{"id":3557,"date":"2026-08-11T22:11:57","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:41:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/non-aligned-movement-aims-and-achievements\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:02:02","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:32:02","slug":"non-aligned-movement-aims-and-achievements","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/non-aligned-movement-aims-and-achievements\/","title":{"rendered":"Non-aligned Movement: aims and achievements"},"content":{"rendered":"
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PSIR Notes<\/a>\u203a<\/span>II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/a>\u203a<\/span>Non-aligned Movement: aims and achievements<\/span><\/div>\n
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Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/div>\n

Non-aligned Movement: aims and achievements<\/h1>\n
Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-A \u00b7 7<\/b> \u2014 Changing International Political Order : (a) Rise of super powers; Strategic and ideological Bipolarity, arms race and cold war; Nuclear threat; (b) Non-aligned Movement<\/span> : Aims and achievements. (c) Collapse of the Soviet Union; Unipolarity and American hegemony; Relevance of non-alignment in the contemporary world.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
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<\/p>\n

Non-Alignment \u2014 the core proposition<\/h3>\n
\n

\u201cNon-alignment was never about staying away from global politics; it was about staying above it.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

C. Raja Mohan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    \n
  • India\u2019s principal contribution to the theory and practice of international politics<\/span>.<\/li>\n
  • Setting \u2192 after the Second World War, newly independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America looked for an alternative to the two Cold War blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union.<\/li>\n
  • Core idea \u2192 an independent foreign policy<\/span>, freedom of judgment on each issue<\/span>, refusal to join military alliances<\/span> \u2014 and no withdrawal from world affairs.<\/li>\n
  • Scale \u2192 from 25 states at Belgrade (1961)<\/span> to about 120 members<\/span> today; nineteen summits<\/span> between 1961 and 2024.<\/li>\n
  • Agenda shift \u2192 Cold War bloc politics \u2192 decolonization \u2192 the North\u2013South economic divide \u2192 today, strategic autonomy, terrorism, climate change and reform of global governance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
    \n

    \u201c\u2026a policy of acting according to our best judgment and furthering the principal objectives and ideals that we have\u2026\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

    Jawaharlal Nehru (1964)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    What It Is Not<\/h3>\n

    Meaning has varied with the writer\u2019s own vantage point. Western scholarship often read non-alignment as neutrality<\/span> or neutralism<\/span>, borrowing from European precedent \u2014 a misreading, since non-alignment arose in a different setting and rests on distinct principles.<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Georg Schwarzenberger<\/span> \u2192 separates non-alignment from isolationism, non-commitment, neutrality, neutralization, unilateralism and non-involvement; it means specifically keeping out of Cold War military alliances.<\/li>\n
    • George Liska<\/span> \u2192 among anti-alliance policies, traditional isolationism or neutrality differ from non-alignment, which opposes all<\/em> alliances \u2014 including those among other states.<\/li>\n
    • U Nu<\/span> (Burma) \u2192 tied non-alignment to Cold War neutralism, i.e. staying out of the East\u2013West ideological struggle.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
      \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Term<\/th>\nWhat it means<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Neutrality<\/span><\/td>\nNon-involvement in an actual war between belligerents; a neutral state can still become a belligerent if circumstances change.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Neutralization<\/span><\/td>\nA permanent, obligatory status of not participating in wars, even when sovereignty is threatened. Classic case: Switzerland.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Non-Alignment<\/span><\/td>\nNon-involvement in Cold War rivalry; not permanent neutrality but independence of foreign policy and avoidance of alliances that could compromise sovereignty.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Two core components<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      • Opposition to military alliances<\/span> \u2192 antipathy toward the Cold War system of military blocs.<\/li>\n
      • Independence of foreign policy<\/span> \u2192 freedom to frame and pursue policy on national interest, free of external pressure or bloc alignment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Bases of Non-Alignment \u2014 negative and positive<\/h3>\n

