{"id":3581,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:07","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-south-asia-the-neighbours\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:05","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:05","slug":"india-and-south-asia-the-neighbours","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-south-asia-the-neighbours\/","title":{"rendered":"India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 3<\/b> \u2014 <span class=\"cur\">India and South Asia<\/span> : (a) Regional Co-operation : SAARC-past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India\u2019s \u201cLook East\u201d policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation : River water disputes; illegal cross border migration; Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; Border disputes.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"how-the-rivalry-is-read\">How the rivalry is read<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> (<em>India\u2014Pakistan Relations Between War and Peace<\/em>) \u2014 antagonism with Pakistan has occupied front stage for the best part of India\u2019s history since 1947.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sumit Ganguly<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">T.V. Paul<\/span> \u2014 an \u2018intractable rivalry\u2019: a string of wars and crises that leaves little room for optimism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">R. Harshe<\/span> \u2014 contrasting conceptions of national identity are deeply embedded in the hostility. Torn apart at independence, the two states set out to build very different kinds of nation-state.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 the estrangement established at partition still governs the relationship; overcoming these psychological and ideological divides requires visionary statecraft.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 structural constraints (religious nationalism, disputed territory, militant groups held as strategic assets) produce a recurring cycle of crisis and reconciliation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"chronology-1947-2025\">Chronology, 1947\u20132025<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>When<\/th>\n<th>What happened<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Aug 1947<\/td>\n<td>Independence and Partition. Rioting kills up to 10 lakh; about 1.5 crore people flee their homes.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Oct 1947<\/td>\n<td>War over Kashmir. UN-brokered ceasefire on 1 Jan 1949, ratified by the <span class=\"n-term\">Karachi Agreement<\/span>, July 1949; Kashmir divided.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Jan 1949<\/td>\n<td>Both accept a UNSC resolution calling for a referendum. The vote never takes place.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sep 1960<\/td>\n<td>World Bank-brokered <span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty<\/span> signed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Aug 1965<\/td>\n<td>Second war over Kashmir; ends in a UN-mandated ceasefire.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Dec 1971<\/td>\n<td>Third war; Indian intervention in East Pakistan; <span class=\"n-term\">Bangladesh created<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Jul 1972<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Simla Agreement<\/span>; accord on return of Pakistani prisoners of war.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>May 1974<\/td>\n<td>Pokhran test; India the first non-P5 state to test.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Dec 1989<\/td>\n<td>Armed insurgency begins in Jammu and Kashmir.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>May 1998<\/td>\n<td>India tests five devices, Pakistan six; sanctions follow.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Feb 1999<\/td>\n<td>Vajpayee\u2019s Lahore bus journey; peace accord with Nawaz Sharif.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>May 1999<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Kargil<\/span> conflict; the United States brokers peace.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>May 2001<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Agra Summit<\/span>; no agreement.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Oct 2001<\/td>\n<td>Attack on the Kashmir legislature building.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Dec 2001<\/td>\n<td>Attack on the Indian Parliament, 14 killed; the standoff ends in October 2002 after international mediation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Jan 2004<\/td>\n<td>Musharraf\u2013Vajpayee talks launch bilateral negotiations.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Feb 2007<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Samjhauta Express<\/span> bombing, 68 killed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Oct 2008<\/td>\n<td>Trade route opened across Kashmir after six decades.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Nov 2008<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Mumbai attacks<\/span>, 166 killed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>May 2014<\/td>\n<td>Nawaz Sharif invited to the swearing-in in New Delhi.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Dec 2015<\/td>\n<td>Surprise visit to Lahore.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Jan 2016<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Pathankot attack<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sep 2016<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Uri attack<\/span>; \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">surgical strikes<\/span>\u201d across the Line of Control.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2018<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Kartarpur Corridor<\/span> approved; inaugurated November 2019.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Feb 2019<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Pulwama attack<\/span>, 40 CRPF personnel killed; <span class=\"n-term\">Balakot air strike<\/span> on the Jaish-e-Mohammed camp.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Aug 2019<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span> revoked<\/span>; Pakistan suspends bilateral trade and expels the High Commissioner.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Apr 2025<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam attack<\/span>; India suspends the Indus Waters Treaty and launches <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sindoor<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"level-one-the-system\">Level one \u2014 the system<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three levels of analysis<\/span><\/p>\n<p>International Relations reads a conflict at three levels: the system, the state and the individual. All three are needed here \u2014 no single level explains why this rivalry survives every attempt to end it.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The same relationship, read three ways<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>SYSTEM<\/th>\n<th>STATE<\/th>\n<th>INDIVIDUAL<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Strong state vs weak state \u00b7 nuclear deterrence \u00b7 external powers \u00b7 global economic change<\/td>\n<td>Contrasting national identities \u00b7 secular inclusion vs Muslim separateness \u00b7 domestic politics<\/td>\n<td>Nehru, Shastri, Indira, Vajpayee, Manmohan \u00b7 Jinnah, Bhutto, Zia, Musharraf<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The structural position<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both are relatively weak states in the global system. At the regional level India is a major power while Pakistan is much smaller in size, population, economy and military capability.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Mandelbaum<\/span> \u2014 strategies are shaped by relative position in a system, which gives a <span class=\"n-term\">strong state vs weak state<\/span> reading:<\/li>\n<li><em>India (strong state)<\/em> \u2192 seeks political and economic engagement; prefers <span class=\"n-term\">bilateral negotiation<\/span>, which places India at an advantage; pressed for higher trade, granted <span class=\"n-term\">MFN status in 1995<\/span>, welcomed Pakistani cultural figures.<\/li>\n<li><em>Pakistan (weak state)<\/em> \u2192 prefers political and economic distancing to reduce vulnerability; prefers <span class=\"n-term\">multilateral frameworks<\/span> that let it draw on outside support; builds military strength for <span class=\"n-term\">internal balancing<\/span> and seeks allies for <span class=\"n-term\">external balancing<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Stephen P. Cohen<\/span> \u2014 the Pakistani military held an exaggerated perception of its relative strength, which produced the false optimism behind two wars. In 1947\u201348 Pakistan secured about a third of Kashmir; confidence was reinforced by membership of the Cold War alliance system (<span class=\"n-term\">SEATO 1954<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">CENTO 1955<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s poor performance against China in 1962 emboldened the 1965 venture; the <span class=\"n-term\">Tashkent Agreement<\/span> (January 1966) confirmed the 1948 division.<\/li>\n<li>Early 1970s \u2192 India\u2019s position became uneasy as the United States improved ties with Beijing <em>via<\/em> Islamabad. India signed the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971 and helped create Bangladesh in December.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"two-systemic-changes-of-the-mid-1980s\">Two systemic changes of the mid-1980s<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">First \u2014 the advent of nuclear weapons<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2014 nuclear rivals follow a pattern: tension rises, crises follow, fear of war then produces caution and negotiation.<\/li>\n<li>After acquiring <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear deterrence<\/span>, Pakistan turned to the low-cost option of <em>asymmetric warfare<\/em> and stepped up support to terrorist groups.<\/li>\n<li>Crisis sequence \u2192 Kargil (troops sent in the guise of <em>mujahideen<\/em>), the December 2001 Parliament attack and the threat of limited war, Mumbai 2008. Improvement stalled again after the beheading of an Indian soldier in January 2013.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">composite dialogue<\/span> of 2004 covered terrorism, nuclear risk reduction and Kashmir; both sides began to think beyond mutually exclusive claims and towards softening the LoC. Talks failed; cross-border terrorism continued.<\/li>\n<li>India then developed the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018Cold Start\u2019 doctrine<\/span>. Pakistan responded with <span class=\"n-term\">tactical nuclear weapons and cruise missiles<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">External powers<\/span> remain a systemic factor: India chose non-alignment, Pakistan aligned with the United States, and from the 1980s drew nuclear materials, technology, weapons and aid from China. India\u2019s closeness to Washington has pushed Islamabad tighter into Beijing\u2019s embrace.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Cold Start<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Rapid occupation of slices of Pakistani territory, to be held as bargaining material. The doctrine assumes a war fought below the nuclear threshold; Pakistan\u2019s tactical nuclear weapons were designed precisely to deny that assumption.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Second \u2014 accelerating global economic change<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>After the balance-of-payments crisis and the reforms, India needed foreign investment and the economic cost of instability became unaffordable. <span class=\"n-sch\">Friedman<\/span> argued that globalisation and fast-moving information technology would not tolerate the uncertainty of regional tension and war threats.<\/li>\n<li>Positives of the 2000s \u2192 opening of trade across Kashmir (2008), the proposed <span class=\"n-term\">Iran\u2013Pakistan\u2013India gas pipeline<\/span>, Pakistan\u2019s promise of MFN status.<\/li>\n<li>Cultural opening \u2192 Pakistan permitted Indian films and cultural troupes after more than four decades, while worrying about <em>\u2018cultural penetration\u2019<\/em>. After Pathankot the relationship went cold and India moved to a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cSAARC minus one\u201d<\/span> approach.<\/li>\n<li>Economically and politically the gap has widened \u2192 India secured the <span class=\"n-term\">NSG waiver (2008)<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">Wassenaar Arrangement (2017)<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Australia Group (2018)<\/span>, while Pakistan faces political instability and economic crisis.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"level-two-identity-and-politics-at-the-state-level\">Level two \u2014 identity and politics at the state level<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2014 the two have contrasting conceptions of national identity, which makes the hostility hard to resolve. Under <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> India sought an <em>inclusive identity<\/em> rooted in secularism; <span class=\"n-term\">Mohammed Ali Jinnah<\/span> chose an Islamic identity based on Muslim separateness.<\/li>\n<li>Identity has an <span class=\"n-term\">external<\/span> component (separateness from other groups) and an <span class=\"n-term\">internal<\/span> one (belonging through participation). Where the internal component is weak, states reinforce it by opposing the external other.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Kashmir and identity<\/span> \u2192 Kashmir is the symbol of an incomplete parting and of mutually exclusive identity, each side claiming the land in its own image. Sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir supports India\u2019s claim that it can accommodate Muslims; Pakistan, weakened further by the loss of Bangladesh in 1971, remains vulnerable.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Domestic politics<\/span> \u2192 India moved from recurrent religious, linguistic and caste conflict into a relatively stable democracy [<span class=\"n-sch\">Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span>], while Pakistan has remained ethnically fragmented, politically unstable and economically weak, producing Islamic extremism and a \u2018culture of Jihad\u2019 [<span class=\"n-sch\">J. Stern<\/span>].<\/li>\n<li>A fractured polity is why Pakistan has not developed the inner confidence for a healthier, more practical approach to India and to Kashmir.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"level-three-leaders-and-what-they-could-not-do\">Level three \u2014 leaders, and what they could not do<\/h3>\n<p>Leaders are constrained by domestic politics, geography and the international milieu, yet on occasion they shape outcomes.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Early leaderships<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> determined the course of Indian foreign policy by personality, preference and decision. <span class=\"n-sch\">J. Bandyopadhyay<\/span> \u2014 Nehruvian policy carried a considerable contradiction between idealist and realist elements; the ambition of a global role was not backed by hard power, as 1962 showed.<\/li>\n<li>More realist figures \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Lal Bahadur Shastri<\/span> in 1965 and <span class=\"n-sch\">Indira Gandhi<\/span> in 1971 \u2014 used the military effectively.<\/li>\n<li>By the end of the twentieth century Indian power shifted to coalitions; leaders were too weak for major initiatives.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan lost <span class=\"n-term\">Jinnah<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Liaquat Ali Khan<\/span> early; the contest for power then prevented decisive direction. <span class=\"n-term\">Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto\u2019s<\/span> populism yielded little.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">General Zia-ul-Haq<\/span> recast Pakistan in an Islamic mould, developed the nuclear programme and kept India at arm\u2019s length. It was the military as an <span class=\"n-term\">institution<\/span>, rather than individual commanders, that shaped the orientation towards India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Benazir Bhutto<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Nawaz Sharif<\/span> raised high expectations and did not meet them.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Leadership in the new millennium<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Atal Bihari Vajpayee<\/span> travelled to Lahore in early 1999; the response was shallow and Kargil followed weeks later.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Vajpayee<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Pervez Musharraf<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">Agra Summit, 2001<\/span>, followed by comprehensive dialogue in 2004. Though considered the architect of Kargil, Musharraf showed a striking willingness to discard old positions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> showed similar flexibility. As per <span class=\"n-sch\">Gilani, Hasan, et al.<\/span>, by mid-2007 both sides had obliquely signalled readiness to consider dividing Kashmir permanently; a <em>\u2018breakthrough\u2019<\/em> was close before Musharraf\u2019s standing collapsed.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Asif Ali Zardari<\/span> maintained continuity; the process slowed with Pakistan\u2019s internal troubles and the <span class=\"n-term\">2008 Mumbai attacks<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Nawaz Sharif<\/span>, returning in 2013, spoke of going \u2018the extra mile\u2019.<\/li>\n<li>State-level constraints curb leaders. <span class=\"n-sch\">L.K. Advani\u2019s<\/span> attempt to bridge the divide in 2005 drew accusations of going \u2018soft\u2019 from his own followers; <span class=\"n-term\">Zardari\u2019s<\/span> criticism of \u2018terrorists\u2019 in Kashmir in 2008 caused a storm in Pakistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"kashmir-symptom-not-cause\">Kashmir \u2014 symptom, not cause<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A territorial conflict over the Kashmir region, primarily between India and Pakistan, with China claiming portions of PoK and Aksai Chin. Dates from <span class=\"n-term\">22 October 1947<\/span>; on the United Nations agenda since partition.<\/li>\n<li>Both claim the entire region; three wars (1947\u201348, 1965, 1999) and repeated skirmishes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2014 Kashmir is more a <span class=\"n-term\">symptom<\/span> than a cause; the main contradiction is a conflict of identity. It is a battle of identities, not only of territory.<\/li>\n<li>India is relatively <span class=\"n-term\">status-quoist<\/span>, Pakistan <span class=\"n-term\">revisionist<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Pervez Musharraf<\/span> treated Kashmir as Pakistan\u2019s jugular vein; for India the core issue is cross-border terrorism.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan argues for self-determination and cites human rights violations while ignoring Balochistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why each side holds on<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>For India<\/em> \u2192 strengthens secular identity; strategic location for security and for countering Chinese designs; freshwater availability.<\/li>\n<li><em>For Pakistan<\/em> \u2192 part of Islamic identity; Muslim brotherhood; water resources.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Where it stands<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s August 2019 move is stuck in Pakistan\u2019s political throat: it can neither swallow it nor spit it out. Pakistan\u2019s current Kashmir debate is about finding a way out.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2014 even if Kashmir were settled, Pakistan is unlikely to give up jihadi terrorism, since the Army\u2019s grievances are too deeply rooted to forego its most effective instrument for bleeding India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-other-three-territorial-disputes\">The other three territorial disputes<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Dispute<\/th>\n<th>India\u2019s position<\/th>\n<th>Pakistan\u2019s position<\/th>\n<th>Where it stands<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Siachen Glacier<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Recognise the <span class=\"n-term\">Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)<\/span> first, then demilitarise. Reads the Simla Agreement \u2014 beyond the last demarcated point <span class=\"n-term\">NJ9842<\/span> the line runs \u201cthence north to the glaciers\u201d \u2014 as placing Pakistan only up to the <span class=\"n-term\">Saltoro Ridge<\/span>. Sequence: demarcation \u2192 delineation \u2192 demilitarisation.<\/td>\n<td>The line runs north-east from NJ9842 to the <span class=\"n-term\">Karakoram Pass<\/span>. Demilitarisation first, by withdrawal to 1972 positions, and only then demarcation.<\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Karachi Agreement of 1949<\/span> gave a vague demarcation and unspecified authority; the glacier has been contested since.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sir Creek<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Green Line is indicative only. Relies on a <span class=\"n-term\">1925<\/span> map placing the boundary mid-channel, supported by mid-channel pillars built in 1924, and invokes the <span class=\"n-term\">Thalweg Principle<\/span>. Answers that the creek is navigable at high tide and used by fishing trawlers.<\/td>\n<td>Claims the whole creek on the basis of the <span class=\"n-term\">Bombay Government Resolution of 1914<\/span>, under which the eastern flank \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Green Line<\/span> \u2014 was the boundary. Says Thalweg applies only to navigable channels.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">92 km<\/span> of marshy land separating <span class=\"n-term\">Gujarat<\/span> from <span class=\"n-term\">Sindh<\/span>, never properly surveyed. Matters for fishing rights, hydrocarbons, the <span class=\"n-term\">EEZ<\/span> and as flamingo habitat; the <span class=\"n-term\">UNCLOS<\/span> deadline has passed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Gilgit-Baltistan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Part of undivided Jammu and Kashmir. The May 2020 grant of \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">provisional provincial status<\/span>\u201d is <span class=\"n-term\">illegal<\/span>; so is the handing of parts of the region to China in <span class=\"n-term\">1963<\/span> and CPEC work there, treated as an <span class=\"n-term\">attack on sovereignty<\/span>.<\/td>\n<td>Administers the region and upgraded it in May 2020 from a \u201cprovisional autonomous region\u201d. With China, has agreed to build five large dams in Pakistan \u2014 one of them here \u2014 under <span class=\"n-term\">One Belt One Road<\/span>.<\/td>\n<td>The territorial dispute that carries the China factor directly inside it.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Thalweg Principle<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Where a boundary is a waterway, it follows the centre of the principal navigable channel. India invokes it at Sir Creek; Pakistan\u2019s reply is that the creek is not a navigable channel at all.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Siachen \u2014 possible solutions<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 the two came close thrice, in <span class=\"n-term\">1989, 1992 and 2006<\/span>, and failed each time over trust deficit. He favours a settlement: the glacial region is a most inhospitable theatre and the extraordinary human and material costs on troops would justify a review.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> proposed making Siachen a \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">mountain of peace<\/span>\u2019 with joint exploration; the Indian Army opposed it.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Stephen P. Cohen<\/span> considers the dispute futile and remarks that the conflict is like two bald persons fighting over a comb.