{"id":3520,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:34","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/integrationist-tendencies-and-regional-aspirations\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:01:40","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:31:40","slug":"integrationist-tendencies-and-regional-aspirations","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/integrationist-tendencies-and-regional-aspirations\/","title":{"rendered":"Integrationist tendencies and regional aspirations"},"content":{"rendered":"
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PSIR Notes<\/a>\u203a<\/span>I-B Indian Government and Politics<\/a>\u203a<\/span>Integrationist tendencies and regional aspirations<\/span><\/div>\n
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Paper I \u00b7 Indian Government and Politics<\/div>\n

Integrationist tendencies and regional aspirations<\/h1>\n
Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I-B \u00b7 7<\/b> \u2014 Federalism : Constitutional provisions; changing nature of centre-state relations; integrationist tendencies and regional aspirations<\/span>; inter-state disputes.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
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<\/p>\n

Centralising Tendencies & the Unitary Appearance<\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Centralisation channel<\/th>\nForm<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Constitutional<\/span><\/td>\nArt 1; Arts 2 & 3; residuary powers; Union List dominance; Concurrent override; emergency; Art 356; integrated judiciary; single citizenship; AIS; Centre-appointed Governor; unequal Rajya Sabha. K.C. Wheare<\/span> \u2014 federal in form, strong unitary tilt.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Political<\/span><\/td>\nsame party at Centre & States; overwhelming majority; CMs depend on central leadership; political Governor; opposition States face pressure. Rajni Kothari<\/span> \u2014 centralisation linked to party dominance; under Indira Gandhi \u2014 Art 356 misuse, Emergency.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Fiscal<\/span><\/td>\nUnion control of buoyant taxes; GST & limited State flexibility; CSS; conditional grants; borrowing limits; cesses\/surcharges; delayed transfers. M.G. Rao<\/span> \u2014 non-divisible cesses & surcharges subvert promised devolution.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Administrative<\/span><\/td>\nAIS cadre control; central-deputation disputes; central forces; Union agencies; Governor’s discretion; tight national-scheme guidelines; centralised digital\/biometric platforms.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

Globalisation strengthens the Centre<\/h4>\n
    \n
  • Jagdish Bhagwati<\/span> \u2014 post-1991 liberalisation needed central oversight of trade, FDI, international standards.<\/li>\n
  • Arvind Panagariya<\/span> \u2014 Centre’s regulatory role grew for trade, IP, labour, environment compliance.<\/li>\n
  • C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 widened foreign policy & defence engagement (Union domains). K. Subrahmanyam<\/span> \u2014 strong national response to terrorism & cyber threats.<\/li>\n
  • M.G. Rao<\/span> \u2014 GST central to an integrated market. Nandan Nilekani<\/span> \u2014 national tech infrastructure (Digital India). Amitabh Mattoo<\/span> & Happymon Jacob<\/span> \u2014 Union role in climate, WTO, UN forums.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Recent developments \u2014 pressure vs resilience<\/h4>\n
    \n\n\n\n\n\n
    Signs of pressure<\/th>\nSigns of resilience<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    GST compensation disputes \u00b7 central agencies vs opposition States \u00b7 Governor’s delay in assent \u00b7 NEET & farm-laws controversies \u00b7 CSS conditionalities \u00b7 autonomy demands \u00b7 cesses\/borrowing disputes \u00b7 delimitation anxiety \u00b7 Union use of powers in education, agriculture, law & order<\/td>\nS.R. Bommai limits Art 356 \u00b7 GST Council regular fiscal bargaining \u00b7 regional parties shape national politics \u00b7 coalitions raise State bargaining \u00b7 judiciary protects basic structure \u00b7 local bodies deepen democracy \u00b7 asymmetry accommodates diversity \u00b7 States innovate in welfare<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
    \n

    Indian federalism as “a vanishing act\u2026 leaving only the grin.”<\/p>\n

    Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    Faizan Mustafa<\/span> \u2014 recognising regional aspirations strengthens unity & democracy. Verdict:<\/span> federal spirit under stress, not destroyed; Indian federalism remains a negotiated, resilient structure.<\/p>\n

    UPSC 2020 \u00b7 20m<\/span>Does Indian federalism appear unitary in practice?<\/span><\/div>\n
    UPSC 2023 \u00b7 20m<\/span>Does the actual working conform to centralising tendencies?<\/span><\/div>\n
    UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span>Recent developments have not eroded the true spirit of federalism \u2014 critically examine.<\/span><\/div>\n

