{"id":3577,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:05","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/institutions-of-policy-making\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:07","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:07","slug":"institutions-of-policy-making","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/institutions-of-policy-making\/","title":{"rendered":"Institutions of policy-making"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Institutions of policy-making<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Institutions of policy-making<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 1<\/b> \u2014 Indian Foreign Policy : Determinants of foreign policy; the <span class=\"cur\">institutions of policy-making<\/span>; Continuity and change.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"who-actually-decides\">Who Actually Decides<\/h3>\n<p>The common perception is that foreign policy is made by the MEA, the PMO or the PM. In reality, <span class=\"n-term\">no single institution or personality<\/span> can complete the complex task alone.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>At different times one actor may dominate, but several contributing actors collectively build India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Foreign Policy Consensus<\/span>, backed by the political leadership across ruling and opposition ranks.<\/li>\n<li>Conventionally, European foreign policy was made by the Foreign Office in secrecy, with no role for public opinion or the legislature.<\/li>\n<li>As a <span class=\"n-term\">parliamentary democracy<\/span>, India must be considerate of the people\u2019s will; decision-making is <span class=\"n-term\">highly diffused<\/span> and it is difficult to say who decides and at what level.<\/li>\n<li>Indian foreign policy is finalised by the <span class=\"n-term\">Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIndia\u2019s foreign policy was always a leadership function and more often than not did not command a consensus.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>K. Subrahmanyam<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>The process is <span class=\"n-term\">actor-specific<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">leadership-driven<\/span>, with personality and charisma playing central roles.<\/li>\n<li>The most important instrument is the <span class=\"n-term\">Ministry of External Affairs<\/span>; other agencies \u2014 the Cabinet, MoD, Ministry of Commerce, NSC, PMO and Parliament \u2014 contribute, as do non-government bodies: media, pressure groups, universities and think-tanks.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Who feeds in, who deliberates, who decides, who executes.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">INPUTS<\/span> (Media \u00b7 pressure groups \u00b7 think-tanks \u00b7 universities \u00b7 states \u00b7 business \u00b7 diaspora) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">DELIBERATION<\/span> (MEA \u00b7 NSC (SPG, NSAB, JIC) \u00b7 Parliament &amp; the Standing Committee) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">DECISION<\/span> (PM &amp; PMO \u00b7 Council of Ministers \u00b7 Cabinet Committee on Security) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">EXECUTION<\/span> (MEA \u00b7 Indian Foreign Service \u00b7 missions abroad). <em>Highly diffused \u00b7 actor-specific \u00b7 leadership-driven \u2014 no single institution completes the task.<\/em><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"parliament\">Parliament<\/h3>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cI am entirely in the hands of the House.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Jawaharlal Nehru, March 1948<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>As per <span class=\"n-sch\">Rudra Chaudhuri<\/span>, the Indian Parliament has demonstratively placed limitations on the executive in international affairs \u2014 but it does not dictate policy like the German Bundestag; the Indian system resembles the <span class=\"n-term\">UK<\/span>, with <span class=\"n-term\">no legal requirement for parliamentary approval<\/span> on foreign policy. Parliamentarians have grown more outward-looking over the years.<\/li>\n<li>The defining role was largely left to the Constitution \u2192 under <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 246<\/span> (<span class=\"n-law\">Seventh Schedule<\/span>)<\/span> foreign policy is a Union subject; under <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 253<\/span><\/span> treaties may be entered into without a parliamentary vote, and war may be declared without formal authorisation \u2014 unlike the US, where senators wield a powerful voice.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Mechanisms available to Parliament<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>No legal mechanism compels endorsement, except extreme measures such as a <span class=\"n-term\">vote of no confidence<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Standing Committee on External Affairs<\/span> exercises limited <span class=\"n-term\">financial control<\/span>, comments on the MEA budget, and can originate studies that shape opinion; committees cannot reshape policy but can press the government to explain itself.<\/li>\n<li>Members use <span class=\"n-term\">motions and resolutions<\/span> to push the government to justify its decisions.