{"id":3449,"date":"2026-08-11T22:10:55","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:40:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/rawls-theory-of-justice\/"},"modified":"2026-08-22T11:55:44","modified_gmt":"2026-08-22T06:25:44","slug":"rawls-theory-of-justice","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/rawls-theory-of-justice\/","title":{"rendered":"Rawls\u2019 theory of justice"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#i-a\">I-A Political Theory and Indian Politics<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Rawls\u2019 theory of justice<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 Political Theory and Indian Politics<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Rawls\u2019 theory of justice<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I-A \u00b7 3<\/b> \u2014 Justice : Conceptions of justice with special reference to Rawl\u2019s theory of justice and its communitarian critiques.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"liberalism-utilitarianism-rawls-intervention\">Liberalism, Utilitarianism &amp; Rawls\u2019 Intervention<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Liberalism &amp; procedural justice.<\/span> Liberty is the central value, individual rights are protected, formal equality is emphasised, the state must not impose a single good life. Classical liberal justice tends towards procedural fairness; the neoliberal link \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Friedrich August von Hayek<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Nozick<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Milton Friedman<\/span> \u2014 treats the market as a model of freedom and growth, the state preventing fraud and coercion, not redesigning outcomes.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Utilitarianism &amp; its limits.<\/span> Utility replaces liberty \u2014 the greatest happiness of the greatest number. <span class=\"n-sch\">Jeremy Bentham<\/span> links justice with pleasure and pain; <span class=\"n-sch\">John Stuart Mill<\/span>: \u201cThe greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation.\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">John Rawls<\/span> accepts utilitarianism as a progressive departure from narrow rights-talk but considers it flawed: it supports <span class=\"n-term\">majoritarianism over egalitarianism<\/span> and can make minorities a means to majority ends.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Rawls\u2019 Kantian maxim<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Influenced by <span class=\"n-sch\">Immanuel Kant<\/span>: no person may be used merely as a means to the ends of others. Each person has an inviolability founded on justice; the welfare of society as a whole cannot override the loss of freedom of some for the greater good of many.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Rawls as a liberal egalitarian.<\/span> He stands between absolute liberty and absolute equality \u2014 against utilitarianism (individual inviolability cannot be sacrificed), against libertarianism (market outcomes judged by fairness), against socialism (equal liberty remains prior). Liberty is lexically prior, equal basic liberty applies to all, social-economic inequality is allowed only when it benefits the least advantaged, fair equality of opportunity is required. This makes liberalism more humane; <span class=\"n-sch\">Will Kymlicka<\/span> treats his work as a major factor in the revival of normative theory.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"john-rawls-works-society-primary-goods\">John Rawls \u2014 Works, Society &amp; Primary Goods<\/h3>\n<p>An American political philosopher in the liberal tradition. Major works: <em>Justice as Fairness<\/em> (1958 article; 1985 essay), <em>A Theory of Justice<\/em> (1971), <em>Political Liberalism<\/em> (1993), <em>The Law of Peoples<\/em> (1998). Key ideas \u2014 original position, veil of ignorance, justice as fairness, primary goods, maximin rule, Difference Principle, lexical order, reflective equilibrium, overlapping consensus, political liberalism.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"society-conflict-and-cooperation\">Society \u2014 conflict and cooperation<\/h4>\n<p>Society is marked by both conflict (different interests and claims) and cooperation (a venture for mutual advantage). For Rawls society is a natural construct (individuals do not choose it), institutions must fairly balance competing claims, and justice is the first virtue of social institutions. <span class=\"n-sch\">Norman Barry<\/span>\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">chain principle<\/span>: society is like a chain \u2014 the weakest link matters as much as the strongest, so the condition of the least advantaged decides the justice of the whole. <span class=\"n-term\">Samuel Gorovitz<\/span> calls Rawls clearly <span class=\"n-term\">redistributionist<\/span> \u2014 government must not merely keep order but achieve distributive justice by valuing the needs of the poor.