{"id":3553,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:56","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/balance-of-power-and-deterrence\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:33","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:33","slug":"balance-of-power-and-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/balance-of-power-and-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"Balance of power and deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-a\">II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Balance of power and deterrence<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Balance of power and deterrence<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-A \u00b7 6<\/b> \u2014 Key Concepts in International Relations : National interest, security and power; <span class=\"cur\">Balance of power and deterrence<\/span>; Transational actors and collective security; World capitalist economy and globalisation.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"balance-of-power-meaning-and-assumptions\">Balance of Power \u2014 Meaning and Assumptions<\/h3>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Working definition<\/span> A system ensuring that no single state becomes strong enough to dominate the others. It is operational in <span class=\"n-term\">multipolarity<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>Traceable to the War of Spanish Succession and the Congress of Vienna (1815) \u2192 the Concert of Europe gave Europe roughly a hundred years of peace \u2014 the \u201cgolden age\u201d of the balance of power.<\/li>\n<li>Assumptions \u2192 no international authority; anarchy; states are rational and pursue national interest; the security dilemma; states are power maximisers ready to wage war; none permits another\u2019s preponderance.<\/li>\n<li>Classical realists (<span class=\"n-sch\">Morgenthau<\/span>) \u2192 the balance of power is a deliberate <span class=\"n-term\">policy choice<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Neorealists (<span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span>) \u2192 it arises <span class=\"n-term\">automatically<\/span> from the anarchic structure.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cBalance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Kenneth Waltz<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"types-of-balancing-and-the-techniques\">Types of Balancing, and the Techniques<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Internal balancing<\/span> \u2192 building one\u2019s own military and economic capacity. <span class=\"n-term\">External balancing<\/span> \u2192 forming alliances; also <span class=\"n-term\">asymmetrical<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">soft balancing<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>When threatened, a state may <span class=\"n-term\">balance<\/span> (ally against the threat) or <span class=\"n-term\">bandwagon<\/span> (align with it); other tactics \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">buck-passing<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">chain-ganging<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Techniques<\/span> \u2192 alliances and counter-alliances (NATO, the Warsaw Pact); arms race and disarmament; <span class=\"n-term\">compensation<\/span> (territorial annexation or division); partition (Germany after 1945); demilitarisation; reparations (Versailles); the creation of buffer states.<\/li>\n<li>Indian strategic tradition \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya<\/span>\u2019s <em>Shadgunya Niti<\/em> as an indigenous balancing doctrine.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-problem-of-definition-and-the-modifications\">The Problem of Definition, and the Modifications<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Martin Wight<\/span> \u2192 the notion is \u201cnotoriously full of confusion.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Inis Claude<\/span> \u2192 the trouble \u201cis not that it has no meaning, but that it has too many meanings.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Morgenthau<\/span> gave four meanings \u2192 a policy; an actual state of affairs; equal distribution; any distribution. <span class=\"n-sch\">Ernst Haas<\/span> gave eight \u2192 from equilibrium, to power politics, to a universal law of history, to a guide for policy-makers.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sidney B. Fay<\/span> \u2192 a \u201cjust equilibrium\u2026 as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others.\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">David Hume<\/span> \u2192 the balance of power is \u201ccommon sense.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Sources of the confusion \u2192 power is hard to measure, interpretations differ, and relations between states are unpredictable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Modification<\/th>\n<th>Claim<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Balance of threat<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Stephen Walt<\/span><\/td>\n<td>States balance against <em>threats<\/em>, not power alone.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Balance of interest<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Randall Schweller<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Interest, not capability alone, drives alignment.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Soft balancing<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">T.V. Paul<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Michel Fortmann<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">James Wirtz<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Balancing the USA directly is too costly; diplomacy and institutions are the realistic route.