    Answer map (unitary appearance \/ centralising tendencies \/ 2025).<\/span> Federal structure with strong Union bias \u2192 Art 1; Arts 2&3; Wheare<\/span> “quasi-federal” \u2192 centralising features (residuary, larger Union List, emergency, Art 356, Governor, AIS, single citizenship) + fiscal control (GST, grants, CSS, borrowing) + central agencies (CBI\/ED\/NIA) \u2192 recent examples: J&K reorganisation, farm laws, NDMA use in COVID-19; Stalin<\/span> & Mehta<\/span> on recentralisation \u2192 BUT federal anchors hold: written Constitution, dual polity, State List, independent judiciary, rigid amendment, S.R. Bommai<\/span>, Kesavananda<\/span>, regional parties, coalitions \u2192 conforms to centralising tendencies but not completely \u2014 a dynamic balance; federal spirit strained, not erased.<\/p>\n

    State Autonomy Movements<\/h3>\n

    Meaning.<\/span> Demands by States \/ regional parties for greater powers within the Union \u2014 not always secessionist<\/span>: more financial powers, limits on Art 356, neutral Governor, role in planning, control over State subjects, language & culture, fair funds, less central interference.<\/p>\n

    \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Phase<\/th>\nFederal effect<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Congress hegemony 1947\u201377<\/span><\/td>\nCongress dominant at Centre & States \u2192 easy centralisation; conflicts managed within party; autonomy demands limited but grew after 1967. Emergency \u2014 States subordinate; autonomy linked with democratic rights. Regional assertion: Akali Dal (Punjab), DMK (Tamil Nadu), Left (West Bengal).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Janata 1977\u201379<\/span><\/td>\nweak coalition Centre \u2192 States gained space; West Bengal Left Front pushed land reform with less fear of dismissal; AIADMK, Akali Dal converged on State powers. Missed opportunity \u2014 no major constitutional reform; short tenure.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Coalition co-governance (post-1989, esp. 1996)<\/span><\/td>\nno single party always dominant; regional parties join Union coalitions; State interests enter national policy; bargaining replaces confrontation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
    \n

    “Participation in national-level government has enhanced the payoffs to leaders of regional parties by offering them ministerial berths, increased discretionary funds from the central government, and more secure state governments.”<\/p>\n

    Adam Ziegfeld<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    Balveer Arora, Mahendra Prasad Singh, Douglas Verney, Lloyd I. Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph<\/span> \u2014 post-1989 as a shift from old federalism to new federalism<\/span>.<\/p>\n

    State Reorganisation & Demands for New States<\/h3>\n

    Articles 2<\/span> & 3<\/h4>\n

    Art 2<\/span> \u2014 admit\/establish new States (Sikkim, 1975). Art 3<\/span> \u2014 form States, alter boundaries\/areas\/names; President recommends Bill, affected legislature gives views, Parliament not bound<\/span> by State opinion \u2014 centralised flexibility.<\/p>\n

      \n
    • D.D. Basu<\/span> \u2014 necessary for territorial integrity. Granville Austin<\/span> \u2014 part of a flexible federal structure.<\/li>\n
    • Rajni Kothari<\/span> \u2014 criticises excessive centralisation in boundary decisions. Subhash C. Kashyap<\/span> \u2014 strong Centre but cautions against arbitrary alteration.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Shifting basis of statehood demands \u2014 Louise Tillin, Remapping India<\/em>.<\/span> 1950s\u201360s Language \u2192 1970s\u201380s Ethnicity \u2192 1990s Political economy \u2192 21st century Development & governance.<\/p>\n

        \n
      • Phase 1 \u00b7 language<\/span> \u2014 Nagpur 1920 promise; States Reorganisation Act, 1956<\/span>; Punjab reorganisation 1966. Ramachandra Guha<\/span> \u2014 a “master stroke” that prevented balkanisation.<\/li>\n
      • Phase 2 \u00b7 ethnicity<\/span> \u2014 North-East (Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal); Gorkhaland, Bodoland.<\/li>\n
      • Phase 3 \u00b7 political economy<\/span> \u2014 Atul Kohli<\/span>; Chhattisgarh & mining.<\/li>\n
      • Phase 4 \u00b7 development\/governance<\/span> \u2014 Telangana, Vidarbha, Bundelkhand, Purvanchal, Harit Pradesh, Gorkhaland.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
        \n