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"primary-goods-two-moral-powers\">Primary goods &amp; two moral powers<\/h4>\n<p>Justice is the fair distribution of <span class=\"n-term\">primary goods<\/span> \u2014 rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, powers, bases of self-respect. Rawls distinguishes <span class=\"n-term\">social goods<\/span> (wages, wealth, rights, freedom) from <span class=\"n-term\">natural goods<\/span> (health, intelligence, natural ability). Parties in the original position are free and equal persons with two moral powers: a <span class=\"n-term\">sense of justice<\/span> (willingness to cooperate on fair terms \u2014 making them reasonable, unlike purely Hobbesian actors) and a <span class=\"n-term\">conception of the good<\/span> (each has an idea of a good life).<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"justice-as-fairness-the-derivation\">Justice as Fairness \u2014 the Derivation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Original position.<\/span> Rawls revives social contract theory: free and equal persons, placed behind the veil of ignorance, choose principles to govern the basic structure of society. It works like an <span class=\"n-term\">Archimedean point<\/span> \u2014 an impartial standpoint that removes morally arbitrary advantage and makes principles fair to all. He follows the contract method of <span class=\"n-sch\">John Locke<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Jean-Jacques Rousseau<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Immanuel Kant<\/span>, but his contract is hypothetical, not historical. Conditions: moderate scarcity, parties neither altruistic nor purely egoistic, mutual indifference, rational concern for primary goods, fair equality among parties.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Veil of ignorance.<\/span> It removes knowledge of class, caste, gender, race, religion, social status, natural talents, wealth, conception of the good and fortune in the natural lottery.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cno one[\u2019s] place in society, \u2026 fortune in the distribution of natural assets \u2026 [or] conceptions of the good. \u2026 The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>John Rawls<\/cite><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>It creates moral insulation from social contingency, prevents bargaining from privilege and forces impartial public reasoning. Critics: <span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span> (a transcendental approach cannot, on its own, advance justice or compare alternatives), <span class=\"n-sch\">Susan Moller Okin<\/span> (Rawls \u201calmost completely ignores women\u201d), <span class=\"n-sch\">Michael Sandel<\/span> (the veil detaches persons from the identities that make moral reasoning possible). Defence: it is a heuristic device, not a sociological description \u2014 and can be extended to gender, disability, ecological risk and future generations.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Maximin rule.<\/span> Maximise the minimum \u2014 choose the best worst-case outcome. Rational persons will not risk the worst position under unjust rules; they secure basic liberty, fair opportunity and protection for the least advantaged. Maximin justifies the Difference Principle.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From the original position to the two principles.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Original Position<\/span> (free, equal, rational parties choose the basic structure) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Veil of Ignorance<\/span> (no knowledge of class, caste, gender, talents, fortune) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Maximin<\/span> (risk-averse: secure the best worst-case) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Two Principles<\/span> (1 \u00b7 Equal Liberty \u2192 2 \u00b7 Fair Equality of Opportunity \u2192 Difference Principle (lexical order)).<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-two-principles-lexical-priority-reflective-equilibrium\">The Two Principles, Lexical Priority &amp; Reflective Equilibrium<\/h3>\n<h4 id=\"first-principle-liberty-principle\">First Principle \u2014 Liberty Principle<\/h4>\n<p>Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with the same scheme for all \u2014 freedom of speech and conscience, political liberty, the right to vote, liberty of the person, rule-of-law protections. Rawls gives liberty priority.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"second-principle-equality-principle\">Second Principle \u2014 Equality Principle<\/h4>\n<p>Social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: <span class=\"n-term\">Fair Equality of Opportunity<\/span> (offices and positions open to all; birth, class, wealth, caste or gender must not block access) and the <span class=\"n-term\">Difference Principle<\/span>.