{"id":3502,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:28","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/union-legislature\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:54","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:54","slug":"union-legislature","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/union-legislature\/","title":{"rendered":"Union Legislature"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#i-b\">I-B Indian Government and Politics<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Union Legislature<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 Indian Government and Politics<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Union Legislature<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I-B \u00b7 4<\/b> \u2014 (a) Principal Organs of the Union Government : Envisaged role and actual working of the Executive, Legislature and Supreme Court. (b) Principal Organs of the State Government : Envisaged role and actual working of the Executive, Legislature and High Courts.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-two-houses-their-powers\">The Two Houses &amp; Their Powers<\/h3>\n<h4 id=\"composition-article-79\">Composition \u2014 <span class=\"n-law\">Article 79<\/span><\/h4>\n<p>Parliament = <span class=\"n-term\">President<\/span> + <span class=\"n-term\">Lok Sabha<\/span> + <span class=\"n-term\">Rajya Sabha<\/span>. It is the supreme Union legislature, the national forum of opinion, the institution of executive accountability, a symbol of unity and a forum of transformation.<\/p>\n<p>Unlike the British Parliament, the Indian Parliament is <span class=\"n-term\">not legally sovereign<\/span> \u2014 it is limited by the written Constitution, Fundamental Rights, the federal division of powers, judicial review and the basic structure doctrine.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"lok-sabha-house-of-the-people\">Lok Sabha \u2014 House of the People<\/h4>\n<p>Directly elected on universal adult franchise; five-year tenure unless dissolved; representation roughly proportionate to population; controls the executive through confidence\/no-confidence; primacy in finance. <span class=\"n-term\">Special position:<\/span> Money Bills can originate only here; the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to it; a no-confidence motion can remove the government only through it.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"rajya-sabha-council-of-states\">Rajya Sabha \u2014 Council of States<\/h4>\n<p>Purpose: federal representation, continuity in legislation, a forum for &#8220;second thought&#8221;, a check on hasty legislation, space for experienced and nominated members. <span class=\"n-term\">Composition:<\/span> indirectly elected by state assemblies; <span class=\"n-term\">12 nominated<\/span> members (art, literature, science, social service); a permanent House, not subject to dissolution. <span class=\"n-term\">Special powers: <span class=\"n-law\">Article 249<\/span><\/span> (legislate on the State List in national interest), <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 312<\/span><\/span> (initiate All-India Services), participation in amendments, and functioning during emergency when the Lok Sabha may be dissolved.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>The Upper House&#8217;s justification has often been more about &#8220;second thought&#8221; than firm &#8220;state rights&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p><cite>W.H. Morris-Jones<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar<\/span> supported it as a chamber of sober reflection.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">For Rajya Sabha<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Protects federal balance \u00b7 improves deliberation \u00b7 represents expertise \u00b7 a revising chamber \u00b7 continuity \u00b7 supports pluralism. <span class=\"n-term\">Theory: Mill<\/span>&#8216;s chamber of revision \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Bhargava<\/span>&#8216;s principled disagreement \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Chandhoke<\/span>&#8216;s minority rights \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Bhatia<\/span>&#8216;s institutional protection of constitutional values.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Against Rajya Sabha<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Weak on Money Bills \u00b7 cannot remove government \u00b7 may delay \u00b7 used to rehabilitate politicians \u00b7 unequal state weight \u00b7 nominees as loyalists \u00b7 bypassed via ordinances \/ Money-Bill route. <span class=\"n-sch\">P.B. Mehta<\/span>: misuse of ordinances and Money Bills to bypass scrutiny. <span class=\"n-sch\">Subhash Kashyap<\/span>: deadlocks weaken law-making. <span class=\"n-sch\">M.V. Rajeev Gowda<\/span>: party politics hits efficiency.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"law-making-money-bills-finance-privileges\">Law-Making, Money Bills, Finance &amp; Privileges<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How a law is made \u2014 the ordinary route.