        “The linguistic reorganization of states in India was a historic response to the imperative of accommodating linguistic diversity within the federal structure. It reinforced the principle of unity in diversity by allowing people to be governed in their mother tongue.”<\/p>\n

        Neera Chandhoke<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

        Factors behind statehood movements<\/h4>\n

        Paul R. Brass<\/span> (ethno-linguistic mobilisation \u2014 Gorkhaland) \u00b7 Atul Kohli<\/span> (regional disparity \u2014 Vidarbha) \u00b7 Jean Dr\u00e8ze<\/span> & Amartya Sen<\/span> (deprivation \u2014 Bundelkhand) \u00b7 Lloyd I. Rudolph<\/span> & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph<\/span> (elites\/parties) \u00b7 Louise Tillin<\/span> & Christophe Jaffrelot<\/span> (political timing & electoral calculation \u2014 Telangana, Uttarakhand, Bihar) \u00b7 Ramachandra Guha<\/span> (historical grievance) \u00b7 Frankel<\/span> (caste-regional class \u2014 Jats, Bhumihars, Rajputs).<\/p>\n

        \n

        “The story of secessionism in Post-Colonial India is a story of failed attempts. Three Indian leaders paid with their lives for the position they had taken on secessionist issues\u2014Mahatma Gandhi on partition, Indira Gandhi on the question of separate Punjab Suba and Rajiv Gandhi on Tamil state.”<\/p>\n

        Jean-Luc Racine<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

        Smaller States \u2014 for & against<\/h4>\n
        \n\n\n\n\n\n
        Arguments for<\/th>\nArguments against<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Louise Tillin<\/span> \u2014 efficient governance (Telangana) \u00b7 Christophe Jaffrelot<\/span> \u2014 region-specific development (Uttarakhand) \u00b7 Suhas Palshikar<\/span> \u2014 improved local representation (Haryana) \u00b7 Neera Chandhoke<\/span> \u2014 preserve local cultures (Manipur) \u00b7 Raghav Gaiha<\/span> \u2014 ease of business (Goa)<\/td>\nPaul R. Brass<\/span> \u2014 higher administrative costs (Sikkim) \u00b7 Niraja Gopal Jayal<\/span> \u2014 limited resources hinder sustainability (Arunachal) \u00b7 Zoya Hasan<\/span> \u2014 identity-based conflicts (Assam) \u00b7 C.B. Macpherson<\/span> \u2014 complicates national coordination (Jharkhand) \u00b7 M.G. Rao<\/span> \u2014 affects global competitiveness (Meghalaya)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
        UPSC 2021 \u00b7 15m<\/span>Gradual shift in the basis of demands for new States?<\/span><\/div>\n

        Answer map (2021).<\/span> Early demands largely linguistic (SRA 1956); Guha<\/span> \u2014 “master stroke” against balkanisation \u2192 then ethnicity (North-East, Bodoland, Gorkhaland) \u2192 post-liberalisation political economy & resource control (Kohli<\/span>, Chhattisgarh) \u2192 21st-century development\/governance\/neglect (Vidarbha, Bundelkhand, Telangana) \u2192 Fazl Ali Commission<\/span> criteria (economic, administrative, ecological, socio-ethnic viability) \u2192 Yadav<\/span> (assertion of marginalised); Tillin<\/span> & Jaffrelot<\/span> (timing); M.P. Singh<\/span> \u2014 smaller States may raise disputes & weaken viability, no automatic better governance.<\/p>\n

        Regionalism & Federalism<\/h3>\n

        Frame.<\/span> Regionalism is challenge and<\/span> strength \u2014 negative<\/span> when exclusionary\/secessionist; democratic<\/span> when it articulates neglected aspirations.<\/p>\n

        \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Form<\/th>\nScholar lens<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Linguistic \/ cultural<\/span><\/td>\nLloyd<\/span> & Susanne Rudolph<\/span> \u2014 linguistic reorganisation addressed regional aspirations (Tamil identity).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Political<\/span><\/td>\nRajni Kothari<\/span> \u2014 regional parties essential to accommodate diverse interests; Subrata K. Mitra<\/span> \u2014 they shape coalitions (Shiv Sena, Dravidian parties, Akali Dal).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Economic<\/span><\/td>\nAshutosh Varshney<\/span> \u2014 disparities link to regional tension; Dipankar Gupta<\/span> \u2014 regionalism from backwardness & deprivation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Cultural \/ administrative<\/span><\/td>\nSuhas Palshikar<\/span> \u2014 languages, identities, cultural expressions; Myron Weiner<\/span> \u2014 federalism both accommodates & creates tension; Paul R. Brass<\/span> \u2014 response to perceived neglect.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        Assessment:<\/span> regionalism can democratise power, correct neglect, strengthen representation, deepen bargaining, reduce secession by giving constitutional space \u2014 dangerous only when linked to violence, exclusion, short-term electoralism, or left unmanaged by institutions.<\/p>\n