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201csocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>John Rawls<\/cite><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h4 id=\"lexical-priority\">Lexical priority<\/h4>\n<p>Principles apply in lexical order: the First Principle must be satisfied before the Second; equal basic liberty cannot be traded for economic gain; fair equality of opportunity precedes the Difference Principle. Liberty has priority over equality, and equality regulates distribution once liberty is secured. Rawls later softens the liberty principle from \u201cthe most extensive total system\u201d (<em>A Theory of Justice<\/em>) to \u201ca fully adequate scheme\u201d (<em>Political Liberalism<\/em>), answering <span class=\"n-sch\">H. L. A. Hart<\/span>\u2019s point that liberty cannot always be mechanically ranked by rational preference.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"reflective-equilibrium\">Reflective equilibrium<\/h4>\n<p>A method of moral justification \u2014 a balance between general principles and considered judgments, adjusted until they form a coherent system. <span class=\"n-term\">Narrow<\/span> reflective equilibrium aligns beliefs with a particular set of principles; <span class=\"n-em\">wide<\/span> reflective equilibrium adjusts beliefs in light of all relevant moral considerations. It gives moral justification to principles and avoids both pure intuition and rigid deduction.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"contractual-distributive-justified-discrimination-liberal-eg\">Contractual &amp; Distributive; Justified Discrimination; Liberal Egalitarianism<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Contractual and distributive character.<\/span> The theory is <span class=\"n-term\">contractual<\/span> \u2014 principles are chosen in the original position, parties agree unanimously under fair conditions, the contract is hypothetical not historical. It is <span class=\"n-term\">distributive<\/span> \u2014 principles regulate the allocation of primary social goods and the Difference Principle protects the least advantaged. <span class=\"n-sch\">Tom Campbell<\/span> calls justice the central and commanding concept of normative political philosophy; <span class=\"n-sch\">Crawford Brough Macpherson<\/span> calls the theory an elegant defence of a liberal democratic welfare state while arguing it rationalises liberal beliefs rather than giving a universal theory; <span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Nozick<\/span> attacks it as an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cend-state\u201d theory<\/span> that reconstructs society to a preferred final pattern. Yet Rawls\u2019 work inaugurated \u201ca golden age in theorising about justice.\u201d<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Rawls\u2019 theory of justice is both contractual and distributive. Examine.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/rawls-theory-of-justice-is-both-contractual-and-distributive-upsc-psir-2017-0301\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h4 id=\"democratic-equality-justified-discrimination\">Democratic equality &amp; justified discrimination<\/h4>\n<p>Rawls calls the Difference Principle a form of <span class=\"n-term\">democratic equality<\/span>: unequal rewards are not rejected automatically, but inequality must improve the condition of the least advantaged, since natural endowments and social starting points are <span class=\"n-term\">morally arbitrary<\/span> and institutions must correct the unfair effects of luck. Limited discrimination is justified when it raises the position of the least advantaged and preserves equal liberty \u2014 through progressive taxation, affirmative action, property-owning democracy, a social minimum, India\u2019s reservations, the U.S. Civil Rights Act. This is not charity; it is <span class=\"n-term\">institutional reciprocity<\/span>. Critics: collectivists see trickle-down capitalism, Marxists say the veil hides private property and exploitation, libertarians say redistribution forces the meritorious to part with holdings, <span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span> says the deprived need capabilities beyond primary goods, socialists call it a \u201cvulgar defence of inequality,\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">Brian Barry<\/span> doubts liberty\u2019s lexical priority follows from rational choice.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Analyse John Rawls\u2019 justification of discrimination to achieve the goals of justice.