<\/li>\n<li>Options discussed \u2192 a \u2018glacier of peace\u2019 occupied by neither side; mutual withdrawal without delineation (undesirable and unlikely); <span class=\"n-term\">mutual withdrawal after jointly recording current military positions<\/span> and exchanging them as an annexure without prejudice to stated positions, pending final settlement of the LoC and AGPL \u2014 the most workable, since Pakistan agreed to it in 1992; conversion into an international site for glacial research.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"terrorism-and-ceasefire-violations\">Terrorism and ceasefire violations<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David Scott<\/span> \u2014 a constant refrain from India is its sense of Pakistan as a state sponsoring \u2018terrorism\u2019.<\/li>\n<li>Origins \u2192 support to Kashmiri and Sikh insurgents in the 1970s, part of <span class=\"n-term\">Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto\u2019s<\/span> search for forward <em>strategic depth<\/em>, a substitute for Pakistan\u2019s lack of depth and early warning after 1971.<\/li>\n<li>After the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan turned to <span class=\"n-term\">asymmetric balancing<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">General Zia-ul-Haq<\/span> began the \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">thousand cuts, zero-option war<\/span>\u2019 policy. Pakistan has also aided <span class=\"n-term\">Khalistani separatists<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Despite the <span class=\"n-term\">Ceasefire Agreement of 2003<\/span>, cross-border violations continue and have risen since 2009. Repeated attacks such as Pathankot and Uri rendered SAARC ineffective; after the surgical strikes relations reached a point of no return.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The dual burden<\/span> \u2192 terrorism denies India a <span class=\"n-term\">decisive victory<\/span> and simultaneously limits India\u2019s ability to achieve <span class=\"n-term\">regional hegemony<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2014 jihadi terrorism is the perfect instrument for continuously coercing India. It gives the \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">deep state<\/span>\u201d plausible deniability, avoids conventional confrontations Pakistan is certain to lose, and converts Pakistan\u2019s nuclear deterrent into a licence to needle New Delhi without exposing itself to heavy retaliation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why terrorism became policy \u2014 the logic chain.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1971<\/span> (East Pakistan lost; no depth, no early warning) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">BHUTTO<\/span> (Search for forward <em>strategic depth<\/em>) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">ZIA<\/span> (\u2018Thousand cuts, zero-option war\u2019) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1998<\/span> (Nuclear cover makes it low-cost) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">INDIA<\/span> (No decisive victory; no regional pre-eminence)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s earlier approach, and the choice since<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Three decades of policy centred on stopping infiltration across the LoC, negotiating a mutually acceptable political settlement, reducing violence within Jammu and Kashmir and reinvigorating the political process. A series of popular elections followed, with violence at its lowest point in 2012.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Chadha<\/span> \u2014 <em>option one<\/em>: \u201cmore of the same\u201d. Continued talks despite occasional strikes, an offensive-defence posture along the LoC limiting infiltration and retaining moral ascendancy, sustained in the hope that domestic blowback and international aversion would eventually change Pakistan\u2019s calculation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Chadha<\/span> \u2014 <em>option two<\/em>: premised on the Pakistan Army\u2019s vested interests being immovable. Unless India could impose costs on the Army itself, terrorism would continue with only tactical adjustment; India therefore needed pressure points against the Pakistan Army. Recent years reflect this second option.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How does cross border terrorism impede the achievements of peace and security in South Asia?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/how-does-cross-border-terrorism-impede-the-achievements-of-peace-upsc-psir-2020-4203\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-indus-waters-treaty\">The Indus Waters Treaty<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 \u2014 how the basin was divided<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th><span class=\"n-lab\">EASTERN RIVERS<\/span> \u2014 to India<\/th>\n<th><span class=\"n-lab\">WESTERN RIVERS<\/span> \u2014 to Pakistan<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Sutlej \u00b7 Beas \u00b7 Ravi. Full use by India.<\/td>\n<td>Indus \u00b7 Jhelum \u00b7 Chenab. India may use about <span class=\"n-term\">20%<\/span> for non-consumptive purposes; no storages permitted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Background<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Signed in <span class=\"n-term\">1960<\/span> between <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Ayub Khan<\/span>, brokered by the <span class=\"n-term\">World Bank<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ramaswamy R. Iyer<\/span> notes the original logic: irrigation networks then had to be developed in western Punjab, now part of Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li>Restrictions were also placed on the extension of irrigation in India.<\/li>\n<li>Institutional machinery \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Permanent Indus Commission<\/span>, with neutral expert determination and <span class=\"n-term\">Permanent Court of Arbitration<\/span> referral; data exchange on project operation and irrigated agriculture. Under <span class=\"n-term\">Article V<\/span> India paid approximately <span class=\"n-term\">\u00a362.06 million<\/span>; international financial assistance went to Pakistan for irrigation works.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Contention<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan has objected to Indian projects on the western rivers, for example the <span class=\"n-term\">Tulbul project<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Indian resentment centres on having conceded about <span class=\"n-term\">80%<\/span> of the water; <span class=\"n-term\">Article XII<\/span> says the treaty <em>may from time to time be modified<\/em>, but this requires ratification by both.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Iftikhar A. Drabu<\/span> \u2014 the treaty has withstood an acrimonious relationship and three wars, and is considered one of the most successful water-sharing arrangements in the world. It survived the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 and the standoffs of 1987, 2001\u201302, 2008, 2016 and 2019.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Options and considerations<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> \u2192 renegotiate to reflect changed geopolitical realities; India is disadvantaged as upper riparian.<\/li>\n<li>Using the treaty as a pressure point \u2192 suspend Permanent Indus Commission meetings; maximise use of the allocated share; contemplate withdrawal, particularly in response to Chinese dams on the Indus.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">TCA Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 future negotiation is possible, including a <span class=\"n-term\">joint river basin authority<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">UNDP<\/span> has called on India to share the water deficit from the western rivers during lean seasons.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Is stopping the flow practical?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Blocking flow means blocking the three western rivers, which carry more than 80% of the Indus basin\u2019s flow \u2014 achievable only by storage or diversion.<\/li>\n<li><em>Diversion<\/em> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Iftikhar A. Drabu: 117 BCM<\/span> would inundate nearly <span class=\"n-term\">120,000 sq km<\/span> to a height of one metre every year, or the whole Kashmir valley to seven metres in a single year. Diverting any one river needs a man-made river running hundreds of kilometres.<\/li>\n<li><em>Storage<\/em> \u2192 a single Tehri-sized storage takes nearly a decade; even thirty simultaneous projects would impound water only around 2030.<\/li>\n<li>Either way Pakistan feels no impact for at least the next <span class=\"n-term\">30 to 50 years<\/span>, and the environmental cost of both is catastrophic.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Arguments against manipulation<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Asma Yaqoob<\/span> \u2192 the treaty is legally a \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">non-exit<\/span>\u201d partnership; denying Pakistan access would damage India\u2019s global reputation and unsettle China and Nepal, with whom India is itself a downstream recipient.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Maya Mirchandani<\/span> \u2192 calls to abrogate are knee-jerk emotional responses; abrogation would alarm other countries with rights over rivers flowing from India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sayanangshu Modak<\/span> \u2192 by keeping to the treaty India strengthens its standing as a responsible upstream riparian when engaging China. Equally, since neither goodwill nor friendship \u2014 the preamble\u2019s stated spirit \u2014 now exists, critics argue India has no obligation to continue.<\/li>\n<li>Without Pakistan actually feeling any impact, abrogation would only feed lobbies within Pakistan that want relations to deteriorate.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amit Ranjan<\/span> \u2192 the widening supply-demand gap has produced <span class=\"n-term\">water nationalism<\/span>; militant groups have taken up the issue, with March 2010 rallies in Muzaffarabad and Lahore denouncing India\u2019s \u201ctheft\u201d of waters through \u201cillegal dams\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Blood and water can\u2019t flow together.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, after Uri, 2016. In 2019 India\u2019s water minister threatened to let \u201cnot even a single drop of water\u201d reach Pakistan.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-suspension-of-april-2025\">The suspension of April 2025<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>On <span class=\"n-term\">23 April 2025<\/span> India <span class=\"n-term\">suspended<\/span> the treaty, triggered by the <span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam attack<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Legal basis<\/span> \u2192 India invoked <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 62<\/span> of the Vienna Convention<\/span>, arguing a <span class=\"n-term\">fundamental change of circumstances<\/span> caused by Pakistan\u2019s support for terrorism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">What India gains<\/span> \u2192 the way opens to untapped hydropower on the western rivers, an estimated <span class=\"n-term\">18,000 MW<\/span>, feeding energy needs and development in Jammu and Kashmir.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Suspension, not revocation<\/span> \u2192 this allows continued diplomatic engagement and possible renegotiation; India can halt data-sharing and pause dispute mechanisms without outright abrogation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Implications for Pakistan<\/span> \u2192 threatens water security in Punjab and Sindh, deepening economic crisis and political instability.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Diplomatic risk<\/span> \u2192 international backlash, damage to India\u2019s standing as a reliable partner in transboundary water agreements, and a precedent for future disputes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Environmental and technical constraints<\/span> \u2192 ecosystem and sediment effects, and the geological difficulty of building in the seismic Himalayan region, requiring substantial investment and time.<\/li>\n<li>Pending Indian projects \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Shahpurkandi Dam<\/span> on the Ravi, the <span class=\"n-term\">Ujh Dam<\/span> in Jammu and Kashmir and the <span class=\"n-term\">Ravi\u2013Beas link<\/span> in Punjab \u2014 need to be expedited to feed the food bowls of India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cDespite the differences between India and Pakistan on various issues, Indus Water Treaty has stood the test of times.\u201d In the light of this statement, discuss the recent developments over this issue.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/despite-the-differences-between-india-and-pakistan-on-various-upsc-psir-2017-4101\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"abeyance-the-word-the-law-the-capacity\">Abeyance \u2014 the word, the law, the capacity<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The word India chose<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India said <span class=\"n-term\">abeyance<\/span>, not suspension and not termination \u2014 the choice was deliberate. <span class=\"n-term\">Article XII(4)<\/span> keeps the treaty in force until replaced by another ratified treaty; there is no exit clause, so a stated withdrawal would have been a plain breach.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s letter of <span class=\"n-term\">24 April 2025<\/span> cited <span class=\"n-term\">significantly altered population demographics<\/span> and the need to accelerate clean-energy development, and accused Pakistan of refusing modification talks and of breaching the treaty through sustained cross-border terrorism.<\/li>\n<li>India is <span class=\"n-term\">not a party to the Vienna Convention<\/span> on the Law of Treaties, and the IWT predates it \u2014 which is why the two sides argue past each other on <span class=\"n-law\">Articles 60 and 62<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Vikram Misri, Foreign Secretary, on the CCS decision, 23 April 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Is it lawful? Three positions<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nishant Sirohi<\/span> (ORF)<\/td>\n<td>Legal statecraft, not a breach \u2014 a proportionate and reversible countermeasure grounded in customary law. India has neither withdrawn nor diverted flows; it has paused procedural cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rishabh Bajoria<\/span> (EJIL:Talk!)<\/td>\n<td>The opposite view \u2014 abeyance works like suspension and would likely fail the tests in VCLT <span class=\"n-law\">Articles 60 and 62<\/span>, since a militant attack is neither a treaty breach nor a fundamental change of circumstances.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Uttam Kumar Sinha<\/span> (MP-IDSA)<\/td>\n<td>India never signed the VCLT and has only re-evaluated its adherence rather than abrogated the treaty. Abeyance is a deliberate administrative action, not a symbolic gesture.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Intent versus capacity \u2014 the gap that decides the question<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The treaty allows India only <span class=\"n-term\">3.6 million acre-feet<\/span> (about 4.4 km\u00b3) of storage on the western rivers, against some <span class=\"n-term\">182 km\u00b3<\/span> flowing to Pakistan yearly. India has built about <span class=\"n-term\">0.7 MAF<\/span> of that entitlement.<\/li>\n<li>Permitted plants are <span class=\"n-term\">run-of-river<\/span> and hold little water; new large storage would take years, some to 2032. So the real pressure today is <span class=\"n-term\">informational, not hydrological<\/span> \u2014 halting flood data and technical exchange hurts Pakistan more than any dam can at present.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Action since abeyance<\/span> \u2192 sediment-flushing at <span class=\"n-term\">Baglihar, Salal and Dulhasti<\/span> on the Chenab without notifying Pakistan; fast-tracked Chenab hydropower \u2014 Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624), Kwar (540), Ratle (850), Sawalkote (1,856). J&amp;K\u2019s installed hydropower is set to rise about 46%, from 3,540 MW to 5,164 MW, by December 2026.<\/li>\n<li>No confirmed evidence yet that aggregate flows have changed; the shift so far is legal and procedural.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Unable for now to block water flows to Pakistan, India can, however, halt the flow of information. In some ways, this could be India\u2019s most powerful current card.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>David Michel, CSIS, 1 May 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The arbitration clash<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Court of Arbitration<\/span> case (PCA No. 2023-01), chaired by <span class=\"n-sch\">Sean D. Murphy<\/span>, ruled on <span class=\"n-term\">27 June 2025<\/span> that abeyance does not remove the Court\u2019s competence.<\/li>\n<li>India did not appear and calls the Court <span class=\"n-term\">illegally constituted<\/span>, while accepting the parallel <span class=\"n-term\">Neutral Expert<\/span> track (Michel Lino) that it had itself requested \u2014 two tracks running at once on the same dams.<\/li>\n<li>A further <span class=\"n-term\">Maximum Pondage award<\/span> (15 May 2026) went against India, which the Ministry of External Affairs dismissed as <span class=\"n-term\">null and void<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The clash is less about any single dam than about whether a party can walk out of a binding dispute system by relabelling its exit.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The text of the Treaty, therefore, does not provide for the unilateral \u2018abeyance\u2019 or \u2018suspension\u2019 of the Treaty.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Court of Arbitration, Supplemental Award on Competence, 27 June 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">One year on \u2014 2026<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Positions have hardened and diverged: India says the treaty is in abeyance, Pakistan says it is <span class=\"n-term\">fully operational and effective<\/span>. Home Minister <span class=\"n-sch\">Amit Shah<\/span> has said it will never be restored; President Zardari objected on World Water Day, 22 March 2026.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan raised the issue at a <span class=\"n-term\">UN Security Council Arria-formula meeting<\/span> on 30 January 2026.<\/li>\n<li>The basin lost about <span class=\"n-term\">24.8%<\/span> of perennial snow and ice cover between 2001 and 2021 \u2014 the argument that climate stress leaves both states no real alternative to cooperation, whatever the treaty\u2019s legal status.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theory \u2014 how to frame it in an answer<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amal Chandra<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">coercive treaty retaliation<\/span>: a treaty becomes an instrument for imposing costs on a state accused of sponsoring terrorism \u2014 a move from liberal institutionalism toward realism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Medha Bisht<\/span> \u2192 coercive diplomacy displacing <span class=\"n-term\">strategic idealism<\/span>, which had assumed that cooperation breeds stability. Her caution: this framing may make future cooperation harder, because it pushes aside the ecological view of shared rivers.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Masha Tokas<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">securitization theory<\/span> \u2014 India recast water from a technical matter into a security concern, ending the older habit of keeping the treaty apart from politics. Against this she sets <span class=\"n-term\">regime theory<\/span>, which the treaty exemplified for decades.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>In such scenarios, power trumps principle, and realism supplants liberal institutionalism.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Amal Chandra, Global Policy Journal, 14 May 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Escalation risk<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan has drawn a red line, treating any real interruption of flows as an <span class=\"n-term\">act of war<\/span> \u2014 which raises the danger of miscalculation between two nuclear states.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dan Haines<\/span> (UCL) \u2192 even symbolic disruption could hurt Pakistani agriculture, close to a quarter of the economy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David Michel<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s upper-riparian advantage could rebound, since China sits above India on the same river system and may copy the tactic on the Brahmaputra; touching a settled water treaty may also unsettle smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh and Nepal.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Any attempt to usurp the water of the lower riparian, or to stop it, or to divert it would be an act of war against Pakistan and would be responded to with full force, including nuclear.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Muhammad Khalid Jamali, Pakistan\u2019s Ambassador<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"pulwama-and-balakot\">Pulwama and Balakot<\/h3>\n<p>An assessment of India\u2019s response by <span class=\"n-sch\">Zorawar Daulat Singh<\/span>:<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Gains<\/th>\n<th>Concerns<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Pre-emptive self-defence<\/span> \u2014 India asserted a right usually associated with Western powers, marking a break from restraint.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Risk of escalation<\/span> into armed conflict.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Challenging proxy warfare<\/span> \u2014 raised the cost of Pakistan\u2019s long-standing strategy.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Erosion of strategic restraint<\/span>, which was designed to avoid unnecessary escalation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Active defence<\/span> \u2014 a proactive stance against terrorism from Pakistani soil.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Pivot state dynamics<\/span> \u2014 Pakistan\u2019s ties with the United States and Saudi Arabia limit their support for India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Global recognition<\/span> \u2014 wider acknowledgement of Pakistan\u2019s support for terrorism.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Internationalisation<\/span> of the conflict, inviting external involvement; and <span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s role<\/span>, whose reluctance to sanction figures such as Masood Azhar hinders efforts to isolate Pakistan.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"cpec-and-the-china-factor\">CPEC and the China factor<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How Sino-Pakistan ties were built<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>1950s\u201360s<\/em> \u2192 contacts at governmental, professional and intellectual levels, thin in political and economic content. Pakistan served as China\u2019s main bridge to the Islamic world and helped bridge the communication gap between the PRC and the West.<\/li>\n<li><em>1960s\u201370s<\/em> \u2192 Pakistan\u2019s disenchantment with the West coincided with trouble from India; the relationship was built in the aftermath of the 1962 border war. In <span class=\"n-term\">1963<\/span> Pakistan ceded the <span class=\"n-term\">Shaksgam Valley<\/span> to China, which then supplied arms, materials for the nuclear weapons programme and economic aid.<\/li>\n<li><em>1965 war<\/em> \u2192 of all Pakistan\u2019s supporters China spoke loudest, linking the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan conflicts and asserting a single Indian design of expansionism. In <em>1971<\/em> China treated events in Pakistan as an internal affair to be settled without foreign intervention.<\/li>\n<li><em>1990s<\/em> \u2192 Li Peng\u2019s April 1999 visit defined a broad consensus on regional and international issues.