{"id":3580,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:06","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-nam-current-role\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:05","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:05","slug":"india-and-nam-current-role","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-nam-current-role\/","title":{"rendered":"India and NAM: current role"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and NAM: current role<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and NAM: current role<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 2<\/b> \u2014 India\u2019s Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement Different phases; Current role.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"does-nam-still-matter\">Does NAM Still Matter?<\/h3>\n<p>Several founding objectives were met \u2192 most colonies gained independence; apartheid ended with <span class=\"n-sch\">Nelson Mandela<\/span>\u2019s election in 1994; and the Cold War closed in the early 1990s, removing the rivalry that had justified non-alignment. That raised the question of purpose.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Keethaponcalan \u2014 why the movement is still needed<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Unresolved issues (poverty, neo-colonialism, debt, terrorism, climate change \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Vijay Prashad<\/span> notes that many economic problems remain open); the continuing national interests of small members; and a shift from unipolarity toward multipolarity (<span class=\"n-sch\">Daniel W. Drezner<\/span> points to the rise of China and India).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The relevance debate<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>A SPENT FORCE \u2014 old slogans, no machinery, no purchase on outcomes<\/th>\n<th>A STANDING ASSET \u2014 freedom of judgment; a floor for small states<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">G. Parthasarathy<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Prabhat Shukla<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">T.P. Sreenivasan<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em>Sreenivasan sits on both sides \u2014 NAM needs revival, and its essence was always strategic autonomy<\/em><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Case against relevance<\/th>\n<th>Case for relevance<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 NAM lost meaning even before the Cold War ended, having failed to shape global affairs.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 non-alignment still governs Indian foreign policy, ensuring relative autonomy and separating substance from posture; the friendship with Russia illustrates this.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">T.P. Sreenivasan<\/span> \u2014 NAM needs revival amid India\u2019s closeness to the United States and strained ties with China; its decline has weakened its ability to address economic disparities.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> \u2014 the world increasingly resembles a Cold War with three dominant poles, which strengthens the case for reviving NAM to protect India\u2019s strategic autonomy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2014 clinging to \u201cold shibboleths\u201d without new goals leaves NAM ineffective against contemporary challenges.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> \u2014 NAM remains relevant for small states, giving them a collective voice on global issues.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">G. Parthasarathy<\/span> \u2014 NAM lacked binding principles and amounted to a coalition of convenience; its loose structure limits action.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">T.P. Sreenivasan<\/span> \u2014 non-alignment is misunderstood; its essence is freedom of judgment and action, i.e. strategic autonomy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Prabhat Shukla<\/span> \u2014 transactional diplomacy has cut NAM\u2019s relevance; India must assure reciprocal support if it expects support in need.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Structural record<\/span> \u2014 growth from 25 states (1961) to about 120 members; a role in facilitating China\u2019s UN accession; participation in WTO negotiations; cohesion around anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-racism; a collective platform on terrorism, climate change and globalization.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">General critique<\/span> \u2014 weak leadership, economic weakness of members, failure to adapt to globalization, terrorism and climate change; no permanent secretariat or firm decision-making machinery; the African Union, ASEAN and BRICS now carry much of the agenda NAM once held.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">A new template<\/span> \u2014 cooperation on pandemics, climate change and terrorism, and a bridge-building role in a polarized order where multilateralism is under strain.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 India\u2019s own distance<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>NAM was founded in 1961 to assert independence from the US and Soviet camps and to advance sovereignty, non-interference and equitable development.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Signs of decline<\/span> \u2192 over the last two decades, weak and inconsistent leadership and fragmented priorities among 120-plus members have reduced coherence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s shift<\/span> \u2192 the Prime Minister\u2019s absence from recent summits signals reduced priority, part of the move to multi-alignment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span> \u2192 NAM\u2019s future depends on redefinition and reform, not on India\u2019s attendance alone; the idea survives even as the institution needs renewal.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Does the Non-Aligned Movement have any future in the wake of India\u2019s growing indifference towards it?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/does-the-non-aligned-movement-have-any-future-in-the-wake-of-upsc-psir-2025-4006\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"from-non-alignment-to-multi-alignment\">From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Non-Alignment 1.0 and 2.0 \u2014 what carries over<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both are anti-violence, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial.<\/li>\n<li>Both aim to protect national interest \u2014 sovereignty and territorial integrity.