{"id":3568,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:01","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/saarc\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:02:05","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:32:05","slug":"saarc","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/saarc\/","title":{"rendered":"SAARC"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n
PSIR Notes<\/a>\u203a<\/span>II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/a>\u203a<\/span>SAARC<\/span><\/div>\n
\n
Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/div>\n

SAARC<\/h1>\n
Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-A \u00b7 10<\/b> \u2014 Regionalisation of World Politics : EU, ASEAN, APEC, AARC, NAFTA.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
\n
<\/p>\n

SAARC<\/h3>\n

Founded with the SAARC Charter, Dhaka (1985)<\/span>; Secretariat in Kathmandu<\/span>; it operates in a conflict-prone region often called the \u201carc of instability.\u201d<\/span> Foundational principles: Panchsheel<\/span> and consensus<\/span> (unanimous decision-making).<\/p>\n

\n

\u201cI dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul.\u201d<\/p>\n

Manmohan Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Impediments to functionality<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  • Structural asymmetry<\/span> \u2014 a \u201cnegative mindset\u201d that challenges India\u2019s regional weight; India seen as a \u201cbullying big brother\u201d<\/span> and \u201cimperialist power\u201d \u2014 the \u201cbig brother, small brother\u201d syndrome<\/span> (Sikkim\u2019s integration, Bangladesh\u2019s creation, the IPKF, Nepal\/Bhutan blockades), while India fears smaller states will \u201cgang up.\u201d<\/li>\n
  • India\u2013Pakistan<\/span> \u2014 C. Raja Mohan<\/span> calls Pakistan the \u201ccamel in the caravan of SAARC,\u201d<\/span> slowing the traffic; Pakistan\u2019s \u201cidentity crisis\u201d fears that fulfilling SAARC would be a de facto nullification of Partition.<\/li>\n
  • Economic asymmetry<\/span> and inward-looking self-reliance \u2014 SAFTA languishes; intra-regional trade stays below 5%. India\u2013China rivalry<\/span> and China\u2019s strategic entry deepen tensions. Institutional paralysis \u2014 S. Jaishankar<\/span> calls SAARC a \u201cjammed vehicle\u201d<\/span>; no summit since 2014.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Improvements, revival and measures needed<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    • Trade \u2014 SAFTA, SAPTA (preferential), SATIS (services). Institutions \u2014 Development Fund, SAARC University, Arbitration Council, SARSO (standards), Food Bank, Milk Grid, disaster agency, Film Festival, Federation Games, SAARC satellite.<\/li>\n
    • No member has withdrawn; BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues but cannot fully supplant SAARC. India convened a video conference of SAARC leaders during COVID-19 (2020); the Himalayan environmental crisis strengthens the case for revival.<\/li>\n
    • Measures \u2014 shared values and a transnational conception of nationhood; no internationalising of bilateral issues; India\u2019s proactive leadership<\/span>; fast-track SAFTA, a unified power grid, freer movement of people, joint action on terrorism and narcotics; a \u201cSAARC Minus\u201d<\/span> concept for flexibility; Modi<\/span> \u2014 \u201ccollaboration over confusion, preparation over panic\u201d; a revived Kautilyan<\/span>, pragmatic approach.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Foundations, Objectives, Principles<\/h3>\n
        \n
      • Interdependence Theory<\/span> holds that economic and political connections between states reduce the likelihood of conflict; Communication Theory<\/span> stresses dialogue and mutual understanding in resolving disputes and improving regional cohesion. SAARC embodies both.<\/li>\n
      • Established with the signing of the SAARC Charter in Dhaka, 1985<\/span>; Secretariat at Kathmandu<\/span>. It operates in a conflict-prone region often called the \u201carc of instability\u201d.<\/li>\n
      • Seven founding members<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Afghanistan<\/span> joined as the eighth in 2007<\/span>.<\/li>\n
      • Objectives<\/span> \u2192 promote peace and prosperity in South Asia; raise living standards by encouraging self-sufficiency and mutual assistance; strengthen cooperation with other regional and global organisations.<\/li>\n
      • Foundational principles<\/span> \u2192 Panchsheel<\/span> \u2014 mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence; and the principle of consensus<\/span>, ensuring collective and unanimous decision-making.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
        \n

        \u201cI dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived, and that is how I want our grandchildren to live.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