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">CPEC and its consequences<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CPEC, a flagship of the <span class=\"n-term\">Belt and Road Initiative<\/span>, passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Geostrategic<\/span> \u2192 transforms China\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Malacca Dilemma<\/span> into India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Gwadar Dilemma<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Geo-economic<\/span> \u2192 undercuts India\u2019s stance towards Pakistan, shifts Pakistan away from South Asian integration, and reduces the value of economic isolation as an Indian instrument.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">P.S. Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 India could consider participating in regional trade if Pakistan and China open cross-South Asian routes. <span class=\"n-sch\">Hardeep S. Puri<\/span> \u2192 maintain resistance to CPEC to safeguard sovereignty.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The relationship raises the specter that India may, in the future, face a two-front war, a scenario that would have been implausible a decade ago.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Manjari Chatterjee Miller<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Implications for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jayadeva Ranade<\/span> \u2192 with Chinese military power flowing into Pakistan, China straddles India on the northern, eastern and western borders, raising the prospect of a two-front war and positioning China to play a role in Kashmir. Since 2010 Pakistan is the only country with which China has an \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">all-weather strategic partnership<\/span>\u201d.<\/li>\n<li>Under Xi Jinping, China\u2019s earlier practice of managing or deferring contentious issues has been discarded for a direct and aggressive approach.<\/li>\n<li>The \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">Rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation<\/span>\u2019 means \u201cthe recovery of territories that China feels it has lost through the imposition of unequal treaties by hostile foreign powers\u201d \u2014 hence the framing of the border question as a colonial legacy, and claims to Aksai Chin, Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, reinforced by stapled visas.<\/li>\n<li>The relationship is not problem-free \u2192 Chinese wariness about Islamist militants in Xinjiang and their Pakistani links, attacks on Chinese citizens in Pakistan, sporadic opposition to CPEC, and Chinese caution on Kashmir. It is nevertheless no longer a mere relationship but a genuine partnership.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"balochistan\">Balochistan<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>In the <span class=\"n-term\">southwest of Pakistan<\/span>, about half the country\u2019s territory, rich in gas, gold, copper, oil and uranium, yet among its poorest regions. <span class=\"n-term\">Gwadar port<\/span> gives it strategic weight.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Unresolved autonomy<\/span> \u2192 the incorporation of Balochistan, including the formerly independent Kalat, has produced persistent grievances. <span class=\"n-term\">Human rights abuses<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">economic exploitation<\/span> without local benefit and <span class=\"n-term\">ethnic nationalism<\/span> against Punjabi dominance sustain the conflict.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan accuses India of supporting Baloch nationalist activity; India generally maintains a non-interventionist stance but has occasionally highlighted the region\u2019s plight.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span> \u2192 mentioning Balochistan puts pressure on both China and Pakistan, since CPEC depends on secure access through Gwadar.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sadanand Dhume<\/span> \u2192 the reference reflects scepticism about productive dialogue with Pakistan in present circumstances.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanwal Sibal<\/span> \u2192 by raising Balochistan in his Independence Day speech, the Prime Minister put Pakistan on notice about its own internal vulnerabilities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"why-pakistan-is-the-hard-case\">Why Pakistan is the hard case<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan is India\u2019s biggest foreign policy challenge \u2014 a source of threats ranging from nuclear war to lone-wolf attacks and suicide bombings, and a proxy of China. Historically India has faced its bigger threats from the western front.<\/li>\n<li>China is a greater power but a comparatively more responsible member of world politics, with some shared interests with India. Pakistan is termed a \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">mad child with loaded gun<\/span>\u2019 and an example of a rogue state; hence India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">strategic restraint<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span> treats such restraint not as weakness but as a measured response.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The challenges, stated plainly<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Taliban takeover of Afghanistan<\/span> \u2192 Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba now have a friendly regime that may look the other way or offer safe haven. <span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> refers to Pakistan as the <em>\u2018patron saint\u2019<\/em> of Afghanistan\u2019s new regime.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Right-wing Hindu nationalism in India<\/span> \u2192 Pakistan signalled a desire to improve ties in its first-ever National Security Policy while remaining concerned about Indian \u201cmilitary adventurism\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Political instability and military dominance<\/span> \u2192 a deep state with a weak political regime; the military\u2019s interest lies in keeping the situation tense. <span class=\"n-sch\">Christine Fair<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Ayesha Siddiqa<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Hussain Haqqani<\/span> hold that the Pakistani Army derives its sustenance from the Kashmir conflict; so long as it can sustain the perception of India as an existential threat and ideological antithesis, it continues to receive state largesse and political clout.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The obsession with Kashmir<\/span> \u2192 makes long-term peace impossible; since the abrogation of <span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span>, Pakistan has tried every diplomatic means to be heard.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Chinese interference<\/span> \u2192 CPEC, Chinese presence on Pakistani soil, and Beijing\u2019s better relations with the Taliban.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s idealistic foreign policy<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Dogra<\/span> argues that idealist Indian leaders made repeated concessions, after which Pakistan always found new means to undermine Indian interests; India has been \u201chopping in confusion\u201d over non-state actors, without an effective deterrent response or a consistent security posture.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Absence of an innovative counter-terrorism strategy<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Kanwal Sibal<\/span> notes India remains in a bind, caught between peace lobbies asserting <em>\u201cno alternative to dialogue\u201d<\/em> and <em>\u201cwe can choose our friends but not neighbours\u201d<\/em>, and the record of Pakistani behaviour.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Unchanging security dilemma<\/span> \u2192 neither side\u2019s threat perception has fundamentally changed; Pakistan\u2019s first National Security Policy mentions peace briefly and spends the rest debating New Delhi\u2019s \u201chegemonic\u201d goals.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What India should do<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Balance Pakistan in Afghanistan<\/span> \u2192 engage the Taliban realistically and build security cooperation, while bracing for a heightened threat.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Counter China<\/span> \u2192 form counter-alliances on the lines of <span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya\u2019s<\/span> <em>raja-mandala<\/em> and raise issues uncomfortable for Beijing.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Revive SAARC<\/span> \u2192 follow a <em>functionalist<\/em> approach and make Pakistan realise the benefits of cooperation, particularly while it is under economic stress.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization<\/span> \u2192 both are members of a security-focused body; find ways to press Pakistan on terrorism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Neutralise Pakistan strategically<\/span> \u2192 conventional victory has become costly and remote since Pakistan acquired credible deterrence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Take the first initiative<\/span> under \u2018Neighbourhood First\u2019 \u2192 India, as the bigger country, should move first, but with caution.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"possibilities-of-cooperation\">Possibilities of cooperation<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2014 systemic change has created conditions for cooperation. Pakistan\u2019s nuclear weapons neutralised India\u2019s conventional advantage, while India\u2019s rising economic and political power has <span class=\"n-term\">widened the gap<\/span> between them.<\/li>\n<li>The widened gap encourages, though it does not necessitate, long-term cooperation; India needs stability in its immediate environs to play a larger role in Asia and beyond.<\/li>\n<li>Nuclear weapons and economic trans-nationalisation together \u2192 (a) give Pakistan security from attack, reducing its sense of vulnerability; (b) produce sufficient risk to make leaders rethink; (c) create stronger incentives to cooperate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Toward a democratic peace?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both moved away from zero-sum approaches to Kashmir in the early twenty-first century, loosening controls on cross-LoC movement of people and goods; state-level factors kept the movement a slow crawl.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Mansfield and Snyder<\/span> \u2014 democratising states are war-prone. Pakistan\u2019s unstable hybrid democracy, its mix of populism and military power, and parties outbidding each other in appeasing conservatives, make democratic peace difficult.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The prospects for a \u2018democratic peace\u2019 between India and Pakistan remain limited for the near future. The truism that democracies do not fight one another applies only to developed capitalist societies, and neither is anywhere close to being that.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rajesh Basrur<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Instances of cooperation, and the economics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty<\/span>, in force through several conflicts, seen as a model for international water-sharing; SAFTA and regional cooperation during periods of calm; cultural exchange of artists; Pakistani players in the Indian Premier League; joint hosting of the <span class=\"n-term\">South Asian Games, 2004<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Political tension long kept trade low because Pakistan sought to keep India at arm\u2019s length. Trade growth does not by itself rule out political tension, as United States\u2013China and Japan\u2013China trade show.<\/li>\n<li>Both the <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan People\u2019s Party<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)<\/span> favour more trade and investment; <span class=\"n-term\">Basrur<\/span> notes that internal pressures nonetheless held up MFN status, despite economic misfortune and IMF pressure.<\/li>\n<li>Trade figures \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">$521 million<\/span> (2004\u201305) \u2192 about <span class=\"n-term\">$2.35 billion<\/span> (2012\u201313) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">$329.26 million<\/span> (2020\u201321) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">$1.35 billion<\/span> in April\u2013December 2022 against $516.36 million in all of 2021\u201322. One study estimates potential growth of about tenfold.<\/li>\n<li>India imposed <span class=\"n-term\">200% tariffs<\/span> after Pulwama and withdrew MFN status; Pakistan suspended trade after August 2019. Facilitating structures exist \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Wagah\u2013Attari<\/span> crossing and <span class=\"n-term\">SAFTA<\/span> \u2014 but advance only as far as politics allows.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"defeat-contain-negotiate-and-the-army-question\">Defeat, contain, negotiate \u2014 and the Army question<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> (<em>The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy<\/em>) identifies three tried options.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three options tried, and the one Basrur puts on the table.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">DEFEAT<\/span> (1948, 1965, 1971. Made Pakistan cautious \u2014 and accelerated the bomb) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">CONTAIN<\/span> (India chose non-alignment; Pakistan built alliances) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">NEGOTIATE<\/span> (Willingness to limit demands read as weakness) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">SYMMETRIC<\/span> (Calibrated backing of nationalist, not fundamentalist, forces)<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Defeat<\/span> \u2192 Pakistan initiated war in 1948, 1965 and 1971 seeking parity; India\u2019s response was reactive in the first two, proactive in the third. Defeat made Pakistan cautious but accelerated its nuclear programme, nullifying the war option, and pushed it towards <em>asymmetrical balancing<\/em> through terrorism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Contain<\/span> \u2192 containment worked poorly, because India chose non-alignment and avoided alliances while Pakistan built them. Continued infiltration, Kargil, the 2001 Parliament attack and Mumbai 2008 showed Pakistan could not be deterred.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Negotiate<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s willingness to make and limit demands appears to have been read as weakness. Pakistan\u2019s internal fissures make abandoning revisionism difficult, as the failure of the composite dialogue showed. <span class=\"n-term\">Bhutto\u2019s<\/span> promise of a 1,000-year war over Kashmir and <span class=\"n-term\">Zia\u2019s<\/span> Islamisation further narrowed the space.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The symmetric option<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Basrur\u2019s suggestion \u2014 calibrated backing of nationalist, as distinct from religious fundamentalist, forces opposed to the Pakistani state. The objection that India could not risk state failure and radicals acquiring the bomb is, in his view, exaggerated.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Assessing Indian policy<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2192 containment yielded few dividends. India kept flagging a military option that was unviable, especially after 2002, and could not influence Pakistan\u2019s asymmetric strategy, which depended entirely on internal Pakistani factors.<\/li>\n<li>India also failed to build a strategic partnership with the United States that would have strengthened its position; a decade after offering military bases in the wake of 9\/11, it was avoiding agreements on logistics support and communications interoperability, apparently wary of antagonising China \u2014 which is odd, given India\u2019s limited capacity to tackle even Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Dogra<\/span> \u2192 since independence, and especially under Nehru, idealism produced concessions that Pakistan pocketed before finding new means to undermine Indian interests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The Army question<\/span> \u2192 any warming will happen only when the Pakistani military comes on board, so engaging the military may be more fruitful than engaging the civilian government. India\u2019s dilemma is that it deals with the civilian government but refuses to deal with the most powerful institution setting Pakistan\u2019s India policy. There are no army-to-army talks, and it is unclear whether the Indian Army, with far less influence over policy, would gain from them \u2014 or whether the Pakistan Army, whose very reason for being is a perceived existential threat, would even be inclined.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"policy-since-2014-and-its-assessment\">Policy since 2014, and its assessment<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The turn<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The government began with \u2018Neighbourhood First\u2019 in earnest, inviting all SAARC heads of state to the swearing-in. Talks stalled after Pathankot (2 January 2016) and the Uri attack of 18 September 2016, the deadliest on security forces in two decades, killing <span class=\"n-term\">19<\/span> soldiers.<\/li>\n<li>India cancelled participation in the SAARC summit scheduled for Islamabad in November 2016; on <span class=\"n-term\">28 September 2016<\/span> it carried out \u201csurgical strikes\u201d across the LoC.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Joseph Vater<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Yogesh Joshi<\/span> \u2192 policy has moved from <span class=\"n-term\">strategic restraint<\/span> to <span class=\"n-term\">realist strategic assertiveness<\/span>. Externally: failure to credibly deter revanchism, upsized military and economic capability, greater freedom from international reprisal, and the threat of radicals moving from Syria to Afghanistan-Pakistan and on to Kashmir. Domestically: the 2019 electoral verdict, a strongman leadership style, nationalist support generated by confronting Pakistan, and a parliamentary majority permitting an agenda not possible under coalition constraints in 1998\u20132004.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanti Bajpai<\/span> \u2192 the policy is \u2018normal anger\u2019 assertive diplomacy with explicit coalition building, defined as a <em>\u2018cooperation-defection cycle\u2019<\/em>: doors kept open to preserve India\u2019s image as a responsible player and for nuclear stability, defection used to set the agenda and the precondition of ending terrorism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>At the heart of Modi\u2019s efforts is the desire to make terrorism the central focus of India\u2013Pakistan negotiations.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Kanti Bajpai. His point: this runs counter to India\u2019s policy since the 1990s, under which a long-term composite dialogue would treat Kashmir and security as co-equal primary issues. The signal now is that India will discuss terrorism and refuse to talk about Kashmir.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Doval Doctrine<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">defensive offence<\/span>. India\u2019s refusal to counter Pakistan\u2019s aerial riposte to Balakot with attacks on military positions in the Naushera sector signalled defensive intent pursued through offensive means.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Key elements<\/span> \u2192 rejection of peace talks as impractical; using India\u2019s superior position against Pakistan\u2019s vulnerabilities; and a three-fold strategy of intelligence-driven pre-emption, strategic weaponisation to disrupt terrorist infrastructure, and high-tech intelligence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Bilateral and coalition diplomacy<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>Bilateral<\/em> \u2192 the cycle of cooperation and defection. Talks were cancelled when the Pakistani High Commissioner invited Hurriyat leaders in August 2014, a practice New Delhi had overlooked for twenty years. At <span class=\"n-term\">Ufa<\/span> (SCO, 11 July 2015) the two agreed to an NSA-level meeting on terrorism; attacks followed at Gurdaspur (17 July) and Udhampur (5 August). After the Paris meeting of November 2015 dialogue resumed; Pathankot followed on 2 January. A joint investigation team visited Pathankot in March 2016; Islamabad cancelled the dialogue on 7 April.<\/li>\n<li><em>Coalition<\/em> \u2192 argued for a UN convention on terrorism; sought sanctions listing for <span class=\"n-term\">Masood Azhar<\/span> in February 2016; the June 2016 India\u2013US joint statement committed both to act in the UN against three Pakistan-based organisations and to press Pakistan on Mumbai and Pathankot. An \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">Acting West<\/span>\u2019 approach persuaded Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to include strong references to terrorism in joint statements.<\/li>\n<li>India also took Pakistan to the <span class=\"n-term\">ICJ<\/span> and worked with the <span class=\"n-term\">Financial Action Task Force<\/span>, drawing the distinction between a \u201cresponsible\u201d India and a \u201crogue\u201d Pakistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>India has moved on from its non-aligned past. India is today an aligned state \u2014 but based on issues.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Vijay Gokhale<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Positives<\/th>\n<th>Criticism<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Defensive offence rests on realist assumptions \u2014 power checks power \u2014 while keeping the door open for dialogue preserves India\u2019s image as a responsible global player.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanti Bajpai<\/span> \u2192 the policy has reached a dead end because Pakistan is a \u2018sharp power\u2019 with a high tolerance for coercion; international patience with India is wearing thin, and India risks the tag of an irresponsible power.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 the response to terror strikes changed the fundamentals of Indian foreign and security policy. Air power used against camps deep inside Pakistani territory for the first time since 1971 shattered the myth of Pakistan\u2019s nuclear cover, opened the possibility of limited conventional war, and put the onus of escalation back on Pakistan.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2192 calls the policy \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">instant coffee<\/span>\u2019, lacking vision and clarity of goal. <span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span> \u2192 the \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">all or nothing<\/span>\u2019 approach has failed; relations have deteriorated and violence in Kashmir has risen.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shishir Gupta<\/span> \u2192 India has decided to call a spade a spade, building a pro-India lobby in the world, defending its interests by choosing friends and degrading enemies; FATF grey-listing helped isolate Pakistan.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2192 counter-terrorism has damaged cadres and local leadership in the Valley, but these tactical gains are undermined by the persistent alienation of the population, which gives Pakistan plentiful opportunity to meddle.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"where-things-stand-and-the-2025-conflict\">Where things stand \u2014 and the 2025 conflict<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Age of minimalism<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Happymon Jacob\u2019s term for the present phase \u2014 a \u2018cold peace\u2019 with no political will for a grand relationship, grand gestures or grand outreach.