{"id":3575,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:04","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/nuclear-proliferation\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:08","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:08","slug":"nuclear-proliferation","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/nuclear-proliferation\/","title":{"rendered":"Nuclear proliferation"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-a\">II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Nuclear proliferation<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Nuclear proliferation<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-A \u00b7 11<\/b> \u2014 Contemporary Global Concerns : Democracy, human rights, environment, gender justice terrorism, <span class=\"cur\">nuclear proliferation<\/span>.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"nuclear-proliferation-the-problem\">Nuclear proliferation \u2014 the problem<\/h3>\n<p>The use of nuclear weapons in 1945 reshaped global security. Despite a decline in arsenals, the spread of technology and continuing debates over nuclear programmes, energy and WMD terrorism keep proliferation at the centre of world politics.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Framing scholar<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye<\/span> \u2014 nuclear weapons have reshaped deterrence dynamics, making their spread a key concern for both strategic stability and global governance since the Cold War.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"spread-of-wmd-technology\">Spread of WMD technology<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">By 1965<\/span> \u2192 five states had tested: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">1968<\/span> \u2192 these five were recognised as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Early 2020s<\/span> \u2192 nine states possess weapons: the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel.<\/li>\n<li>Parallel effort \u2192 under the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997), many states chose to destroy their chemical stockpiles.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"desirability-of-nuclear-weapons-schools\">Desirability of nuclear weapons \u2014 schools<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Nuclear weapons have prevented large-scale war since 1945; their destructive potential is a deterrent that makes states less likely to fight (\u201cmore may be better\u201d)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Selective proliferation<\/span> \u2014 only politically stable, responsible states should hold nuclear technology; concern about instability in Third World states<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mueller<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Fears, especially of nuclear terrorism, are exaggerated; nuclear war or a group acquiring materials is minimal; rejects nuclear weapons as \u201cextra insurance\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Sagan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u201cMore will be worse\u201d in a world of weak institutions and regional rivalries<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"motivations-to-acquire-two-models\">Motivations to acquire \u2014 two models<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Model<\/th>\n<th>Logic &amp; thinkers<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Security model<\/span><\/td>\n<td>In an anarchical system states rely on self-help; they weigh nuclear weapons when facing threats that cannot be met otherwise, using them as a deterrent \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Hans Morgenthau<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span> (self-preservation)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Norms model<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Sagan<\/span> \u2192 non-material factors \u2014 status and prestige; states may pursue weapons to assert standing in the international system<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"why-nations-relinquish-nuclear-weapons\">Why nations relinquish nuclear weapons<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Realist<\/span> \u2192 states forgo weapons when they receive <span class=\"n-term\">extended deterrence<\/span>, the security umbrella of another nuclear power; providing such an umbrella can prevent proliferation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Liberal<\/span> \u2192 institutions, treaties and regimes prevent proliferation; the near-universal NPT is a major achievement in deterring acquisition.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Social constructivist<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Nina Tannenwald<\/span> shows how cultural taboos have evolved since 1945; opinion and new norms explain non-use; treaties may not eliminate weapons but they delegitimise possession and use.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"norms-taboos-proliferation\">Norms, taboos &amp; proliferation<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nina Tannenwald<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear taboo<\/span>; despite its arsenal, the US has not used nuclear weapons since 1945, even in long conflicts, because use is now seen as morally unacceptable. Treaties create a <span class=\"n-term\">stigma<\/span> that makes keeping or using weapons harder to justify.