<\/li>\n<li>A paradox \u2192 a government with a large majority sometimes cedes to a weak opposition: Nehru accepted some demands of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, which held only <span class=\"n-term\">3 seats<\/span>. Nehru acknowledged that \u201cexternal affairs will follow internal affairs.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Actual working experience \u2014 the record<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">1949<\/span> \u2192 Parliament scrutinised the resolution for continued <span class=\"n-term\">membership of the Commonwealth<\/span>, with criticism from within the Congress and the opposition; Nehru was only lightly checked.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">1954<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">US\u2013Pakistan Mutual Defense Pact<\/span>; pressure from the Right and the CPI-led Left pushed Nehru to sharper statements against the pact and America.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">PRC<\/span> and Aksai Chin-for-NEFA \u2192 the government failed to win Parliament\u2019s confidence; Nehru placed his correspondence with Zhou Enlai and a <span class=\"n-term\">white paper<\/span> before the House.<\/li>\n<li>After the <span class=\"n-term\">1962 war<\/span> \u2192 Western pressure to negotiate on Kashmir was resisted because of opposition in Parliament, led by <span class=\"n-term\">Vajpayee<\/span>, who warned the US and UK against interfering.<\/li>\n<li>The exchange of enclaves with Bangladesh and the <span class=\"n-term\">Land Boundary Agreement<\/span> required a constitutional amendment, passed in <span class=\"n-term\">2015<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Civil Nuclear Deal (2008)<\/span> \u2192 four Left parties threatened to withdraw support from the UPA (the BJP also opposed), leading to a no-confidence motion. While passing the <span class=\"n-term\">Nuclear Liabilities Bill<\/span>, the opposition pushed sections <span class=\"n-term\">17(b)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">46<\/span> to allow action against suppliers \u2014 the value of parliamentary oversight and the Standing Committee.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Parliamentary diplomacy<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Parliamentary diplomacy \u2192 the involvement of legislators in international affairs, extending beyond executive-driven foreign policy through delegations and dialogues.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> \u2192 parliamentarians bring a more democratic and representative dimension, bridging political divides and building bipartisan support.<\/li>\n<li>Parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence allow MPs to scrutinise and influence policy in line with national interest; it projects India\u2019s democratic values and pluralistic ethos on the global stage.<\/li>\n<li>Engagement with the <span class=\"n-term\">Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)<\/span> demonstrates India\u2019s commitment to multilateralism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 such participation amplifies India\u2019s voice and cultivates bilateral and regional relationships. Interaction between Indian MPs and their counterparts promotes mutual understanding on climate change, terrorism and development.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span> \u2192 it integrates democratic oversight and adds to soft power, while remaining underutilised because of executive dominance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Examine the role of \u2018parliamentary diplomacy\u2019 in India\u2019s foreign policy.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/examine-the-role-of-parliamentary-diplomacy-in-indias-foreign-upsc-psir-2019-3904\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-states-impact-on-foreign-policy\">The States\u2019 Impact on Foreign Policy<\/h3>\n<p>Under the <span class=\"n-law\">Seventh Schedule<\/span>, foreign relations lie wholly within the Union\u2019s power \u2014 yet the states are not absent from policy-making.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cApart from pressures at the national level, Governments at the centre find themselves susceptible to domestic compulsions in cases where state legislatures and regional political dynamics shape Foreign Policy priorities\u2026 regional preferences appear to have become that much more important to the executive at the centre.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Rudra Chaudhuri<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>Under coalition governments, regional demands cannot be wished away: PM <span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> did not attend the <span class=\"n-term\">CHOGM (Colombo, 2013)<\/span> owing to opposition from Tamil Nadu (AIADMK, DMK); the <span class=\"n-term\">River Teesta<\/span> accord (2012\u201313) could not be finalised because the West Bengal Chief Minister opposed it.<\/li>\n<li>There is no constitutional provision to accommodate such demands, but coalition politics and the regionalisation of the party system secure them a hearing at the Centre.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Economic liberalisation<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">coalition governments<\/span> together created an environment for states to engage the Centre on issues affecting their interests.