<\/li>\n<li>Both reject formal military blocs and uphold an independent, autonomous foreign policy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What changes<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1.0 \u2192 non-alignment from bloc politics; 2.0 \u2192 multiple alignment.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 emerged in the Cold War; 2.0 in the setting of globalization and liberalization.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 was largely <span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span>\u2019s personal initiative; 2.0 arose from the changing dynamics of a multipolar world.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 diluted ties with neighbours; 2.0 deepens them through <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Link West<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 was strictly against military alignment; under 2.0 India has signed <span class=\"n-term\">LEMOA<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">COMCASA<\/span>, moving away from a purely Nehruvian posture.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Non-Alignment 2.0 document (2012)<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Framed by <span class=\"n-term\">twelve experts<\/span> on international relations, defence and foreign policy \u2192 a prescription for India\u2019s foreign and strategic policy over the following decade.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Objectives<\/span> \u2192 identify opportunities and challenges; enhance strategic autonomy while upholding liberal values; set out a comprehensive framework built on India\u2019s economic and security capabilities.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Key formulations<\/span> \u2192 \u201cstrategic autonomy has been the defining value\u201d since independence; the goal is \u201cto give India maximum options\u201d; and knowledge is \u201cthe field that is vital to defining national power in the twenty-first century.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Criticism<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Bharat Karnad<\/span> calls it a regressive roadmap, faulting its overemphasis on ideational and moral influence and questioning the revival of non-alignment when material power drives international relations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic autonomy and multi-alignment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Terminology \u2192 the phrase <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cNon-Aligned\u201d<\/span> was first used by <span class=\"n-sch\">V.K. Krishna Menon<\/span> at the UN General Assembly in <span class=\"n-term\">1953<\/span> and by <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> in <span class=\"n-term\">1956<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> \u2192 non-alignment belonged to a specific era and context, but the independence of action within it remains a thread of continuity in Indian foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Multi-alignment<\/span> \u2192 engaging several powers at once on specific interests \u2014 defence, trade, technology \u2014 without a single alliance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nirupama Rao<\/span> \u2192 strategic autonomy is now driven by sustained economic growth, energy and maritime security, and access to technology and innovation, pursued through \u201cwell-rounded strategic relationships and partnerships with all the major powers.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s NAM heritage still supplies diplomatic flexibility, letting it engage many states without binding itself to one bloc.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThis is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar (2020)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Multi-alignment \u2014 many partnerships, one decision-maker.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">PARTNERSHIPS<\/span> (Quad \u00b7 BRICS \u00b7 SCO \u00b7 INSTC \u00b7 G20 activism \u00b7 defence and energy ties with Russia) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">STRATEGIC AUTONOMY<\/span> (issue-by-issue judgment; no single bloc) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">OUTCOMES<\/span> (maximum options \u00b7 Global South leadership \u00b7 \u201cVishwa Mitra\u201d). <em>Voice of Global South Summits \u00b7 Vaccine Maitri \u00b7 African Union into the G20 \u00b7 International Solar Alliance \u00b7 digital public infrastructure<\/em><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThere is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interests. This is a bitter truth.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>the Chanakya maxim invoked by India\u2019s strategic establishment<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 1.0 against 2.0<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Shared ground \u2192 anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, protection of sovereignty, rejection of military blocs, an independent foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li>Divergence \u2192 1.0 sought distance from blocs; 2.0 seeks multiple, issue-based alignments.<\/li>\n<li>Instruments of 2.0 \u2192 LEMOA and COMCASA, Act East and Link West, and non-attendance at NAM summits mark the departure from Nehruvian practice.<\/li>\n<li>Scholarly framing \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> holds the old tenets less adequate today; <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> argues India cannot be pigeonholed into a rigid non-aligned stance.<\/li>\n<li>Assessment \u2192 the grammar shifts from neutrality to engagement; the constant is autonomy in decision-making.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 debunked, or reinterpreted?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-alignment was the cornerstone of Cold War diplomacy \u2192 autonomy through the avoidance of formal alliances.<\/li>\n<li>A de facto tilt toward the Soviet Union already qualified strict non-alignment, forced by the US posture toward Pakistan and China.<\/li>\n<li>The 1991 Soviet collapse and economic liberalization pushed a reorientation toward strategic autonomy and strategic partnerships.<\/li>\n<li>Multi-alignment reinforces autonomy by cultivating a diverse network of partnerships across the geopolitical spectrum.<\/li>\n<li>Continuity, not rupture \u2192 as at Bandung, India can still model a path for the Global South between US\u2013China confrontation.<\/li>\n<li>Assessment \u2192 \u201cdebunk\u201d overstates it; India has reinterpreted non-alignment as multi-alignment while keeping strategic autonomy intact.