{"id":3526,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:36","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/caste-in-indian-politics\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:44","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:44","slug":"caste-in-indian-politics","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/caste-in-indian-politics\/","title":{"rendered":"Caste in Indian politics"},"content":{"rendered":"
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PSIR Notes<\/a>\u203a<\/span>I-B Indian Government and Politics<\/a>\u203a<\/span>Caste in Indian politics<\/span><\/div>\n
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Paper I \u00b7 Indian Government and Politics<\/div>\n

Caste in Indian politics<\/h1>\n
Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I-B \u00b7 9<\/b> \u2014 Caste, Religion and Ethnicity in Indian Politics.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
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Identity Politics & Development Politics<\/h3>\n

Meaning<\/h4>\n

Identity politics<\/span> = political mobilization around a shared social identity \u2014 caste, religion, language, region, ethnicity, tribe, gender or minority status. It emerges from shared experience of exclusion, humiliation, historical injustice, lack of representation, cultural insecurity and unequal access to state resources. It differs from purely ideological or class-based politics and gives voice to groups ignored by universal claims of nationalism, class or development. Craig Calhoun<\/span> treats it as a modern phenomenon \u2014 an effort to consolidate individual and group identity in an impersonal world.<\/p>\n

Merits<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  • Political voice to historically marginalized communities.<\/li>\n
  • Expands democratic participation.<\/li>\n
  • Builds self-respect among excluded groups.<\/li>\n
  • Secures reservations, representation, welfare claims.<\/li>\n
  • Pressures the state to address social injustice.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Limitations<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    • Hardens group boundaries.<\/li>\n
    • Produces competitive victimhood.<\/li>\n
    • Weakens common citizenship.<\/li>\n
    • Elite capture for narrow electoral gain.<\/li>\n
    • Reduces individuals to caste \/ community categories.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
      \n

      \u201cRecognition is a matter of justice, not only because it provides self-respect and social esteem but also because it is a precondition for participation in democratic politics.\u201d<\/p>\n

      Nancy Fraser<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

      \n

      \u201cIdentity politics often reduces individuals to their group affiliations, limiting their freedom to express their varied identities.\u201d<\/p>\n

      Todd Gitlin<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

      Brian Barry<\/span> and Amartya Sen<\/span> caution that identity politics may slide into sectarianism if group claims override broader democratic principles.<\/p>\n

      \u201cIdentity Plus\u201d Politics \u2014 Yogendra Yadav<\/h4>\n

      Indian elections show neither pure identity politics nor pure development politics. Caste, religion and region remain important, but voters also weigh welfare delivery, employment, inflation, public goods, corruption, leadership, governance and national security. Yogendra Yadav<\/span> calls this \u201cIdentity Plus\u201d<\/span> politics \u2014 caste and religion do not disappear; they combine with development claims. Fred W. Riggs<\/span>\u2019s \u201cprismatic society\u201d<\/span> model fits India: tradition and modernity coexist rather than replace each other. Suhas Palshikar<\/span> flags regional-identity themes (\u201cBihari vs Bahari\u201d); Milan Vaishnav<\/span> sees voters weighing economics more seriously; Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span> warns excess identity politics can weaken the governance frame development needs.<\/p>\n

      Where Indian elections actually sit.<\/span> Pure identity<\/span> (dignity \u00b7 recognition \u00b7 caste \/ religion \/ region) \u2192 \u201cIdentity Plus\u201d (Yadav)<\/span> (identity + development together \u00b7 2014\/19 Vikas \u00b7 Bihari vs Bahari \u00b7 UP\/Gujarat coalition + Hindutva + welfare \u00b7 AAP bijli-paani-shiksha) \u2190 Pure development<\/span> (welfare \u00b7 governance \u00b7 growth). Riggs\u2019s prismatic society \u2014 tradition and modernity coexist, not one replacing the other.<\/em><\/p>\n

      Assessment<\/h4>\n

      Identity politics deepens<\/span> democracy when it gives dignity to excluded groups; it weakens<\/span> democracy when it becomes a permanent instrument of polarization. Development politics turns thin if it ignores social injustice. The Indian pattern is a dynamic balance \u2014 identity gives voice; development gives legitimacy<\/span>.<\/p>\n

      Caste in Indian Politics<\/h3>\n

      Meaning & Sociological Basis<\/h4>\n

      The word caste<\/span> comes from Spanish\/Portuguese casta<\/em> \u2014 \u201crace\u201d or \u201clineage\u201d. In India it is expressed through j\u0101ti<\/span>: a hereditary, endogamous group with a shared name, ritual status, occupational association and social hierarchy. The varna<\/span> scheme runs Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras and the historically excluded \u201cuntouchables\u201d \u2014 now widely referred to as Dalits or Scheduled Castes.<\/p>\n