<\/li>\n<li>States adjoining neighbours have a major say \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">Ganges Water Sharing Treaty<\/span> and the enclaves settlement needed West Bengal and Meghalaya; UP and Bihar are key for Nepal; J&amp;K, Punjab and Gujarat for Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Tamil Nadu<\/span> \u2192 a disproportionate influence on Sri Lanka policy (the Tamil factor); <span class=\"n-term\">Kerala<\/span> \u2192 active on NRI and Gulf issues; the north-eastern states \u2192 engagement with Myanmar.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tariq Karim<\/span> blamed India\u2019s cooperative federalism for the lack of progress on water-sharing.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Kincaid<\/span> coined <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cconstituent diplomacy\u201d (1990)<\/span> \u2014 the international activities of local governments; <span class=\"n-term\">para-diplomacy<\/span> strengthens federalism (sister cities such as Kyoto\u2013Varanasi).<\/li>\n<li>The MEA has set up a dedicated <span class=\"n-term\">States Division<\/span> as its interface with the states; Heads of Missions are encouraged to visit relevant states.<\/li>\n<li>Efforts remain <span class=\"n-term\">ad hoc<\/span>; they need institutionalisation, with the principle of collaborative sub-regionalism trumping cooperative federalism on matters of core national interest.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How do the constituent states influence the foreign policy-making process in India?<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-cabinet\">The Cabinet<\/h3>\n<p>In parliamentary systems important decisions are taken by the cabinet. As per <span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span>, the Cabinet is the political body ultimately responsible for foreign policy-making.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>It decides on external security in consultation with the MHA, MoD and MEA; on trade and investment with Commerce, Finance and the MEA.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span> \u2192 the role of any minister other than the Foreign Minister varies with the power and personality of the PM and the issues involved. <span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span> only informed the cabinet of decisions taken; even so, members expressed views \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Sardar Patel<\/span>\u2019s differences with Nehru on China are well known.<\/li>\n<li>Under <span class=\"n-term\">coalition governments<\/span>, the views of cabinet members representing coalition partners have gained importance, especially on neighbourhood policy (Teesta, CHOGM).<\/li>\n<li>Multilateral trade negotiations cut across ministries \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">specialised cabinet committees<\/span> resolve inter-departmental conflict.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Minister of External Affairs<\/span> is a member of four cabinet committees \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Economic Affairs, Parliamentary Affairs, Political Affairs and Security<\/span>. The <span class=\"n-term\">Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)<\/span> gives final shape to vital foreign policy and security issues, for example the surgical strikes.<\/li>\n<li>In emergencies, <em>ad hoc<\/em> committees are set up \u2014 the \u201cEmergency Committee\u201d after the 1962 war, and the committee on WTO matters.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"ministry-of-external-affairs\">Ministry of External Affairs<\/h3>\n<p>The MEA had a humble beginning in <span class=\"n-term\">1947<\/span> as the <span class=\"n-term\">Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations<\/span>, to steer Nehru\u2019s vision of an independent foreign policy.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Pallavi Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 the ministry set up under Nehru was not fit to reflect India\u2019s newly independent status, because its antecedents and traditions had been fashioned to serve the British Empire. Notable individuals who shaped early foreign policy \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Y.D. Gundevia<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Krishna Menon<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">K.M. Panikkar<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The MEA affects policy primarily at the <span class=\"n-term\">individual level<\/span> \u2192 the personality factor matters most.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span> \u2192 the MEA is the lead ministry and the main instrument for formulation and implementation; it is expected to provide intelligent, accurate answers and is the storehouse of expert knowledge. It works as the <span class=\"n-term\">foreign policy secretariat<\/span>, channelling options to the Cabinet and implementing decisions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The External Affairs Minister<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A political appointee and Cabinet member, not necessarily an expert; policies recommended by the ministry are cleared or modified by the minister before implementation.<\/li>\n<li>Sitting PMs \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">P.V. Narasimha Rao<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Vajpayee<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> \u2014 have held the office.<\/li>\n<li>Relative power varies with the PM\u2019s preferences \u2192 under Nehru, a marked influence of his individual worldview; the trend continued under Indira Gandhi, leading to inadequate institutional development and low salience of foreign policy in public opinion.