{"id":3508,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:30","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/election-commission\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:01:37","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:31:37","slug":"election-commission","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/election-commission\/","title":{"rendered":"Election Commission"},"content":{"rendered":"
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PSIR Notes<\/a>\u203a<\/span>I-B Indian Government and Politics<\/a>\u203a<\/span>Election Commission<\/span><\/div>\n
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Paper I \u00b7 Indian Government and Politics<\/div>\n

Election Commission<\/h1>\n
Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I-B \u00b7 6<\/b> \u2014 Statutory Institutions\/Commissions : Election Commission<\/span>, Comptroller and Auditor General, Finance Commission, Union Public Service Commission, National Commission for Scheduled Castes, National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, National Commission for Women; National Human Rights Commission, National Commission for Minorities, National Backward Classes Commission.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
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Constitutional, Statutory & Executive Bodies<\/h3>\n

Indian democracy runs on more than legislature, executive and judiciary. A second tier of independent bodies regulates elections, audits finance, supervises recruitment, protects rights and advises on fiscal transfers. Gautam Bhatia<\/span> groups them as fourth branch institutions<\/span> \u2014 not substitutes for elected government, but the machinery that limits arbitrariness and builds specialised accountability.<\/p>\n

Four functions every commission performs:<\/span> Regulation \u2014 elections, recruitment, finance, rights \u00b7 Oversight \u2014 checking misuse of power \u00b7 Investigation \u2014 complaints, violations, maladministration \u00b7 Policy advice \u2014 reforms, safeguards, devolution, welfare<\/p>\n

Three sources of authority \u2014 and why it decides everything about an answer<\/span><\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Source<\/th>\nBodies<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
CONSTITUTIONAL<\/span> \u2014 created by the Constitution<\/td>\nECI \u00b7 CAG \u00b7 Finance Comm. \u00b7 UPSC \u00b7 NCSC \u00b7 NCST \u00b7 NCBC<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
STATUTORY<\/span> \u2014 created by an Act<\/td>\nNHRC (1993) \u00b7 NCW (1990) \u00b7 NCM (1992)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EXECUTIVE ORDER<\/span> \u2014 neither Constitution nor statute<\/td>\nNITI Aayog<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Stronger source \u2192 stronger insulation. Constitutional bodies enjoy fixed tenure, charged-or-protected service conditions and removal safeguards; statutory bodies stay more vulnerable because powers, finances and appointments depend more directly on government.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Body<\/th>\nSource<\/th>\nAnchor<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Election Commission<\/span><\/td>\nConstitutional<\/td>\nArticle 324<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CAG<\/span><\/td>\nConstitutional<\/td>\nArticles 148\u2013151<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Finance Commission<\/span><\/td>\nConstitutional<\/td>\nArticle 280<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
UPSC<\/span><\/td>\nConstitutional<\/td>\nArticle 315<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NCSC \/ NCST \/ NCBC<\/span><\/td>\nConstitutional<\/td>\nArticles 338<\/span> \/ 338A \/ 338B<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NHRC<\/span><\/td>\nStatutory<\/td>\nProtection of Human Rights Act, 1993<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NCW<\/span><\/td>\nStatutory<\/td>\nNational Commission for Women Act, 1990<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
NCM<\/span><\/td>\nStatutory<\/td>\nNational Commission for Minorities Act, 1992<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Accountability \u2014 the framework to argue with<\/span><\/p>\n

The chapter\u2019s analytical position: a commission\u2019s capacity to hold government accountable turns on three variables \u2014 autonomy<\/span>, mandate<\/span> and the extent to which recommendations are implemented<\/span>. Comparative reference points the chapter uses: the US Federal Reserve and SEC (independence from political pressure as the test of effectiveness); the UK\u2019s National Audit Office and Independent Office for Police Conduct (specialised oversight, but needing continual reform); Brazil\u2019s Public Ministry and Federal Police (anti-corruption muscle, repeatedly tested by controversy).<\/p>\n

Common challenges \u2014 the shared diagnosis (write these as the structural critique)<\/span><\/p>\n

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  • politicised appointments;<\/li>\n
  • weak financial autonomy;<\/li>\n
  • non-binding recommendations;<\/li>\n
  • delay in tabling reports;<\/li>\n
  • staff shortage;<\/li>\n
  • dependence on ministries;<\/li>\n
  • overlapping jurisdiction;<\/li>\n
  • weak public awareness;<\/li>\n
  • limited legislative follow-up;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Election Commission of India<\/h3>\n