        Ethnicity, Regionalism & National Integration<\/h3>\n

        Meaning & Approaches<\/h4>\n

        Ethnicity<\/span> = group consciousness based on common descent, language, religion, history, territory, culture, tribe, caste and shared memory.<\/p>\n

        \n

        Max Weber<\/span> \u2014 ethnic groups are \u201cthose human groups that share a subjective belief about their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

          \n
        • Paul R. Brass<\/span> \u2192 ethnic and communal mobilizations are closely connected.<\/li>\n
        • Dipankar Gupta<\/span> \u2192 ethnicity refers to the nation-state, territory and sovereignty; communalism targets government policies without necessarily questioning state loyalty.<\/li>\n
        • Donald Horowitz<\/span> \u2192 broad definition \u2014 conflicts on ascriptive identities (race, language, religion, tribe, caste) count as ethnic.<\/li>\n
        • Ashutosh Varshney<\/span> \u2192 ethnic conflict = conflict between contending ethnic groups fighting for their position in society.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
          \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          Approach<\/th>\nClaim<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
          Primordial<\/span><\/td>\nEthnic identities are inherited and given; conflict is natural when groups differ.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Instrumentalist<\/span><\/td>\nIdentities are created \/ manipulated by elites \u2014 politicians, religious leaders, teachers \u2014 for power.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Hybrid<\/span><\/td>\nLoyalties exist but need political conditions to become conflict. Key question: why<\/em> do people respond to elite manipulation?<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

          Anthony D. Smith<\/span> stresses deep historical-cultural roots. Hamza Alavi<\/span> sees ethnic categories as attempts at mobilization and manipulation. James Manor<\/span> argues Indians have fluid, overlapping identities that prevent permanent fault lines. Atul Kohli<\/span> holds ethnic politics is expected in a multicultural democracy and that democratic accommodation is the best response.<\/p>\n

          \n

          \u201cThe manifestation of ethnicity in Indian politics is not so much an outcome of popular grassroots passions as it is a creation of vested political interests.\u201d<\/p>\n

          S. D. Muni<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

          Manifestations & State Response<\/h4>\n

          Ethnic assertion \u2014 escalation ladder & how the state responds.<\/span> Autonomy<\/span> (within the Union) \u2192 Secession<\/span> (separate nation) \u2192 Insurgency<\/span> (armed struggle) \u2192 Riots \/ conflict<\/span> (on identity markers). Forms 1\u20133 link to self-determination movements. Brass on India\u2019s method: secession rejected outright \u00b7 religiously framed demands less tolerated \u00b7 linguistic \/ developmental demands more easily accommodated \u00b7 demands gain attention when broadly supported \u00b7 affected groups\u2019 views considered.<\/em><\/p>\n

          State toolkit: coercion, accommodation, divide-and-rule, patronage, state reorganization, constitutional safeguards, peace accords, development packages, security measures. Selig S. Harrison<\/span> called the first decades after Independence the \u201cmost dangerous decades\u201d<\/span> for linguistic and communal conflict. Examples: Punjabi Suba accepted once Haryana also demanded a Hindi-speaking area; linguistic reorganization accommodated many demands; the North-East was reorganized through statehood and autonomy.<\/p>\n

          North-East India<\/h4>\n

          Eight states \u2014 Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura \u2014 with many ethnic groups, tribes, languages and religions; strategically placed near Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and China; rich in oil, coal, gas, minerals, forests and the Brahmaputra system. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission<\/span> notes a long cycle of violent conflicts.<\/p>\n

          \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          State<\/th>\nConflict<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
          Nagaland<\/td>\nDemand for a sovereign Nagaland; Naga insurgents rejected the Constitution and boycotted the 1952 elections; NSCN emerged as a major insurgent formation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Assam<\/td>\nULFA, anti-migrant politics, Bodoland and Karbi Anglong demands.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Bodos<\/td>\nDemand for Bodoland; conflict with other communities.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Manipur<\/td>\nTensions among Meiteis, Nagas and Kukis.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Mizoram<\/td>\nMizo insurgency; Mizo-Chakma and Mizo-Bru tensions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Tripura<\/td>\nConflict between indigenous tribes and Bengali migrants.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          Arunachal<\/td>\nTensions around the Chakma community and local tribes.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