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Sagan<\/span> (Norms model) \u2192 status and prestige, not only security, drive proliferation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Wendt<\/span> \u2192 nuclear weapons are not only military power but a country\u2019s identity and status; the world\u2019s response to states like North Korea and Iran can reshape how they are viewed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">UPSC 2013<\/span> \u2014 What roles do norms, taboos and epistemic communities play in the context of nuclear proliferation?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Build the answer on<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Constructivist frame \u2192 norms and shared beliefs, not only material power, shape nuclear decisions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nina Tannenwald<\/span> \u2192 the nuclear taboo explains US non-use since 1945; treaties create a stigma that delegitimises possession and use.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Sagan<\/span>\u2019s Norms model \u2192 weapons pursued for status and prestige; <span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Wendt<\/span> \u2192 weapons express a state\u2019s identity and standing.<\/li>\n<li>Contrast with the Security model \u2192 survival under anarchy drives acquisition (<span class=\"n-sch\">Hans Morgenthau<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li>Normative progress underpins disarmament \u2192 changing perceptions are central to global attitudes (<span class=\"n-sch\">Mohamed ElBaradei<\/span>\u2019s call for universal commitment and mutual trust).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"nuclear-deterrence-in-south-asia\">Nuclear deterrence in South Asia<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hans Morgenthau<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span> \u2192 absent a global authority, nuclear weapons are essential for survival.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span> (offensive realism) \u2192 states seek not just defence but control and influence; India\u2019s programme partly asserts power in South Asia and Pakistan\u2019s answers India, so weapons may not prevent war but could raise the likelihood of conflict in a tense region.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Schelling<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Bernard Brodie<\/span> \u2192 the purpose is a credible threat of massive retaliation, not use; hence the South Asian <span class=\"n-term\">paradox<\/span> \u2014 weapons may prevent major wars while heightening the risk of devastating escalation. <span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Wendt<\/span> \u2192 they also carry meaning for identity and status.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-possibility-of-a-new-arms-race\">The possibility of a new arms race<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hans Morgenthau<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span> \u2192 rising powers (US, Russia, China) are enhancing capabilities; competitive pursuit will lead to a new race.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Keohane<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye<\/span> \u2192 treaties like the NPT and bodies like the UN reduce risk through diplomacy, transparency and trust \u2014 but the failure to extend the <span class=\"n-term\">INF Treaty<\/span> exposes the limits.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span> \u2192 renewed great-power competition could reignite a race; <span class=\"n-sch\">Francis Fukuyama<\/span> \u2192 evolving global norms might still help avoid one; <span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Wendt<\/span> \u2192 the response to North Korea and Iran could change how weapons are viewed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The Ukraine war has drawn comparisons to the <span class=\"n-term\">1962 Cuban Missile Crisis<\/span>. As <span class=\"n-sch\">George Bunn<\/span> wrote, the crisis catalysed arms control by \u201cawakening American and Soviet interest in seeking accommodation,\u201d yet between 1962 and 1968 the US stockpile grew by almost 16 per cent and Soviet warheads nearly tripled. The US has since suspended the Strategic Stability Dialogue \u2014 mistrust chilling arms control even as it shows why the threat must be reduced.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-non-proliferation-treaty-npt\">The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)<\/h3>\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">NPT<\/span>, signed in June 1968, sought a non-proliferation regime by preventing non-nuclear states from developing or acquiring weapons.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Core bargain<\/span> \u2192 nuclear-weapon states commit not to transfer weapons or technology; non-nuclear states commit not to acquire them; peaceful nuclear technology is permitted under IAEA oversight.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Disarmament provision<\/span> \u2192 calls on nuclear states to reduce arsenals but sets no timeline or enforceable requirement.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Haves and have-nots<\/span> \u2192 the five permanent UNSC members retain weapons while others refrain \u2014 seen by many, India included, as unfair.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Criticism<\/span> \u2192 perpetuates a power gap, weak on disarmament, failed to stop programmes in France and China, discriminatory.