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span> \u2192 very little bilateral contact, few expectations of a breakthrough, hardly any warmth. New Delhi has learnt that peace with Pakistan demands too much time, commitment and effort with little guarantee of success; relations have been reduced to a backchannel between the Indian NSA and the Pakistan Army establishment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sushant Sareen<\/span> \u2192 2019 set the tone. Within days India shook off restraints it had imposed on itself for three decades, striking not in PoK but in Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; the August move on <span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span> killed whatever remained. At best, diplomatic relations may be restored, trade may open and travel may ease; beyond that the LoC will stay hot and terrorism will continue below the threshold of tolerance.<\/li>\n<li>Factors shaping the future \u2192 democracy and internal stability in Pakistan; the influence of the United States despite both sides rejecting mediation; agreement on a direction for comprehensive effort on Kashmir; and recognition of the Simla and Lahore arrangements.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The escalation arc \u2014 each response goes one step further.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">URI, 2016<\/span> (Surgical strikes across the Line of Control) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">PULWAMA, 2019<\/span> (Balakot \u2014 air power beyond the LoC, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">PAHALGAM, 2025<\/span> (Operation Sindoor \u2014 drones and precision strikes)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The 2025 conflict<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Triggered by the terrorist attack at <span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam<\/span>, attributed to Pakistan-based groups.<\/li>\n<li>Both sides avoided targeting civilians directly and avoided full-scale war. India framed the action as a response to terrorism rather than war against Pakistan, managing international perceptions while maintaining strategic restraint.<\/li>\n<li>The nuclear dimension hung over the conflict without escalation; crisis management and military-to-military communication mattered in de-escalation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span> \u2192 warfare is becoming faster and more technologically sophisticated; deterrence works up to a point, but the underlying cause, Pakistan\u2019s support for terrorism, remains unresolved.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"operation-sindoor-the-doctrine-and-the-debate\">Operation Sindoor \u2014 the doctrine and the debate<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The sequence, in dates<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">22 April 2025<\/span> \u2014 Pahalgam; 26 civilians killed, most male and identified by religion. India attributed it to <span class=\"n-term\">The Resistance Front<\/span>, described as a Lashkar-e-Taiba front; Pakistan denied involvement.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">23 April<\/span> \u2014 IWT held in abeyance; Attari check-post shut, SAARC visa-exemption entry cancelled, Pakistani defence advisors expelled, High Commission strength cut from 55 to 30.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">7 May<\/span> \u2014 nine sites struck in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; no Pakistani military facilities targeted. First strikes on the <span class=\"n-term\">Muridke<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Bahawalpur<\/span> headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Attacks reached deepest into Pakistani Punjab since <span class=\"n-term\">1971<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Weapons firsts<\/span> \u2192 first Indian use of <span class=\"n-term\">BrahMos<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">SCALP-EG<\/span> cruise missiles against Pakistan; first India\u2013Pakistan clash where both sides used drones to inflict damage; Pakistan\u2019s first use of <span class=\"n-term\">Fatah-I and Fatah-II<\/span> ballistic missiles.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">9\u201310 May<\/span> \u2014 India struck about eleven military sites, including <span class=\"n-term\">Nur Khan airbase<\/span> near Rawalpindi. No manned aircraft crossed into the other\u2019s airspace; the fighting stayed a stand-off exchange. Pakistan launched <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos<\/span> on 10 May.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">10 May<\/span> \u2014 ceasefire understanding through <span class=\"n-term\">DGMO channels<\/span>. The United States role is disputed: Washington claimed mediation, India insists the pause was bilateral.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Casualties, disputed<\/span> \u2192 India claimed over 100 terrorists killed; Pakistan reported 51 dead. India acknowledged at least five service personnel lost; totals remain contested.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The doctrine, 12 May<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three pillars<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Retaliation for any terror attack, on India\u2019s terms \u00b7 no tolerance of \u2018nuclear blackmail\u2019 \u00b7 no distinction between terrorists and the governments that sponsor them.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>If there is a terrorist attack on India, a fitting reply will be given \u2026 on our terms only \u2026 India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail \u2026 we will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, Address to the Nation, 12 May 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Terror and talks cannot go together \u2026 Terror and trade cannot go together \u2026 Water and blood cannot flow together.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, Address to the Nation, 12 May 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What changed \u2014 the case for a new doctrine<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Arzan Tarapore<\/span> \u2192 a change in India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">theory of victory<\/span>. India no longer expects that threatening punishment can change Pakistani behaviour; it now accepts that Pakistani intent is fixed and seeks instead to degrade terrorist capacity through repeated, direct cost imposition \u2014 cumulative deterrence, on the Israeli model of periodic degradation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span> \u2192 a doctrinal innovation that collapses the distinction between subconventional and conventional aggression and, with little nuclear talk on either side, calls Pakistan\u2019s nuclear bluff. His sharpest claim: Sindoor builds a <span class=\"n-term\">tripwire<\/span> \u2014 a terror attack means Pakistan has already begun a conventional conflict, so the burden of avoiding war shifts to Islamabad.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Walter Ladwig III<\/span> \u2192 a lower bar for action: a failure by Pakistan to deny space to terrorist groups is now treated as reason enough to strike.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The retaliation, rather than its threat, is the instrument of coercion \u2014 levying tangible costs that force the adversary\u2019s future attacks to be smaller or rarer.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Arzan Tarapore, War on the Rocks, 19 May 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The counter-case \u2014 continuity, and the costs<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The commitment trap<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Tarapore<\/span> argues the pledge to respond every time cedes the initiative to the terrorists and narrows India\u2019s own room to manoeuvre in a crisis. <span class=\"n-sch\">Moeed Yusuf<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rizwan Zeb<\/span> trace the same dynamic back to Uri and Pulwama, where each claim of a \u2018new normal\u2019 raised the political price of inaction next time.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sameer Lalwani<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Shailender Arya<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">David Brostoff<\/span> \u2192 question the coercive value of <span class=\"n-term\">non-contact warfare<\/span>. Stand-off strikes and drones drift toward limited, incremental action that may signal resolve without imposing much real pain; the Pakistan Army treats militant proxies as an instrument of policy and has domestic reasons to keep fighting.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Ladwig<\/span> \u2192 a structural risk \u2014 once retaliation is guaranteed, fringe actors may stage attacks precisely to provoke a crisis.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Tarapore<\/span> concedes that a pure cost-imposition strategy cannot deliver peace and, on its own terms, never ends.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Calibration under the nuclear overhang<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Christopher Clary<\/span> (<em>Four Days in May<\/em>) \u2192 overt nuclear signalling was <span class=\"n-term\">lower<\/span> than in earlier India\u2013Pakistan crises; both sides calibrated moves and tested escalation thresholds without clearly crossing them. He reads the 8\u201310 May strikes through <span class=\"n-term\">Schelling\u2019s<\/span> theory of coercion.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Yusuf<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Zeb<\/span> \u2192 across a quarter century these have been crises in a nuclearised environment rather than nuclear crises, because both states hold a <span class=\"n-term\">recessed deterrence<\/span> posture \u2014 leaning on <span class=\"n-sch\">Vipin Narang\u2019s<\/span> account of Pakistan\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">asymmetric escalation posture<\/span>. Their warning: the real hazard is a growing belief on both sides that escalation can be managed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it.<\/em> \u2014 **Thomas C. Schelling, <em>Arms and Influence<\/em>, 1966<\/p>\n<p><cite>cited in Clary<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>South Asian crises can most aptly be described as crises in a nuclearized environment rather than nuclear crises per se.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Moeed Yusuf &amp; Rizwan Zeb, Carnegie Endowment, 2026<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Doctrine, or only a pattern?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Soumya Awasthi<\/span> \u2192 a turn to <span class=\"n-term\">proactive compellence<\/span> \u2014 escalation-dominant, built on cost imposition meant to alter the adversary\u2019s calculus. Her caution: India has no formally published counter-terrorism doctrine, its intelligence-to-strike cycle is not routinised, and its narrative advantage faded within days.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 one year on, what emerged is a clearer <span class=\"n-term\">pattern of behaviour rather than a fixed doctrine<\/span>; Sindoor demonstrated a capability that still awaits institutional permanence. He also reads the wider design \u2014 by linking previously insulated areas such as water and connectivity to security, India signalled that the costs of backing proxy violence would be spread across several fronts.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The mediation dispute<\/span> \u2192 Trump\u2019s claim to have brokered the ceasefire cut against India\u2019s long-held rejection of third-party mediation; <span class=\"n-term\">Pant<\/span> calls the resulting contest a battle over narratives that served Pakistan\u2019s interest in internationalising the dispute, and holds that Washington\u2019s acceptance of India\u2019s counter-terrorism framing proved conditional rather than transformative.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The China factor<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Lalwani<\/span> and co-authors note that Pakistan\u2019s use of Chinese systems and reported Chinese support hardened Indian assessments of a fused <span class=\"n-term\">two-front threat<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>A doctrine that exists only in battlefield execution, without doctrinal codification \u2026 remains a half-completed revolution.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Soumya Awasthi, Observer Research Foundation, 7 May 2026<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"theory-scholars-books\">Theory, scholars, books<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theoretical perspectives<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Functionalism<\/span> \u2192 despite deep conflict, cooperation on water, trade and counter-terrorism could be built by concentrating on shared economic and security benefit.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Sociological Liberalism<\/span> \u2192 societal ties and people-to-people interaction \u2014 cultural exchange, education, civil society \u2014 build trust and reduce the weight of nationalist rhetoric.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Social Constructivism<\/span> \u2192 the conflict is not only material; perceptions, historical narratives and misunderstanding shape it, so trust-building and reframing are central.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Views of scholars<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sumit Ganguly<\/span> (<em>Deadly Impasse<\/em>) \u2192 traditional deterrence models and the security dilemma are inadequate here; persistent insecurity on both sides blocks rapprochement. He characterises Pakistan as revisionist and irredentist, driven by a parochial mindset within its military establishment rather than a comprehensive national interest, and stresses the conflict of identity between Islamist Pakistan and secular India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Insecurity dilemma perspective<\/span> \u2192 pathological obsession and paranoia among elites; a reductive nationalism fixated on animosity. In Pakistan, discourse is consumed by hostility towards India with minimal focus on national pride, amplified by a well-funded military establishment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dilip Hiro<\/span> \u2192 a narrative of fatal miscalculation, entrenched antagonism and reciprocal paranoia among elites.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Stephen P. Cohen<\/span> \u2192 a \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">mutually hurting stalemate<\/span>\u201d, in which neither party can secure victory nor sustain continued losses.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hussain Haqqani<\/span> \u2192 symbolic gestures will not solve the conflict; a major shift in attitudes is required on both sides.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan\u2019s distinctive features \u2192 a <span class=\"n-term\">hybrid political system<\/span> with a <span class=\"n-term\">dyarchic structure<\/span> in which the military wields substantial influence through a selected civilian figurehead; a <span class=\"n-term\">rentier state<\/span> reliant on external assistance; often characterised as a <span class=\"n-term\">rogue state<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Prescriptions \u2014 who says what<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Prescription<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Engage the military leadership in Rawalpindi rather than only the civilian government in Islamabad.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Be cautious with the civil government to avoid provoking the military; re-evaluate the Indus Waters Treaty.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Back-channel diplomacy through the United States and Saudi Arabia; conclude the <span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism<\/span>; strengthen internal security and communal harmony.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Escalate stakes and target Pakistan\u2019s vulnerabilities; criticises inconsistency in India\u2019s response.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Avoid a tit-for-tat approach; take a strategic view of a conflict with many dimensions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Restrained action to maintain India\u2019s image as a mature and responsible nation; cyber warfare in preference to direct military retaliation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Creative statecraft and out-of-the-box diplomacy; disputes the efficacy of military options.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Dealing with Pakistan is a strategic chess game; avoid predictable responses, tailor strategy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Srinath Raghavan<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s policy has shifted from engagement to deterrence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Two books worth naming in an answer<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">J.N. Dixit<\/span>, <em>India-Pakistan In War And Peace<\/em> \u2192 Kashmir will not be resolved unless the aspirations of the Kashmiri people are addressed, and India will find it hard to negotiate the demands of groups such as the JKLF and the All Party Hurriyat Conference. On Pakistan he offers a dismal but realistic picture: its military leadership will keep the issue alive, and whenever Kashmir went to the backburner Pakistan sought to internationalise it, as Kargil showed, with disregard for the Shimla Accord and the Lahore Declaration. On nuclear weapons, he attributes India\u2019s 1998 decision to the external threat from China and its links with Pakistan, India\u2019s quest for regional power status, and the discriminatory nature of regimes such as the CTBT; Pakistan followed only to match India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sharat Sabharwal<\/span>, <em>India\u2019s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship<\/em> \u2192 dealing with Pakistan is a game of <span class=\"n-term\">snakes and ladders<\/span>: every time you climb and feel progress is being made, the snake intervenes and you are lower than before. Pakistani security agencies and their terror proxies ensured the relationship hit one of the longer snakes each time it looked up. He holds that direct engagement with the Army would not change behaviour, given its hostility.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>India will have to continue to count on its counter-terror capabilities and deterrence, combined with turning as much heat as possible on Pakistan in conjunction with its international partners.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Sharat Sabharwal<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Atal Bihari Vajpayee<\/span> \u2192 <em>we can change our friends but not our neighbours<\/em>. Good relations with neighbours are a precondition for a country\u2019s progress, and in an era of complex interdependence a nation\u2019s destiny is tied to its region.<\/li>\n<li>India lives in a difficult neighbourhood with no simple solutions; the record of managing these challenges is creditable, and is likely to continue through new partnerships and hard decisions.<\/li>\n<li>The way forward lies in normalisation, or at least stabilisation \u2014 innovative diplomacy, coalition building, and the wisdom <span class=\"n-sch\">Sun Tzu<\/span> attached to understanding one\u2019s adversary. Bolstering India\u2019s integration into the global economy raises the number of stakeholders in its stability; redressing internal grievances removes what Pakistan can exploit.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"how-the-relationship-is-described\">How the relationship is described<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Uniquely rooted in shared history and geographical proximity, and marked by inherent uncertainties and complex dynamics.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sheikh Hasina<\/span> described the relationship as like a flowing river, full of generosity. <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> describes the current state of affairs as a <span class=\"n-term\">fraternal friendship<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>For the relationship to thrive, it is often said that India should let go of historical grievances while Bangladesh should consider geographical realities.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh Vardhan Shringla<\/span> called the relationship a \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">role model<\/span>\u201d for international affairs. <span class=\"n-sch\">Ajit Doval<\/span> recognised Bangladesh as India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">most important neighbour<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> \u2192 \u201cif there is one example where the neighbourhood first policy has yielded good result, it is in case of Bangladesh\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sreeradha Datta<\/span> \u2192 \u201cIndia\u2013Bangladesh relations reflect the complex legacy of partition, liberation, and regional geopolitics.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Geography has made us neighbors, history has made us friends.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Sheikh Mujibur Rahman<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"three-dimensions-of-the-relationship\">Three dimensions of the relationship<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Strategic<\/th>\n<th>Economic<\/th>\n<th>Political<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Managing external threats<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh\u2019s proximity to China is both an opportunity and a challenge; stable relations are essential to mitigate undue Chinese influence.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Resource potential<\/span> \u2014 oil and gas resources that can enhance regional energy security.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Regional integration<\/span> \u2014 active participation in SAARC, BIMSTEC and BBIN.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Internal security<\/span> \u2014 porous borders have produced illegal migration on a large scale; border security cooperation is essential.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Expansive market<\/span> \u2014 a large population offering trade, investment and collaboration.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Climate change<\/span> \u2014 vulnerability to rising sea levels makes Bangladesh a leading voice in climate discussions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Counter-terrorism<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh has faced attacks linked to groups such as ISIS; collaborative counter-terrorism is essential.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Trade<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh is India\u2019s largest trade partner in South Asia; <span class=\"n-term\">Border Haats<\/span> and trade agreements have eased cross-border commerce.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Northeast security<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh borders several northeastern states, so friendly relations matter for their stability.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"what-india-and-bangladesh-have-built\">What India and Bangladesh have built<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The balance sheet in one line<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th><span class=\"n-lab\">COOPERATION<\/span> \u2014 and it is substantial<\/th>\n<th><span class=\"n-lab\">CONTENTION<\/span> \u2014 and it is unresolved<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Connectivity \u00b7 energy \u00b7 ports \u00b7 health \u00b7 the Land Boundary and maritime settlements<\/td>\n<td>Illegal migration \u00b7 Teesta \u00b7 trade imbalance \u00b7 the opening for China<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Connectivity and infrastructure<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Bangladesh India Friendship Pipeline<\/span> for supply of diesel; agreement to use <span class=\"n-term\">Chittagong and Mongla<\/span> seaports for transportation to India\u2019s northeastern states; the <span class=\"n-term\">BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Feni bridge<\/span> connecting Sabroom in Tripura to Ramgarh; four of six pre-1947 rail links restored; an inland waterway between Sonamura port in Tripura and Munshiganj; work to double air connectivity to <span class=\"n-term\">120 flights per week<\/span>; direct bus services between Kolkata\u2013Dhaka\u2013Agartala and Dhaka\u2013Guwahati\u2013Shillong; a <span class=\"n-term\">15-km<\/span> broad gauge rail line between Agartala and Bangladesh.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Energy, security, economy<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Rooppur Atomic Energy Project<\/span>, an Indo-Russian collaboration in Bangladesh; export of <span class=\"n-term\">660 MW<\/span> of electricity; extradition of ULFA terrorists.