{"id":3565,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:00","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/european-union\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:02:04","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:32:04","slug":"european-union","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/european-union\/","title":{"rendered":"European Union"},"content":{"rendered":"
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PSIR Notes<\/a>\u203a<\/span>II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/a>\u203a<\/span>European Union<\/span><\/div>\n
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Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/div>\n

European Union<\/h1>\n
Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-A \u00b7 10<\/b> \u2014 Regionalisation of World Politics : EU, ASEAN, APEC, AARC, NAFTA.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
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Meaning of Regionalism<\/h3>\n

Regionalism \u2014 the effort by states within a geographic area to seek deeper support and collaboration across the social-cultural, political, military and economic spheres, often crystallising into regional organisations. Also called regional integration<\/span>.<\/p>\n

Condition and process<\/span><\/p>\n

Condition<\/span> \u2014 a shared basis of affinity: geographical proximity, cultural or linguistic similarity, common historical experience (colonialism in Asia and Africa), shared economic conditions (underdevelopment in Latin America), or a common sense of threat. Process<\/span> \u2014 a blueprint for regional organisation that turns these latent affinities into tighter cooperation.<\/p>\n

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  • Regions are often \u201cimagined communities\u201d<\/span> \u2014 politically and socially constructed, not natural or given. A territory that reads as a \u201cregion\u201d economically or culturally (e.g. South Asia) may not cohere politically or on security.<\/li>\n
  • Neighbourhood-based cooperation is old; its notable modern form emerged in the twentieth century, especially after World War I.<\/li>\n
  • Syllabus scope: EU, ASEAN, APEC, SAARC, NAFTA<\/span> \u2014 with BIMSTEC and Central America as comparators.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Theoretical Traditions<\/h3>\n

    Three stances gave regionalism its legitimacy as idea and project \u2014 functionalist<\/span>, neo-functionalist<\/span>, federalist<\/span> \u2014 supplemented by communication and intergovernmentalist approaches.<\/p>\n

    \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
    Tradition<\/th>\nCore claim<\/th>\nThinker(s)<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
    Functionalism<\/span><\/td>\nA Working Peace System<\/em> (1943): states should cooperate in technical, interdependent \u201cfunctional\u201d areas; cooperation breeds knowledge and habits that spill into other domains \u2014 a \u201cphilosophy of peace\u201d<\/span> in which rising technical and trade interdependence drives regional cooperation.<\/td>\nDavid Mitrany<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Neo-functionalism<\/span><\/td>\nMitrany adapted to Europe: cooperation in one sector yields advantages that push members to widen it \u2014 the spillover effect<\/span>; for integration to advance, political participation is unavoidable. Path in Europe: ECSC, then EEC.<\/td>\nErnst B. Haas<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Federalist<\/span><\/td>\nBacked regionalism because it met the twin needs of decentralisation and integration; European federalists stressed pooling sovereignty<\/span> \u2014 allocating a portion of sovereignty to build and sustain institutions on the EEC model.<\/td>\nEuropean Federalists<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Community \/ communication<\/span><\/td>\nRegionalism produces a security community<\/span> held together by interdependence and collaboration; the degree of integration is gauged from transactions<\/span> between members. For durability, the cultural and social (non-political) components matter most.<\/td>\nKarl Deutsch<\/span>; Amitai Etzioni<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
    Intergovernmentalism<\/span><\/td>\nInternational norms are weak; states stay protective of sovereignty. Classical<\/em> \u2014 sovereignty and cooperation are a trade-off; instrumentalist<\/em> \u2014 states commit only when the collective gain outweighs the cost of ceding sovereignty; liberal<\/em> \u2014 integration is driven by national preferences and interstate bargaining, with member states in charge of pace and direction.<\/td>\nClassical \u00b7 Instrumentalist \u00b7 Liberal<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

    Evolution<\/h3>\n

    From technical unions to a European model for the world.<\/span> 19th century<\/span> (Public international unions \u2014 Bureau of Weights & Measures, Universal Postal Union) \u2192 Post-WWII Europe<\/span> (Functionalist cooperation on economic reconstruction) \u2192 Council of Europe, 1949<\/span> (ECHR (1950), European Social Charter (1961)) \u2192 Cold War security<\/span> (Warsaw Pact & NATO frame European defence) \u2192 A model<\/span> (European bodies copied elsewhere \u2014 unevenly)<\/p>\n