        Negative basis \u2014 the anti-military-alliance policy<\/span><\/p>\n

          \n
        • Avoiding Cold War entanglement<\/span> \u2192 staying out of alliances kept nations clear of superpower confrontations.<\/li>\n
        • National security<\/span> \u2192 alliances could provoke adversaries and raise the risk of conflict on one\u2019s own soil.<\/li>\n
        • Preserving sovereignty<\/span> \u2192 military pacts carry obligations that erode independent decision-making.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          Positive bases<\/span><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. Ideological independence<\/span> \u2192 post-colonial states carried distinct cultural identities and socio-economic problems; they wanted systems suited to their own context, not wholesale Western capitalism or Soviet communism. Staying out of both blocs guarded domestic priorities from external ideological pressure.<\/li>\n
          2. Economic development<\/span> \u2192 aid was needed, but not aid tied to political or ideological conditions. Bokaro Steel Plant<\/span> \u2014 after the U.S. Congress refused assistance, India secured Soviet help without altering its foreign policy. Aswan Dam<\/span> (Egypt) \u2014 after Western withdrawal, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union while retaining non-alignment.<\/li>\n
          3. Independence of judgment<\/span> \u2192 U Nu<\/span> and Kwame Nkrumah<\/span> stressed judging each issue on its merits, free of bloc pressure; positions taken case by case on the specific circumstances of each question.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            Non-Alignment & Sovereignty \u2014 a two-way pull<\/h3>\n
            \n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            How it enhances sovereignty<\/th>\nHow it limits sovereignty<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
            Attribute of sovereignty<\/span> \u2014 an independent foreign policy reinforces autonomy in international relations.<\/td>\nRestraint in exercising sovereign rights<\/span> \u2014 unrestricted freedom, especially on questions of war, can damage international peace.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Democratic principle<\/span> \u2014 equality among nations, against the hierarchy built into alliances that serve dominant powers.<\/td>\nCommitment to peace<\/span> \u2014 non-aligned states accept certain constraints on their conduct to support global stability.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

            Peace, Disarmament & Conflict Resolution<\/h3>\n

            Non-alignment reaches past national interest to hold peace itself as an objective.<\/p>\n

              \n
            • Recognition of the catastrophic potential of nuclear war<\/span> \u2192 emphasis on preventing global conflict.<\/li>\n
            • Support for disarmament and arms control<\/span> \u2192 reductions in nuclear arsenals and military spending.<\/li>\n
            • Faith in international organizations<\/span> \u2192 trust in the United Nations for dialogue and peaceful settlement.<\/li>\n
            • Contribution<\/span> \u2192 the Moscow (Partial) Test Ban Treaty, 1963<\/span> owed much to non-aligned pressure; non-aligned states have acted as mediators on the strength of their impartial standing.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

              As a technique of conflict resolution<\/span><\/p>\n

                \n
              • Avoid taking sides<\/span> \u2192 impartial mediation becomes possible.<\/li>\n
              • Suspension of moral judgment<\/span> \u2192 in the interest of peace, refraining from assigning blame and concentrating on settlement.<\/li>\n
              • Belgrade illustration<\/span> \u2192 Nehru<\/span> appealed to both the United States and the Soviet Union to halt nuclear tests without naming who began them \u2014 the urgency of ending the arms race placed above the question of fault.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                Critiques<\/span><\/p>\n

                  \n
                • Justice against peace<\/span> \u2192 the approach can appear to equate aggressor and victim, weakening justice.<\/li>\n
                • Restraint against interest<\/span> \u2192 a fine line separates withholding judgment for peace from withholding it for self-interest; credibility rests on genuine impartiality.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                  Bandung 1955 & Belgrade 1961<\/h3>\n

                  Bandung Conference (1955)<\/span><\/p>\n

                    \n
                  • Precursor to NAM \u2192 29 Asian and African countries<\/span>, called by Sukarno<\/span> of Indonesia, met to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation.<\/li>\n
                  • The Ten Bandung Principles<\/span> \u2192 respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, peaceful coexistence.<\/li>\n
                  • Christopher Waters<\/span> reads Bandung as foregrounding decolonization and Cold War anxieties; Carsten Rauch<\/span> treats it as the first step toward NAM.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                    First Summit, Belgrade (1961)<\/span><\/p>\n

                      \n
                    • Formal founding of NAM \u2192 25 states<\/span>.<\/li>\n
                    • Key figures \u2192 Josip Broz Tito<\/span> (Yugoslavia), Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> (India), Gamal Abdel Nasser<\/span> (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah<\/span> (Ghana), Sukarno<\/span> (Indonesia).<\/li>\n
                    • Two primary objectives \u2192 (i) non-alignment with any superpower bloc; (ii) national liberation and decolonization.<\/li>\n
                    • John A. Graham<\/span> \u2192 the aim was a buffer of non-aligned states to resist external pressure during the Cold War and to hasten decolonization.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                      Debate on NAM\u2019s roots \u2014 1955 or 1961?<\/span><\/p>\n

                        \n
                      • Peter Willetts<\/span> \u2192 non-alignment as a coherent idea was not born until 1961 and did not survive beyond that year; linking NAM to Bandung gives it \u201cfalse roots.\u201d<\/li>\n
                      • Keethaponcalan<\/span> \u2192 disputes this, stressing the continuity between Bandung\u2019s principles and NAM\u2019s formation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                        Evolution of the Movement \u2014 and its Summits<\/h3>\n

