{"id":3556,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:57","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/rise-of-super-powers-bipolarity-arms-race-and-cold-war\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:02:01","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:32:01","slug":"rise-of-super-powers-bipolarity-arms-race-and-cold-war","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/rise-of-super-powers-bipolarity-arms-race-and-cold-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Rise of super powers, bipolarity, arms race and cold war"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-a\">II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Rise of super powers, bipolarity, arms race and cold war<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Rise of super powers, bipolarity, arms race and cold war<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-A \u00b7 7<\/b> \u2014 Changing International Political Order : (a) Rise of super powers; Strategic and ideological Bipolarity, arms race and cold war; Nuclear threat; (b) Non-aligned Movement : Aims and achievements. (c) Collapse of the Soviet Union; Unipolarity and American hegemony; Relevance of non-alignment in the contemporary world.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-order-and-its-two-shifts\">The Order and Its Two Shifts<\/h3>\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">international political order<\/span> is the pattern of power, rules and relationships that governs how states behave at a given moment. Since 1945 that pattern has shifted twice over.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Two shifts, one unfinished transition.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1945\u20131991 \u00b7 Bipolar<\/span> (Rivalry of the USA and the USSR \u2014 the Cold War) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1991\u2013 \u00b7 Unipolar moment<\/span> (Collapse of the USSR leaves the USA sole superpower) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Today \u00b7 Diffusion<\/span> (Power moves from the trans-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific \u2014 multipolarity? new bipolarity? disorder?)<\/p>\n<p>The question that runs through the unit: did the Cold War\u2019s end bring a <span class=\"n-term\">new order<\/span> \u2014 or a <span class=\"n-term\">new disorder<\/span>?<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-cold-war-meaning-and-origins\">The Cold War: Meaning and Origins<\/h3>\n<p>An intense ideological, political and strategic rivalry between the USA and the USSR after the Second World War.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Meaning<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\u201cCold\u201d because it never escalated into <span class=\"n-term\">direct military conflict<\/span> between the two superpowers \u2014 yet the whole world was shaped by their competition.<\/li>\n<li>Term first used by <span class=\"n-sch\">George Orwell<\/span> (1945) for an \u201cundeclared state of war\u201d; popularised soon after by <span class=\"n-sch\">Walter Lippmann<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Bernard Baruch<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Winston Churchill<\/span> (1946) gave it its imagery \u2014 the division of Europe as an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cIron Curtain\u201d<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Origins<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>No single start date; tensions hardened around 1945 as the wartime alliance broke down.<\/li>\n<li>Post-war shift from a <span class=\"n-term\">multipolar<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">bipolar<\/span> system dominated by the USA and the USSR.<\/li>\n<li>Spheres of influence carved out in Europe at <span class=\"n-term\">Yalta<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Potsdam<\/span>; Germany and Berlin divided into a Soviet-controlled East and a Western-controlled West.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"phases-of-the-cold-war\">Phases of the Cold War<\/h3>\n<p>Four movements, from confrontation to thaw and back to confrontation.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The arc of the rivalry.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1 \u00b7 1945\u20131962<\/span> (Confrontation and containment \u2014 Berlin, Korea, Suez) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2 \u00b7 The Crises<\/span> (Berlin Wall (1961); Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">3 \u00b7 D\u00e9tente<\/span> (1962\/69\u201379 \u2014 Ostpolitik, SALT, Helsinki) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">4 \u00b7 New Cold War<\/span> (1979\u201389 \u2014 Afghanistan, Reagan, SDI)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">First phase (1945\u201362): confrontation and containment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Europe<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Berlin Blockade<\/span> (1948\u201349): the USSR cut ground access to West Berlin; the Western <span class=\"n-term\">Berlin Airlift<\/span> supplied the city \u2014 the first major confrontation. <span class=\"n-term\">Marshall Plan<\/span> (1948): US aid to rebuild Western Europe; the USSR answered with <span class=\"n-term\">COMINFORM<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Molotov Plan<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">NATO<\/span> (1949): US-led mutual defence pact \u2192 the USSR formed the <span class=\"n-term\">Warsaw Pact<\/span> (1955). Containment formalised in the <span class=\"n-term\">Truman Doctrine<\/span> (1947). <span class=\"n-term\">Berlin Wall<\/span> (1961) \u2014 the Iron Curtain in concrete.