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    • Council of Europe<\/span> pioneered common European norms and rights; the ECHR (1950)<\/span> was the first legally binding regional human-rights instrument, the European Social Charter (1961)<\/span> the first regional human-rights framework.<\/li>\n
    • Replication was uneven: non-European regions lacked Europe\u2019s homogeneity of growth, ideology, culture and religion, so large continents (Asia, Africa, Latin America) produced smaller, sub-continental and sub-regional bodies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Forms & Features<\/h3>\n

      Membership types (Andrew Heywood):<\/span> Transcontinental \u2014 APEC, BRICS \u00b7 Continental \u2014 Council of Europe \u00b7 Sub-continental \u2014 SAARC<\/p>\n

      Overlapping membership is common \u2014 Mexico shares interests with the Asia-Pacific (APEC), North America (NAFTA) and Latin America (LAIA).<\/em><\/p>\n

      Three primary types<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Type<\/th>\nContent<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
      Economic<\/span><\/td>\nCommon market \/ free trade area \u2014 earliest form, in post-war Europe.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Political<\/span><\/td>\nPreserve and strengthen shared political values (individual freedom, democracy, liberalism); build a common collective image.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Strategic \/ military-security<\/span><\/td>\nCollective self-defence against stronger neighbours \u2014 e.g. NATO<\/span> and the Warsaw Pact<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

      Traditional vs new<\/span><\/p>\n

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      • Traditional regionalism<\/span> followed a fixed economic ladder: free trade area, common market, economic community, economic union.<\/li>\n
      • Under new regionalism<\/span>, regional organisations gained a standing distinct from international ones \u2014 they \u201chave changed from objects to subjects\u201d<\/span> (Fredrik Soderbaum and Bjorn Hettne<\/span>), no longer rigidly state-centric.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        New Regionalism<\/h3>\n

        Regionalism peaked in the 1960s\u2013early 1970s, went quiet, and revived from the early 1990s as trade blocs built on preferential rules and exclusive membership \u2014 the \u201csecond coming.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

        Context and content<\/span><\/p>\n

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        • Globalisation<\/span> is the primary driver; neoliberal policy moved regional bodies from passive objects to active agents, rejecting the over-determination of international institutions \u2014 regional bodies read as \u201cpotentially competing structures\u201d<\/span> (Hettne and Soderbaum<\/span>).<\/li>\n
        • Linked to structural change: end of the Cold War, the bipolar-to-multipolar shift, a post-Westphalian nation-state reduced to a non-dominant role, and the decline of Third World solidarity and NAM in favour of neoliberal development.<\/li>\n
        • Hettne and Soderbaum<\/span>: globalisation of finance, trade, production and technology is a New International Division of Labour (NIDL)<\/span>; the multipolar post-Cold War power structure is a New International Division of Power (NIDP)<\/span>.<\/li>\n
        • New regionalist sentiment is a higher-level extension of nationalism, filling gaps left by the state\u2019s inability to defend interests in a globalised world \u2014 \u201cpooling sovereignty\u201d<\/span> (Andrew Heywood<\/span>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          Contours and drivers<\/span><\/p>\n

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          • Unlike the simple common-market era, new organisations are complete and wide-ranging \u2014 converging political regime, economic interest, security and culture; sub-regional blocs and micro-regions proliferate within macro-regions.<\/li>\n
          • Tracking a state\u2019s path through overlapping deals is hard \u2014 J. N. Bhagwati<\/span>\u2019s \u201cspaghetti bowl\u201d<\/span> (cited via Heywood).<\/li>\n
          • Drivers: wider acceptance of export-led strategies (Japan, then the Asian tigers); ex-communist states using integration to consolidate market transition; the rise of the WTO; the USA moving from sponsor to active participant \u2014 all under an acceleration of globalisation, with regionalism reborn to manage the effects of globalisation<\/span> (competitive, not merely protectionist).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            Regionalism & Globalisation<\/h3>\n

            Central debate: are the two complementary<\/span> (mutually reinforcing) or antagonistic<\/span> (frictional)?<\/p>\n