                        Institutionalization ran through regular summits, standing committees for routine affairs, and a shift of leadership after Nehru<\/span>, Nasser<\/span> and Tito<\/span> to states such as Zambia, Tanzania and Cuba. The movement grew more demanding and more radical \u2014 a fair share of global resources, economic justice \u2014 put greater weight on solidarity and collective self-reliance<\/span> through South\u2013South cooperation, and pressed for firmer coordinating structures.<\/p>\n

                        Five turns of the movement, 1955 to 2024.<\/span> 1955 \u00b7 Bandung<\/span> (Ten Principles; Afro-Asian solidarity) \u2192 1961 \u00b7 Belgrade<\/span> (Founding; 25 states; anti-colonialism) \u2192 1970s \u00b7 Radical turn<\/span> (Lusaka, Algiers; NIEO; economic justice) \u2192 1992 \u00b7 Jakarta<\/span> (Identity in a unipolar world; South\u2013South) \u2192 2024 \u00b7 Kampala<\/span> (Shared global affluence; UN reform)<\/p>\n

                        \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                        Summit \u00b7 Year \u00b7 Venue<\/th>\nRemembered for<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                        Bandung, Indonesia (1955)<\/td>\nPrecursor; Ten Principles; foundation of non-alignment.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        1st \u00b7 Belgrade (1961)<\/td>\nFounding; 25 states; non-alignment, anti-colonialism, peaceful coexistence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        2nd \u00b7 Cairo (1964)<\/td>\nWider membership; economic cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        3rd \u00b7 Lusaka (1970)<\/td>\nLusaka Declaration; opposition to apartheid; non-interference.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        4th \u00b7 Algiers (1973)<\/td>\nNIEO proposed; support for the Palestinian cause.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        5th \u00b7 Colombo (1976)<\/td>\nColombo Declaration; self-reliance against neo-colonial dependence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        6th \u00b7 Havana (1979)<\/td>\nFidel Castro<\/span>; anti-imperialism; internal divisions over closeness to the Soviet Union.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        7th \u00b7 New Delhi (1983)<\/td>\nIndia reasserted non-aligned roots; disarmament and economic questions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        8th \u00b7 Harare (1986)<\/td>\nStrong anti-apartheid focus; economic development.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        9th \u00b7 Belgrade (1989)<\/td>\nHeld amid the end of the Cold War; environment and human rights added.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        10th \u00b7 Jakarta (1992)<\/td>\nJakarta Declaration; identity in a unipolar world; South\u2013South cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        11th \u00b7 Cartagena (1995)<\/td>\nRelevance affirmed; call for UN democratization.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        12th \u00b7 Durban (1998)<\/td>\nNelson Mandela<\/span>; debates on globalization.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        13th \u00b7 Kuala Lumpur (2003)<\/td>\nOpposition to unilateralism; anti-terrorism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        14th \u00b7 Havana (2006)<\/td>\nReaffirmation of principles; the Havana Declaration restructured the agenda around peace, disarmament, South\u2013South cooperation, human rights, sustainable development and multilateralism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        15th \u00b7 Sharm El Sheikh (2009)<\/td>\nGlobal economic crisis; call for a fairer financial system.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        16th \u00b7 Tehran (2012)<\/td>\nLarge participation; Iran used it to counter isolation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        17th \u00b7 Porlamar, Venezuela (2016)<\/td>\nSanctions and economic crises; solidarity in adversity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        18th \u00b7 Baku (2019)<\/td>\nReaffirmed principles; terrorism, climate change, inequality.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                        19th \u00b7 Kampala, Uganda (2024)<\/td>\nTheme \u201cDeepening Cooperation for Shared Global Affluence\u201d; Bandung and Belgrade principles reaffirmed; support for Palestine and a Gaza ceasefire; comprehensive UN and Security Council reform with greater African representation (Ezulwini Consensus, Sirte Declaration); SDGs by 2030; reform of the international financial architecture; climate action on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; pandemic preparedness; condemnation of terrorism; admission of South Sudan; Uganda chairing both NAM and the G-77.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