<\/li>\n<li>Many EAMs were \u201clittle more than relay systems\u201d for their bureaucrats \u2192 with few exceptions they never emerged as autonomous sources of policymaking, vacating the arena to the PM.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Structure and composition<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Foreign Secretary<\/span> is the senior-most bureaucrat, responsible for supervision and coordination, and an important adviser to the minister.<\/li>\n<li>The MEA is largely staffed by the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Foreign Service<\/span>, selected through the UPSC.<\/li>\n<li>MEA importance varies with the PM\u2019s interest, and has been losing ground to the <span class=\"n-term\">PMO<\/span>. Under Nehru \u2014 PM and EAM at once \u2014 the Prime Minister\u2019s Secretariat became the centre of decision-making.<\/li>\n<li>Since the late 1980s \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">economic diplomacy<\/span> capabilities: the Economic Diplomacy Division, Multilateral Economic Relations, and centres for ASEAN and BIMSTEC.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Policy Planning and Research Division<\/span> collects inputs from missions, the IDSA and ICWA, CII, FICCI and ASSOCHAM, academia and specialists.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Challenges before the MEA<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIn this emerging new world, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) can no longer maintain its Cold War-era institutional infrastructure.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Harsh V. Pant<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Challenge<\/th>\n<th>What it means<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Shortage of diplomats<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A little over 900 \u2014 far fewer than Brazil (1,200), the UK (6,000) and the US State Department (over 20,000).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">No institutionalised policy planning<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Policy is largely Prime Minister-centric.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Separate cadres not absorbed<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Career diplomats handle everything; the Commerce and Environment ministries have sought separate cadres of commercial and environment counsellors.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Overloaded circuits (Kishan S. Rana)<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The ministry handles a couple of major challenges at a time; areas like Africa and South-East Asia slip in priority.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Hierarchical subculture<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Decision-making is delegated upwards; junior officers exercise far less power than Western counterparts.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Lack of accountability<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The 2nd ARC noted that \u201cthe present multi-layered organizational structure with fragmented decision-making leads to a culture of alibis for non-performance.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Improper coordination<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> committee urged that MEA\u2013Defence\u2013Finance coordination be encouraged, not seen as an encroachment of turf; it recommended lateral entry and language expertise.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">The 2020 overhaul<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Seven Additional Secretaries empowered along verticals (culture, trade and development), with experts drawn from the private sector. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 the multilateral vertical must coordinate with other ministries and federal units for synergy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-indian-foreign-service-the-pillai-committee\">The Indian Foreign Service \u00b7 the Pillai Committee<\/h3>\n<p>The IFS is the <span class=\"n-term\">permanent bureaucracy<\/span> of career diplomats, working with the PMO, the NSC and others in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Selected through the UPSC; the <span class=\"n-term\">Foreign Secretary<\/span> is the permanent head. Embassies collect information not openly available in the host country.<\/li>\n<li>India is served by the <span class=\"n-term\">smallest diplomatic corps of any major country<\/span> \u2014 the fewest among the BRICS. An official source puts the corps at around <span class=\"n-term\">1,750 officers<\/span> (roughly 750 IFS Grade-A, 250 Grade-B, plus attach\u00e9s).<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s corps is roughly equal to tiny Singapore\u2019s; its numerical strength for projecting influence befitting an emerging power is questionable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIndia is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country, not just far smaller than the big powers but by comparison with most of the larger emerging countries.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Shashi Tharoor<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Pillai Committee (1965)<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>PM <span class=\"n-sch\">Shastri<\/span> appointed a committee on the foreign service headed by <span class=\"n-sch\">N.R. Pillai<\/span> in <span class=\"n-term\">1965<\/span> to review structure, recruitment, training and service conditions. Most of the ills it examined remain relevant.