<\/span> Bill introduced (Minister \/ Private Member) \u2192 Readings &amp; debate \u2192 Select \/ Joint Committee (optional) \u2192 Passed by both Houses \u2192 Joint sitting if deadlock \u2192 President&#8217;s assent \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">ACT<\/span>. <em>Money Bill side-rail:<\/em> originates <span class=\"n-em\">only<\/span> in Lok Sabha \u2192 Speaker certifies \u2192 Rajya Sabha may only <em>recommend<\/em> \u2192 must return within 14 days \u2192 Lok Sabha may accept or reject.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"financial-control\">Financial control<\/h4>\n<p>No tax without parliamentary sanction; no withdrawal from the <span class=\"n-term\">Consolidated Fund<\/span> without approval; budget debate and grants; committee scrutiny through the <span class=\"n-term\">Public Accounts Committee<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Estimates Committee<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Committee on Public Undertakings<\/span>.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"parliamentary-privileges-articles-105-194\">Parliamentary privileges \u2014 <span class=\"n-law\">Articles 105<\/span> &amp; 194<\/h4>\n<p>Purpose: protect free speech in the House, ensure legislative independence, shield members from external pressure, enable scrutiny of the executive, maintain the dignity of the legislature. <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Articles 122<\/span> &amp; 212<\/span> bar judicial scrutiny on procedural grounds; courts may intervene where constitutional rights are substantively violated.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">P.V. Narasimha Rao<\/span> (1998) \u2192 earlier protection for bribery-linked speech\/vote inside the House.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-law\">State of Kerala v. K. Ajith<\/span> (2021) \u2192 privilege is not a gateway to escape ordinary law.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-law\">Sita Soren v. Union of India<\/span> (2024) \u2192 parliamentary immunity does not protect bribery.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Codification debate<\/span> \u2014 <em>for:<\/em> clarity of scope, natural justice, judicial review, accountability, protection against misuse; <em>against:<\/em> erosion of autonomy, excess judicial interference, reduced flexibility, need for wide consensus. <span class=\"n-sch\">Upendra Baxi<\/span>: privilege must not block transparency. <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajeev Bhargava<\/span>: the tension between privilege and individual rights. <span class=\"n-sch\">M.P. Singh<\/span>: privilege with safeguards against abuse.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-speaker-presiding-officers\">The Speaker &amp; Presiding Officers<\/h3>\n<p>The Speaker represents the authority, dignity and freedom of the House \u2014 the whole House, not a party or constituency.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Constitutional basis: <span class=\"n-law\">Article 93<\/span><\/span> (Speaker &amp; Deputy Speaker), <span class=\"n-term\">94<\/span> (vacation\/resignation), <span class=\"n-term\">95<\/span> (Deputy Speaker&#8217;s powers), <span class=\"n-term\">96<\/span> (not to preside during own removal). Salary <span class=\"n-term\">charged on the Consolidated Fund<\/span> \u2192 institutional independence; presides over joint sittings under <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 108<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Core functions:<\/span> presides and maintains order; interprets rules; allocates time; admits questions and motions; <span class=\"n-term\">certifies Money Bills<\/span>; refers Bills to committees; decides disqualification under the <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Tenth Schedule<\/span><\/span>; protects privileges; continues in office after dissolution until a successor is chosen.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>&#8220;The Speaker represents the House. He\/She represents the dignity of the House, the freedom of the House \u2026 the Speaker becomes a symbol of nation&#8217;s freedom and liberty. Therefore that should be an honoured position \u2026 occupied always by persons of outstanding ability and impartiality.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Jawaharlal Nehru<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>&#8220;The chief characteristics attaching to the office of Speaker \u2026 are authority and impartiality.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Thomas Erskine May<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">Vice-President<\/span> chairs the Rajya Sabha and is expected to remain non-partisan.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"problems-controversies\">Problems &amp; controversies<\/h4>\n<p>Elected on a party ticket and often retaining party association; bias risk in anti-defection decisions; controversial Money-Bill certification (e.g. the <span class=\"n-term\">Aadhaar Bill<\/span>); declining referral of Bills to committees; large-scale suspension of opposition members; no strong neutrality convention like the British Speaker.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-law\">Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu<\/span> (1992) \u2192 the Speaker&#8217;s Tenth-Schedule decision is subject to judicial review.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Raja Ram Pal<\/span> (2007) \u2192 proceedings are not immune from review where substantive illegality exists.