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"relative-and-absolute-gains\">Relative and Absolute Gains<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span> \u2192 states think in <span class=\"n-term\">relative<\/span> gains \u2014 military advantage over others matters more than absolute capability.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Grieco<\/span> \u2192 survival requires a \u201cproportionate advantage,\u201d so even allies may not cooperate.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Keohane<\/span> (neoliberal institutionalism) \u2192 cooperation presumes the pursuit of <span class=\"n-term\">absolute<\/span> gains.<\/li>\n<li>The pay-off \u2192 a preference for relative gains makes balancing more likely; a preference for absolute gains favours deep institutions and security communities (<span class=\"n-sch\">Duncan Snidal<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Axelrod<\/span> on the dynamic interaction).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"criticism-appraisal-and-contemporary-relevance\">Criticism, Appraisal and Contemporary Relevance<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Liberals \u2192 it legitimises and entrenches rivalry, breeding instability; <span class=\"n-sch\">Woodrow Wilson<\/span> wished the \u201cgreat game\u201d of balance of power \u201cforever discredited.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Constructivists (<span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Wendt<\/span>) \u2192 it overlooks norms and values. Feminists \u2192 it encodes a gendered conception of power.<\/li>\n<li>It may produce the <span class=\"n-term\">stability-instability paradox<\/span> \u2014 deterrence prevents high-intensity war but encourages proxy and low-intensity conflict. And it stops operating in unipolarity: after 1991 no counter-coalition formed against the USA.<\/li>\n<li>As a basis for peace it is inadequate \u2192 it failed to prevent two world wars; war itself becomes a means of conflict resolution within the system, producing \u201cunnecessary war and the unnecessary extension of war.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Not relevant, say the critics \u2192 globalisation and interdependence, global-governance institutions, non-state actors and transnational threats (terrorism, pandemics, climate) all defy power balancing.<\/li>\n<li>Yet realists hold it durable \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Waltz<\/span>: unipolarity is the least durable structure because dominant powers overstretch and weaker states fear them. <span class=\"n-term\">Mearsheimer<\/span> \u2192 the Cold War \u201clong peace\u201d rested on bipolarity, rough US\u2013Soviet equality and nuclear weapons.<\/li>\n<li>Present scenario \u2192 US\u2013China rivalry; NATO expansion and the Russia\u2013Ukraine war; the Quad and Indo-Pacific alignments; the EU\u2019s collective bargaining; small states pursuing nuclear weapons (North Korea); technology empowering small and non-state actors.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cAs nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Kenneth Waltz<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2016 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cThe notion of balance of power is notoriously full of confusion.\u201d In the light of this quotation, do you think that the concept of balance of power is relevant?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-notion-of-balance-of-power-is-notoriously-full-of-confusion-upsc-psir-2016-3202\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Explain the concept of balance of power. What are the various techniques of maintaining balance of power?<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"deterrence-meaning-basis-mad\">Deterrence \u2014 Meaning, Basis, MAD<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A psychological and relational concept resting on the rationality of actors \u2192 an adversary is dissuaded by the <span class=\"n-term\">credible threat of unacceptable cost<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Bernard Brodie<\/span> \u2192 a credible nuclear deterrent \u201cmust be always at the ready, yet never used.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Schelling<\/span> \u2192 strategy is now the art of coercion and intimidation, not the science of military victory; the power to hurt is bargaining power, most effective when held in reserve.<\/li>\n<li>Developed by game-theory and strategic thinkers \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Bernard Brodie<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Herman Kahn<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Schelling<\/span>. Evolution \u2192 from conventional to nuclear deterrence, offered as an alternative to the balance of power.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Mutually Assured Destruction<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Nuclear-armed adversaries avoid war for fear of catastrophic, mutual destruction \u2192 the emphasis falls on <span class=\"n-term\">second-strike capability<\/span>; some advocate a first strike (<span class=\"n-term\">NUTS<\/span> \u2014 Nuclear Utilization Target Selection).<\/li>\n<li>It drove arms races; the USA adopted \u201cflexible response\u201d under Kennedy. <span class=\"n-term\">Tactical nuclear weapons<\/span> (Pakistan and India \u2014 HATF, Prahar); <span class=\"n-term\">extended deterrence<\/span> for Japan and South Korea.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Stability-instability paradox<\/span> (<span class=\"n-term\">Schelling<\/span>) \u2192 nuclear weapons confer large-scale stability between nuclear states but push competition into smaller-scale instability \u2014 proxy wars and minor conflicts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"advantages-limitations-and-the-proliferation-debate\">Advantages, Limitations and the Proliferation Debate<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Advantages<\/th>\n<th>Limitations<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Prevents global conflict \u2014 even minor powers can deter majors.