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Indefinite extension (1995)<\/span> \u2192 a New York conference extended the NPT indefinitely, a diplomatic triumph for the US; NAM challenges were managed by attaching disarmament goals, and the extension prompted the CTBT.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-the-npt\">India &amp; the NPT<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India has refused to join, viewing the NPT as an unjust system that lets existing nuclear states build arsenals while excluding India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">V. C. Trivedi<\/span>, India\u2019s delegate at the eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC, from July 1965), likened the treaty to a seventeenth-century emperor who banned drinking while being a drunkard.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Resolution 1887<\/span> \u2192 the UNSC called on outside states to join, but India declared it would not join as a non-nuclear-weapon state, since weapons are integral to its security.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Third-world critique<\/span> \u2192 the regime is \u201clargely the product of interstate diplomacy dominated by Western great powers\u201d (<span class=\"n-term\">Barkawi and Laffey<\/span>); aligning the five nuclear states with the five permanent UNSC seats legitimises nuclear power for a few while prohibiting it for the rest (<span class=\"n-sch\">Biswas<\/span>); indefinite extension lets nuclear states modernise and pursue vertical proliferation (<span class=\"n-sch\">Singh<\/span>); the exclusive regime perpetuates \u201clogics of colonial violence, oppression, and inequity\u201d (<span class=\"n-sch\">Biswas<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Peterson<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">US\u2013India civil nuclear agreement<\/span> \u2192 lets India access nuclear technology without signing the NPT, meeting energy needs while retaining its capabilities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"ctbt-fmct-nsg\">CTBT \u00b7 FMCT \u00b7 NSG<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Regime<\/th>\n<th>What it does \u00b7 India\u2019s position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CTBT<\/span> Comprehensive Test-Ban<\/td>\n<td>Bans all nuclear explosions (unlike the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which spared underground tests). India, via <span class=\"n-sch\">Arundhati Ghosh<\/span> \u2192 will not join, now or later: no fixed disarmament timeline, a haves\/have-nots distinction, and computer-simulated tests that lack the same verification. India has held a self-imposed <span class=\"n-term\">testing moratorium<\/span> since 1998, and could sign without ratifying, as the US has done<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">FMCT<\/span> Fissile Material Cut-off<\/td>\n<td>Seeks to halt production of fissile materials; the <span class=\"n-term\">Shannon Mandate<\/span> \u2192 adoption only if all parties agree. Pakistan wants existing stockpiles destroyed; India and the US would cover only future production; the US prefers domestic verification, India broader international oversight<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">NSG<\/span> Nuclear Suppliers Group<\/td>\n<td>Controls trade in nuclear materials and technology; membership brings information, validation, coordination and transparency. India is not a member \u2192 the NSG set a 1967 cutoff and India tested first in 1974; the group was also tied to the NPT. India\u2019s responsible conduct \u2192 no covert activity, a defensive domestic programme, a <span class=\"n-term\">no-first-use<\/span> policy, restraint in the 1999 Kargil War<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em>North\u2013South dimension \u2192 from the outset the would-be proliferators targeted by NSG export controls (bar Israel and South Africa) lay in \u201cthe South,\u201d shaping Third World attitudes and the critique of the group as an exclusive \u201ccartel.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"evolution-of-non-proliferation-efforts\">Evolution of non-proliferation efforts<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Six decades \u2014 from sharing to control to counter-proliferation.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1957<\/span> (IAEA \u2014 share nuclear-energy info) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1962\u201363<\/span> (Cuban crisis; Partial Test Ban) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1968<\/span> (NPT \u2014 five NWS; peaceful use) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1991\u20132010<\/span> (START, SORT, New START) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2003\u201304<\/span> (PSI; UNSC 1540) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2017<\/span> (TPNW \u2014 ban on humanitarian grounds)<\/p>\n<p>START (1991), SORT (2002) and New START (2010) cut US and Russian warheads and delivery vehicles; the Proliferation Security Initiative (2003) improved cooperation against WMD trafficking; UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) set legal measures against non-state actors; the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017) had 86 signatories by 2021. Two forms run throughout \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">horizontal proliferation<\/span> (spread to new countries) and <span class=\"n-term\">vertical proliferation<\/span> (expansion of existing arsenals); since 1945 the effort has shifted from disarmament to arms control and counter-proliferation.