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Asia<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Korean War<\/span> (1950\u201353): North Korea crossed the 38th parallel with Soviet approval; the USA intervened under the UN banner; <span class=\"n-sch\">Mao Zedong<\/span> sent Chinese troops to aid the North; stalemate at the 38th parallel. <span class=\"n-term\">Vietnam War<\/span>: rooted in Eisenhower\u2019s fear of the <span class=\"n-term\">domino effect<\/span>; the USA formed <span class=\"n-term\">SEATO<\/span> (1954).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Middle East<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Suez Crisis<\/span> (1956): <span class=\"n-sch\">Gamal Abdel Nasser<\/span> nationalised the Suez Canal; Britain, France and Israel intervened; the USA and the USSR pressed them to withdraw \u2014 exposing the declining weight of the old European powers. The USA formed <span class=\"n-term\">CENTO<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Latin America<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Cuban Missile Crisis<\/span> (1962): Soviet missiles in Cuba brought the world to the brink. <span class=\"n-term\">Khrushchev<\/span> sought to protect <span class=\"n-sch\">Fidel Castro<\/span> and offset US missiles in Turkey. The settlement: the USSR to remove its missiles from Cuba; the USA not to invade Cuba and, secretly, to withdraw its missiles from Turkey.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Cambridge histories of the Cold War read these episodes as proof that the superpowers were willing to fight through <\/em><em>proxy wars<\/em><em> (<\/em><em>Odd Arne Westad<\/em><em>), and that Berlin and Cuba dramatised the era\u2019s dangers (<\/em><em>James G. Hershberg<\/em><em>, <\/em><em>Douglas Little<\/em><em>).<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Second phase: the crises<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Followed <span class=\"n-term\">Stalin<\/span>\u2019s death (1953) and the rise of <span class=\"n-sch\">Nikita Khrushchev<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Berlin Crisis<\/span> (1961): East Germany built the Wall to stop the exodus westward; <span class=\"n-sch\">John F. Kennedy<\/span> chose not to confront the USSR militarily. Then the <span class=\"n-term\">Cuban Missile Crisis<\/span> (1962) \u2014 the peak of nuclear brinkmanship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Third phase \u2014 D\u00e9tente (1962\/1969\u20131979)<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A thaw, as both sides recognised the costs of overstretch.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Charles de Gaulle<\/span> (France) and <span class=\"n-sch\">Willy Brandt<\/span> (West Germany) sought better ties with the East; Brandt\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Ostpolitik<\/span> aimed to normalise relations with East Germany and the USSR.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Richard Nixon<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Henry Kissinger<\/span> pursued d\u00e9tente with the USSR and opened relations with China, working the Sino-Soviet split (<span class=\"n-sch\">Jussi M. Hanhim\u00e4ki<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Helsinki Accords<\/span> (1975): the West acknowledged Soviet control over Eastern Europe; the USSR accepted human-rights commitments.<\/li>\n<li>Arms control: <span class=\"n-term\">SALT<\/span> talks and the <span class=\"n-term\">ABM Treaty<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>D\u00e9tente was partial \u2014 proxy wars continued (1971 India\u2013Pakistan war, Arab\u2013Israeli wars).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Sino-Soviet split<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>USSR\u2013PRC relations deteriorated in the late 1960s over ideology and strategy, producing border clashes (<span class=\"n-sch\">Zhang Shu Guang<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li>The split opened the door to US engagement with China, shifting the balance of power (<span class=\"n-sch\">Sergey Radchenko<\/span>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">New Cold War (1979\u20131989)<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Triggered by the <span class=\"n-term\">Soviet invasion of Afghanistan<\/span> (1979), read by the USA as expansionism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Jimmy Carter<\/span> imposed sanctions; the USA boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics.<\/li>\n<li>The fall of South Vietnam (1975) had already signalled d\u00e9tente\u2019s failure and raised US domestic pressure to confront Soviet influence (<span class=\"n-sch\">Fredrik Logevall<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ronald Reagan<\/span> took a hardline stance; his rhetoric and military build-up were read by the USSR as aggressive (<span class=\"n-sch\">Beth A. Fischer<\/span>). Reagan combined two pressures \u2014 backing Islamic fighters against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and launching a renewed nuclear arms race.<\/li>\n<li>The fall of the <span class=\"n-term\">Berlin Wall<\/span> (1989) and the <span class=\"n-term\">Malta Summit<\/span> marked the end.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-arms-race-during-the-cold-war\">The Arms Race during the Cold War<\/h3>\n<p>Cause and casualty of the rivalry at once.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Definition<\/span><\/p>\n<p>An <span class=\"n-term\">arms race<\/span> is the competitive acquisition and advancement of military capability among two or more powerful states.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The nuclear race<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The US use of the atomic bomb in 1945 opened the nuclear age and bred mistrust; the USSR tested its first bomb in 1949.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">missile gap<\/span> perception of the 1950s drove US spending.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic Defence Initiative<\/span> (SDI \/ \u201cStar Wars\u201d), proposed by <span class=\"n-term\">Reagan<\/span> in 1983 \u2014 a space-based missile defence. Never realised, yet the USSR read it as a major threat and the race intensified.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Other examples<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">UK\u2013Germany<\/span> (pre-WWI): naval race; the launch of <span class=\"n-term\">HMS Dreadnought<\/span> (1906) set off rapid expansion and fed the tensions behind the First World War.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2013Pakistan<\/span>: continuing missile competition and a persistent nuclear standoff in South Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Francis J. Gavin<\/span>: the race heightened tension but also built a <span class=\"n-term\">deterrent<\/span> that prevented direct superpower conflict.<\/li>\n<li>On balance the effects are negative \u2014 heavy economic cost, debt and dependency (worst for arms importers), heightened hostility, and a measurable rise in the risk of war. The strain of the race contributed to the collapse of the USSR, leaving the USA as sole superpower.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"interpretations-of-the-cold-war\">Interpretations of the Cold War<\/h3>\n<p>Who is to blame? Three schools, and the standard three-mark opening of any Cold War answer.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>School<\/th>\n<th>Holds responsible<\/th>\n<th>Core argument<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Traditionalist \/ Orthodox<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">USSR<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Soviet conduct was driven by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of worldwide class struggle and the spread of international communism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Revisionist<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">USA<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Soviet expansion was defensive \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbuffer zone\u201d<\/span> against the West, and a weakened Germany to prevent future invasion.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Post-Revisionist<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Both<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Both pursued hegemonic ambitions; alternative readings stress <span class=\"n-term\">miscalculation<\/span> on both sides.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-arms-race-nuclear-order-and-disarmament\">The Arms Race, Nuclear Order and Disarmament<\/h3>\n<p>Nuclear weapons still shape power politics, alliances and regional security after the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The persistence of deterrence<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Schelling<\/span>: coercion as the credible <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cpower to hurt\u201d<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Mutually Assured Destruction<\/span> (MAD) as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbalance of terror\u201d<\/span>, resting on <span class=\"n-term\">second-strike capability<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear triad<\/span>, and extended to allies (Japan, South Korea) through <span class=\"n-term\">extended deterrence<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span>: nuclear weapons helped keep the Cold War \u201ccold\u201d \u2014 a logic many realists apply to great-power restraint after 1991.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Henry Kissinger<\/span>: reliance on deterrence assumes rational actors, which is unsafe.