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Nabam Rebia<\/span> (2016) \u2192 a Speaker facing a removal motion cannot decide disqualification.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Keisham Meghachandra<\/span> (2020) \u2192 disqualification should normally be decided within three months.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>&#8220;Speakers \u2026 hold a pivotal position in the scheme of parliamentary democracy and are guardians of the rights and privileges of the House.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Supreme Court, Kihoto Hollohan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Reforms:<\/span> consult the Leader of Opposition; build a neutrality convention; adopt &#8220;once a Speaker, always a Speaker&#8221;; no party post in office; bar immediate post-tenure executive office; transfer anti-defection adjudication to the Election Commission or an independent tribunal; committee-based scrutiny of Money-Bill certification; timely disqualification. <span class=\"n-sch\">J\u00fcrgen Habermas<\/span> stresses free, fair deliberation; <span class=\"n-sch\">John Stuart Mill<\/span>, procedural neutrality.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">The Speaker represents the freedom and dignity of the House. Examine.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-speaker-represents-the-freedom-and-dignity-of-the-house-upsc-psir-2022-1909\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"anti-defection-law-the-speaker-s-dilemma\">Anti-Defection Law &amp; the Speaker&#8217;s Dilemma<\/h3>\n<p>Inserted by the <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">52nd Amendment<\/span>, 1985<\/span> (<span class=\"n-law\">Tenth Schedule<\/span>); strengthened by the <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">91st Amendment<\/span>, 2003<\/span>. Purpose: end &#8220;Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram&#8221; politics; stability; party discipline; respect for the mandate; less horse-trading.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Grounds of disqualification:<\/span> voluntarily giving up party membership; voting\/abstaining against the whip without permission; an independent joining a party; a nominee joining a party after the permitted period.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The adjudication problem \u2014 and the reform direction.<\/span> Speaker decides (<span class=\"n-law\">Tenth Schedule<\/span>) \u2192 Dual identity: party leader + quasi-judge \u2192 Neutrality &amp; delay concerns. <span class=\"n-term\">REFORM<\/span> \u2192 President \/ Governor on EC advice (Art 103 model) \u00b7 OR independent tribunal of retired judges \u00b7 3-month limit \u00b7 confine to survival votes. <em>Maxims engaged: nemo judex in causa sua (no one judges their own cause) \u00b7 audi alteram partem (hear the other side).<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Judicial review:<\/span> Paragraph 7 tried to bar review; in <span class=\"n-term\">Kihoto Hollohan<\/span> (1992) the Court upheld the Schedule but struck down the exclusion \u2014 judicial review is part of basic structure; courts may review the Speaker&#8217;s decision <em>after<\/em> it is made. Related: <span class=\"n-law\">P.M. Kaliappan v. P.M. Sayeed<\/span> (1999), <span class=\"n-term\">A.K. Kraipak<\/span> (1969), <span class=\"n-law\">U.O.I. v. Tulshiram Patel<\/span> (1985), <span class=\"n-law\">Jagjit Singh v. Haryana<\/span> (2006).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Reform proposals:<\/span> the <span class=\"n-term\">Dinesh Goswami Committee<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">170th Law Commission Report<\/span> favour shifting adjudication to the President\/Governor on Election Commission advice (<span class=\"n-law\">Article 103<\/span> model); independent tribunals; a three-month period; and limiting the law to votes affecting the government&#8217;s survival.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Scholarly assessment: K.R. Venugopal<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Subhash Kashyap<\/span> support it for stability\/discipline; <span class=\"n-sch\">Fali S. Nariman<\/span> criticises it for reducing legislators to &#8220;voting machines&#8221;; <span class=\"n-sch\">M.P. Singh<\/span> for stifling dissent; <span class=\"n-sch\">Justice J.S. Verma<\/span> warned against misuse; <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Dhavan<\/span> seeks balance with conscience; <span class=\"n-sch\">N.R. Madhava Menon<\/span> would limit it on conscience issues.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"parliamentary-committees\">Parliamentary Committees<\/h3>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>&#8220;Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Woodrow Wilson<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Smaller bodies of members from one or both Houses that examine Bills, budgets, departmental performance, public expenditure, policy documents and executive action. Authority: <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 105<\/span><\/span> (privileges\/powers) and <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 118<\/span><\/span> (rules of procedure).