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Four weaknesses<\/span> \u2192 the corps is not large enough and lacks wide professional experience; poor coordination among officials; limited and inadequate professional training; weak inter-ministerial coordination.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Suggestions<\/span> \u2192 increase the manned force and select older professionals; revive the post of <span class=\"n-term\">secretary-general<\/span>; improve coordination, training and specialisation; strengthen economic and commercial expertise through <span class=\"n-term\">lateral entry<\/span> \u2014 climate change needs scientific expertise that generalists cannot provide.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> \u2192 frugal staffing reveals a country punching well below its weight.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIFS and MEA have strengths in terms of the individual level competences of its officers but also a range of weaknesses particularly at the organisational and systemic levels, the most tractable and remediable weaknesses being at the organisational level.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Kanti Bajpai and Byron Chung<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-prime-minister-s-office\">The Prime Minister\u2019s Office<\/h3>\n<p>A parliamentary form of government often works like a <span class=\"n-term\">prime ministerial<\/span> one, in which the PM and the PMO are decisive. The PMO includes officials on deputation from the MEA.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Structure<\/span> \u2192 the principal secretary, the NSA, an additional PS, a secretary, two additional secretaries, five joint secretaries and others.<\/li>\n<li>Under <span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span> (1947\u201364) the Prime Minister\u2019s Secretariat had a low profile \u2014 he retained the MEA and handled policy himself. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shastri<\/span>, less acquainted with foreign affairs, brought the Secretariat to prominence.<\/li>\n<li>PMO dominance became evident under <span class=\"n-sch\">Indira Gandhi<\/span> \u2192 the PMO absorbed functions previously with other ministries, giving the PM greater control over both domestic and foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li>No PM can decide every issue alone \u2192 only issues vital to security, foreign policy goals, economic development or the party\u2019s standing are decided in the PM\u2019s office. The PM can appoint <span class=\"n-term\">special envoys<\/span> (climate change, the India\u2013US nuclear talks, Af\u2013Pak, disarmament); Indira Gandhi used an envoy for the <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Soviet Friendship Treaty (1971)<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Major initiatives have come from a leader\u2019s political capital \u2192 Indira Gandhi\u2019s realism and USSR ties; Rajiv Gandhi\u2019s liberalisation and the reversal on the China border; the <span class=\"n-term\">Gujral Doctrine<\/span>; Manmohan Singh\u2019s emphasis on a \u2018multi-polar Asia\u2019 and India as a \u2018responsible\u2019 great power; Narasimha Rao\u2019s strategic weapons programme; Vajpayee\u2019s economic liberalisation; Modi\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First<\/span> policy.<\/li>\n<li>The role of the <span class=\"n-term\">NSA<\/span> and principal secretaries has grown \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Brajesh Mishra<\/span> functioned as NSA even before the formal role, provoking reactions that the NSA was overshadowing the EAM.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harish Kapur<\/span> (<em>Foreign Policies of India\u2019s Prime Ministers<\/em>) \u2192 since independence the MEA has largely remained secondary to the PMO, as India never had a charismatic Foreign Minister powerful enough to leave an imprint.<\/li>\n<li>NSA <span class=\"n-sch\">Ajit Doval<\/span> holds a similarly powerful position today \u2192 Act East and Neighbourhood First were initiated by the PM and PMO and coordinated by the MEA, and the Pakistan policy of <span class=\"n-term\">Offensive Defence (the Doval Doctrine)<\/span> is shaped by the NSA.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"media-and-pressure-groups\">Media and Pressure Groups<\/h3>\n<p>Media \u2014 print, electronic, internet and social \u2014 performs both <span class=\"n-term\">information aggregation and dissemination<\/span>: it conveys public demands to the leadership and carries policy to the masses, while the government seeks to build consensus.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Against the <span class=\"n-term\">realist<\/span> view that downplays non-state actors, <span class=\"n-term\">liberalism<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">constructivism<\/span> value media and pressure groups in constructing perceptions and exerting soft power.<\/li>\n<li>The MEA\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Public Diplomacy Division<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">External Publicity Division<\/span> manage what has been called India\u2019s \u2018media diplomacy\u2019, \u2018soundbite diplomacy\u2019, \u2018instant diplomacy\u2019 and \u2018real-time diplomacy\u2019.<\/li>\n<li>Media\u2013policy relations are a <span class=\"n-term\">two-way street<\/span> \u2192 the government guides information; the media nudges policy through reportage and commentary.