        Manmohan Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

        Issues with SAARC Functionality<\/h3>\n
          \n
        • South Asia often lacks a cohesive identity; effectiveness is impeded by structural asymmetry<\/span> and geopolitical tensions<\/span>.<\/li>\n
        • Structural asymmetry stems from a \u201cnegative mindset\u201d<\/span> that contests India\u2019s regional pre-eminence rather than cooperating with it.<\/li>\n
        • India is perceived as a \u201cbullying big brother\u201d<\/span> and an \u201cimperialist power\u201d<\/span>, producing the \u201cbig brother, small brother\u201d syndrome<\/span>. Smaller members fear that closer integration means Indian dominance \u2014 a perception fuelled by the integration of Sikkim, the formation of Bangladesh, the IPKF mission in Sri Lanka, and blockades in Nepal and Bhutan. India in turn fears that smaller countries might collectively \u201cgang up\u201d against it.<\/li>\n
        • Bimal Prasad<\/span>: smaller states show interest in friendly relations with India yet view it as the \u201cmain source of threat to their security\u201d. India sees its neighbours as essential components of its security framework while they see it as a danger to theirs \u2014 a perception that has let outside powers such as China and the United States establish a presence.<\/li>\n
        • Geopolitically<\/span>, SAARC is caught in the India\u2013China rivalry<\/span>, which worsens tensions and undermines cohesive integration.<\/li>\n
        • Economic asymmetry<\/span> and inward-looking policies<\/span> \u2014 preference for self-reliance, reluctance to engage in meaningful interdependence; SAFTA<\/span> continues to languish in implementation.<\/li>\n
        • Soft power<\/span> \u2192 India is often seen to lack soft power projection commensurate with its regional weight, while China\u2019s emergence as a counterweight introduces a new dimension requiring recalibrated responses.<\/li>\n
        • Consensus requirement<\/span> \u2192 any decision needs agreement from all, which prevailing mistrust makes hard to achieve. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee<\/span>: at the 18th Summit in Kathmandu (2014) the signing of the SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement<\/span> was stalled because Pakistan declined.<\/li>\n
        • Afghanistan<\/span> \u2014 absence of consensus on recognising the Taliban makes convening a summit itself difficult.<\/li>\n
        • International alignments<\/span> compel developing countries to maintain strong affiliations with developed powers; Pakistan\u2019s need for good relations with the United States does not allow mutual trust to grow.<\/li>\n
        • In 39 years<\/span>, SAARC has held only 18 summits<\/span>, and could not advance beyond SAPTA (1995)<\/span> and SAFTA (2004)<\/span> despite an international environment favourable to regionalism.<\/li>\n
        • Charter constraint<\/span> \u2014 SAARC\u2019s mandate expressly forbids it from taking up bilateral disputes, which removes precisely the issues that matter most.<\/li>\n
        • Institutional weakness<\/span> \u2014 a feeble secretariat and inadequate funding.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
          \n

          SAARC is a \u201cjammed vehicle\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

          S. Jaishankar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

          Its central dysfunction is the inability to convene regular summits \u2014 none since 2014 \u2014 which reflects institutional paralysis and erodes confidence in its capacity.<\/em><\/p>\n

          \n

          \u201cSAARC was established to strengthen cooperation between the South Asian countries and to act as a mechanism for regional integration in South Asia. However, SAARC has always been hostage to the India-Pakistan conflict.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

          Niranjan Marjani<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

          Thirty-nine years, eighteen summits.<\/span> 1985<\/span> (Charter signed at Dhaka; Secretariat at Kathmandu) \u2192 1995<\/span> (SAPTA \u2014 preferential trade) \u2192 2004<\/span> (SAFTA \u2014 tariff reduction) \u2192 2014<\/span> (18th Summit, Kathmandu \u2014 the last one) \u2192 2016<\/span> (Islamabad summit cancelled after Uri) \u2192 2020<\/span> (Leaders\u2019 video conference on COVID-19)<\/p>\n

          Achievements \u2014 the institutional record<\/h3>\n

          SAFTA \u2014 tariff reduction \u00b7 SAPTA \u2014 preferential trade \u00b7 SATIS \u2014 services \u00b7 SAARC Development Fund \u00b7 SAARC University \u00b7 SAARC Arbitration Council \u00b7 SARSO \u2014 standards \u00b7 Food Bank \u00b7 Film Festival \u00b7 Milk Grid \u00b7 Agency for Disasters \u00b7 Federation Games \u00b7 SAARC satellite<\/p>\n