          Modernization \/ Nation-building<\/span> \u2014 S. K. Chaube, V. B. Singh, B. G. Verghese, Myron Weiner, Hiren Gohain<\/p>\n

            \n
          • tension between modern & traditional leadership,<\/li>\n
          • rising aspirations of new middle classes,<\/li>\n
          • development gaps & unmet expectations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            Federation-building<\/span> \u2014 Sanjib Baruah, Sajal Nag, Udayan Sharma, Sanjay Hazarika, M. P. Bezbaruah, Urmila Phadnis<\/p>\n

              \n
            • nation-state building ignored smaller communities,<\/li>\n
            • centralization violated autonomy,<\/li>\n
            • rights violations deepened alienation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

              Sanjib Baruah<\/span> (In the Name of the Nation<\/em>): the postcolonial state retained colonial security devices; the Sixth Schedule<\/span> and small states were used to manage<\/em> the region; AFSPA deepened alienation; militarization produced \u201cotherness\u201d<\/span>; democracy often became a tool of legitimacy rather than genuine integration. His prescription \u2014 shift from \u201cnation-state building\u201d<\/span> to \u201cgenuine federation-building\u201d<\/span>.<\/p>\n

              Government measures:<\/span> Sixth Schedule<\/span> ADCs \u00b7 Article 371<\/span> \u00b7 North Eastern Council \u00b7 MDoNER \u00b7 Act East \u00b7 Assam & Mizo Accords \u00b7 statehood \u00b7 security + development + rehabilitation<\/p>\n

              \n

              UPSC 2018 \u00b7 15 marks<\/span><\/p>\n

              Critically examine the ethnic conflicts in North-East India.<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

              \n

              UPSC 2022 \u00b7 20 marks<\/span> \u2014 Ethnicity is the underlying cause which poses a great challenge in the resolution of the problems in the North-East region of India. Comment.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

              Tamil Nadu & Dravidian Politics<\/h4>\n

              Ethnic politics around language, region, caste and anti-Brahminism. E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker (Periyar) attacked Indian nationalism as rooted in Hindu religion \/ Brahminism, imposing Hindi over Dravidian languages and sustaining high-caste dominance; C. N. Annadurai argued for Dravida Nadu against North Indian high-caste domination. Narendra Subramanian<\/span> notes Dravidian parties were among the first to challenge Congress at the state level with relatively less violence. DMK and AIADMK abandoned full secession but kept Tamil identity, anti-Hindi politics, social justice, regional autonomy and an anti-caste rationalist heritage.<\/p>\n

              Punjab & Sikh Homeland<\/h4>\n

              Punjabi Suba movement:<\/span> Akali Dal demanded a Punjabi-speaking state; Master Tara Singh gave it a religious basis, Sant Fateh Singh a socio-economic one; Baldev Raj Nayar<\/span> notes the Akalis\u2019 constitutional, infiltration and agitational strategies. Khalistan phase:<\/span> the 1980s saw the demand for an independent Khalistan; Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale became central; Operation Blue Star, Indira Gandhi\u2019s assassination and anti-Sikh violence deepened the crisis.<\/p>\n

              Socio-economic explanation<\/span> \u2014 Sucha Singh Gill, K. C. Singhal, Harish Kumar Puri, Joyce Pettigrew, M. S. Dhami, Javeed Alam, Gurharpal Singh<\/p>\n

              Green Revolution changes, unemployment, crisis of Sikh identity, consumerist modernity vs traditional values.<\/p>\n

              Political manipulation<\/span> \u2014 Paul R. Brass<\/p>\n

              Socio-economic explanations are reductionist; stresses strategic manipulation of religion and grievance \u2014 Indira Gandhi\u2019s engagement with Bhindranwale to weaken the Akali Dal backfired.<\/p>\n