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Morton Kaplan<\/span>\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cunit veto\u201d<\/span> system projects a world where each actor can destroy every other.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Disarmament<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Definition<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Disarmament<\/span> is the reduction or elimination of military forces and weapons through cooperation, treaties and oversight. Four components: reduction in quantity; formal negotiation and treaties; focus on weapons and tools; an oversight body. The United Nations has mediated disarmament since the 1960s through resolutions, committees and monitoring.<\/p>\n<p>Armaments make war physically possible and politically probable; disarmament can reduce tension and redirect spending to human welfare. The <span class=\"n-term\">Arms Trade Treaty<\/span> seeks to prevent transfers that enable rights violations.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The instruments<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Instrument<\/th>\n<th>Status and the point to make<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">NPT<\/span> (1968; in force 1970)<\/td>\n<td>The core of the non-proliferation regime. <span class=\"n-sch\">George Perkovich<\/span>: India and Pakistan remain non-signatories because they are not recognised as nuclear-weapon states; the <span class=\"n-term\">1995 indefinite extension<\/span> is seen as discriminatory by such states.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CTBT<\/span> (1996) <span class=\"n-term\">&amp; FMCT<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The CTBT is not in force; the FMCT remains stalled \u2014 both blocked largely by US and other nuclear-weapon-state resistance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">GICNT<\/span> (2006)<\/td>\n<td>Coordinates against <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear terrorism<\/span> by non-state actors.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">The Obama push<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Prague speech (2009); <span class=\"n-term\">UNSC Resolution 1887<\/span>; four Nuclear Security Summits.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty<\/span> \/ TPNW (2017)<\/td>\n<td>The first legally binding comprehensive prohibition, yet to enter into force \u2014 all major nuclear powers absent.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">New START<\/span> (2010)<\/td>\n<td>The cornerstone of US\u2013Russia arms control, set to <span class=\"n-term\">expire in 2026<\/span> \u2014 the sharpest present worry for the future of arms control.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s policy<\/span> (post-1998)<\/td>\n<td>Credible minimum deterrence \u00b7 No First Use \u00b7 assured command and control \u00b7 reliable delivery vehicles.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Civil society<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Pugwash Movement<\/span> (Nobel Peace Prize).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em><span class=\"n-sch\">John Simpson<\/span>: the non-proliferation agenda has not worked sufficiently after the 1990s \u2014 Iran and North Korea continue to pursue capability; a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory process is needed for non-proliferation in the short term and disarmament in the long term.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The contemporary nuclear order<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Renewed nuclear competition between the USA and Russia, both modernising arsenals.<\/li>\n<li>New domains complicate the old idea of an arms race: <span class=\"n-term\">hypersonic missiles<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">cyber<\/span> capabilities and <span class=\"n-term\">AI<\/span> for defence.<\/li>\n<li>China\u2019s expanding arsenal adds a third major actor; regional races persist \u2014 India\u2013Pakistan; Iran\u2013Saudi Arabia in West Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why a nuclear-free world remains distant<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Moral authority has limited effect on states like Iran and North Korea.<\/li>\n<li>Great-power unanimity is fragile \u2014 China has no plans to scrap its weapons.<\/li>\n<li>Technical verification of warhead elimination is hard.<\/li>\n<li>A perverse risk: disarmament could turn conventional wars nuclear again, and a weakened US nuclear umbrella could push Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Gulf states to reconsider their non-nuclear status (<span class=\"n-sch\">George Perkovich<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">James Acton<\/span>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Korean Peninsula<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>North Korea is a self-declared nuclear power; ICBMs able to reach the US mainland shift the regional balance and undermine the perceived invulnerability of the USA; extended deterrence loses credibility as Seoul and Tokyo doubt the umbrella and move toward self-reliance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">\u201cThe North Korea Paradox\u201d<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Max Fisher<\/span>): US relative strength is paradoxically a weakness \u2014 knowing it would lose a full conflict, North Korea\u2019s only option is rapid escalation to nuclear use, which constrains US choices.