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 an alternative universality<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-Alignment 2.0 (2012) set out a framework for India\u2019s foreign and strategic policy, drawing on Nehruvian principles adapted to a multipolar world.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Alternative universality<\/span> \u2192 India offering a model of order distinct from both Western liberal hegemony and rigid bloc politics.<\/li>\n<li>Strategic autonomy as the defining value \u2192 policy that gives India \u201cmaximum options\u201d while preserving the core of non-alignment.<\/li>\n<li>Emphasis on an open global order, deep economic engagement, and knowledge as the key to national power in the twenty-first century.<\/li>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">polycentric order<\/span> \u2192 states coexisting and cooperating in networks rather than fixed alliances, which is what makes multi-alignment possible.<\/li>\n<li>Global South leadership \u2192 the Voice of Global South Summits and the African Union\u2019s entry into the G20 project this aspiration.<\/li>\n<li>Assessment \u2192 2.0 does frame India as a site of an alternative universality, but its credibility rests on converting convening power into concrete outcomes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Compare and contrast Non-Alignment 1.0 with Non-Alignment 2.0.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/compare-and-contrast-non-alignment-10-with-non-alignment-20-upsc-psir-2019-4003\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cIndia has, of late, chosen to debunk non-alignment in its pursuit of multi-alignment.\u201d Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-has-of-late-chosen-to-debunk-non-alignment-in-its-pursuit-upsc-psir-2024-4005\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Non-Alignment 2.0 underscores India\u2019s unique aspiration to emerge as a site for an alternative universality. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/non-alignment-20-underscores-indias-unique-aspiration-to-emerge-upsc-psir-2025-4007\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"non-alignment-international-relations-theory\">Non-Alignment &amp; International Relations Theory<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Realism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A strategy by weaker states such as India to preserve sovereignty and avoid domination in an anarchic system \u2014 balancing power without formal alliances. <span class=\"n-sch\">Hans Morgenthau<\/span>, however, criticized neutrality as utopian and unsustainable where power politics rules.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Constructivism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>NAM as shared ideas, identities and norms \u2192 a collective identity of non-alignment and solidarity beyond material interest. <span class=\"n-sch\">Hedley Bull<\/span>, in <em>The Anarchical Society<\/em>, held that middle powers and dialogue stabilize international order \u2014 which fits NAM\u2019s mediating and de-escalating role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic autonomy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The right to make independent foreign policy decisions free of external control \u2014 the principle India upheld through NAM.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Kautilya\u2019s <em>Arthashastra<\/em><\/span><\/td>\n<td>An ancient precedent for pragmatic diplomacy \u2192 balance of power, avoidance of entanglement, preservation of sovereignty.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Balance of power<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Non-alignment let states hold an equilibrium between the US and Soviet blocs without joining either.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"reforming-nam-for-the-twenty-first-century\">Reforming NAM for the Twenty-First Century<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Keethaponcalan<\/span> proposes three sets of changes.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Set<\/th>\n<th>Proposal<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Symbolic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Rename the movement \u2014 non-alignment was never its sole aim; a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cSouthern Solidarity Movement\u201d<\/span> would stress unity built on shared colonial history and socio-economic conditions. <span class=\"n-sch\">Ran Kochan<\/span> notes that many members were in fact aligned with a superpower, which strained the label.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Structural<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Establish a <span class=\"n-term\">permanent secretariat<\/span> to improve coordination and image. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sally Morphet<\/span> observes that rising Global South powers can sustain such an institution, and that fears about cost or exposing internal differences are unfounded.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Policy &amp; agenda<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Redefine non-alignment as constructive, selective engagement with major powers rather than non-cooperation \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Ran Kochan<\/span> argues NAM cannot survive as a mere protest movement. Priority to internal development through South\u2013South collaboration, a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cSouthern Development Bank\u201d<\/span> on the model of the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, and control over natural resources instead of dependence on external aid.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vijay Prashad<\/span> \u2192 NAM needs a new charter akin to the NIEO to redefine its purpose for present challenges.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Way forward<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The world is more interconnected than ever \u2014 climate change, terrorism, poverty and public-health emergencies can be met only together.<\/li>\n<li>NAM should be positioned neither for nor against any ideology or group of nations, but should select cross-sectoral priorities \u2192 counter-terrorism, global governance reform, sustainable development, South\u2013South cooperation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">T.V. Paul<\/span> \u2192 there is space for <span class=\"n-term\">\u201csoft balancing,\u201d<\/span> so that weaker countries can \u201cdelegitimize imperial ventures,\u201d though \u201cthe onus is on smaller countries.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>A democratic, effective, flexible, credible, transparent and representative multilateral platform is what a twenty-first-century order requires.