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Noam Chomsky<\/span> \u2192 we live in webs of deceit, in an indoctrinated society; the principal role of media is to <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cmanufacture consent\u201d<\/span> for foreign policy. <span class=\"n-sch\">Piers Robinson<\/span> \u2192 media influences policy only when the policy is uncertain and coverage is framed to advocate a particular course.<\/li>\n<li>Hurdles \u2192 lack of expertise in reporting, poor editorial supervision, and the distortion of news to attract an audience.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Indian media and foreign policy-making<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> (<em>The Media in the Making of Indian Foreign Policy<\/em>) \u2192 two phases: <span class=\"n-term\">1947\u20131990<\/span>, state-controlled dissemination; <span class=\"n-term\">1991 onwards<\/span>, ownership diversified alongside LPG and the internet, and open criticism of policy became possible.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Kargil conflict (1999)<\/span> \u2192 private cable journalists bypassed controls, triggering a wave of nationalism and beginning the empowerment of the media.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">26 November 2008 Mumbai attack<\/span> \u2192 uncontrolled, near real-time coverage aided the terrorists\u2019 actions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Evaluation<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cCNN effect\u201d<\/span> \u2192 the \u2018accelerant effect\u2019 of a 24-hour media environment that presses on decision-making and impairs both intelligence-gathering and response formation.<\/li>\n<li>Bombardment of information and the chase for TRPs can compromise operational security (WikiLeaks and classified information).<\/li>\n<li>Media shapes the domestic image of foreign countries \u2014 the negative image of Pakistan and China. Indian media depend on foreign news agencies, buying footage and using stringers.<\/li>\n<li>With the <span class=\"n-term\">end of consensual foreign policy<\/span> (the Indo-US nuclear deal), media became an <span class=\"n-term\">arbiter<\/span> rather than a <span class=\"n-term\">reporter<\/span> among contending views.<\/li>\n<li>Media provides a forum for the diaspora (remittances, lobbying) and has become an autonomous business player, sometimes adopting contrarian positions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Pressure groups<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pressure groups are <span class=\"n-term\">normally weak<\/span> in influencing foreign policy compared with domestic policy, yet they sometimes matter.<\/li>\n<li>Friendship societies (the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society) maintain contacts in the MEA and Parliament.<\/li>\n<li>India delayed diplomatic relations with Israel from <span class=\"n-term\">1948 to 1992<\/span> owing to the activities of certain interest groups.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"national-security-council\">National Security Council<\/h3>\n<p>Indian national security policy-making has suffered from two drawbacks \u2192 it is highly <span class=\"n-term\">ad hoc<\/span> and lacks <span class=\"n-term\">effective coordination<\/span>.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dinesh Singh<\/span> (EAM under Indira Gandhi) \u2192 much of foreign policy involved responding to others rather than proactive determination; the reason was the personality factor, as PMs like Nehru, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi believed they had answers to every crisis. A minister can never be an expert like a trained foreign service officer.<\/li>\n<li>The flaws of the ad-hoc setup showed in the <span class=\"n-term\">1962 war<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">K.P. Mishra<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">K. Subrahmanyam<\/span> were among the earliest to suggest a <span class=\"n-term\">National Security Council<\/span> \u2014 Mishra also urging an Expert Advisory Committee and policy planning.<\/li>\n<li>Measures were initiated by PMs <span class=\"n-sch\">V.P. Singh<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Narasimha Rao<\/span> in the later 1990s, but the NSC took final shape under <span class=\"n-term\">Vajpayee<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> \u2192 foreign policy is <span class=\"n-term\">MINIMAXING<\/span>: minimising risks and maximising benefits; the NSC is central to protecting India\u2019s security and strategic interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">National Security Council \u2014 the three tiers under the Prime Minister.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">NSC \u2014 chaired by the Prime Minister<\/span> (Ministers of External Affairs, Defence, Home and Finance \u00b7 NSA (Secretary, rank of Cabinet minister) \u00b7 Deputy Chairman, NITI Aayog) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">SPG<\/span> (Strategic Planning Group \u2014 headed by the Cabinet Secretary; topmost decision-making body at the bureaucratic level; formulates and implements strategic policy; arbitrates between ministries) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">NSAB<\/span> (National Security Advisory Board \u2014 professionals, academics, scientists, administrative experts, retired bureaucrats; long-term analysis and perspectives) \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">JIC<\/span> (Joint Intelligence Committee \u2014 inputs from the IB, R&amp;AW and military intelligence directorates; highest intelligence assessment organisation; inter-agency coordination). <em>Deliberative, created by executive action \u2014 the executive body is the CCS.