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Singapore Summit<\/span> (June 2018): the first meeting of sitting US and North Korean leaders; a joint statement on security guarantees, new relations and denuclearisation. Symbolic diplomacy versus substantive progress (<span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Snyder<\/span>); critics warned symbolism is insufficient without concrete steps (<span class=\"n-sch\">Daryl Kimball<\/span>, Arms Control Association); no clarity on the actual process of denuclearisation (<span class=\"n-sch\">Sue Mi Terry<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Collapse<\/span>: the 2019 <span class=\"n-term\">Hanoi Summit<\/span> failed over sanctions sequencing; North Korea resumed missile tests in 2019 (<span class=\"n-sch\">Victor Cha<\/span>). The summit elevated North Korea\u2019s stature without meaningful concessions, at a cost to US non-proliferation credibility (<span class=\"n-sch\">Bruce Klingner<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The China factor<\/span>: the only power able to rein in Pyongyang is China \u2014 but US\u2013China rivalry makes Beijing likely to keep the North as a <span class=\"n-term\">strategic buffer<\/span>; recall the earlier failure of the Six-Party Talks.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Way forward<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Frank Aum<\/span>): a functionalist <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cpeace by pieces\u201d<\/span> approach \u2014 an end-of-war declaration first, then NPT re-entry, IAEA safeguards and CTBT ratification. Incremental denuclearisation, global sanctions and US\u2013China cooperation; all-or-nothing approaches will fail.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why disarmament has stalled<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The gains to recall<\/span>: Cold War strategic parity produced SALT, the ABM Treaty, the hotline and later START \u2014 the largest arms-control reductions in history; the non-aligned helped bring about the <span class=\"n-term\">Partial Test Ban Treaty<\/span> (1963).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The reversal<\/span>: renewed US\u2013Russia competition and modernisation; New START undermined as it nears expiry; great powers taking sides in regional conflicts.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Regional conflict as disruptor<\/span>: the Russia\u2013Ukraine war has dismantled the very mechanisms that enabled d\u00e9tente \u2014 parity, dialogue and institutions \u2014 making fresh cooperation harder than in the 1970s. West Asia: Iran\u2019s programme, Saudi\u2013Iran tensions and external arms supplies; Israel treats Iran\u2019s ambitions as existential. South Asia: the India\u2013Pakistan standoff and periodic missile tests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The balance<\/span>: bloc alignment and treaty erosion have jeopardised past progress, but India\u2019s No First Use and credible minimum deterrence show that restraint remains possible; a verifiable, non-discriminatory, cooperative framework is the way forward.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><span><\/span><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/non-aligned-movement-aims-and-achievements\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Non-aligned Movement: aims and achievements<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-order-and-its-two-shifts\">The Order and Its Two Shifts<\/a><a href=\"#the-cold-war-meaning-and-origins\">The Cold War: Meaning and Origins<\/a><a href=\"#phases-of-the-cold-war\">Phases of the Cold War<\/a><a href=\"#the-arms-race-during-the-cold-war\">The Arms Race during the Cold War<\/a><a href=\"#interpretations-of-the-cold-war\">Interpretations of the Cold War<\/a><a href=\"#the-arms-race-nuclear-order-and-disarmament\">The Arms Race, Nuclear Order and Disarmament<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Rise of super powers, bipolarity, arms race and cold war for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics \u203a Rise of super po<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-A.7.1","fx_note_sec":"II-A","fx_note_point":"7","fx_note_desc":"Rise of super powers, bipolarity, arms race and cold war for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics \u203a Rise of super po","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3556","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3556","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3556\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3613,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3556\/revisions\/3613"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3556"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}