<\/li>\n<li>Substantial lines of credit for developmental projects; MoUs for two special economic zones for Indian companies at <span class=\"n-term\">Bheramara and Mongla<\/span>; a draft agreement and two pacts on coastal shipping cooperation in 2015; the transit facility signed in June 2015.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Dispute resolution<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">Land Boundary Agreement<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">maritime boundary<\/span> were peacefully settled, the latter through acceptance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration award in Bangladesh\u2019s favour.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Health, culture, multilateral<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">9 million<\/span> Covishield doses supplied; Bangladesh accounts for more than <span class=\"n-term\">35%<\/span> of India\u2019s international medical patients and more than <span class=\"n-term\">50%<\/span> of India\u2019s medical tourism revenue. Bangladeshis form a large share of tourists in India, outnumbering all tourists from Western Europe in 2017.<\/li>\n<li>Joint commemoration of Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s birth anniversary, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman\u2019s birth centenary and the 50th anniversary of the War of Liberation; cultural exchange programmes for 2015\u20132017 (<span class=\"n-sch\">Kashem and Islam<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li>Work together on UNSC reform, climate change, the SDGs and protection of migrants\u2019 rights; cooperation in SAARC and BIMSTEC; Bangladesh thanked India for convening the SAARC leaders\u2019 video conference in March 2020 and creating the <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC Emergency Response Fund<\/span>; both are members of <span class=\"n-term\">IORA<\/span>, whose chairmanship Bangladesh assumed in 2021.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"contention-i-illegal-migration\">Contention I \u2014 illegal migration<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India and Bangladesh share the world\u2019s longest land border, approximately <span class=\"n-term\">3,700 km<\/span>. Estimates suggest <span class=\"n-term\">30 to 40 million<\/span> Bangladeshis are in India illegally, with notable demographic change in regions such as Tripura.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Causes<\/span> \u2192 lack of recognition, since Bangladesh has not fully acknowledged the extent of the problem; poor border management; push factors such as floods, poverty and historical conflict including the 1971 war; pull factors such as porous borders, corruption among law enforcement, and political motives of electoral support.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Challenges<\/span> \u2192 trafficking of drugs, humans and cattle; fake voter ID cards threatening democratic processes; communal tensions from demographic shifts, affecting the secular character of society; economic strain on infrastructure, healthcare and education.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Potential solutions<\/span> \u2192 enhanced border management including electrified fences aligned with regional security dynamics; addressing corruption among law enforcement agencies; the <span class=\"n-term\">Gujral Doctrine<\/span> approach of cooperating with Bangladesh on the underlying causes of poverty and unemployment; effective data management through the National Population Register; and a <span class=\"n-term\">work permit<\/span> system, which would reduce corruption, maintain accurate records, build goodwill, combat organised crime and protect migrants from exploitation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Write a brief analysis of the ethnic conflicts and cross-border migrations along India-Myanmar and India-Bangladesh borders.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/write-a-brief-analysis-of-the-ethnic-conflicts-and-cross-border-upsc-psir-2021-4103\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the consequences of illegal cross-border migration in India&#8217;s north-eastern region.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-consequences-of-illegal-cross-border-migration-in-upsc-psir-2022-4205\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"contention-ii-water-farakka-and-teesta\">Contention II \u2014 water: Farakka and Teesta<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India and Bangladesh share <span class=\"n-term\">54 common rivers<\/span>. A bilateral <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Rivers Commission (JRC)<\/span> has worked since June 1972 to maximise benefits from common river systems, but only two rivers \u2014 the Ganga and the Teesta \u2014 have been the subject of formal agreement, and the JRC has been <span class=\"n-term\">inactive since 2011<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Farakka Barrage<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nilanjan Ghosh<\/span> \u2192 the Farakka Barrage, long the point of contention in transboundary relations, is now emerging as an <span class=\"n-term\">inter-state<\/span> water dispute. It was planned to enhance the flow of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and revive the port at Kolkata downstream.<\/li>\n<li>Bangladesh was critical from the proposal stage, apprehending that enhanced flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly would reduce the dry season flow of the Ganges\/Padma into Bangladesh.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">What should be done<\/span> \u2192 removal of Farakka would harm ecosystem services in that part of the state. The basic problem is the flawed design of the barrage, which did not consider the <span class=\"n-term\">sediment variable<\/span>; ecologically informed engineering is the need of the hour. River basin commissions with powers above the federal states should be set up to prevent escalation of inter-state conflicts, and outmoded engineering paradigms should be dispensed with.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Teesta<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">315 km<\/span> river rising in the eastern Himalayas near Chunthang in Sikkim, flowing through West Bengal into Bangladesh and on to the Bay of Bengal; a tributary of the Brahmaputra, known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh. It originally flowed south into the Padma and around <span class=\"n-term\">1787<\/span> changed course eastward to join the Jamuna.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The dispute<\/span> \u2192 contested since 1947, when the catchment areas were allotted to India. After the JRC was set up in 1972, an <span class=\"n-term\">ad hoc arrangement of 1983<\/span> gave India <span class=\"n-term\">39%<\/span> and Bangladesh <span class=\"n-term\">36%<\/span>; allocation has been under discussion since 1972, with only 25% of the waters shared and the remainder unevenly divided. Bangladesh seeks a 25% share. Negotiations began in earnest after the <span class=\"n-term\">Ganga Water Treaty of 1996<\/span> and have made limited progress.<\/li>\n<li>Constant dam building along the Teesta in Sikkim has reduced lean season flow into Bangladesh, on which the livelihood of millions depends. As a lower riparian, Bangladesh is naturally sensitive on transboundary issues.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">For West Bengal<\/span>, the river sustains five northern districts \u2014 Darjeeling, North and South Dinajpur, Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri \u2014 among the poorest farming districts, with about <span class=\"n-term\">12.77%<\/span> of the state\u2019s population. There is also the matter of Kolkata port silting up and needing more water in the lean season.<\/li>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">framework agreement<\/span> under the Manmohan Singh government faced obstacles from coalition politics and objections from West Bengal, along with complications from India\u2019s water agreements with Pakistan. The West Bengal Chief Minister vetoed the proposed treaty in <span class=\"n-term\">2011<\/span> but has more recently said the state is ready to share water if suitable alternatives, such as interlinking of rivers through canals, are explored with the central government.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tariq A. Karim<\/span> \u2192 despite advances in other areas, the Teesta dispute remains a major concern for many Bangladeshis, and this emotional factor exacerbates tensions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jaideep Majumdar<\/span> \u2192 unresolved issues on the Teesta might weaken India\u2019s position on other water disputes, such as the Brahmaputra with China; failure could also undermine opportunities for \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">Blue Water Partnerships<\/span>\u201d in the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2192 broader strategic interests should not be impeded by narrow domestic concerns; the <span class=\"n-term\">Gujral Doctrine<\/span> of good neighbourly relations could serve as a basis for resolution.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Analyze the impact of Hydro politics on Indo Bangladesh relations.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/analyze-the-impact-of-hydro-politics-on-indo-bangladesh-relations-upsc-psir-2020-4102\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the steps required to realise &#8216;hydro-co-operation&#8217; between India and Bangladesh<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-steps-required-to-realise-hydro-co-operation-between-upsc-psir-2022-4104\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"contention-iii-china-in-dhaka\">Contention III \u2014 China in Dhaka<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The starting position \u2014 Bangladesh as India\u2019s largest trade partner in South Asia and the showcase of <span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> called it the one clear success of the policy; <span class=\"n-sch\">Ajit Doval<\/span> called it India\u2019s most important neighbour.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">What China brings<\/span> \u2192 the dominant share of Bangladesh\u2019s defence imports, infrastructure finance, and a standing offer on the Teesta.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The turn after 2024<\/span> \u2192 under interim leader <span class=\"n-sch\">Muhammad Yunus<\/span>, Dhaka moved from cautious balancing toward closer alignment with Beijing, inviting China into the sensitive <span class=\"n-term\">Teesta project<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Mongla port<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan re-enters<\/span> \u2192 renewed ties including the <span class=\"n-term\">Aman-25<\/span> naval exercise and the first ministerial visit in thirteen years add a military edge. <span class=\"n-sch\">Aparna Divya<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Salman Ali Bettani<\/span> trace a possible <span class=\"n-term\">Bangladesh\u2013Pakistan\u2013China triangle<\/span> taking shape.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The sharpest concern<\/span> \u2192 a reported Chinese airfield at <span class=\"n-term\">Lalmonirhat<\/span>, close to the <span class=\"n-term\">Siliguri Corridor<\/span> that links India to its Northeast.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">What India still holds<\/span> \u2192 connectivity, power trade, the settled land boundary and maritime award, health and education links, and the weight of a 3,700 km border. China can finance; it cannot relocate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">China&#8217;s growing footprint and a tangible shift in power dynamics in Bangladesh has weakened India&#8217;s leverage in Dhaka. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/chinas-growing-footprint-and-a-tangible-shift-in-power-dynamics-upsc-psir-2025-4106\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"after-hasina-the-verdict-and-the-extradition-question\">After Hasina \u2014 the verdict and the extradition question<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What happened<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">August 2024<\/span> \u2014 a student-led uprising ended <span class=\"n-sch\">Sheikh Hasina<\/span>\u2019s fifteen-year rule. She fled to India on <span class=\"n-term\">5 August 2024<\/span> and has stayed since.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">17 November 2025<\/span> \u2014 tribunal ICT-1 sentenced Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to <span class=\"n-term\">death in absentia<\/span> for crimes against humanity during the July\u2013August 2024 crackdown. Dhaka asked India to hand her over under the <span class=\"n-term\">2013 extradition treaty<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The crackdown<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">OHCHR<\/span> report of 12 February 2025 estimated up to about <span class=\"n-term\">1,400<\/span> killed; three-quarters of protest deaths came from firearms, many from weapons meant for war.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">12 February 2026<\/span> \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">BNP-led alliance<\/span> won 212 of 297 declared seats; turnout 59.88%. <span class=\"n-sch\">Tarique Rahman<\/span> became prime minister after seventeen years in exile, and renewed the extradition request in April 2026 under a <span class=\"n-term\">Bangladesh First<\/span> approach.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The treaty \u2014 what it allows and blocks<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Provision<\/th>\n<th>Effect<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-law\">Article 1<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Extradition may be sought of a person merely <span class=\"n-term\">charged<\/span>, not only convicted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-law\">Article 6<\/span>(1) &amp; 6(2)<\/td>\n<td>A request may be refused if the offence is of a <span class=\"n-term\">political character<\/span> \u2014 but murder and internationally recognised crimes are excluded from that category, so the exception does not fit Hasina\u2019s case.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-law\">Article 8<\/span>(1)(a)(iii)<\/td>\n<td>Refusal is allowed if extradition would be <span class=\"n-term\">unjust or oppressive<\/span>, or the charge was not made in good faith. India\u2019s firmer ground.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-law\">Article 10<\/span>(4)<\/td>\n<td>For convicts, a request needs a conviction certificate and <span class=\"n-term\">no pending appeal<\/span>. Hasina can still appeal, so a valid request cannot yet be made.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-law\">Article 21<\/span>(3)<\/td>\n<td>Either state may end the treaty on <span class=\"n-term\">six months\u2019 notice<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>The 2016 amendment easing evidence requirements \u2014 pushed through by Hasina\u2019s own government \u2014 now works against her. And because the treaty has no binding dispute-settlement body, each government can defend its own reading.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The debate<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Prabhash Ranjan<\/span> \u2192 the decision is political, not strictly legal. <span class=\"n-law\">Article 6<\/span> cannot shield her; <span class=\"n-law\">Article 8<\/span> can. The appeal window lets India delay without a formal refusal \u2014 a legal question becomes one of timing and political will.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Veena Sikri<\/span> \u2192 the treaty\u2019s protection against political persecution could justify continued shelter. She raises procedural doubts about the trial: judges without experience of international-crimes law, an ordinance widening the tribunal\u2019s remit that parliament never approved, and prosecutors she sees as partisan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Ranjan<\/span> accepts the trial\u2019s fairness can be questioned, yet holds that an unelected government can still run a lawful court under international law. The dispute sets <span class=\"n-term\">accountability for mass killings<\/span> against the charge of <span class=\"n-term\">victor\u2019s justice<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>At the end of the day, the call on Hasina\u2019s extradition is about politics, not so much about law.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Prabhash Ranjan, Hindustan Times, 13 September 2024<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What it does to Neighbourhood First<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Sohini Bose<\/span> \u2192 the Hasina years were a golden phase for Neighbourhood First and Act East, because her zero-tolerance policy on cross-border insurgents secured India\u2019s Northeast. Her fall puts connectivity through <span class=\"n-term\">Chattogram<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Mongla<\/span> in doubt and revives an opposition they read as anti-India and pro-China \u2014 yet geography ties the two states together, so India must persist.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy<\/span> \u2192 one of the sharpest strategic shocks Delhi has faced, since Hasina alone had honoured India\u2019s core sensitivities. He identifies <span class=\"n-term\">three Indian red lines<\/span> \u2014 protection of Hindu minorities, control of anti-India militants, and caution over Pakistan and China \u2014 which the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami have crossed before.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shanthie Mariet D\u2019Souza<\/span> \u2192 the carefully drafted treaty lets India hedge, but Delhi should expect blowback from Dhaka whatever it decides.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sreeradha Datta<\/span> \u2192 India is unlikely to extradite, but letting Hasina campaign from exile deepens Bangladeshi anger; disengagement is not an option for either country.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Avinash Paliwal<\/span> \u2192 history rhyming with <span class=\"n-term\">1975<\/span>, when the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman turned a trusted relationship cold. India over-invested in one leader; he calls Delhi <span class=\"n-term\">regime agnostic<\/span>, ready to work with whoever holds power, and expects a cool but workable reset with the BNP, much as India adjusted to Ziaur Rahman after 1975.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>I think history is rhyming when it comes to India and Bangladesh.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Avinash Paliwal, CASI Deep Dive interview, 31 March 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The two statements to quote<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>As a close neighbour, India remains committed to the best interests of the people of Bangladesh, including in peace, democracy, inclusion and stability in that country.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>India, Ministry of External Affairs, 26 November 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>It would be a grave act of unfriendly conduct and a travesty of justice for any other country to grant shelter to these individuals convicted of crimes against humanity.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"theory-and-scholars-bangladesh\">Theory and scholars \u2014 Bangladesh<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>What it explains here<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Liberalism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Cooperation and institutional frameworks; bilateral agreements and regional platforms such as SAARC and BIMSTEC promoting peace and shared prosperity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Dependency Theory<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Bangladesh\u2019s developmental challenges shaped by structural inequalities in the global system, producing reliance on India for resources and development.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Neorealism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Security concerns arising from the shared border and from external actors such as China influencing regional power dynamics.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Complex interdependence<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trans-boundary issues such as the Teesta, border management and trade imbalances managed alongside connectivity through BBIN and BIMSTEC.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Hedging<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Why Dhaka sits between India and China without choosing either side \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Al Amin<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Md Abul Hasan<\/span> adds a <span class=\"n-term\">weak-state<\/span> framing: the room to manoeuvre depends on the judgement of the political elite.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Offensive realism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>An order without central authority forces states to guard their own security \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Mearsheimer<\/span>, used to explain why India and China compete over Bangladesh.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Small-state vulnerability<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Hedley Bull<\/span> \u2014 small states are shaped by the power struggles of their larger neighbours.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Bangladesh adopts a nuanced hedging strategy, engaging diplomatically and economically with both India and China while maintaining a position of neutrality and nonalignment.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Al Amin, <em>Discover Global Society<\/em>, 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Bangladesh\u2019s autonomy is fundamentally dependent on the goodwill of its political elites\u2026 failures in managing hedging relationships with each dominant power could lead to falling into the trap of geopolitics.<\/em> \u2014 **Md Abul Hasan, <em>Asia and Africa Today<\/em>, No. 04, 2024**<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Views of scholars and policy suggestions<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 India should demonstrate sensitivity to Bangladesh\u2019s needs and concerns, actively understanding their perspective.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 soft power and people-to-people connections can bridge trust gaps; managing the neighbourhood demands not dominance but diplomacy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2192 strategic collaboration is essential for regional security, particularly on terrorism and border issues. <span class=\"n-sch\">Ayesha Siddiqa<\/span> \u2192 the strategic importance of cooperation, given growing Chinese influence in South Asia.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Pinak Ranjan Chakraborthy<\/span> \u2192 creation of a <span class=\"n-term\">security community<\/span> in the Indian Ocean region.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jayanta Kumar Ray<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Muntassir Mamoon<\/span> (<em>India-Bangladesh Relations: Current Perspectives<\/em>) \u2192 sceptics may say India can afford indifference while Bangladesh cannot, but realities do not admit such oversimplification. With India\u2019s northeast region chronically unstable, and with China and Myanmar trying to improve relations with Bangladesh \u2014 which itself is a commercial gateway to the Northeast \u2014 India has to substantially upgrade relations to safeguard vital interests. The need to strengthen SAARC adds urgency.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Quality-advantage branding<\/span> \u2192 emphasise the superior quality of Indian assistance against other providers, and align support with Bangladesh\u2019s developmental needs. Increase investment, fulfil developmental promises and resolve Line-of-Credit issues; revive SAARC; increase strategic integration and explore new areas such as cyber capabilities and energy exploration.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>India must ensure that goodwill is not transactional, but transformative.