                        Achievements of the Movement<\/h3>\n
                          \n
                        • Decolonization and anti-imperialism<\/span> \u2192 support for liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America; moral and political pressure on colonial powers through the UN.<\/li>\n
                        • Transformation of the international system<\/span> \u2192 a larger body of sovereign states shifted the balance in the UN General Assembly and gave voice to marginalized nations.<\/li>\n
                        • New International Economic Order<\/span> \u2192 the North\u2013South divide brought to the centre; demands for fairer trade, technology transfer and unconditional assistance.<\/li>\n
                        • Peace and disarmament<\/span> \u2192 instrumental in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963); consistent advocacy of nuclear disarmament.<\/li>\n
                        • Against racialism and apartheid<\/span> \u2192 opposition to South Africa\u2019s regime and support for sanctions; steady backing of Palestinian rights.<\/li>\n
                        • Cultural and informational initiatives<\/span> \u2192 a non-aligned news pool to reduce dependence on Western media; cultural and educational exchange.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                          Six contributions \u2014 Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya<\/span><\/p>\n

                            \n
                          1. Accelerated decolonization by strengthening freedom struggles and mobilizing world opinion.<\/li>\n
                          2. Became a force against imperialism, neo-imperialism, racism and hegemonism.<\/li>\n
                          3. Universalized the international system \u2192 turned weaker states from objects into subjects of international relations.<\/li>\n
                          4. Advanced the case for a new international order based on equality.<\/li>\n
                          5. Reduced polarization by de-emphasizing power blocs.<\/li>\n
                          6. Promoted communication and cooperation over power politics.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                            The \u201cThird Force\u201d Question \u2014 why it did not consolidate<\/h3>\n
                              \n
                            • NAM gave a collective voice to states unwilling to take sides in the US\u2013USSR rivalry; its genesis lay at Bandung (1955)<\/span>, where the term \u201cthird world\u201d<\/span> was also coined.<\/li>\n
                            • Through the Cold War it worked as a buffer<\/span> between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, pressing anti-colonialism, self-determination, disarmament and the primacy of the UN.<\/li>\n
                            • In the 1970s some members tried to convert NAM into a formal UN voting bloc<\/span> and to add an economic dimension; Kwame Nkrumah<\/span>\u2019s neo-colonialism<\/span> named the continued Western control over new states.<\/li>\n
                            • Rapid expansion<\/span> \u2192 over 120 members by 1990 \u2192 consensus harder, strategic coherence diluted.<\/li>\n
                            • Fault lines<\/span> \u2192 regional and ideological splits from Colombo (1976) through Havana (1979) into the 1980s exposed a serious risk of rupture.<\/li>\n
                            • No permanent secretariat<\/span>, no enforcement machinery \u2192 weak follow-through compared with the UN.<\/li>\n
                            • Members\u2019 differing dependence on the superpowers for aid undercut unity and the claim to equidistance.<\/li>\n
                            • And yet<\/span> \u2192 it universalized international relations, advanced decolonization and gave the Global South a platform \u2014 a partial third force, limited by size and structure rather than by the idea itself.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
                              UPSC 2024 \u00b7 20m<\/span>During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement tried to become a \u201cThird Force\u201d in world politics, but failed because it was too large and unwieldy. Comment.<\/span><\/div>\n

                              The Non-Aligned Movement<\/h3>\n

                              NAM emerged after the Second World War to give the newly independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America an alternative to Cold War alignment; eighteen summits were held between 1961 and 2012.<\/p>\n

                              What non-alignment is \u2014 and is not<\/span><\/p>\n

                                \n
                              • Georg Schwarzenberger<\/span>: distinguishes non-alignment from isolationism, non-commitment, neutrality, neutralization, unilateralism and non-involvement \u2014 it means specifically staying out of military alliances<\/span>, above all Cold War ones.<\/li>\n
                              • George Liska<\/span>: traditional isolationism or neutrality differs from non-alignment, which opposes all<\/span> alliances, including those among other states.<\/li>\n
                              • U Nu<\/span> (Burma): non-alignment as neutralism \u2014 staying uninvolved in the East\u2013West ideological struggle.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
                                \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                                Concept<\/th>\nContent<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                                Neutrality<\/span><\/td>\nNon-involvement in actual wars; a neutral can become a belligerent.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                Neutralization<\/span><\/td>\nA permanent status of non-participation in war \u2014 e.g. Switzerland.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                                Non-alignment<\/span><\/td>\nNon-involvement in the Cold War rivalry<\/span> \u2014 not permanent neutrality, but independence of foreign policy and avoidance of military alliances that compromise sovereignty.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

                                Western scholars often equate non-alignment with neutrality; the comparison misleads \u2014 non-alignment arose in a different context, with distinct principles.<\/em><\/p>\n