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/analyse-john-rawls-justification-of-discrimination-to-achieve-the-upsc-psir-2018-0304\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h4 id=\"how-rawls-enriches-liberalism\">How Rawls enriches liberalism<\/h4>\n<p>Four enrichments: liberty stays central (equal basic liberty has lexical priority); equality enters liberalism (social-economic inequality must be morally justified); the welfare state gets a philosophical defence (redistribution becomes a requirement of justice, not compassion); liberalism becomes anti-utilitarian (minority rights cannot be sacrificed for aggregate welfare). He rejects Soviet-style communism (violates basic liberties, fails fair opportunity) and laissez-faire capitalism (unequal life chances, weak fair competition). His preferred form: <span class=\"n-term\">a property-owning democracy<\/span> \u2014 wide distribution of productive assets, social minimum, fair value of political liberties, economic independence. <span class=\"n-sch\">David Hume<\/span>\u2019s circumstances of justice and <span class=\"n-sch\">Immanuel Kant<\/span>\u2019s moral autonomy influence him; his distributive justice compensates for morally arbitrary misfortune in the social and natural lotteries.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How has Rawls enriched the idea of justice in liberalism?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/how-has-rawls-enriched-the-idea-of-justice-in-liberalism-upsc-psir-2021-0307\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Explain how Rawls used the liberal and egalitarian perspective to develop his concept of distributive justice.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/explain-how-rawls-used-the-liberal-and-egalitarian-perspective-to-upsc-psir-2025-0311\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"rawls-political-liberalism\">Rawls\u2019 Political Liberalism<\/h3>\n<p>In <em>Political Liberalism<\/em>, Rawls answers communitarian and pluralist criticism by distinguishing a <span class=\"n-term\">political conception of justice<\/span> from a <span class=\"n-term\">comprehensive doctrine<\/span>. The political conception applies only to basic political and economic institutions, does not govern the whole of personal life, is free-standing, and does not depend on one religion, morality or philosophy \u2014 it arises from the public political culture of a democratic society.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive doctrines<\/span> cover all of life \u2014 utilitarianism, Kantianism, Judaism, religious worldviews, moral philosophies. Rawls does not ask citizens to abandon them; he asks them to accept a shared political conception for the basic structure.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overlapping consensus<\/span><\/p>\n<p>How can citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines accept the same principles of justice? They support one political conception for different moral, religious or philosophical reasons. This differs from mere compromise \u2014 compromise is strategic and temporary; overlapping consensus is moral and stable within democratic culture.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Reasonable pluralism<\/span> is a normal feature of democratic culture: citizens disagree because they reason from different experiences and values. The <span class=\"n-term\">burden of judgment<\/span> \u2014 complex evidence, different weights on values, diverse experiences, the limits of reason \u2014 sets limits on what can be reasonably justified to others, and supports toleration and public reason.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"greek-perspective-the-rawlsian-concept\">Greek Perspective &amp; the Rawlsian Concept<\/h3>\n<p>Both treat justice as the organising principle of political life, but the moral frame differs sharply.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Basis<\/th>\n<th>Greek Perspective<\/th>\n<th>John Rawls\u2019 Perspective<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Moral frame<\/td>\n<td>virtue, harmony, common good<\/td>\n<td>rights, fairness, basic liberties<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Method<\/td>\n<td>natural hierarchy and social function<\/td>\n<td>hypothetical contract<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Subject<\/td>\n<td>polis and duty<\/td>\n<td>liberal-democratic society and free citizens<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Equality<\/td>\n<td>proportional equality<\/td>\n<td>moral equality<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Distribution<\/td>\n<td>based on merit and function<\/td>\n<td>based on primary goods and least advantaged<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Good and right<\/td>\n<td>good life precedes right<\/td>\n<td>right precedes good<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>Greek justice is <span class=\"n-term\">teleological<\/span>, duty-centred and hierarchical, accepting inherent inequality; law is believed to carry higher moral or natural authority and the state applies it rather than freely creating it. <span class=\"n-sch\">John Rawls<\/span> begins from moral equality, uses the original position and veil of ignorance, protects liberty first, and allows inequality only when it benefits the least advantaged. <span class=\"n-sch\">Norman Barry<\/span> highlights Rawls\u2019 concern for the neediest through the <span class=\"n-term\">chain principle<\/span>. The movement from Greek justice to Rawls is the movement from polis ethics to constitutional pluralism.