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Shyam Saran<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"after-the-takeover\">After the takeover<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Taliban takeover has made the regional security situation more fragile; Pakistan-based organisations such as <span class=\"n-term\">Jaish-e-Mohammed<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Lashkar-e-Taiba<\/span> now have a regime that may look the other way or provide safe haven.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> refers to Pakistan as the <em>\u2018patron saint\u2019<\/em> of the new regime. Islamabad publicly condemns these organisations while quietly permitting or supporting their operations, seeking indirect control or strategic influence to reduce space for India.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s counter should be to mend ties with the regime realistically, innovatively countering Pakistan\u2019s search for <span class=\"n-term\">strategic depth<\/span> by building security cooperation, while bracing for a heightened threat.<\/li>\n<li>There is still <span class=\"n-term\">no consensus in South Asia on recognising the Taliban<\/span> as the legitimate government, which makes holding a SAARC summit difficult, since barring Pakistan no member would be comfortable sharing the table with its representatives.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-new-great-game\">The New Great Game<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Since 2001 China\u2019s policy has moved from a non-engagement <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cobserver\u201d policy (2002\u20132010)<\/span> to an <span class=\"n-term\">economics-centred agenda (2011\u20132017)<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">security-dominated agenda (post-2018)<\/span>, which has remained dominant since August 2021.<\/li>\n<li>Beijing\u2019s primary concerns are curbing regional instability and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for groups it brands terrorist, especially <span class=\"n-term\">Uyghur militants<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>China\u2019s economic interests centre on mining \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Mes Aynak<\/span> copper mine and oil extraction in <span class=\"n-term\">Faryab and Sar-e-Pol<\/span> \u2014 both long on hold. BRI projects circumvent Afghan territory; Chinese policymakers worry about the effect of instability on their interests in Pakistan and Central Asia.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 closer collaboration between China and Pakistan could be a \u201cserious challenge for India\u201d, given India\u2019s border dispute with China and the treatment of CPEC as a threat to Indian trade and security.<\/li>\n<li>China and Russia share strong mutual interests, both focused on security and violent extremism; Russia is concerned that violence could spill into Central Asia, which it treats as its <span class=\"n-term\">near abroad<\/span> and exclusive sphere of influence. Neither has recognised the Taliban government, and both have criticised the American and European focus on human rights and democracy while scaling down expectations of an inclusive government.<\/li>\n<li>Post-August 2021 China\u2019s main assistance has been humanitarian aid and COVID-19 vaccines; diplomatically it has rallied support for rebuilding, calling for sanctions relief and unfreezing of Afghan assets, with Pakistan urging Western powers to engage.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dr. Sanjeev Kumar<\/span> notes that a serious study by <span class=\"n-term\">Peking University in 2018<\/span> appreciated the Indian model of delivering major projects in Afghanistan \u2014 India\u2019s aid is more comprehensive and wider in coverage than China\u2019s, and Afghans valued that India had contributed more than the UN and NATO.<\/li>\n<li>India must therefore ensure involvement in Afghanistan\u2019s settlement to protect national interests, check China-Pakistan ambitions and engage Russia without affecting relations with the West.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"views-of-scholars-and-the-2023-question\">Views of scholars \u2014 and the 2023 question<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sushant Sareen<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">engage, isolate, or oppose<\/span> \u2014 Indian policy should incorporate all three. While engaging the Taliban, India must reach out to its old friends, most of them in exile, to push for reconciliation; it must simultaneously isolate the Taliban without breaking ranks with the international community; and it must oppose the Taliban, not only diplomatically and politically but by covertly supporting anti-Taliban forces \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">carrot-and-stick approach<\/span>. There are never any full stops in Afghanistan, and no reason for India to put full stops in its own policy; pragmatism combined with hard-nosed moves is the way to get back in the game.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Katju<\/span> \u2192 the Taliban is here to stay, and India has no alternative but to deal with it even while repeating, if it wishes, the mantra of inclusive government. Maintaining contacts with leaders of the ousted Republic would be unobjectionable, especially as the Taliban itself wants them to return. The sooner India establishes a permanent presence in Kabul the better; this is not evangelism but the cold pursuit of interests, which often requires <span class=\"n-term\">supping with the devil, with a long spoon<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rudra Chaudhuri<\/span> \u2192 the approach will mean taking risks, assessing costs and expecting failures, and also doing everything possible to address real challenges. Facts must be taken for what they are: that Afghanistan is changing is a fact, and that the United States is leaving is a fact. As <span class=\"n-sch\">Kissinger<\/span> argues, it is not easy to change facts; what is possible is for facts to be used. A state\u2019s decision to recognise a government is a matter of pure discretion premised on larger political gains, and India\u2019s approach should be determined by its geo-strategic interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">What steps has India taken to regain its foothold in Afghanistan since the Taliban has taken over the country in August 2021?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/what-steps-has-india-taken-to-regain-its-foothold-in-afghanistan-upsc-psir-2023-4105\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"nepal-the-unique-neighbour\">Nepal \u2014 the unique neighbour<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Land-locked; bounded by China&#8217;s Tibetan region to the north and India on three sides; smaller than several Indian states.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 Nepal is India&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">unique neighbour<\/span>: the two are bound in a complex web of linkages and contiguities across civilisational, historical, socio-cultural, economic, geostrategic and political terrains.<\/li>\n<li>A border of over <span class=\"n-term\">1,850 km<\/span> with five Indian states \u2014 Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand \u2014 with <span class=\"n-term\">open borders<\/span>. No two countries in the world are as closely interdependent; the relationship is more a by-product of people-to-people ties than of government-to-government ties.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">A. Bhattacharya<\/span> \u2014 strategic weight arises from location between two rising Asian giants and from Nepal&#8217;s transformation into a <span class=\"n-term\">buffer zone<\/span> in the 1950s. <span class=\"n-sch\">David Scott<\/span> \u2014 &#8216;India-China rivalry in Nepal&#8217; defines its main strategic importance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> (<em>Does the Elephant Dance?<\/em>) \u2014 the tensions and interdependencies typical between small and large neighbours; historical, geographical, economic, political, religious and sociocultural links, and constant population flows, create deep attachments and also deep resentments. The <span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950<\/span> is the bedrock of the special relationship; because it was driven by Indian security considerations, Nepalese resent Indian domination.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why Nepal matters for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>As an immediate neighbour, Nepal forms the <span class=\"n-term\">inner circle<\/span> of the <em>raja-mandala<\/em> \u2014 a natural security buffer between India and China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Internal security<\/span> \u2014 no anti-India terrorists or Maoists should find haven there.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Chinese opening<\/span> \u2014 political instability and economic crisis open the door; reports suggest China brokered a deal between factions of the ruling Nepal Communist Party, and its <span class=\"n-term\">cheque-book diplomacy<\/span> offers loans and grants for infrastructure.<\/li>\n<li>Nepal&#8217;s position is vulnerable to China\u2013United States rivalry and to unanticipated Sino-Indian conflict along the Himalayan borders. Instability also compromises India-aided projects, where timely completion would create much-needed goodwill.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Flood management and hydropower<\/span> \u2014 the Gandak and Kosi feed India&#8217;s perennial river systems; Nepal&#8217;s cooperation is essential to control floods in Bihar, and its hydropower potential can be tapped through joint ventures.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Open border<\/span> \u2014 citizens cross for livelihood and marriage, so unrest spills over.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 new connectivity and communication technologies, missiles and cyber security have reduced the salience of the Himalayas as a barrier; India&#8217;s defence and security concerns in Nepal have become more subtle and mundane, relating to the use of Nepali territory to India&#8217;s disadvantage by China, any third country, or non-state actors.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;India&#8217;s relations with Nepal are shaped as much by geography as by history and sentiment.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Shivshankar Menon<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The two-soils formulation<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 for India, Nepal is the <em>punya bhoomi<\/em>, its sacred geography a living repository of the subcontinent&#8217;s spiritual heritage; for Nepal, India is the vast economic hinterland and may well be called its <em>karma bhoomi<\/em>. Destinies are inseparably intertwined, and problems have arisen whenever Delhi or Kathmandu has acted against the logic of extraordinary interdependence. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sushma Swaraj<\/span> called it the <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;roti beti ka rishta&#8221;<\/span>.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"chronology-sugauli-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 Sugauli to the present<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Year<\/th>\n<th>Marker<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>1816<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sugauli Treaty<\/span> between British India and Nepal \u2014 it forced Nepal not to engage other foreigners, setting a precedent for later Indian engagement. A Supplementary Boundary Treaty followed the same year.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1948<\/td>\n<td>Nepal contributes troops at the time of the integration of Hyderabad.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1950<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Peace and Friendship<\/span>; Nepal is reinforced as an integral part of India&#8217;s sub-Himalayan strategic space.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1951<\/td>\n<td>China occupies Tibet; India redefines its posture from &#8216;threat from Nepal&#8217; to &#8216;threat to Nepal&#8217;. Rana rule ends under <span class=\"n-term\">King Tribhuvan<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1955<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">King Mahendra<\/span> ascends; resentful of Indian influence, he opens Nepal&#8217;s external relations.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1960s<\/td>\n<td>Mahendra allows China and Pakistan to build a presence, countering Indian pressure for restoration of democracy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1988<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">King Birendra<\/span> procures arms from China in violation of the understanding with India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1989<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Anti-Panchayat Movement (Jan Andolan-I)<\/span>; India extends support.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1995<\/td>\n<td>Maoist revolution begins with the aim of abolishing the monarchy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1999<\/td>\n<td>Hijacking of Indian Airlines flight <span class=\"n-term\">IC 814<\/span> from Kathmandu, ending in Kandahar.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2001<\/td>\n<td>The royal family massacre.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2005<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">King Gyanendra<\/span> approaches China for arms after India&#8217;s embargo following his direct takeover.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2005\u201306<\/td>\n<td><em>Jan Andolan-II<\/em>; India helps mainstream the Maoists.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2006<\/td>\n<td>Parliament reinstated; <span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive Peace Agreement<\/span> signed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2008<\/td>\n<td>Monarchy abolished; Maoists come to power; India supports the electoral process.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2015<\/td>\n<td>Constitution enacted; India, unhappy with certain provisions, imposes an undeclared economic blockade. India extends <span class=\"n-term\">USD 1 billion<\/span> after the earthquake (<span class=\"n-term\">Operation Maitri<\/span>).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2020<\/td>\n<td>Nepal claims the <span class=\"n-term\">Limpiyadhura\u2013Lipulekh<\/span> tri-junction area.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2021<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sher Bahadur Deuba<\/span> visits India; agreements on railways, transmission lines and the International Solar Alliance. Both Prime Ministers meet at COP26 in Glasgow.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2022<\/td>\n<td>Visit to Lumbini on Buddha Purnima; Shilanyas of the India International Centre for Buddhist Culture and Heritage.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2023<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Pushpa Kamal Dahal &#8216;Prachanda&#8217;<\/span> visits India; cooperation agreements in many fields.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2024 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td>Nepal and China sign the <span class=\"n-term\">Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation<\/span>, settling a grants-versus-loans dispute on &#8220;aid assistance financing&#8221;.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2025 (Aug)<\/td>\n<td>Oli raises the Lipulekh dispute with Xi Jinping.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2025 (Sep)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Gen Z protests<\/span> force Oli to resign; <span class=\"n-term\">Sushila Karki<\/span> heads an interim government; parliament dissolved.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2026 (Mar)<\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Rastriya Swatantra Party<\/span> wins <span class=\"n-term\">182 of 275 seats<\/span> on 5 March; <span class=\"n-term\">Balen Shah<\/span> becomes prime minister on 27 March.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2026 (Apr)<\/td>\n<td>Stricter tariffs on Indian goods enforced from 19 April.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"evolution-monarchical-nepal-to-federal-republic\">Evolution \u2014 monarchical Nepal to federal republic<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How Nepal became a buffer \u2014 and how the buffer logic curdled.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1816 \u00b7 Sugauli<\/span> (Nepal barred from engaging other foreigners \u2014 the origin of India&#8217;s third-country reflex) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1950 \u00b7 Treaty<\/span> (Peace and Friendship; reciprocal &#8216;national treatment&#8217;; sub-Himalayan strategic space) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1950\u201351 \u00b7 Tibet<\/span> (Security concern flips: &#8216;threat <em>from<\/em> Nepal&#8217; becomes &#8216;threat <em>to<\/em> Nepal&#8217;) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1955 \u00b7 Mahendra<\/span> (Nationalist foreign policy; China road, Chinese presence in the Terai, ties with Pakistan) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1960s\u201390s<\/span> (The China card institutionalised \u2014 Birendra 1988, Gyanendra 2005)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase I \u2014 monarchical Nepal<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 a strong imprint of British legacy forced India not to allow other foreigners into Nepal&#8217;s economic and strategic affairs; India remains uneasy about third-country involvement even today, while continuing to recruit Nepali Gurkhas despite dissent within Nepal.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> took a <span class=\"n-term\">realist posture<\/span>, accepting openly that India&#8217;s security interests had priority over Nepal&#8217;s sovereignty.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier \u2026 We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, such as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened as that would also be a risk to our security.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Jawaharlal Nehru, in Parliament, December 1950<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">geographical determinism<\/span> of India&#8217;s security interests led Nehru to build a &#8216;special relationship&#8217; involving guarding Nepal&#8217;s northern border, modernising its defence capabilities and closely coordinating its foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li>Nepal assisted India in 1948 with troops for Hyderabad and for the situation created by Pakistan&#8217;s tribal invasion of Kashmir. With Tibet invaded in 1950, the <span class=\"n-term\">1950 Treaty<\/span> was signed and the security concern was redefined from &#8216;<em>threat from Nepal<\/em>&#8216; to &#8216;<em>threat to Nepal<\/em>&#8216;.<\/li>\n<li>India supported the end of hereditary Rana rule in 1951 in favour of monarchy under <span class=\"n-term\">King Tribhuvan<\/span> with a cabinet system; relations soured once <span class=\"n-term\">King Mahendra<\/span> succeeded in 1955.<\/li>\n<li>In 1959 a constitution established multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. Deteriorating India\u2013China relations in the 1960s gave Mahendra room for <span class=\"n-term\">two decisions<\/span>: he <span class=\"n-term\">dismissed the elected Koirala government<\/span>, discarded the constitution and assumed absolute power; and he promoted a <span class=\"n-term\">nationalistic foreign policy<\/span>, for which the projection of nationalism meant resistance to India&#8217;s pervasive political, economic and cultural presence.<\/li>\n<li>He allowed China to build a <span class=\"n-term\">road connection<\/span> and encouraged Chinese traders and officials in the <span class=\"n-term\">Terai<\/span>, close to India&#8217;s Indo-Gangetic heartland, and established diplomatic relations with Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">King Birendra<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">King Gyanendra<\/span> continued to use China, Pakistan and other players to balance India and extract concessions. Relations from the <span class=\"n-term\">1960s to the 1990s were tense, sour and non-cordial<\/span>; India&#8217;s security and economic interests suffered most during the decades of monarchical supremacy.<\/li>\n<li>The last decade of the twentieth century saw absolute monarchy give way to a hybrid dispensation of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, opening political space for ethnic groups and for the <span class=\"n-term\">Madhesis<\/span> of the plains. The Maoist movement became an armed insurgency demanding, among other things, abolition of the monarchy.<\/li>\n<li>Fearing extension of the &#8216;red corridor&#8217; into India, India in 2005 promoted an understanding between the mainstream parties and the Maoists, producing the <span class=\"n-term\">12-point agreement<\/span>. Under the pressure of Jan Andolan the King conceded popular sovereignty in 2006 and the monarchy ended; a <span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive Peace Agreement<\/span> closed the decade-old civil war and set a roadmap to a constituent assembly.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase II \u2014 Nepal as a federal republic<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>In 2008 the monarchy was abolished by the newly elected constituent assembly; the major parties agreed to write a constitution within two years.<\/li>\n<li>Having helped mainstream the Maoists, India was panicked by their electoral success in 2008 and by their attempts to dominate the state, pitted itself against them, and lost most of the goodwill earned. Discord derailed constitution-making and the First Constituent Assembly was dissolved without a constitution.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 breakdowns in India&#8217;s policy and diplomacy adversely affected its immediate and short-term interests; more than six decades of such breakdowns have eroded those interests and crippled India&#8217;s capacity to pursue them. The 1950 Treaty remains intact but <span class=\"n-term\">its substance has been mutilated<\/span> in many significant respects, and even the promising trade agreement of <span class=\"n-term\">2011<\/span> on promoting investment became controversial in Nepal&#8217;s domestic politics.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"relations-under-the-present-government-hit-to-super-hit\">Relations under the present government \u2014 HIT to &#8216;Super HIT&#8217;<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Addressing Nepal&#8217;s Constituent Assembly in 2014, the Prime Minister gave the <span class=\"n-term\">HIT formula<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Highways, Information highways and Transways<\/span>, that is transmission lines \u2014 as the three pillars of the relationship. In 2023 he expressed the wish that the relationship become <span class=\"n-term\">&#8216;Super HIT&#8217;<\/span> and be taken to Himalayan heights.<\/li>\n<li>The Constituent Assembly missed its deadline repeatedly; the constitution was finally promulgated in <span class=\"n-term\">2015<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Who are the Madhesis?<\/span> An ethnic group in Nepal with extensive cross-border ethnic and linguistic links with India. India&#8217;s involvement in Nepali politics and the upsurge in Madhesi protests both have deep historical roots.<\/li>\n<li>Unhappy that the demands of the Terai people were not accommodated, India resorted to <span class=\"n-term\">muscular diplomacy<\/span> and an undeclared blockade in 2015. The relationship touched its lowest ebb and Nepal courted China. Nepal&#8217;s communist parties are generally pro-China; the Nepali Congress under <span class=\"n-term\">Sher Bahadur Deuba<\/span> is pro-India.<\/li>\n<li>After the 2015 earthquake India extended all needed help through <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Maitri<\/span> and USD 1 billion for recovery.<\/li>\n<li>Tensions rose again in 2020 over the north-western boundary, with Nepal claiming the Limpiyadhura\u2013Lipulekh tri-junction. COVID-19 hardened relations further, the open border staying closed for over a year and a half from March 2020.