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Types:<\/span> Standing \u2014 PAC \u00b7 Estimates \u00b7 CoPU \u00b7 DRSCs \u00b7 Ad hoc \u2014 JPC on 2G \u00b7 Select Cttee, Surrogacy Bill 2016<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Financial committees: Estimates Committee<\/span> (Lok Sabha only; suggests economy \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Asok Chanda<\/span> on rationalising expenditure); <span class=\"n-term\">Public Accounts Committee<\/span> (audits sanctioned spend; &#8220;twin sister&#8221; of the Estimates Committee; <span class=\"n-sch\">W.H. Morris-Jones<\/span> saw it as a deterrent against waste); <span class=\"n-term\">Committee on Public Undertakings<\/span> (state enterprises; <span class=\"n-term\">Indrajit Gupta<\/span> criticised weak implementation). <span class=\"n-term\">DRSCs<\/span> (after 1989) bring continuous oversight, technical scrutiny, non-partisan review and cross-pollination between Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>Committees &#8220;identify pressing and prospective issues, suggest solutions, and highlight gaps in implementation.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Chakshu Roy<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lok Sabha<\/th>\n<th>Bills referred to committees<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>14th Lok Sabha<\/td>\n<td>60%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>15th Lok Sabha<\/td>\n<td>71%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>16th Lok Sabha<\/td>\n<td>28%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>17th Lok Sabha<\/td>\n<td>16%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>High-impact measures such as the farm laws and the Delhi (Government of NCT) <span class=\"n-law\">Amendment Act, 2021<\/span> were passed without full committee scrutiny.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Issues:<\/span> weak political will, executive dominance, partisan use, short one-year tenure, poor attendance, thin research support, non-binding recommendations, delayed Action Taken Reports, jurisdictional overlap, weak transparency. <span class=\"n-sch\">P.B. Mehta<\/span> links weak committees with executive centralisation; <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajeev Bhargava<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Zoya Hasan<\/span> warn against partisan functioning; <span class=\"n-sch\">Upendra Baxi<\/span> notes non-binding reports reduce control; <span class=\"n-sch\">Faizan Mustafa<\/span> stresses expertise; <span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Bhatia<\/span> warns excess consensus dilutes dissent; <span class=\"n-sch\">Neera Chandhoke<\/span> cautions against avoidable judicial intervention.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-law\">Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India<\/span> \u2192 committee reports may be used as a persuasive external aid in statutory interpretation.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>&#8220;All Bills should be referred to DRSCs \u2026 [which may] finalise the second-reading stage in the committee.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>NCRWC<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Parliamentary committees are indispensable to the legislative process\u2026 cross-pollination between the two chambers. Discuss.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/parliamentary-committees-are-indispensable-to-the-legislative-upsc-psir-2025-1912\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"opposition-decline-changing-profile\">Opposition, Decline &amp; Changing Profile<\/h3>\n<h4 id=\"the-opposition\">The Opposition<\/h4>\n<p>Central to responsible government \u2014 it scrutinises policy, questions ministers, offers alternatives, voices minorities, mobilises debate and prevents concentration of power. <span class=\"n-term\">Instruments:<\/span> Question Hour, debates, adjournment and privilege motions, no-confidence, committee scrutiny, amendments, public mobilisation (e.g. the GST\/GSTN debate, Land Acquisition Bill 2015, CAA, Triple Talaq). <span class=\"n-sch\">Neera Chandhoke<\/span> wants coherent alternatives; <span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Bhatia<\/span> links it with public-interest scrutiny; <span class=\"n-sch\">Faizan Mustafa<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">M.P. Singh<\/span> note fragmentation weakens it; <span class=\"n-term\">Bhargava<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Mehta<\/span> regret the loss of ideological depth.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"decline-of-parliament-the-shankar-rodrigues-arc\">Decline of Parliament \u2014 the Shankar &amp; Rodrigues arc<\/h4>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three phases \u2014 effectiveness to &#8220;federation of anarchy&#8221;.<\/span> Phase 1 \u2014 to 1960s: Congress dominance, deliberative culture, <span class=\"n-term\">~120 sitting days\/yr (1952\u201372)<\/span> \u2192 Phase 2 \u2014 1970s+: Disillusionment, Emergency, regional &amp; social movements \u2192 Phase 3 \u2014 1990s+: Coalitions, disruptions, criminalisation, <span class=\"n-term\">17th LS ~58 days\/yr<\/span>. <em>Budget Session 2023:<\/em> Lok Sabha functioned for <span class=\"n-term\">33%<\/span> and Rajya Sabha for <span class=\"n-term\">24%<\/span> of scheduled time; only <span class=\"n-term\">16%<\/span> of Bills in the 17th Lok Sabha went to committees.