<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Mandate<\/span> \u2192 advise and assist the PM; formulate national security strategies, the basis for national military strategy; integrate strategic information from agencies, the armed forces and think-tanks \u2014 as in the Balakot response.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Growing importance of the NSA<\/span> \u2192 advising on external affairs and security, balancing foreign policy and security interests, opening new channels of intelligence, and arbitrating between ministries.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Issues with the NSC<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Absence of a National Security Doctrine<\/span> \u2192 the NSAB drafted national security strategy documents on four occasions, but a lingering worry about a \u2018commitment trap\u2019 delayed publication.<\/li>\n<li>The NSC <span class=\"n-term\">rarely meets<\/span> \u2192 it is an <span class=\"n-term\">advisory<\/span> body, while the <span class=\"n-term\">CCS<\/span> is the executive body.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">P.V. Narasimha Rao<\/span> found the NSC pointless in India, holding that its concept suited a <span class=\"n-term\">presidential<\/span> system, whereas in India the cabinet is supreme.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Suggestions<\/span> \u2192 the NSC should have <span class=\"n-term\">legislative backing<\/span> (as in the USA) for accountability and independence; the JIC should be one unit under an administrative body rather than a central decision-making unit.<\/li>\n<li>The NSC has brought in expert and non-official views; strategic thinking is now <span class=\"n-term\">institutionalised<\/span>; the NSAB provided support such as the <span class=\"n-term\">draft nuclear policy of 1999<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>With external terrorism, two antagonistic neighbours and internal threats, the role of the NSA and NSC is significant \u2014 but the body needs to be more empowered by legislation and more inclusive. Final decisions rest with the PM and the CCS.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Describe the structure and function of the National Security Council of India. What role does it play in the formulation of Indian foreign policy?<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"think-tanks-and-universities\">Think-Tanks and Universities<\/h3>\n<p>Think-tanks and universities aid policy analysis through research papers and briefs. These non-governmental, non-profit bodies carry a <span class=\"n-term\">blend of theory and practice<\/span>, staffed by researchers, former diplomats and practitioners.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amitabh Mattoo<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rory Medcalf<\/span> \u2192 although India\u2019s think-tanks and universities have shaped policy at decisive moments, they have generally been <span class=\"n-term\">less influential than expected<\/span> in a democracy; their research often lacks the rigour of Western counterparts.<\/li>\n<li>The overarching reasons \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">government apathy and secrecy<\/span>; a powerful bureaucracy that guards the policy reins; and the <span class=\"n-term\">impracticality of scholars<\/span> who have distanced themselves from the hard realities of foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li>India has notionally the <span class=\"n-term\">4th largest number of think-tanks<\/span> in the world, after the US, China and the UK \u2014 but most do not significantly influence policy, and quality is mixed and often below world standards.<\/li>\n<li>Constraints \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">Official Secrets Act<\/span>, no systematic timeline for declassification, and the reluctance of bureaucrats to speak candidly. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sanjay Baru<\/span> \u2192 most organisations offer little in the key area of middle-level intellectual leadership; funding is another challenge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The hubs of \u2018second-track\u2019 diplomacy \u2014 increasingly undertaken by the CII<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">ICWA<\/span> \u2014 Indian Council for World Affairs: the oldest, established <span class=\"n-term\">1943<\/span>; hosted the <span class=\"n-term\">Asian Relations Conference (1947)<\/span>; explored the \u2018Indo-Pacific\u2019 construct (2013).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">IDSA<\/span> \u2014 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: founded <span class=\"n-term\">1965<\/span>; India\u2019s leading think-tank on strategic issues.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">ORF<\/span> \u2014 Observer Research Foundation: funded by Reliance; a partner of choice for high-level second-track dialogues.<\/li>\n<li>The government increasingly recognises their expertise \u2192 the MEA convenes dialogue with scholars, and the NSAB engages external experts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Universities<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanti Bajpai<\/span> \u2192 during the Nehruvian era domestic academia feared Nehru\u2019s aura and knowledge on International Relations and remained trapped in an <span class=\"n-term\">intellectual vacuum<\/span>, believing they could not engage him as equals \u2192 state policy was rarely analysed objectively, and academics rationalised the official position.