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation-the-working-relationship\">Areas of cooperation \u2014 the working relationship<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Defence &amp; disaster<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Training and modernisation of the Nepal Army; the <span class=\"n-term\">Bilateral Consultative Group on Security Issues (BCGSI)<\/span>, last held in Bengaluru in October 2021. India was the first responder after the 2015 earthquake with NDRF teams and special aircraft. About <span class=\"n-term\">32,000 Nepalese Gorkhas<\/span> serve in the Indian Army. <span class=\"n-term\">Surya Kiran<\/span> joint exercise, held alternately in India and Nepal.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Power<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Three cross-border transmission lines with Indian assistance \u2014 the 400 kV <span class=\"n-term\">Muzaffarpur\u2013Dhalkebar<\/span> (2016), the 132 kV <span class=\"n-term\">Kataiya\u2013Kusaha<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Raxaul\u2013Parwanipur<\/span> (2017). First hydropower projects on the <span class=\"n-term\">Kosi (1954)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Gandak (1959)<\/span>; Pokhara, Trisuli, Western Gandak and Devighat followed. A <span class=\"n-term\">Power Exchange Agreement<\/span> since 1971 meets border-area needs: Nepal exports more than <span class=\"n-term\">450 MW<\/span> to India, India supplies about <span class=\"n-term\">600 MW<\/span>. A long-term <span class=\"n-term\">Power Trade Agreement (2023)<\/span> targets import of <span class=\"n-term\">10,000 MW<\/span> over ten years. Nepal joined the International Solar Alliance as its 105th member.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Petroleum<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Amlekhgunj\u2013Motihari<\/span> pipeline (2019), built by Indian Oil Corporation, is South Asia&#8217;s first cross-border petroleum pipeline; extension to Chitwan decided in 2023, and a new pipeline planned from Siliguri to Jhapa with storage terminals at Chitwan and Jhapa.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India is Nepal&#8217;s largest trading partner; Nepal is India&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">11th largest export destination<\/span>, up from 28th in 2014. Bilateral trade crossed <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 7 billion<\/span> in FY 2019-20 and reached <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 11,005.10 million<\/span> in 2021-22. Indian companies are the largest investors, at about <span class=\"n-term\">40%<\/span> of approved FDI; the <span class=\"n-term\">RuPay<\/span> card was launched in Nepal. In 2023 India gave in-principle approval for exporting Nepali electricity to Bangladesh via India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Connectivity<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement<\/span> (2015), members meeting in New Delhi in March 2022 to finalise the MoU. The <span class=\"n-term\">Transit Treaty<\/span> renewed in 2023 after expiring in 2019, adding new rail routes and use of India&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">inland waterways<\/span> for cargo to seaports. Bridges at Shirsha and Jhulaghat for far-west Nepal; an MoU on rail connectivity; <span class=\"n-term\">Integrated Check Posts<\/span> at Birgunj and Biratnagar; six connectivity projects approved in 2023.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Education &amp; culture<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Shared Hindu and Buddhist heritage; visa-free entry. Nearly <span class=\"n-term\">8 million<\/span> Nepalese live and work in India and around <span class=\"n-term\">6,00,000<\/span> Indians reside in Nepal; Indians are about <span class=\"n-term\">30%<\/span> of foreign tourists in Nepal. Sister-city agreements \u2014 Kathmandu\u2013Varanasi, Lumbini\u2013Bodhgaya, Janakpur\u2013Ayodhya \u2014 and the <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Nepal Ramayana Circuit<\/span>. Heritage work at Pashupatinath and Bhandarkhal Garden in Patan Durbar. Around <span class=\"n-term\">3,000 scholarships<\/span> annually and training for about 250 Nepali officials under ITEC; the <span class=\"n-term\">Sampark<\/span> alumni network (2021); the Swami Vivekananda Centre for Indian Culture, Kathmandu (2007).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"territorial-disputes-kalapani-lipulekh-susta\">Territorial disputes \u2014 Kalapani, Lipulekh, Susta<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span> sets the frame: &#8216;Indians have taken Nepal too much for granted. India&#8217;s approach towards Nepal has been dismissive and neglectful. The Indian government and public have never shown adequate sensitivity to Nepali pride and uniqueness.&#8217; <span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> adds that Nepal has several concerns beyond worries over excessive Indian interference; Nepalese hold that treaties and agreements are &#8216;unequal&#8217;, which prevents the two from tapping the full potential of cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>After the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir, India published a new map in <span class=\"n-term\">November 2019<\/span> showing <span class=\"n-term\">Kalapani<\/span> as Indian territory. Nepal objected and in 2020 laid claim to the <span class=\"n-term\">Limpiyadhura\u2013Lipulekh<\/span> tri-junction.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Kali<\/span> river delineates the border through the Kalapani region; the dispute covers about <span class=\"n-term\">35 sq km<\/span> where the border is marked by the Mahakali. The <span class=\"n-term\">Gandak<\/span> forms the international boundary elsewhere. The <span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Sugauli (1816)<\/span> is the basis of demarcation, with a Supplementary Boundary Treaty concluded the same year.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Susta<\/span> \u2014 about <span class=\"n-term\">140 sq km<\/span> in Uttar Pradesh at the Terai border, under Indian control and claimed by Nepal; the change of course of the Gandak is the main cause. The <span class=\"n-term\">1981 Boundary Committee<\/span> delineated 98% of the border but not Susta.<\/li>\n<li>India termed the claim a &#8216;unilateral act&#8217; not based on historical facts and evidence. Nepal&#8217;s new political map came in retaliation for the Indian road from <span class=\"n-term\">Dharchula to Lipulekh<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Kalapani \u2014 one river, two readings<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Nepal&#8217;s reading<\/span> \u2014 Limpiyadhura is the source of the Kali \u2014 higher than the rest of the river&#8217;s flow \u2014 which places Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani <em>east<\/em> of the Kali. <span class=\"n-term\">Evidence cited<\/span>: Sugauli 1816 \u00b7 the 2020 political map \u00b7 about 35 sq km at stake<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India&#8217;s reading<\/span> \u2014 The border begins at Kalapani, where the river originates in springs below the Lipulekh pass; the ground north of these streams is not clearly delineated by Sugauli. <span class=\"n-term\">Evidence cited<\/span>: nineteenth-century historical, administrative and revenue records \u00b7 continuous administration since the 1950s \u00b7 infrastructure development \u00b7 a 2015 Chinese statement on expanding trade through the Lipulekh pass<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Sugauli leaves the ground north of the streams undelineated \u2014 that silence is the dispute<\/em><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the future prospects of Indo-Nepal relations in the context of the recent publication of new Nepalese map wrongly claiming Indian territory.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-future-prospects-of-indo-nepal-relations-in-the-upsc-psir-2020-4202\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-1950-treaty-the-revision-demand\">The 1950 Treaty \u2014 the revision demand<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Concluded when Nepal feared a Chinese threat after the occupation of Tibet, the Treaty specifically mentions cooperation against threats from third countries and reciprocally grants residents the right to reside, work and acquire property \u2014 in effect extending <span class=\"n-term\">&#8216;national treatment&#8217;<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Treaty issues<\/span> \u2014 the obligation to seek consent while importing arms from third countries is resented as an attack on sovereignty; Nepal wants India to revisit the Treaty to reflect contemporary realities. India&#8217;s tepid response has intensified strain.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 India incorporated a provision to keep foreign influences at bay and to secure preference over all foreign assistance for the &#8216;development of natural resources&#8217; and &#8216;industrial projects&#8217; in Nepal.<\/li>\n<li>Nepal&#8217;s political elite calls the Treaty <span class=\"n-term\">unequal<\/span>; though it can be abrogated on one year&#8217;s notice, no Nepali government has exercised that <span class=\"n-term\">sovereign right<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The Nepali side has wished to retain what is advantageous while dispensing with reciprocal obligation. India has not received the &#8216;national treatment&#8217; it is due, while Nepali citizens continue to enjoy privileges almost equivalent to those of Indian citizens; Indians in Nepal need residence and work permits and cannot buy property.<\/li>\n<li>India has acceded to Nepal&#8217;s request for review, but only one round has been held at foreign secretary level.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"chinese-inroads-and-the-trilateral-question\">Chinese inroads \u2014 and the trilateral question<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Smaller and weaker neighbours play the <span class=\"n-term\">China card<\/span> to bargain with India. <span class=\"n-sch\">Prashant Jha<\/span> notes China was not much interested in Nepal initially, but its investments in economic and developmental activity have grown, along with engagement with political parties, high-level visits, and increasingly public statements on Nepal&#8217;s domestic situation. Failures and delays in Indian projects gave China ample room.<\/li>\n<li>Kings <span class=\"n-term\">Mahendra<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Birendra<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Gyanendra<\/span> all strengthened ties with China or used the China card. Cooperation has moved from trade and development into strategic areas \u2014 PLA\u2013Nepal Army joint exercises in <span class=\"n-term\">2017 and 2018<\/span>, and regular PLA financial assistance to the Nepali Army since <span class=\"n-term\">2019<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Nepal&#8217;s assent to the <span class=\"n-term\">One Belt One Road<\/span> initiative is viewed with suspicion; Nepal has slowly fallen prey to <em>chequebook diplomacy<\/em> and <em>debt trap<\/em> policy.<\/li>\n<li>Relations were elevated from a &#8220;Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship&#8221; to a &#8220;Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship and Prosperity&#8221;. The <span class=\"n-term\">Himalayan Quadrilateral<\/span> meeting between China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal is an attempt by China to contain India in South Asia.<\/li>\n<li>Trade rules have made it easier for small and medium Nepali businesses to trade with China; despite open borders, complex documentation and difficulty in cash movement complicate India\u2013Nepal trade. Ideological similarity between the communist parties helps China.<\/li>\n<li>India is Nepal&#8217;s largest trading partner at <span class=\"n-term\">65%<\/span> of its total trade \u2014 and also the source of its largest trade deficit. Geographical constraint has left Nepal heavily reliant without acquiring comparative advantage in exports; local enterprises cannot compete against cost-efficient Indian products, and non-tariff barriers and poor infrastructure add to discontent.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Current dimensions<\/span> \u2014 Chinese FDI now surpasses India&#8217;s commitments; trade and transit agreements have improved connectivity; infrastructure such as dams and <span class=\"n-term\">Pokhara Airport<\/span>; Chinese universities attracting Nepali students; BRI participation signalling geopolitical realignment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;The tendency in India is to regard Nepal&#8217;s dependence on India for transit as leverage against it.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Shyam Saran<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 every ruling dispensation in Kathmandu uses two cards to compel Indian acquiescence: the <span class=\"n-term\">China card<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Hindu card<\/span>. If India does not support the incumbent government it will court China; and since Nepal is the only other Hindu-majority country, India must not weaken the religious affinities that bind them. India must never fall into this trap.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 India&#8217;s approach during the 2015 constitutional crisis damaged relations seriously: intrusive, muscular and economically coercive. Nepal reacted under Oli&#8217;s leadership by whipping up anti-Indian nationalism and an aggressive display of the China card. Both sides now seem to realise they went overboard. Denial of transit is a powerful negative instrument but breeds hostile sentiment that Nepali politicians then exploit.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ranjit Rae<\/span> (<em>Kathmandu Dilemma: Resetting India-Nepal Ties<\/em>) \u2014 the Nepali media accuses India of trying to make Nepal a Hindu Rashtra although the Government of India has made clear it has no views and the matter is for Nepal&#8217;s people; Oli&#8217;s anti-India agenda included the Kalapani encroachment charge, disrespect to the Indian emblem and distorted facts on the birthplace of Lord Rama. Against this, he finds <span class=\"n-term\">less substance and more hype<\/span> in projections of Nepal\u2013China bonhomie: India\u2013Nepal trade is booming and Indian assistance, mostly on a grant basis, is increasing, compared with Chinese soft loans. The trade deficit and falling Indian FDI can be minimised if Nepal fully uses its hydropower potential and resolves political sensitivities on Indian investment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Deb Mukherji<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Baral<\/span> (<em>Politics of Geo-politics: Continuity and Change in India-Nepal Relations<\/em>) \u2014 they stress overall continuity and recognition of India&#8217;s national security interests; the need for autonomy is among the foremost concerns in the Nepalese mindset. The 1950 Treaty provided the base for stronger relations, yet India is accused of &#8220;micro-managing&#8221; Nepal&#8217;s domestic affairs. Since the late 1950s Nepal has engaged China, Pakistan and others, making clear that India is a &#8216;special&#8217; friend but not the &#8216;only&#8217; friend, while not being particular about India&#8217;s security concerns. Deep-rooted civilisational ties and strategic location impose an obligation on both: they can neither alienate nor be free of each other. The triangular dynamic \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Sinophiles<\/span> standing for the friendly stability China provides, <span class=\"n-term\">Indophobes<\/span> treating India as an interventionist power \u2014 is a critical reason for the shrinking of Nepal&#8217;s autonomy, its foreign policy narrowed to India and China rather than integrated with the world.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the potential role India can play in initiating a possible phase of trilateral economic engagement among India, China and Nepal.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-potential-role-india-can-play-in-initiating-a-upsc-psir-2025-4207\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"rivers-defence-and-security\">Rivers, defence and security<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">River water sharing<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India&#8217;s first hydropower projects were on the <span class=\"n-term\">Kosi (1954)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Gandak (1959)<\/span>; the Nepalese perceived them as tilted heavily in India&#8217;s favour [<span class=\"n-sch\">Gyawali<\/span>; <span class=\"n-sch\">Shrestha<\/span>]. To accommodate these concerns the agreements were revised in <span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span> (Gandak) and <span class=\"n-term\">1966<\/span> (Kosi).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Akhilesh Upadhyay<\/span> notes a general impression in Nepal that it did not get a fair deal on the Kosi and Gandak. <span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 a deep cleavage of distrust followed, and no major project could be undertaken until the <span class=\"n-term\">Mahakali Treaty<\/span> of 1998.<\/li>\n<li>Implementation of the Mahakali Treaty has barely moved. Out of commercially viable potential of <span class=\"n-term\">45,000 MW<\/span>, Nepal has developed hardly <span class=\"n-term\">600 MW<\/span> \u2014 not enough even for its basic requirements \u2014 so it buys power from India rather than selling.<\/li>\n<li>Both sides have agreed to assemble a team of experts to resolve differences and finalise the detailed project report for the <span class=\"n-term\">6,480 MW Pancheshwar Multipurpose<\/span> bi-national plant on the Mahakali.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Defence and security<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 Nepali territory has been used, given the open border, by cross-border terrorists from Pakistan, criminal gangs, smugglers of both countries, and for the flow of fake Indian currency.<\/li>\n<li>The hijacking of <span class=\"n-term\">IC 814<\/span> from Kathmandu in December 1999 made prevention of such incidents a major Indian concern.<\/li>\n<li>India stresses strengthening the legal framework against common cross-border challenges and has provided liberal assistance for infrastructure, capacity building, equipment and training.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"nepal-after-2024-the-gen-z-uprising-and-the-2026-verdict\">Nepal after 2024 \u2014 the Gen Z uprising and the 2026 verdict<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">BRI financing settled on paper<\/span> \u2014 Nepal and China signed the <span class=\"n-term\">Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation<\/span> in <span class=\"n-term\">December 2024<\/span>, settling a long grants-versus-loans dispute on &#8220;aid assistance financing&#8221;. The drawn-out fight over that wording shows Nepal&#8217;s own wariness of Chinese debt.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Lipulekh raised with Beijing<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">K.P. Sharma Oli<\/span> took the dispute to Xi Jinping in <span class=\"n-term\">August 2025<\/span>, carrying a bilateral boundary question into a third capital.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The uprising<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Gen Z protests<\/span> in <span class=\"n-term\">September 2025<\/span> forced Oli to resign; <span class=\"n-term\">Sushila Karki<\/span> led an interim government and parliament was dissolved. Mass jailbreaks and looted weapons alarmed New Delhi, which alerted the <span class=\"n-term\">Sashastra Seema Bal<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Both powers wanted the same thing<\/span> \u2014 India and China each backed timely polls and offered help, India providing over <span class=\"n-term\">600 vehicles<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The verdict<\/span> \u2014 on <span class=\"n-term\">5 March 2026<\/span> the <span class=\"n-term\">Rastriya Swatantra Party<\/span> won <span class=\"n-term\">182 of 275 seats<\/span>, overturning expectations of a hung house. <span class=\"n-term\">Balen Shah<\/span> beat Oli in Jhapa-5 and became prime minister on <span class=\"n-term\">27 March 2026<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">A more transactional phase<\/span> \u2014 from <span class=\"n-term\">19 April 2026<\/span> Nepal enforced stricter tariffs on Indian goods. Shah is a Nepali-nationalist figure; the tariffs and the earlier Lipulekh friction point to a more contested relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Nihar R. Nayak \u2014 two powers, two definitions of stability<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nihar R. Nayak<\/span>, writing for the Stimson Center&#8217;s <em>South Asian Voices<\/em>, shows that India and China each pursue stability in Nepal through different frames: <span class=\"n-term\">India links it to border security and democracy, China to the &#8216;One China Principle&#8217; and Tibet.<\/span><\/li>\n<li>In <span class=\"n-term\">MP-IDSA Monograph No. 72<\/span> Nayak applies <span class=\"n-term\">buffer-state theory<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">neorealism<\/span> to Nepal, drawing on <span class=\"n-sch\">M.G. Partem<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">John Chay<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Thomas Ross<\/span> on buffer states, on <span class=\"n-sch\">M.F. Elman<\/span> for the neorealist claim, and on <span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni&#8217;s<\/span> account of Nepal&#8217;s three-level foreign policy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;Nepal occupies a unique position in South Asia. It is a small and landlocked semi-buffer state, located between two Asian powers that have fought a war with each other\u2026 Its tactics have been mostly hedging in the post-Cold War period.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 **Nihar R. Nayak, <em>Political Changes in Nepal and Bhutan<\/em>, MP-IDSA Monograph No. 72, 2021, pp. 22, 17**<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"nepal-theory-scholars-policy\">Nepal \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lenses:<\/span> Functionalism \u00b7 Sociological Liberalism \u00b7 Realism \u00b7 Balance of influence<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>What it explains<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Functionalism<\/td>\n<td>Shared needs in trade, security and energy have produced sustained collaboration.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sociological Liberalism<\/td>\n<td>People-to-people ties and social and cultural bonds strengthen diplomatic relations.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Realism<\/td>\n<td>Territorial disputes and the pursuit of national interest; security concerns shape Nepal&#8217;s ties with India and with China.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Balance of influence<\/td>\n<td>Small-state hedging amid Sino-Indian competition.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Views of scholars<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 several reasons lie behind India&#8217;s policy breakdowns. A congenital flaw in a policy driven by inherent insecurity bordering on paranoia; micro-management of Nepali affairs and a casual approach to Nepal&#8217;s sensitivities produced anti-India feeling. India&#8217;s policy played a decisive role in resolving Nepal&#8217;s transformational conflicts but lacked a clear and categorical stance to sustain that transformation, reflecting gross neglect of India&#8217;s own stated political principles and institutional preferences. A further problem is a marked <span class=\"n-term\">preference for weak and pliable individuals<\/span> over leaders with grassroots support \u2014 India preferred M.P. Koirala over the more charismatic B.P. Koirala, and such preferences are common knowledge in Nepal and work against Indian interests. Policy may articulate a long-term perspective but ends up taking a short-term view, and the information and critical assessment feeding it are poor.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 Nepal balances India&#8217;s overwhelming presence by courting China, which India resents and which heightens security concerns. The root of Nepal&#8217;s poverty and underdevelopment lies in the mindset of political elites who prefer to see India as a threat rather than an opportunity; any joint project is examined for what it brings to the Indian plate rather than for what it fetches Nepal. He also affirms that <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;Nepal is not just a neighbour but a natural ally.