                                Bases of non-alignment<\/span><\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                • Negative basis<\/span> \u2014 an anti-military-alliance policy: to avoid Cold War entanglement, to protect national security (alliances can provoke adversaries), and to preserve sovereignty.<\/li>\n
                                • Ideological independence<\/span> \u2014 developing systems suited to one\u2019s own context rather than wholesale Western capitalism or Soviet communism.<\/li>\n
                                • Economic development<\/span> \u2014 aid without strings: India\u2019s Bokaro Steel Plant<\/span> (Soviet help after the US Congress refused) and Egypt\u2019s Aswan Dam<\/span> (Soviet support after the West withdrew) preserved non-alignment.<\/li>\n
                                • Independence of judgment<\/span> \u2014 judging each issue on its merits, case by case (U Nu<\/span>, Kwame Nkrumah<\/span>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                                  Sovereignty, peace and conflict resolution<\/span><\/p>\n

                                    \n
                                  • Enhances sovereignty<\/span> \u2014 an independent foreign policy reinforces autonomy, and non-alignment promotes equality among nations against the hierarchy of alliances. Limits sovereignty<\/span> \u2014 by prioritising peaceful coexistence, non-aligned states accept restraint in the interest of global stability.<\/li>\n
                                  • Peace<\/span> \u2014 NAM goes beyond national interest to promote peace actively: recognising the catastrophic potential of nuclear war, supporting disarmament, trusting the UN. It helped bring about the Partial Test Ban Treaty<\/span> (1963), and non-aligned states often mediated disputes from a neutral stance.<\/li>\n
                                  • As a technique of conflict resolution<\/span> \u2014 it avoids taking sides and may suspend moral judgment to facilitate peace: at the Belgrade Conference, Nehru<\/span> appealed to both the USA and the USSR to halt nuclear tests without naming who began them. Critique<\/span>: this can appear to equate aggressor and victim, undermining justice; credibility requires genuine impartiality.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                                    Evolution into a movement<\/span><\/p>\n

                                      \n
                                    • Genesis in the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference<\/span> (1955) \u2014 where the term \u201cThird World\u201d was coined and Nkrumah<\/span> used \u201cneo-colonialism\u201d.<\/li>\n
                                    • First summit at Belgrade<\/span> (1961); founders Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span>, Gamal Abdel Nasser<\/span>, Sukarno<\/span> and Josip Broz Tito<\/span>.<\/li>\n
                                    • Institutionalisation through regular summits and standing committees; leadership later passed from the founders to Zambia, Tanzania and Cuba.<\/li>\n
                                    • The agenda evolved: anti-colonialism and anti-racialism \u2192 the New International Economic Order<\/span> (NIEO) in the 1970s \u2192 disarmament in the 1980s.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                                      Achievements<\/span><\/p>\n

                                        \n
                                      • Decolonisation and anti-imperialism<\/span> \u2014 strengthened liberation struggles and pressured colonial powers; the UNGA declared decolonisation a key objective in 1960.<\/li>\n
                                      • Transformation of the system<\/span> \u2014 new sovereign states gave voice to the marginalised and reformed the dynamics of the UN General Assembly.<\/li>\n
                                      • Advocacy of the NIEO<\/span> \u2014 highlighting the North\u2013South divide and demanding fairer trade, technology transfer and South\u2013South cooperation; the NIEO push (Algiers, 1970s) against new protectionism such as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (1973).<\/li>\n
                                      • Peace and disarmament<\/span> \u2014 instrumental in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963); consistent advocacy of a nuclear-weapon-free world.<\/li>\n
                                      • Against racialism and apartheid<\/span>, and support for the Palestinian cause; opposition to the Suez Crisis (1956).<\/li>\n
                                      • Cultural and informational initiatives<\/span> \u2014 a non-aligned news pool to reduce reliance on Western media.<\/li>\n
                                      • Indira Gandhi<\/span> called NAM \u201cthe largest peace movement of history\u201d<\/span>; John Foster Dulles<\/span> dismissed its independence of judgment as \u201cimmoral\u201d<\/span> \u2014 equidistance was itself the contribution, a coalitional move by weaker states refusing to take sides.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                                        J. Bandyopadhyaya<\/em>*\u2019s assessment: NAM accelerated decolonisation; formed an international force against imperialism, racism and hegemonism; universalised the international system (turning weaker states from objects into subjects); advocated a new order based on equality; prevented polarisation; and promoted communication over power. <\/span>J\u00fcrgen Dinkel*: NAM shaped both the North\u2013South conflict and South\u2013South relations, and permanently expanded the ensemble of actors in international relations.<\/em><\/p>\n

                                        NAM: Relevance, Soft Balancing and Non-Alignment 2.0<\/h3>\n

                                        Carry both columns, then take a position.<\/p>\n