<\/td>\n<td>Does not prevent small-scale conflict (<span class=\"n-sch\">Henry Kissinger<\/span>).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear taboo<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Nina Tannenwald<\/span>) \u2014 reluctance to use since 1945 exceeds cost-benefit logic.<\/td>\n<td>Creates global inequality; encourages proliferation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Bargaining power; flexibility of triad delivery.<\/td>\n<td>Ineffective against non-state actors; no guarantee of peace (the Cuban Missile Crisis).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em>A second strike usually needs a <\/em><em>nuclear triad<\/em><em> (USA, Russia, China, India); the UK and France hold only sea- and air-based weapons.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">More may be better \u2014 or worse<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span> \u2192 \u201cmore may be better\u201d; MAD makes nuclear war irrational and states become \u201cexceedingly cautious.\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span> agrees \u2192 nuclear weapons are \u201ca superb deterrent.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Sagan<\/span> \u2192 organisational pessimism \u2014 weapons are controlled by organisations with parochial biases, not by rational statesmen.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cNuclear weapons do not produce perfect nuclear organisations; they only make their inevitable mistakes more deadly.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Scott Sagan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">National prestige theory<\/span> \u2192 some authoritarian regimes seek weapons for status and regime survival.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Frank Zagare<\/span> \u2192 deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate; rational-choice scholars propose <span class=\"n-term\">perfect deterrence<\/span>, varying states by the credibility of their threats.<\/li>\n<li>In 2007, <span class=\"n-sch\">Henry Kissinger<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">William Perry<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">George Shultz<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Sam Nunn<\/span> reversed their position \u2192 in a world of many new, poorly safeguarded nuclear states and the risk of nuclear terrorism, the weapons had become a source of extreme risk.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Pakistan<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">credible minimum deterrence<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">No First Use<\/span> against Pakistan\u2019s tactical weapons compensating for conventional asymmetry. It has prevented full-scale war since 1998; restraint held in the 2019 Pulwama\u2013Balakot crisis. But it does not stop sub-conventional conflict \u2014 Pakistan\u2019s use of non-state actors below the nuclear threshold complicates India\u2019s calculus. <span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> \u2192 strategic-level stability still requires strong conventional capability and diplomacy.<\/li>\n<li>Contemporary challenges \u2192 resurgent Cold War dynamics (US\u2013China), diminished inter-state trust, the risk of inadvertent escalation, rogue states (North Korea), and the failure of deterrence against actors who do not follow state-based calculations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the utility of Nuclear Deterrence Theory in the context of the recent standoff between India and Pakistan.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-utility-of-nuclear-deterrence-theory-in-the-context-upsc-psir-2019-3207\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/national-interest-security-and-power\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>National interest, security and power<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/transnational-actors-and-collective-security\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Transnational actors and collective security<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#balance-of-power-meaning-and-assumptions\">Balance of Power \u2014 Meaning and Assumptions<\/a><a href=\"#types-of-balancing-and-the-techniques\">Types of Balancing, and the Techniques<\/a><a href=\"#the-problem-of-definition-and-the-modifications\">The Problem of Definition, and the Modifications<\/a><a href=\"#relative-and-absolute-gains\">Relative and Absolute Gains<\/a><a href=\"#criticism-appraisal-and-contemporary-relevance\">Criticism, Appraisal and Contemporary Relevance<\/a><a href=\"#deterrence-meaning-basis-mad\">Deterrence \u2014 Meaning, Basis, MAD<\/a><a href=\"#advantages-limitations-and-the-proliferation-debate\">Advantages, Limitations and the Proliferation Debate<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Balance of power and deterrence for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics \u203a Balance of power and deterrence Paper I \u00b7<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-A.6.2","fx_note_sec":"II-A","fx_note_point":"6","fx_note_desc":"Balance of power and deterrence for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics \u203a Balance of power and deterrence Paper I \u00b7","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3553","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3553","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3553\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3814,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3553\/revisions\/3814"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}