        \n
      • Louis Dumont<\/span> (Homo Hierarchicus<\/em>) \u2192 caste through hierarchy, purity and pollution; the Indian model of stratification, contrasted with the Western class model and tied to religious ideology and ritual rank.<\/li>\n
      • M. N. Srinivas<\/span> \u2192 challenges Dumont\u2019s rigidity; caste is flexible and dynamic. Gives Sanskritization<\/span> (lower castes adopt higher-caste practices to raise status), Westernization, and the dominant caste<\/span> (numerically strong + economically powerful + politically influential).<\/li>\n
      • Nicholas Dirks<\/span> (Castes of Mind<\/em>) \u2192 caste became a single, unique, rigid category under colonial modernity \u2014 enumeration, ethnography and administration hardened<\/em> identities (not that caste did not exist earlier).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Historical Transformation<\/h4>\n
        \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Phase<\/th>\nWhat changed<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Colonial<\/span><\/td>\nCensus & administrative categories strengthened caste; separate electorates and communal representation politicized social categories; caste became a tool of representation, reform and elite negotiation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Reform & protest<\/span><\/td>\nBrahmo & Arya Samaj attacked orthodoxy; Jyotirao Phule\u2019s Satyashodhak Samaj questioned Brahmin dominance; Periyar led the non-Brahmin movement in Madras; Ambedkar led anti-untouchability \/ Dalit rights; Gandhi led anti-untouchability on different lines.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Post-Independence<\/span><\/td>\nConstitution abolished untouchability but retained caste for protective discrimination; reservations, land reform, education, urbanization weakened rigid rules; adult franchise turned numerical strength into electoral power; Panchayati Raj opened new arenas; Mandal made OBCs a major category.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        Andre B\u00e9teille<\/span>\u2019s sharp question: the Constitution abolishes untouchability without<\/em> abolishing caste \u2014 making caste both a target of reform and a basis of public policy.<\/p>\n

        Caste Associations & Federations<\/h4>\n

        Single-caste associations<\/span> work on one caste\u2019s education, welfare, representation and status. Caste federations<\/span> combine castes for bargaining \u2014 e.g. Kshatriya Sabhas uniting Rajputs and Kolis in Gujarat. Lloyd I. Rudolph<\/span> and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph<\/span> argue caste associations nominate their own members for office, influence cabinets and legislatures, shape welfare \/ education \/ economic policy, organize previously excluded electorates and educate large sections in democratic values.<\/p>\n

        Caste as a Political Category \u2014 Rajni Kothari<\/h4>\n

        Kothari\u2019s core idea: politics has not merely been influenced by caste \u2014 politics has transformed caste<\/span>. Three dimensions:<\/p>\n

        Kothari\u2019s politicization of caste \u2014 three dimensions.<\/span> Secularization<\/span> (ritual purity\/pollution \u2192 secular bargaining for reservation, jobs, tickets, leadership, welfare, state power) \u2192 Integration<\/span> (fusion & fission \u2014 castes combine \/ split by calculation \u00b7 Triveni Sangh \u00b7 AJGAR \u00b7 KHAM \u00b7 MAJGAR) \u2192 Secular consciousness<\/span> (lower castes grasp their political weight; numerical strength = bargaining power).<\/p>\n

        Coalitions:<\/span> Triveni Sangh \u00b7 Bihar \u00b7 Kurmi + Yadav + Koeri \u00b7 AJGAR \u00b7 Ahir + Jat + Gujar + Rajput \u00b7 KHAM \u00b7 Gujarat \u00b7 Kshatriya + Harijan + Adivasi + Muslim \u00b7 MAJGAR \u00b7 Muslim + AJGAR<\/p>\n

        \n

        \u201cCasteism in politics is no more or no less than the politicization of caste.\u201d<\/p>\n

        Rajni Kothari<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

        \n

        UPSC 2021 \u00b7 15 marks<\/span> \u2014 Explain how caste as a social category is also becoming a political category in the democratic politics of India.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

        Caste in Electoral Politics<\/h4>\n

        Caste shapes ticket distribution, candidate selection, booth-level mobilization, vote banks, caste coalitions, campaign language, reservation claims, local leadership recruitment and social engineering.<\/p>\n