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>Parliament as a &#8220;federation of anarchy&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p><cite>Hamid Ansari<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">World Bank<\/span> parameters for assessing legislatures: financial accountability, compliance, efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Decline thesis<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">P.B. Mehta<\/span> (executive dominance) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Zoya Hasan<\/span> (marginalised lose voice) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Subhash Kashyap<\/span> (archaic procedure, weak discipline, poor party system) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Devesh Kapur<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Mehta<\/span> (criminalisation, weak committee experience).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Against decline<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Arvind Virmani<\/span> (Parliament still functional through Bills, questions, output) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> (democratic vibrancy) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Shankar &amp; Rodrigues<\/span> (it has broadened and deepened democracy despite stress).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>&#8220;Good governance needs good legislatures to oversee the performance of the executive.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><cite>Venkaiah Naidu<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h4 id=\"changing-profile-of-parliamentarians-three-phases\">Changing profile of parliamentarians \u2014 three phases<\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Phase 1 (to 1960s):<\/span> upper-caste, urban, foreign-educated, movement-derived authority, part-time politicians; OBCs, women and minorities under-represented.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Phase 2 (1970s\u201390s):<\/span> the &#8220;Twilight Zone&#8221; \u2014 the Green Revolution strengthened landowning OBCs, regional parties rose, Indian-educated and full-time politicians increased.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Phase 3 (1990s+): plebianisation<\/span> \u2014 stronger OBC representation; caste, religion and ethnicity become central; education improves; the rural\u2013urban divide weakens; women&#8217;s representation long remained low.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">M.N. Srinivas<\/span> links low female representation to a patriarchal mindset; <span class=\"n-term\">Bhargava<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Austin<\/span> see early Parliament as elite constitutionalism; <span class=\"n-sch\">Chandhoke<\/span> sees democratisation producing identity politics; <span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Michels<\/span>&#8216; <span class=\"n-term\">Iron Law of Oligarchy<\/span> helps explain the rising wealth of MPs; <span class=\"n-sch\">Faizan Mustafa<\/span> links wealth with elite capture; <span class=\"n-sch\">Mehta<\/span> warns performance may replace substance; <span class=\"n-sch\">Zoya Hasan<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Carl Schmitt<\/span> frame the tension between identity mobilisation and deliberative institutions.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/union-executive\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Union Executive<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/supreme-court\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Supreme Court<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-two-houses-their-powers\">The Two Houses &amp; Their Powers<\/a><a href=\"#law-making-money-bills-finance-privileges\">Law-Making, Money Bills, Finance &amp; Privileges<\/a><a href=\"#the-speaker-presiding-officers\">The Speaker &amp; Presiding Officers<\/a><a href=\"#anti-defection-law-the-speaker-s-dilemma\">Anti-Defection Law &amp; the Speaker&#8217;s Dilemma<\/a><a href=\"#parliamentary-committees\">Parliamentary Committees<\/a><a href=\"#opposition-decline-changing-profile\">Opposition, Decline &amp; Changing Profile<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Union Legislature for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a I-B Indian Government and Politics \u203a Union Legislature Paper I \u00b7 Indian Government and Politics Union Legislature Syllab<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"I-B.4.2","fx_note_sec":"I-B","fx_note_point":"4","fx_note_desc":"Union Legislature for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a I-B Indian Government and Politics \u203a Union Legislature Paper I \u00b7 Indian Government and Politics Union Legislature Syllab","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3502","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3502","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3502\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3843,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3502\/revisions\/3843"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3502"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}