              Jammu & Kashmir<\/h4>\n

              Shaped by geography, history, religion, regional diversity and external intervention. Historical: Maharaja Hari Singh initially wanted independence; Sheikh Abdullah initially supported accession; Articles 370 and 35A<\/span> gave special constitutional status; Sheikh Abdullah\u2019s arrest in 1953 created long-term distrust; autonomy demands also came from Jammu and Ladakh; Pakistan-backed insurgency in the 1980s turned the conflict violent. Balraj Puri<\/span>\u2019s causes: central interference reducing autonomy, derailing of democracy, unemployment, deteriorating economy, denial of regional autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh, lack of legitimate opposition, and use of armed forces instead of political dialogue.<\/p>\n

              Post-2019.<\/span> Abrogation of Article 370<\/span> on August 5, 2019<\/span> changed J&K\u2019s constitutional relationship with India: removal of special status \u00b7 legal integration with the Union \u00b7 end of Article 35A<\/span> \u00b7 bifurcation into Union Territories \u00b7 greater centralization \u00b7 political reorganization \u00b7 security restrictions \u00b7 civil-rights debate \u00b7 focus on development and investment (tourism, handicrafts, agriculture, IT) \u00b7 changing role of regional parties (National Conference, People\u2019s Democratic Party, which historically articulated regional autonomy and identity).<\/p>\n

              \n

              UPSC 2025 \u00b7 10 marks<\/span> \u2014 Delineate the key factors that have shaped the evolving political landscape in Jammu and Kashmir post 2019.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

              Relative Deprivation & Ethnic Conflict<\/h4>\n

              Relative deprivation = the perception that a group is unfairly disadvantaged compared with others \u2014 arising when groups compare expected with actual status, resources with other groups, rights with others\u2019 privileges, recognition with humiliation.<\/p>\n

              \n

              Ted Robert Gurr<\/span> \u2014 relative deprivation is \u201cthe tension that develops from a discrepancy between the \u2018ought\u2019 and the \u2018is\u2019 of collective value satisfaction, and this disposes men to violence\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

              Examples:<\/span> North-East insurgencies in Assam and Nagaland (perceived neglect, weak development, lack of recognition); Dalit movements (deprivation vs upper castes); Jat and Patidar agitations (declining agrarian income, job competition); the Bodo movement (language, land, institutional exclusion); Telangana (deprivation within a larger state); Jammu & Kashmir (autonomy, identity, representation). Yogendra Yadav<\/span> notes dominant agrarian castes seek reservations when they fear loss of status; Gopal Guru<\/span> links Dalit mobilization with long-standing exclusion; Charles Tilly<\/span> argues nation-state building can exclude and subordinate ethnic groups.<\/p>\n

              \n

              UPSC 2024 \u00b7 10 marks<\/span> \u2014 \u201cRelative deprivation is a major source of ethnic conflict.\u201d Elaborate the statement with relevant examples.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

              Regionalism & Federal Accommodation<\/h4>\n

              Regionalism = mobilization around territory, culture, development and local identity. Paul R. Brass<\/span> holds regionalism is a long-term trend while nationalism has often been short-term in Indian politics. Movements range from autonomy \u2192 separate statehood \u2192 special status \u2192 resource control \u2192 language recognition \u2192 protection from outsiders \u2192 secession. Gurharpal Singh<\/span> divides them into movements from core<\/em> regions (Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh) and from peripheries<\/em> (Nagaland).<\/p>\n

              Explanations:<\/span> modernization \u00b7 democracy awakens tradition \u00b7 uneven development \u00b7 Telangana, Vidarbha \u00b7 sons-of-the-soil \u00b7 Shiv Sena, AGP \u00b7 cultural anxiety \u00b7 fear of assimilation \u00b7 development deficit<\/p>\n

              Prema Singh<\/span> argues regional solidarity can support welfare and development \u2014 strong regional identities in South India helped better bargaining and development. The Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions support democratic decentralization as a way to manage regional aspirations. Atul Kohli<\/span> warns that mishandled regional movements can turn secessionist, as in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.<\/p>\n

              \n

              UPSC 2016 \u00b7 10 marks<\/span> \u2014 Cultural and Regional differences are the enduring bases on which politics is played out in India.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

              Assessment<\/h4>\n

              Ethnicity is not merely a threat \u2014 it is also a demand for recognition. India has often managed ethnic conflict better than many postcolonial states; the danger rises when accommodation is delayed and coercion becomes excessive. The solution is more democracy, not less<\/span> \u2014 power-sharing, autonomy, inclusive growth, decentralization, cultural recognition and federal trust.<\/p>\n

              Previous<\/em>Changing nature of centre-state relations<\/b><\/a>Next<\/em>Inter-state disputes<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n

              <\/main><\/p>\n