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"trump-kim-singapore-summit\">Trump\u2013Kim Singapore Summit<\/h3>\n<p>The denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula sits at the intersection of the security model, deterrence and the norms around nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the Trump\u2013Kim Singapore Summit on the prospects of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-trump-kim-singapore-summit-on-the-prospects-of-upsc-psir-2018-3804\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Build the answer on<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>North Korea is one of the nine nuclear-armed states and remains outside the NPT.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Security-model logic<\/span> \u2192 for a state that sees weapons as integral to survival, complete denuclearisation is hard to secure through summitry alone.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Deterrence<\/span> \u2192 weapons create a credible threat of retaliation (<span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Schelling<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Bernard Brodie<\/span>), reducing the incentive to give them up.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Norms and taboo<\/span> \u2192 sustained pressure and stigma (<span class=\"n-sch\">Nina Tannenwald<\/span>) shift behaviour over time more than one-off deals; identity and status matter (<span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Wendt<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Verification is the central obstacle<\/span>; the peaceful-use loophole (civilian route to military capability) complicates trust.<\/li>\n<li>Diplomacy over coercion (<span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Keohane<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye<\/span>), but durable denuclearisation needs enforceable, mutual guarantees.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-vision-on-nuclear-disarmament\">India\u2019s vision on nuclear disarmament<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India has consistently advocated a world free of nuclear weapons, holding disarmament essential for global stability, and supports a universal ban with binding legal frameworks.<\/li>\n<li>It presses for the <span class=\"n-term\">full dismantling<\/span> of weapons \u2014 a threat to security, human well-being and the environment \u2014 with international oversight to ensure compliance.<\/li>\n<li>Its posture pairs <span class=\"n-term\">no first use<\/span> with a self-imposed testing moratorium since 1998, and calls for open dialogue and confidence-building to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"nuclear-proliferation-assessment\">Nuclear proliferation \u2014 assessment<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye<\/span> \u2192 nuclear weapons reshaped deterrence, making their spread central to strategic stability and global governance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Sagan<\/span> \u2192 \u201cMore will be worse\u201d where institutions are weak and rivalries persist; prevention needs coercive diplomacy, arms-control regimes and norm entrepreneurship together.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Mohamed ElBaradei<\/span> \u2192 a nuclear-weapons-free world depends not merely on treaties but on universal commitment, mutual trust and equitable enforcement, so that disarmament is truly global rather than selective.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cThe unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Albert Einstein<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The principle affirmed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 \u2014 that \u201ca nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought\u201d \u2014 remains the moral bedrock of non-proliferation.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-arms-race-nuclear-order-and-disarmament\">The Arms Race, Nuclear Order and Disarmament<\/h3>\n<p>Nuclear weapons still shape power politics, alliances and regional security after the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The persistence of deterrence<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Schelling<\/span>: coercion as the credible <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cpower to hurt\u201d<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Mutually Assured Destruction<\/span> (MAD) as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbalance of terror\u201d<\/span>, resting on <span class=\"n-term\">second-strike capability<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear triad<\/span>, and extended to allies (Japan, South Korea) through <span class=\"n-term\">extended deterrence<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span>: nuclear weapons helped keep the Cold War \u201ccold\u201d \u2014 a logic many realists apply to great-power restraint after 1991.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Henry Kissinger<\/span>: reliance on deterrence assumes rational actors, which is unsafe.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Morton Kaplan<\/span>\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cunit veto\u201d<\/span> system projects a world where each actor can destroy every other.