<\/li>\n<li>Nehru was also an <span class=\"n-term\">institution builder<\/span> \u2192 under his patronage <span class=\"n-sch\">Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru<\/span> founded the <span class=\"n-term\">ICWA (1943)<\/span>, which helped set up the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian School of International Studies (1955)<\/span> at the University of Delhi \u2014 later the <span class=\"n-term\">School of International Studies, JNU (1970)<\/span> \u2014 the Department of African Studies at Delhi, and the Department of International Relations at Jadavpur (1956). International Studies is now taught in about <span class=\"n-term\">150 universities<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Mattoo<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Medcalf<\/span> \u2192 individual scholars of excellence exist across India but operate solo; the scholarly activity has yet to produce the <span class=\"n-term\">scholar-practitioners<\/span> who enrich US debates.<\/li>\n<li>Indian scholars are still not able to question the state\u2019s external policies; those with a different view fear sanction and professional disadvantage; a secretive bureaucracy withholds data, and weak infrastructure leaves India under-supplied with policy analysts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-private-and-business-sector-the-diaspora\">The Private and Business Sector \u00b7 the Diaspora<\/h3>\n<p>As per <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Kumar<\/span>, in the first three decades after independence \u2014 until the mid-1980s \u2014 the role of the private and business sector was <span class=\"n-term\">marginal<\/span>.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Reasons<\/span> \u2192 a closed, <span class=\"n-term\">autarkic<\/span> development model; the predominance of public-sector enterprises; a smaller private-sector share, leaving FICCI, CII and ASSOCHAM marginal; the socialist and non-aligned stance during the Cold War; and the sector\u2019s own existential struggle.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Post-liberalisation<\/span> \u2192 with Rajiv Gandhi and the reforms the private sector sought an increased role, aided by multilateral trade negotiations, engagement with SAARC and ASEAN, and FTAs.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Current status<\/span> \u2192 the sector is still finding its place, with limited tangible influence except where it converges with the official stance. It needs higher norms of self-regulation; its protectionist and mercantilist tendencies sit uneasily with the government\u2019s thrust towards openness.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The diaspora<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) have a growing role. The government treats the diaspora as an asset for promoting India\u2019s priorities globally, and seeks to put its <span class=\"n-term\">remittances, lobbying and representative power<\/span> to work.<\/li>\n<li>Successive governments have attempted to harness the diaspora\u2019s influence in host states.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/determinants-of-foreign-policy\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Determinants of foreign policy<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/continuity-and-change-in-indian-foreign-policy\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Continuity and change in Indian foreign policy<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#who-actually-decides\">Who Actually Decides<\/a><a href=\"#parliament\">Parliament<\/a><a href=\"#the-states-impact-on-foreign-policy\">The States\u2019 Impact on Foreign Policy<\/a><a href=\"#the-cabinet\">The Cabinet<\/a><a href=\"#ministry-of-external-affairs\">Ministry of External Affairs<\/a><a href=\"#the-indian-foreign-service-the-pillai-committee\">The Indian Foreign Service \u00b7 the Pillai Committee<\/a><a href=\"#the-prime-minister-s-office\">The Prime Minister\u2019s Office<\/a><a href=\"#media-and-pressure-groups\">Media and Pressure Groups<\/a><a href=\"#national-security-council\">National Security Council<\/a><a href=\"#think-tanks-and-universities\">Think-Tanks and Universities<\/a><a href=\"#the-private-and-business-sector-the-diaspora\">The Private and Business Sector \u00b7 the Diaspora<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Institutions of policy-making for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Institutions of policy-making Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Institutions of polic<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.1.2","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"1","fx_note_desc":"Institutions of policy-making for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Institutions of policy-making Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Institutions of polic","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3577","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3577","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3577\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3804,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3577\/revisions\/3804"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3577"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}