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Make a comparative assessment of the Greek perspective of justice with the Rawlsian concept of justice.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/make-a-comparative-assessment-of-the-greek-perspective-of-justice-upsc-psir-2020-0306\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"criticism-of-john-rawls\">Criticism of John Rawls<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Attacked from every side \u2014 the critics around Rawls<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nozick<\/span> \u2014 too redistributive; talents are not common assets<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Marxists<\/span> \u2014 too capitalist; veil hides class &amp; property<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Communitarians<\/span> \u2014 too individualistic; abstract self<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Feminists<\/span> \u2014 gender-blind; family left unexamined<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">JOHN RAWLS<\/span> \u2014 justice as fairness<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span> \u2014 too institutional; capability over goods<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Isaiah Berlin<\/span> \u2014 lexical ordering denies value pluralism<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Brian Barry<\/span> \u2014 liberty priority not forced by rational choice<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Schaefer<\/span> \u2014 Difference Principle may breach Kantian equality<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Criticism refines Rawls more than it displaces him \u2014 he stays the central reference point.<\/em><\/p>\n<h4 id=\"functional-logical\">Functional &amp; logical<\/h4>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Jean Hampton<\/span>: the theory may not be truly contractarian \u2014 the veil, not bargaining, produces the Two Principles, and since all parties behind the veil are identical, real bargaining is unnecessary. Also, the defence of maximin is problematic: if parties care little for gains above the minimum, this conflicts with the assumption that each wants as much primary social goods as possible.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"libertarian-marxist\">Libertarian &amp; Marxist<\/h4>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Nozick<\/span> (Lockean): treating talents as common assets reduces dignity and self-respect; a person may be entitled to talents even if undeserved; using the better-off for the worst-off violates the Kantian no-means principle; redistribution violates just holdings. <span class=\"n-sch\">Friedrich August von Hayek<\/span> too gives primacy to liberty and accepts market inequalities. Marxist: the veil ignores class relations \u2014 deliberation without knowledge of property is meaningless. <span class=\"n-sch\">Crawford Brough Macpherson<\/span>: the system defends private capitalist enterprise and the Difference Principle resembles trickle-down. <span class=\"n-sch\">Bhabatosh Dutta<\/span>: maximin can justify enriching the rich if some benefit trickles down; raising the minimum need not reduce inequality; filtration theory is empirically disproved. (<span class=\"n-sch\">Buchanan<\/span>: Marxism rests on class struggle and historical development, not abstract moral philosophy.)<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"feminist-capability\">Feminist &amp; capability<\/h4>\n<p>Feminists say the theory neglects gender, family, unpaid care and intra-household power. <span class=\"n-sch\">Susan Moller Okin<\/span>: Rawls does not examine justice inside the family, the veil omits sex, generic male language hides women, the monogamous family is treated as basic but its internal inequality is unexamined. <span class=\"n-sch\">Martha Nussbaum<\/span> notes the absence of women in the original position; <span class=\"n-sch\">Carole Gilligan<\/span> (<em>In a Different Voice<\/em>) offers an ethics of care; <span class=\"n-sch\">Catherine MacKinnon<\/span> is also placed among feminist critics. <span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span>: equal primary goods do not create equal real freedom \u2014 people differ in health, disability, gender and circumstance \u2014 so the primary-goods metric is inadequate and may yield \u201cunjustified inequality and unfairness.\u201d<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"social-justice-contemporary-importance\">Social Justice &amp; Contemporary Importance<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Social justice<\/span> means organising society so that every person receives legal rights, dignity, fair opportunity, protection from exploitation and social-economic security. It is dynamic \u2014 it expands as society recognises new forms of deprivation, and earlier charity-based concerns (work, unemployment assistance, housing, education, welfare) become obligations of the state.