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Disarmament<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Definition<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Disarmament<\/span> is the reduction or elimination of military forces and weapons through cooperation, treaties and oversight. Four components: reduction in quantity; formal negotiation and treaties; focus on weapons and tools; an oversight body. The United Nations has mediated disarmament since the 1960s through resolutions, committees and monitoring.<\/p>\n<p>Armaments make war physically possible and politically probable; disarmament can reduce tension and redirect spending to human welfare. The <span class=\"n-term\">Arms Trade Treaty<\/span> seeks to prevent transfers that enable rights violations.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The instruments<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Instrument<\/th>\n<th>Status and the point to make<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">NPT<\/span> (1968; in force 1970)<\/td>\n<td>The core of the non-proliferation regime. <span class=\"n-sch\">George Perkovich<\/span>: India and Pakistan remain non-signatories because they are not recognised as nuclear-weapon states; the <span class=\"n-term\">1995 indefinite extension<\/span> is seen as discriminatory by such states.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CTBT<\/span> (1996) <span class=\"n-term\">&amp; FMCT<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The CTBT is not in force; the FMCT remains stalled \u2014 both blocked largely by US and other nuclear-weapon-state resistance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">GICNT<\/span> (2006)<\/td>\n<td>Coordinates against <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear terrorism<\/span> by non-state actors.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">The Obama push<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Prague speech (2009); <span class=\"n-term\">UNSC Resolution 1887<\/span>; four Nuclear Security Summits.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty<\/span> \/ TPNW (2017)<\/td>\n<td>The first legally binding comprehensive prohibition, yet to enter into force \u2014 all major nuclear powers absent.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">New START<\/span> (2010)<\/td>\n<td>The cornerstone of US\u2013Russia arms control, set to <span class=\"n-term\">expire in 2026<\/span> \u2014 the sharpest present worry for the future of arms control.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s policy<\/span> (post-1998)<\/td>\n<td>Credible minimum deterrence \u00b7 No First Use \u00b7 assured command and control \u00b7 reliable delivery vehicles.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Civil society<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Pugwash Movement<\/span> (Nobel Peace Prize).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em><span class=\"n-sch\">John Simpson<\/span>: the non-proliferation agenda has not worked sufficiently after the 1990s \u2014 Iran and North Korea continue to pursue capability; a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory process is needed for non-proliferation in the short term and disarmament in the long term.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The contemporary nuclear order<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Renewed nuclear competition between the USA and Russia, both modernising arsenals.<\/li>\n<li>New domains complicate the old idea of an arms race: <span class=\"n-term\">hypersonic missiles<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">cyber<\/span> capabilities and <span class=\"n-term\">AI<\/span> for defence.<\/li>\n<li>China\u2019s expanding arsenal adds a third major actor; regional races persist \u2014 India\u2013Pakistan; Iran\u2013Saudi Arabia in West Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why a nuclear-free world remains distant<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Moral authority has limited effect on states like Iran and North Korea.<\/li>\n<li>Great-power unanimity is fragile \u2014 China has no plans to scrap its weapons.<\/li>\n<li>Technical verification of warhead elimination is hard.<\/li>\n<li>A perverse risk: disarmament could turn conventional wars nuclear again, and a weakened US nuclear umbrella could push Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Gulf states to reconsider their non-nuclear status (<span class=\"n-sch\">George Perkovich<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">James Acton<\/span>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Korean Peninsula<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>North Korea is a self-declared nuclear power; ICBMs able to reach the US mainland shift the regional balance and undermine the perceived invulnerability of the USA; extended deterrence loses credibility as Seoul and Tokyo doubt the umbrella and move toward self-reliance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">\u201cThe North Korea Paradox\u201d<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Max Fisher<\/span>): US relative strength is paradoxically a weakness \u2014 knowing it would lose a full conflict, North Korea\u2019s only option is rapid escalation to nuclear use, which constrains US choices.