            The fault line of the globalisation\u2013regionalism relationship<\/span><\/p>\n

            \n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            COMPLEMENTARY<\/th>\nANTAGONISTIC<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
            mutually reinforcing; open regionalism as a way station<\/td>\ndialectic, friction and stress; fragments global trade<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            Panagariya \u00b7 Fawcett \u00b7 Hurrell \u00b7 Nesadurai \u00b7 Telo<\/span><\/td>\nHettne \u00b7 Inotai \u00b7 Sunkel \u00b7 Bhagwati \u00b7 Hirst & Thompson<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
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            • Building or stumbling blocks?<\/span> J. N. Bhagwati<\/span> asked whether regional blocs are \u201cbuilding blocks\u201d<\/span> or \u201cstumbling blocks\u201d<\/span>; regional systems have produced \u201ccomplex and overlapping bilateral and regional arrangements, each with conflicting and contradictory provisions\u201d (Heywood<\/span>).<\/li>\n
            • Open regionalism as a way station.<\/span> Andrew Hurrell<\/span> \u2014 the region is the most viable level to reconcile global capitalist competition with the need for political regulation (the \u201cone-world\/many-worlds\u201d<\/span> relationship); Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill<\/span> \u2014 a \u201csafer\u201d version of globalisation; Mario Telo<\/span> (citing Larry Summers<\/span>) \u2014 regional liberalisation is the best route to globalisation; Helen Nesadurai<\/span> \u2014 open regionalism as a \u201cway station to globalization\u201d<\/span> is the dominant model.<\/li>\n
            • Regionalisation as response.<\/span> Economic<\/em> \u2014 RTAs secure markets and give stability unilateral policy cannot. Cultural<\/em> \u2014 Niels Lange<\/span>: cultural influence now appears in commodified form (converging consumption, anglicised languages, shared youth culture); Bennett Collins<\/span>: cultural regionalism resists a global identity (rise of the Bloc Quebecois). Post-COVID<\/em> \u2014 Peter Enderwick and Peter Buckley<\/span>: weaknesses of globalisation plus pandemic disruption push a stronger regional focus and a rethink of global supply chains.<\/li>\n
            • Hirst and Thompson<\/span>: \u201cregionalization has become the strongest feature of the international economy rather than globalisation,\u201d even undermining it. Thomas Christiansen and Edward Best<\/span>: regionalism is not a contradiction to globalisation \u2014 regions accommodate to it differently.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

              Regionalism & State Sovereignty<\/h3>\n

              How much sovereignty does integration cost?<\/span><\/p>\n

              \n\n\n\n\n\n\n
              ZERO-SUM<\/th>\nPOOLED<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
              binding decisions and supranational bodies erode state autonomy<\/td>\nstates merely share sovereignty, shape their destiny, remain free to leave<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
              Court of Justice of the EU; African Union sanctions on defaulting members<\/td>\nBrexit illustrates both readings \u2014 exit was possible, so sovereignty was not lost<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
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              • Neo-functionalist \/ neo-liberal institutionalist<\/span> \u2014 successful regionalism depends on transferring sovereignty to regional institutions; spillover<\/span> then broadens cooperation as policymakers shift loyalties from national to regional levels.<\/li>\n
              • Intergovernmentalist<\/span> \u2014 states stay protective of sovereignty (classical = trade-off; instrumentalist = cooperate only when gains outweigh costs).<\/li>\n
              • Reassertion of sovereignty<\/span> \u2014 US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (2017) and Brexit; Helen Thompson<\/span>: \u201cregionalism is out, sovereignty back in.\u201d Yet integration continued despite the exits (remaining TPP states negotiated a successor; the EU deepened after a major power left) \u2014 predictions of the nation-state\u2019s demise are overstated.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

                Regionalism & Global Governance<\/h3>\n
                \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
                Relationship<\/th>\nWhat it does<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
                Reproduction<\/span><\/td>\nMirrors global governance at the regional level; a means to insert members into the global economy on central neoliberal norms \u2014 the regional level as a building block to globalisation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Resistance<\/span><\/td>\nPreserves national policy instruments hard to sustain under globalisation; historically, post-decolonisation projects built on self-determination and anti-colonialism (Ba<\/span>) and dependency-driven inward regionalism (Fawcett<\/span>).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
                Additional goals \/ developmental<\/span><\/td>\nRegional public power used for developmental or strategic ends beyond competitiveness: regional industrial strategy (Hettne<\/span>); temporary protection to nurture indigenous firms before full openness (Nesadurai<\/span>).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

                The UN Charter recognises regional arrangements as a means of maintaining peace and permits regional \/ collective self-defence until the UN can act effectively.<\/em><\/p>\n

                Merits & Demerits<\/h3>\n
                \n

                \u201cIt is fair to say that when a scholarly interest in integration became active, it had behind it a good deal of criticism of the sovereign state as an institution.\u201d<\/p>\n

                J. D. B. Miller<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

                The claim that the nation-state\u2019s age is over is contestable \u2014 nationalism and national interest still guide foreign policy despite flourishing regional bodies.<\/em><\/p>\n

                Grounds favouring regionalism (Leroy-Bennett)<\/span><\/p>\n