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-settled-position\">The Settled Position<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Where to land an answer on this chapter<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Non-alignment was a <span class=\"n-term\">strategy, not a doctrine<\/span> \u2014 an independent foreign policy through which a materially weak India protected sovereignty, pursued development and claimed a leadership role among post-colonial states.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Its normative ethos \u2014 anti-colonialism, disarmament, peaceful coexistence, equity \u2014 universalized international relations and gave the Global South a voice, even as size and structure limited NAM as a \u201cthird force.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>The Cold War\u2019s close ended much of the original agenda, but its principles persist.<\/li>\n<li>For NAM itself, relevance now depends on reform \u2192 a redefined agenda, firmer structure, and a shift from protest to constructive engagement in a multipolar and interdependent world.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Indian foreign policy is \u201cno longer about choosing sides, but about maximizing options.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>C. Raja Mohan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The move from non-alignment to multi-alignment is \u201cnot an abandonment, but a reinterpretation\u201d \u2014 the grammar changes, but strategic autonomy endures.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rakesh Sood<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"nam-relevance-soft-balancing-and-non-alignment-2-0\">NAM: Relevance, Soft Balancing and Non-Alignment 2.0<\/h3>\n<p>Carry both columns, then take a position.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The end of bipolarity raised doubts about NAM\u2019s purpose in a unipolar world.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The continuing rationale<\/span>: it opposes domination by any single superpower and advocates a multipolar order; it addresses globalisation-driven inequality, terrorism, environment and UN reform.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">V. N. Khanna<\/span>: NAM\u2019s future lies in being an <span class=\"n-term\">economic movement<\/span> bridging the North\u2013South divide \u2014 it remains vital as long as global inequalities persist.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Critics of relevance<\/th>\n<th>Defenders of relevance<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Hans K\u00f6chler<\/span>: NAM was relevant only in the bipolar Cold War; with one dominant power its objectives are redundant, many members now depend on the USA, and it has no charter, statute or secretariat.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">T. V. Paul<\/span>: despite its shortcomings NAM acted as a limited <span class=\"n-term\">soft-balancing<\/span> mechanism \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cnaming\u201d<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cshaming\u201d<\/span> were its tools; it deserves partial credit for ending colonialism, containing proliferation and reducing bipolar tension; there is space to resurrect the Bandung spirit.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Chris Alden<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Marco Ant\u00f3nio Vieira<\/span>: NAM produced few results and faded with Western collective action and falling commodity prices \u2014 anachronistic ideologically, structurally and economically.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">M. K. Narayanan<\/span>: it is premature to pronounce NAM dead \u2014 it could be used to counter China\u2019s \u201cnot so peaceful\u201d rise and to champion transnational issues.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span>: NAM is in a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cstate of coma\u201d<\/span> \u2014 a crisis of identity and relevance; for him it was idealistic and largely irrelevant even before the Cold War\u2019s end.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">K. Harikumar<\/span>: NAM is a vital platform for South\u2013South cooperation. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span>: though the name negates a choice no longer on the table, NAM has widened its objectives to resist the hegemony of the sole superpower and assert members\u2019 independence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span>: NAM was prudent when India lacked power; it is now a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cdying organisation\u201d<\/span> and India should not stick to old shibboleths. Competition from more effective groupings \u2014 G-7, ASEAN, SCO, BRICS \u2014 handles trade and economic issues that NAM does not.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">T. P. Sreenivasan<\/span>: NAM stood for freedom of judgment and action, and remains valid whether there is one bloc or two. <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span>: non-alignment belonged to a specific era, but the <span class=\"n-term\">independence of action<\/span> it enshrined remains a continuity in Indian foreign policy \u2014 a rejection of non-alignment is not a rush to alignment; India will not join an alliance system.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Structural weaknesses to name in a critique<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>No charter, statute or secretariat; over 100 members by 1990, making consensus difficult and the agenda diffuse; bilateral disputes raised on a collective platform.<\/li>\n<li>Fracture, not only size: from <span class=\"n-term\">Colombo (1976)<\/span> through the <span class=\"n-term\">Havana Conference (1979)<\/span>, serious splits along regional and ideological lines; internal camp-following toward the USA or the USSR.<\/li>\n<li>The contradiction between \u201crespect for human rights\u201d and \u201cnon-interference\u201d; the inability to prevent the India\u2013Pakistan wars or resolve Palestine; little European representation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Non-Alignment 2.0<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty-First Century<\/em> \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">Centre for Policy Research<\/span> publication (March 2012), written over fourteen months by <span class=\"n-sch\">Sunil Khilnani<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Kumar<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Prakash Menon<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Nandan Nilekani<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Srinath Raghavan<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Siddharth Varadarajan<\/span>, with inputs from NSA <span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> and others.