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Singapore Summit<\/span> (June 2018): the first meeting of sitting US and North Korean leaders; a joint statement on security guarantees, new relations and denuclearisation. Symbolic diplomacy versus substantive progress (<span class=\"n-sch\">Scott Snyder<\/span>); critics warned symbolism is insufficient without concrete steps (<span class=\"n-sch\">Daryl Kimball<\/span>, Arms Control Association); no clarity on the actual process of denuclearisation (<span class=\"n-sch\">Sue Mi Terry<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Collapse<\/span>: the 2019 <span class=\"n-term\">Hanoi Summit<\/span> failed over sanctions sequencing; North Korea resumed missile tests in 2019 (<span class=\"n-sch\">Victor Cha<\/span>). The summit elevated North Korea\u2019s stature without meaningful concessions, at a cost to US non-proliferation credibility (<span class=\"n-sch\">Bruce Klingner<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The China factor<\/span>: the only power able to rein in Pyongyang is China \u2014 but US\u2013China rivalry makes Beijing likely to keep the North as a <span class=\"n-term\">strategic buffer<\/span>; recall the earlier failure of the Six-Party Talks.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Way forward<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Frank Aum<\/span>): a functionalist <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cpeace by pieces\u201d<\/span> approach \u2014 an end-of-war declaration first, then NPT re-entry, IAEA safeguards and CTBT ratification. Incremental denuclearisation, global sanctions and US\u2013China cooperation; all-or-nothing approaches will fail.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why disarmament has stalled<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The gains to recall<\/span>: Cold War strategic parity produced SALT, the ABM Treaty, the hotline and later START \u2014 the largest arms-control reductions in history; the non-aligned helped bring about the <span class=\"n-term\">Partial Test Ban Treaty<\/span> (1963).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The reversal<\/span>: renewed US\u2013Russia competition and modernisation; New START undermined as it nears expiry; great powers taking sides in regional conflicts.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Regional conflict as disruptor<\/span>: the Russia\u2013Ukraine war has dismantled the very mechanisms that enabled d\u00e9tente \u2014 parity, dialogue and institutions \u2014 making fresh cooperation harder than in the 1970s. West Asia: Iran\u2019s programme, Saudi\u2013Iran tensions and external arms supplies; Israel treats Iran\u2019s ambitions as existential. South Asia: the India\u2013Pakistan standoff and periodic missile tests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The balance<\/span>: bloc alignment and treaty erosion have jeopardised past progress, but India\u2019s No First Use and credible minimum deterrence show that restraint remains possible; a verifiable, non-discriminatory, cooperative framework is the way forward.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/terrorism\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Terrorism<\/b><\/a><span><\/span><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#nuclear-proliferation-the-problem\">Nuclear proliferation \u2014 the problem<\/a><a href=\"#spread-of-wmd-technology\">Spread of WMD technology<\/a><a href=\"#desirability-of-nuclear-weapons-schools\">Desirability of nuclear weapons \u2014 schools<\/a><a href=\"#motivations-to-acquire-two-models\">Motivations to acquire \u2014 two models<\/a><a href=\"#why-nations-relinquish-nuclear-weapons\">Why nations relinquish nuclear weapons<\/a><a href=\"#norms-taboos-proliferation\">Norms, taboos &amp; proliferation<\/a><a href=\"#nuclear-deterrence-in-south-asia\">Nuclear deterrence in South Asia<\/a><a href=\"#the-possibility-of-a-new-arms-race\">The possibility of a new arms race<\/a><a href=\"#the-non-proliferation-treaty-npt\">The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)<\/a><a href=\"#india-the-npt\">India &amp; the NPT<\/a><a href=\"#ctbt-fmct-nsg\">CTBT \u00b7 FMCT \u00b7 NSG<\/a><a href=\"#evolution-of-non-proliferation-efforts\">Evolution of non-proliferation efforts<\/a><a href=\"#trump-kim-singapore-summit\">Trump\u2013Kim Singapore Summit<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-vision-on-nuclear-disarmament\">India\u2019s vision on nuclear disarmament<\/a><a href=\"#nuclear-proliferation-assessment\">Nuclear proliferation \u2014 assessment<\/a><a href=\"#the-arms-race-nuclear-order-and-disarmament\">The Arms Race, Nuclear Order and Disarmament<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nuclear proliferation for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics \u203a Nuclear proliferation Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Politic<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-A.11.6","fx_note_sec":"II-A","fx_note_point":"11","fx_note_desc":"Nuclear proliferation for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-A Comparative Political Analysis and International Politics \u203a Nuclear proliferation Paper I \u00b7 Comparative Politic","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3575","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3575","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3575\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3806,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3575\/revisions\/3806"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3575"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}