        \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Party<\/th>\nCaste base \/ strategy<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Bahujan Samaj Party<\/td>\nDalit support base.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Samajwadi Party<\/td>\nYadav and OBC base.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Rashtriya Janata Dal<\/td>\nYadav-Muslim and backward-caste mobilization.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Lok Dal \/ Charan Singh<\/td>\nJat and middle-peasant mobilization.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Dravidian parties<\/td>\nAnti-Brahmin and non-Brahmin mobilization.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Bharatiya Janata Party<\/td>\nExpanded via non-dominant OBCs, Dalit j\u0101tis and Hindu consolidation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        Paul R. Brass<\/span> describes the old Congress base as a \u201ccoalition of castes\u201d<\/span>. Christophe Jaffrelot<\/span> calls lower-caste mobilization \u201cIndia\u2019s silent revolution\u201d<\/span>. Yogendra Yadav<\/span> maps three democratic upsurges:<\/p>\n

        Yadav\u2019s three democratic upsurges.<\/span> 1st upsurge<\/span> (1960s\u201370s \u00b7 OBC & intermediate caste participation) \u2192 2nd upsurge<\/span> (1980s\u201390s \u00b7 rising Dalit assertion) \u2192 3rd upsurge<\/span> (more marginalized groups enter democratic institutions).<\/p>\n

        \n

        UPSC 2023 \u00b7 20 marks<\/span> \u2014 The rise of caste politics is to be attributed to both regional aspirations and electoral manifestations. Comment.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

        Caste in Non-Electoral Politics<\/h4>\n

        Caste organizations also act outside elections \u2014 as pressure groups, welfare associations, educational trusts, hostels, scholarship networks, marriage-regulation bodies, health, cultural and dispute-resolution institutions; they run schools, hospitals, dharmashalas, libraries, festivals and welfare funds. Caste also produces conflict: land disputes trigger caste violence. Mendelsohn & Vicziany<\/span> connect violence against Dalits with land and power; Dag-Erik Berg<\/span> reads the Karamchedu massacre as status competition; Bihar\u2019s caste armies of the late 1970s\u201380s show how land and caste dominance became armed conflict.<\/p>\n

        Dalit Politics<\/h4>\n
        \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
        Phase<\/th>\nContent<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
        Co-option \/ alignment<\/span><\/td>\nRepublican Party of India (Ambedkar legacy) sought Dalit advancement; Congress co-opted Dalit leaders through symbolic representation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Autonomy<\/span><\/td>\nKanshi Ram built independent assertion via BAMCEF, DS4, BSP; Mayawati as CM of UP = Dalit entry into state power.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
        Radicalism<\/span><\/td>\nDalit Panthers (1972) \u2014 Ambedkarism + Marxism + Black Panther ideology; Bhim Army = confrontational, rights-based politics.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

        Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span> (\u201cNew Dalit Challenge\u201d): Dalits are no longer satisfied with mere constitutional recognition; they reject the \u201cmanagerial\u201d approach of symbolic co-option without real power; they build counter-hegemony by rewriting history; they move from survival politics to dignity politics<\/span> \u2014 Bhima-Koregaon reflected this, colliding with upper-caste strategies of containment. C. P. Bhambri<\/span> holds rising Dalit consciousness is positive but needs alliances with progressive forces. Further readings: Anand Teltumbde<\/span> (mainstream appropriation dilutes radical Dalit politics), Sukhadeo Thorat<\/span> (economic uplift essential), Kancha Ilaiah<\/span> (education + economic empowerment central), Jaffrelot<\/span> (Dalit parties = an alternative to mainstream politics).<\/p>\n

        Backward Classes & Mandal Politics<\/h4>\n

        OBCs are not a single caste \u2014 internally heterogeneous, with dominant OBCs and Most Backward Castes differing sharply in access. Basis: zamindari abolition weakened landlord power; Green Revolution empowered intermediate peasant castes; Charan Singh mobilized Jats, Yadavs, Kurmis; Ram Manohar Lohia used quota politics against upper-caste dominance; Devi Lal and Karpoori Thakur added momentum. The B. P. Mandal<\/span> Commission identified OBCs and recommended 27% reservation<\/span> in central government jobs; V. P. Singh implemented it in 1990<\/span>.<\/p>\n

        Kisan politics<\/span><\/p>\n

        Charan Singh \u2014 peasant solidarity against urban India.<\/p>\n

        Quota politics<\/span><\/p>\n

        Lohia & Janata Dal \u2014 caste-based affirmative action.<\/p>\n

        Christophe Jaffrelot<\/span> argues Mandal enabled lower-caste people to vote for leaders from their own milieu<\/em>. Limits: OBCs are not cohesive; Yadav dominance created internal tension; MBCs often felt excluded; Hindu nationalism offered a competing identity; BJP used social engineering to include non-dominant OBCs.<\/p>\n

        Reservation Politics & Caste Census<\/h4>\n

        Supporters<\/span><\/p>\n