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Core idea<\/span>: identify the principles to make India a leading global player while preserving <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>; in a world no longer split between two powers, non-alignment means managing complicated, shifting coalitions rather than settled alliances.<\/li>\n<li>It drew fire \u2014 critics accused it of resurrecting the buried ghost of non-alignment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The 17th NAM Summit<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Held on <span class=\"n-term\">Margarita Island, Venezuela<\/span> (2016); theme <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cPeace, Sovereignty and Solidarity for Development\u201d<\/span>; a <span class=\"n-term\">21-article final declaration<\/span> demanding an equitable world order fair to developing nations.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Key articles<\/span>: strengthening NAM and the international order; the right to self-determination; a world free of nuclear weapons; protection of human rights; condemnation of unilateral coercive measures and of terrorism; the centrality of international law and the UN Charter; a just solution on Palestine, with the Israeli occupation named a destabilising factor.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Reform agenda<\/span>: a more democratic UNGA and Security Council; transparency in appointing the Secretary-General; the 2030 Agenda and SDGs; climate change; South\u2013South cooperation; reform of the international financial architecture.<\/li>\n<li>NAM is a forum of about <span class=\"n-term\">120 developing states<\/span> not formally aligned with any major bloc \u2014 after the UN, the largest grouping of states. Yet <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span>\u2019s \u201cmovement in a state of coma\u201d expresses the persistent doubt.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How to strengthen NAM<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Premise<\/span>: the institutional framework still functions \u2014 it needs reshaping and re-energising, not reinvention.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Symbolic<\/span> \u2014 genuine multilateral partnerships; a positive, forward-looking agenda. <span class=\"n-term\">Structural<\/span> \u2014 specialised, role-based functionaries; institutional capacity; a permanent secretariat and coordination mechanisms. <span class=\"n-term\">Policy<\/span> \u2014 a proactive, target-based approach; more frequent summits and deliberation, including Track-II diplomacy; reform from a loose grouping into a results-oriented organisation (<span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Substantive agenda<\/span>: terrorism, climate justice, UN reform, protection of international law, elimination of WMDs, the SDGs.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">For India<\/span>: a platform to assert soft power and lead smaller states; to gather South-East Asian support against Chinese assertion in the South China Sea; to enable Afro-Asian cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">NAM and India\u2019s soft power<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye<\/span> on <span class=\"n-term\">soft power<\/span>: influencing others\u2019 preferences through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion \u2014 \u201ca country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries \u2014 admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness \u2014 want to follow it.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">NAM\u2019s normative ethos<\/span>: sovereignty, non-interference, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, peaceful coexistence \u2014 values that match India\u2019s foreign-policy objectives (<span class=\"n-term\">Havana Declaration<\/span>, 1979).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Lehmann<\/span>: lacking economic and military capability after independence, India chose non-alignment as an instrument to exercise considerable international soft power.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Stature<\/span>: India\u2019s advocacy of a multipolar order and sovereign equality raises its standing (<span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span>); leadership within NAM gave it a platform on disarmament, peace and development. South\u2013South cooperation as soft power \u2014 development partnerships, the International Solar Alliance, ITEC and cultural diplomacy built on shared anti-colonial histories.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Balance<\/span>: critics argue relevance has waned and India should look elsewhere; balancing NAM principles with evolving interests is hard \u2014 yet the normative ethos still amplifies India\u2019s image as a principled, autonomous actor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-nam-different-phases\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India and NAM: different phases<\/b><\/a><span><\/span><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#does-nam-still-matter\">Does NAM Still Matter?<\/a><a href=\"#from-non-alignment-to-multi-alignment\">From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment<\/a><a href=\"#non-alignment-international-relations-theory\">Non-Alignment &amp; International Relations Theory<\/a><a href=\"#reforming-nam-for-the-twenty-first-century\">Reforming NAM for the Twenty-First Century<\/a><a href=\"#the-settled-position\">The Settled Position<\/a><a href=\"#nam-relevance-soft-balancing-and-non-alignment-2-0\">NAM: Relevance, Soft Balancing and Non-Alignment 2.0<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and NAM: current role for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and NAM: current role Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and NAM: current ro<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.2.2","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"2","fx_note_desc":"India and NAM: current role for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and NAM: current role Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and NAM: current ro","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3580","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3580","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3580\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3801,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3580\/revisions\/3801"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3580"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}