    Article 324<\/span> \u00b7 the referee of representative democracy<\/em><\/p>\n

    Periodic elections are a core condition of democracy \u2014 the Supreme Court has read democracy into the basic structure<\/span> (Kesavananda Bharati<\/span>, Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain<\/span>, Minerva Mills<\/span>). The ECI holds superintendence, direction and control<\/span> of elections to Parliament, State legislatures and the offices of President and Vice-President.<\/p>\n

    Durga Das Basu:<\/span> the Constitution provides an independent body \u2014 the Election Commission, Article 324<\/span> \u2014 to supervise the entire machinery for elections and ancillary matters.<\/p>\n

    Composition \u00b7 appointment \u00b7 removal<\/span><\/p>\n

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    • Established 25 January 1950<\/span>; single-member, then multi-member from 1989; 1993 law stabilised it.<\/li>\n
    • T.N. Seshan v. Union of India<\/span> \u2192 ECs equal in status and power to the CEC.<\/li>\n
    • Now: CEC + two ECs; decisions by majority.<\/li>\n
    • Appointed by President; tenure 6 years or age 65.<\/li>\n
    • Status = Supreme Court judge.<\/li>\n
    • Removal: CEC like a SC judge; other ECs only on CEC\u2019s recommendation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Subhash Kashyap<\/span>: the multi-member structure is a safeguard against arbitrary decision-making.<\/p>\n

      Constitutional provisions \u2014 Part XV<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      <\/th>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      324<\/span><\/td>\nsuperintendence, direction, control<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      325<\/span><\/td>\none general roll; no exclusion by religion\/race\/caste\/sex<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      326<\/span><\/td>\nadult suffrage<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      327<\/span><\/td>\nParliament\u2019s power on elections<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      328<\/span><\/td>\nState legislature\u2019s power<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      329<\/span><\/td>\nbar on court interference except by election petition<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
      \n

      The ECI is perhaps the envy of the world \u2014 one institution that has drawn many compliments, largely due to the reforms of T.N. Seshan, who put in place rules that reduced human discretion to the minimum and so eliminated fear: commissioners only had to follow the rules and need not bother about pressure from any political party.<\/em><\/p>\n

      Justice K.M. Joseph<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

      The powers of the ECI fall into three baskets<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Basket<\/th>\nContent<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      ADMINISTRATIVE<\/span><\/td>\nrolls \u00b7 schedules \u00b7 nominations \u00b7 recognise parties \u00b7 symbols \u00b7 expenditure limits \u00b7 exit\/opinion polls \u00b7 Model Code \u00b7 countermand polls \u00b7 voter education<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      ADVISORY<\/span><\/td>\nadvises President \/ Governors on MP & MLA disqualification \u00b7 feasibility of polls under President\u2019s Rule<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      QUASI-JUDICIAL<\/span><\/td>\nparty-recognition & symbol disputes \u00b7 disqualify for non-filing of expense accounts<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      ECI v. Mohd. Abdul Ghani<\/span>: the Commission cannot alter boundaries\/area\/extent of any constituency fixed by a Delimitation Order. N.P. Ponnuswami<\/span>: \u201celection\u201d covers the whole process; disputes handled post-poll by petition (Art. 329(b)). Mohinder Singh Gill<\/span>: Art. 324 powers are wide but not unrestrained \u2014 bound by law, rule of law and natural justice. K. Ganesan<\/span> warns that claiming extraordinary Art. 324 powers in matters already covered by law is dangerous.<\/p>\n

      Legal framework for free & fair elections<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      <\/th>\n<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      RPA, 1950<\/span><\/td>\nconstituencies, seat allocation, electoral rolls, voter qualification<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      RPA, 1951<\/span><\/td>\nconduct of elections, dis\/qualifications, offences, party registration, disputes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Reg. of Electors Rules, 1960<\/span><\/td>\nroll preparation, registration, identity cards<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Conduct of Election Rules, 1961<\/span><\/td>\nnotifications, nomination, scrutiny, polling, counting<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Anti-Defection Law, 1985<\/span><\/td>\nTenth Schedule<\/span>; defection of legislators<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Model Code of Conduct<\/span><\/p>\n