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"core-elements-objections\">Core elements &amp; objections<\/h4>\n<p>Primacy of community interest (individual claims may be limited when they harm vulnerable groups); interconnected political equality, social dignity and economic equity; a reformative thrust; operational safeguards \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Roscoe Pound<\/span>\u2019s six social interests (security, institutions, morals, material goods, progress, individual rights) and eight jural postulates that translate justice into ordinary law; affirmative action; the welfare state. Objections: expanded state power, bureaucratic patronage, threat to liberty, difficulty of measuring deprivation, new permanent inequalities, reduced incentive. <span class=\"n-sch\">Friedrich August von Hayek<\/span> warns enforced equality may produce servitude; <span class=\"n-sch\">John Rawls<\/span> defends institutional change when institutions are unjust; <span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span> adds that policy must be judged by actual freedoms.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"why-rawls-still-matters\">Why Rawls still matters<\/h4>\n<p>Justice as fairness informs debates on income inequality and welfare; basic liberties protect civil liberties, privacy and political rights; <em>Political Liberalism<\/em> and overlapping consensus help with cultural-religious pluralism; his ideas shape global justice, intergenerational justice (the veil asks what present generations owe future ones), ethical decision-making and democratic values. The Difference Principle connects with progressive taxation and welfare; climate justice can use the veil to protect vulnerable countries and future generations. His concern for the least advantaged resonates with <span class=\"n-sch\">Mahatma Gandhi<\/span>\u2019s talisman and <span class=\"n-sch\">Deendayal Upadhyaya<\/span>\u2019s Antyodaya. Ongoing debates run through multicultural justice (<span class=\"n-sch\">Will Kymlicka<\/span>), global justice (<span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Nagel<\/span>) and extensions of the theory (<span class=\"n-sch\">Philip Pettit<\/span>).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Key texts beyond Rawls<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Kelly Brown Douglas<\/span>, <em>Stand Your Ground<\/em> (2015) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span>, <em>The Idea of Justice<\/em> (2009) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Laura Valentini<\/span>, <em>Justice in a Globalized World<\/em> (2011) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Lea Ypi<\/span>, <em>Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency<\/em> (2012).<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/conceptions-of-justice\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Conceptions of justice<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/communitarian-critiques-of-rawls\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Communitarian critiques of Rawls<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#liberalism-utilitarianism-rawls-intervention\">Liberalism, Utilitarianism &amp; Rawls\u2019 Intervention<\/a><a href=\"#john-rawls-works-society-primary-goods\">John Rawls \u2014 Works, Society &amp; Primary Goods<\/a><a href=\"#justice-as-fairness-the-derivation\">Justice as Fairness \u2014 the Derivation<\/a><a href=\"#the-two-principles-lexical-priority-reflective-equilibrium\">The Two Principles, Lexical Priority &amp; Reflective Equilibrium<\/a><a href=\"#contractual-distributive-justified-discrimination-liberal-eg\">Contractual &amp; Distributive; Justified Discrimination; Liberal Egalitarianism<\/a><a href=\"#rawls-political-liberalism\">Rawls\u2019 Political Liberalism<\/a><a href=\"#greek-perspective-the-rawlsian-concept\">Greek Perspective &amp; the Rawlsian Concept<\/a><a href=\"#criticism-of-john-rawls\">Criticism of John Rawls<\/a><a href=\"#social-justice-contemporary-importance\">Social Justice &amp; Contemporary Importance<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Rawls\u2019 theory of justice for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a I-A Political Theory and Indian Politics \u203a Rawls\u2019 theory of justice Paper I \u00b7 Political Theory and Indian Politic<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"I-A.3.2","fx_note_sec":"I-A","fx_note_point":"3","fx_note_desc":"Rawls\u2019 theory of justice for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a I-A Political Theory and Indian Politics \u203a Rawls\u2019 theory of justice Paper I \u00b7 Political Theory and Indian Politic","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3449","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3449","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3449\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5159,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3449\/revisions\/5159"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3449"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}