&#8221;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 <em>mutual respect<\/em> is the key; Delhi must resist the temptation to meddle in Nepal&#8217;s political processes, and instead of demanding an &#8220;India first policy&#8221; should affirm strong support for a &#8220;Nepal first policy&#8221;. India must act with empathy, not just power, in its periphery.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> \u2014 India needs a positive agenda in Nepal and could be more proactive in supporting economic renewal, democracy and civil society; its approach appears reactive to events on the ground, suggesting an absence of actual strategy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya Adhikari<\/span>, offering the Nepali perspective \u2014 India&#8217;s economic growth arouses respect and envy; apprehensions about the Maoists have somewhat mitigated disapproval in Kathmandu, but criticism persists about perceived or actual Indian involvement in domestic politics. The &#8216;China card&#8217; can be played only when politics is stable and the centre cohesive, and even then nobody expects China&#8217;s influence to rival India&#8217;s.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> \u2014 Nepal will always need India, simply because of geography; China can replace India as Nepal&#8217;s main provider of essential supplies only by moving the Himalayas southward.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanak Mani Dixit<\/span> \u2014 India must move beyond being a &#8220;big brother&#8221; and be <span class=\"n-term\">big and a brother<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> \u2014 India&#8217;s soft power in Nepal must be reinvigorated, acknowledging Nepal&#8217;s sovereignty while recognising strategic interdependence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Abhijnan Rej<\/span>: &#8220;New Delhi has found itself utterly unprepared to deal with an assertive Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Anil Sigdel<\/span> \u2014 as long as non-interference and peaceful co-existence are respected and high-level political engagement is pursued, cooperation will follow; the present government appears to have moved from muscular diplomacy towards cooperative diplomacy. <span class=\"n-sch\">Arun Kumar Sahu<\/span> \u2014 the Chinese are practitioners of realpolitik with national security high on the agenda; a relationship built on similarities of history, culture and social ethos may prove more durable, and a democratic, progressive and economically stronger India may overshadow the China factor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy suggestions for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India has not used its soft power well; poor use of economic support for strategic objectives is a serious flaw. Since the 1960s India has struggled to initiate significant infrastructure projects, the <span class=\"n-term\">East\u2013West Highway<\/span> being a notable exception. Unless this changes, Chinese inroads will not stop.<\/li>\n<li>Restart the water dialogue and frame policies safeguarding those affected on both sides of the border; resolve Kalapani, Lipulekh and Susta at the earliest, with India showing generosity.<\/li>\n<li>Introduce new economic, developmental and infrastructure initiatives that bring tangible benefits to Nepali citizens and address vulnerabilities emerging as Nepal engages China.<\/li>\n<li>Recognise that a <span class=\"n-term\">strongly sovereign Nepal<\/span> is beneficial, not detrimental, to India&#8217;s security; emphasise Nepal&#8217;s sovereign status and independent policy choices, and help Nepal exercise them.<\/li>\n<li>Manage Nepal&#8217;s challenges realistically \u2014 remittances make up about <span class=\"n-term\">30%<\/span> of its GDP, mostly from the Gulf, and there is an increasingly strong Nepali diaspora worldwide.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"bhutan-the-buffer-that-never-played-the-card\">Bhutan \u2014 the buffer that never played the card<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Satish Kumar<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan, the <em>Druk Yul<\/em> (&#8216;land of thunder dragons&#8217;), located between the Tibetan plateau and the Assam-Bengal plains, is geopolitically vital. It has a border of <span class=\"n-term\">605 km with India and 470 km with China<\/span>; the two countries &#8216;collide&#8217; in and over Bhutan, making it a <span class=\"n-term\">buffer state<\/span> of the first importance in the eastern Himalayas in the military sense.<\/li>\n<li>India and Bhutan share an open border of <span class=\"n-term\">700 km<\/span>, a visa-free regime and duty-free trade.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tuhina Sarkar<\/span> \u2014 the relationship is unique in being relatively trouble-free compared with other bilateral relations in South Asia; ties are deep-rooted, traditional, amicable and warm. Formal diplomatic relations began in <span class=\"n-term\">1968<\/span> with a resident representative in Thimphu; before that, engagement was handled by the Political Officer in Sikkim.<\/li>\n<li>The former King described India and Bhutan as <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;milk and water&#8221;<\/span> which cannot be separated. <span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> describes a partnership in which Bhutan retains its independence while cooperating closely with India on key issues.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;No two countries in the world understand each other so well or share so much as India and Bhutan.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>PM Modi<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Indian interests in Bhutan<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Arvind Gupta<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">geo-strategic location<\/span> between India and China is critical for India&#8217;s security.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Chumbi Valley<\/span>, at the trijunction of Bhutan, India and China, lies about 500 km from the <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;Chicken&#8217;s Neck&#8221;<\/span> corridor in North Bengal connecting the Northeast to the rest of the country. The western Bhutan border guards possible Chinese ingress routes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Containing insurgency in Northeast India<\/span> \u2014 militants have found haven in Bhutan in the past; Bhutan collaborated with India in flushing out the <span class=\"n-term\">NDFB<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">ULFA<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>China lacks a diplomatic presence in Thimphu and has expressed interest in establishing relations; reports suggest Beijing is pressing Bhutan for trade and diplomatic ties as part of a reciprocal arrangement for a border resolution.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Security buffer<\/span> \u2014 prevents hostile access to sensitive areas, particularly the <span class=\"n-term\">Siliguri Corridor<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Regional influence<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan&#8217;s support amplifies India&#8217;s voice in SAARC and BIMSTEC and strengthens India&#8217;s position in Himalayan geopolitics. <span class=\"n-term\">Environmental diplomacy<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan&#8217;s status as <span class=\"n-term\">carbon-negative<\/span> offers a distinctive avenue of cooperation aligned with India&#8217;s sustainability goals.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"chronology-1949-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 1949 to the present<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Year<\/th>\n<th>Marker<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>1949 (Aug)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourliness<\/span> (Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship) signed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1958<\/td>\n<td>Jawaharlal Nehru&#8217;s visit; gradual opening of Bhutan.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1968<\/td>\n<td>Formal diplomatic relations established.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1984<\/td>\n<td>China and Bhutan begin boundary negotiations \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">24 rounds<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">11 rounds of Expert Group Meetings<\/span> to date.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1998<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Bhutan-China Agreement on Peace and Tranquility on Borders<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2003<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Operation All Clear<\/span> against insurgents active in Northeast India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2004<\/td>\n<td>Pakistan&#8217;s Prime Minister visits Bhutan on the opening of an embassy; India grows uneasy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2007<\/td>\n<td>The 1949 Treaty revised; the new <span class=\"n-term\">India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty<\/span> commits both to &#8220;cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.&#8221;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2008<\/td>\n<td>Democratic elections; Bhutan becomes a democracy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addresses the first elected parliament.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2012<\/td>\n<td>Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meets Bhutanese Prime Minister <span class=\"n-term\">Jigme Y. Thinley<\/span> on the sidelines of Rio+20; New Delhi grows suspicious.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2013<\/td>\n<td>India withdraws LPG and kerosene subsidies during a brief episode of acrimony.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2014<\/td>\n<td>Bhutan is the destination of the Prime Minister&#8217;s first foreign visit.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2016<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit<\/span> signed; in November Bhutan&#8217;s parliament rejects the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2017 (Jun)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Doklam standoff<\/span>; <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Juniper<\/span>. In November the King visits India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2018<\/td>\n<td>Bhutanese Prime Minister <span class=\"n-term\">Tshering Tobgay<\/span> visits India; Bhutan opens a consulate in Guwahati.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2019<\/td>\n<td>Two-day visit to Thimphu; four projects inaugurated \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">720 MW Mangdechhu<\/span> hydro project, ISRO&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">Ground Earth Station<\/span> for the South Asia Satellite, the <span class=\"n-term\">RuPay Card<\/span>, and interconnection of India&#8217;s National Knowledge Network with Bhutan&#8217;s Druk Research and Education Network.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2020 (Jul)<\/td>\n<td>China makes new claims in eastern Bhutan, in the <span class=\"n-term\">Sakteng wildlife sanctuary<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2021<\/td>\n<td>Bhutan is the first country to receive Covishield doses from India (1,50,000 in January; 5,50,000 in total as a gift). The 10th Expert Group Meeting with China produces an MoU on a <span class=\"n-term\">three-step roadmap<\/span>. In December the Prime Minister is conferred the <span class=\"n-term\">Order of the Druk Gyalpo<\/span>, Bhutan&#8217;s highest civilian decoration, as the first foreign national to receive it.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2022<\/td>\n<td>Launch of the jointly developed <span class=\"n-term\">India-Bhutan SAT<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2023<\/td>\n<td>In February India hands over a <span class=\"n-term\">USD 1 billion<\/span> grant for the <span class=\"n-term\">Gyalsung Project<\/span> (of a total USD 2 billion). In April the King visits India; discussions cover the border situation and the China\u2013Bhutan boundary talks.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"from-sinchula-to-2007-the-treaty-architecture\">From Sinchula to 2007 \u2014 the treaty architecture<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Bhutanese practise Buddhism, which came to Bhutan from Tibet and was born in India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Reetika Sharma<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Ramvir Goria<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span> \u2014 the British wanted control of Bhutan without assimilating it, preferring a buffer from Tibet. The <span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Sinchula (1864)<\/span> deprived Bhutan of rights in the Duars in return for an annual subsidy, and Bhutan came to be guided by Britain in foreign relations \u2014 the origin of the <span class=\"n-term\">guidance clause<\/span> in the 1949 Treaty.<\/li>\n<li>Bhutan pursued a <span class=\"n-term\">policy of isolation<\/span> to preserve its environment and tradition. Change began when <span class=\"n-term\">Jigme Dorji Wangchuck<\/span> became king in 1952; in 1953 he instituted the National Assembly and systematised national laws. His son <span class=\"n-term\">Jigme Singye Wangchuck<\/span> continued reform, bringing modernisation without harming tradition, and saw hydropower as a source of development, collaborating with India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Satish Kumar<\/span> \u2014 Nehru was the first foreign dignitary ever to visit Bhutan; the visit was a landmark and a step in the gradual opening of Bhutan for India. It brought assurances in the Indian Parliament that any Chinese aggression against Bhutan and Sikkim would be treated as aggression against India. In 1961 a contingent of Indian military officers visited to establish arrangements for Bhutan&#8217;s defence.<\/li>\n<li>Bhutan was a <span class=\"n-term\">protectorate of India from 1949 to 1974<\/span>, when it became a member of the UN; India looked after its defence and foreign policy and was responsible for decisions on these matters.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The treaty revised \u2014 what 2007 changed<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">1949 \u00b7 Perpetual Peace and Friendship<\/span> \u2014 Peace and non-interference; free trade and commerce; equal justice to each other&#8217;s citizens. <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 2<\/span><\/span> \u2014 Bhutan to be guided by India&#8217;s advice in external relations. <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 10<\/span><\/span> \u2014 amendment only by mutual consent. <span class=\"n-term\">Behind it<\/span>: Sinchula 1864, and the guidance clause it bequeathed; protectorate status, 1949\u20131974<\/li>\n<li>\u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2007 \u00b7 India\u2013Bhutan Friendship Treaty<\/span> \u2014 Clauses II, III and IV of 1949 removed; the offensive clauses eliminated and security and political cooperation given new foundations. Both to &#8220;cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests&#8221;. <span class=\"n-term\">Behind it<\/span>: democratisation and decentralisation; scope broadened to cultural, economic and development dimensions; the legal basis India invoked at Doklam<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Medha Bisht \u2014 provisions dating back over fifty years were out of date and did not reflect contemporary bilateral ties<\/em><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">&#8220;The Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship between India and Bhutan needs to be revised with more pragmatic, realistic obligations and responsibilities.&#8221; Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-treaty-of-perpetual-peace-and-friendship-between-india-and-upsc-psir-2017-4201\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Bhutan has never tried to take advantage of India\u2013China disputes by playing one against the other; it has instead cooperated with India for its development.<\/li>\n<li>India helped and backed Bhutan&#8217;s entry into the <span class=\"n-term\">Colombo Plan<\/span> (1961), the <span class=\"n-term\">Universal Postal Union<\/span> (1969), the <span class=\"n-term\">United Nations<\/span> (1971), the <span class=\"n-term\">Non-Aligned Movement<\/span> (1973) and <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC<\/span> (1985).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Political &amp; strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Both support each other at SAARC, the UN and the WTO; Bhutan supports India&#8217;s bid for a permanent UNSC seat. Reaffirmation of open borders, close alignment and consultation on foreign policy, and regular open communication on strategic issues.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India is <span class=\"n-term\">Bhutan&#8217;s largest trading partner<\/span>; exports to Bhutan were <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 1.02 billion<\/span> in 2022, and trade more than doubled from <span class=\"n-term\">USD 484 million<\/span> in 2014-15 to <span class=\"n-term\">USD 1,083 million<\/span> in 2020-21. Imports from India account for <span class=\"n-term\">80% of Bhutan&#8217;s total imports<\/span>; about one-third of Bhutan&#8217;s exports to India is electricity, with ferro-silica (declining, and complained of), cement and dolomite. A <span class=\"n-term\">mini dry port<\/span> is planned at <span class=\"n-term\">Phuntsholing<\/span>. India extends a <span class=\"n-term\">Standby Credit Facility<\/span> against rupee liquidity crunches, with an additional <span class=\"n-term\">USD 100 million<\/span> under a standby swap within the SAARC currency swap framework. A <span class=\"n-term\">Free Trade Agreement<\/span> in 2006, renewed in 2016 as <span class=\"n-term\">Trade, Commerce and Transit<\/span>, gives a free trade regime and duty-free transit of Bhutanese goods for trade with third countries; seven additional entry-exit points formalised in 2021.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Three hydropower projects developed with Indian assistance \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">1020 MW Tala<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">336 MW Chukha<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">60 MW Kurichhu<\/span>. Ten more agreed; three under construction \u2014 Punatsangchhu-I, Punatsangchhu-II and Mangdechhu. An <span class=\"n-term\">Inter-Government Agreement<\/span> approved on four joint-venture projects \u2014 Kholongchu, Wangchhu, Bunakha and Chamkharchhu. A goal of <span class=\"n-term\">10 GW<\/span> of hydropower had been set for 2020.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Defence &amp; security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India is responsible for Bhutanese security and supports training and modernisation of its army; a <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Military Grid<\/span> is planned to patrol against Indian militants. India supplies low-tech arms such as 5.56 mm INSAS rifles, night-vision devices, winter clothing and military vehicles. The <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT)<\/span> based in Bhutan trains Bhutanese forces. <span class=\"n-term\">Operation All Clear<\/span> (December 2003 to January 2004) flushed out about 30 camps of ULFA, NDFB and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Disaster management<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Group of Experts on Flood Management<\/span> examines causes and impacts of recurrent floods and erosion in the southern foothills and the adjoining Indian plains. The comprehensive scheme for a hydro-meteorological and flood forecasting network on rivers common to India and Bhutan comprises <span class=\"n-term\">32 stations<\/span> in Bhutan. India assisted during landslides and earthquakes and exported medicines and vaccines during COVID-19.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Development<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India is the largest contributor to Bhutan; Indian initiative led Bhutan to launch its <span class=\"n-term\">First Five Year Economic Development Plan<\/span> in 1961, and India fully funded the first two plans and contributed outside the plans through megaprojects \u2014 Old Paro Airport, the Bhutan Broadcasting Station, electricity distribution systems, eastern grid transmissions, all major highways, telecom microwave links, mini-hydels, mineral exploration, survey and mapping, rehabilitation of educational infrastructure, and the Thimphu, Mongar and Jigme Dorji Wangchuck hospitals. In 2008 India announced the first rail link, from Hashimara in West Bengal to Phuntsholing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Education &amp; culture<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Scholarships, technical expertise and specialists, in addition to assistance under the Colombo Plan. <span class=\"n-term\">Sherubtse College<\/span>, Bhutan&#8217;s only degree college, is affiliated to Delhi University; Bhutan has established a chair for Buddhist studies at Nagarjuna University in Andhra Pradesh. Annual festivals and exhibitions and cooperation between museums; nearly <span class=\"n-term\">20,000<\/span> members of the Indian community live in Bhutan, mostly traders and labourers. An <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Bhutan Foundation<\/span> enhances people-to-people contact.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Bhutan&#8217;s own three priorities:<\/span> Peace, security, prosperity \u00b7 Gross National Happiness \u00b7 A vibrant democracy<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-chinese-angle-and-doklam-2017\">The Chinese angle and Doklam, 2017<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Satish Kumar<\/span> \u2014 China has always claimed rights in <span class=\"n-term\">Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Arunachal Pradesh<\/span>, on grounds of traditional, ethnic, cultural and religious affinity between Tibetans and the populations of the claimed territories. The primary objective of China&#8217;s manoeuvres appears to be separating these territories from India and integrating them into the Chinese sphere of influence by methods short of outright warfare.<\/li>\n<li>In <span class=\"n-term\">July 1958<\/span> China published a map indicating the Sino-Indian border by a thick brown line, taking in a large chunk of Indian territory and a considerable area of eastern and northeastern Bhutan. China occupied eight villages on the Bhutan\u2013Tibet border in <span class=\"n-term\">1959<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Under <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 2<\/span><\/span> of the 1949 Treaty, India took up the border question with China on Bhutan&#8217;s behalf; China under Zhou Enlai refused Nehru&#8217;s contention that any &#8216;special relation&#8217; existed between Bhutan and Sikkim and India.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">1998 Agreement on Peace and Tranquility<\/span> committed both sides to maintain peace and to uphold the status quo of the boundary prior to March 1959; Chinese road-building close to Bhutan&#8217;s border marked a diversion from it and led to protests in Bhutan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The land swap offer<\/span> \u2014 China proposed giving <span class=\"n-term\">495 sq km<\/span> near central Bhutan in return for <span class=\"n-term\">269 sq km<\/span> in the west where the <span class=\"n-term\">Chumbi Valley<\/span> lies. The deal would have brought China closer to the Chicken&#8217;s Neck and been disastrous for India&#8217;s security; Bhutan declined.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya G. Shivamurthy<\/span>: &#8220;Starting in 1984, Bhutan and China started bilateral negotiations on their territorial disputes.&#8221; There have been 24 rounds and 11 Expert Group Meetings. Negotiations reached a stalemate in 1998, prompting Bhutan to propose an <span class=\"n-term\">expert technical group<\/span> to delineate boundaries through study of maps. By 2015 technical field survey reports in the Central and Western sectors were complete. Chinese intrusions nonetheless continued, with citizens encouraged to settle in disputed areas and roads, infrastructure and permanent settlements built within Bhutanese territory.<\/li>\n<li>Chinese forces dismantled several unmanned posts in Bhutan, disturbing the sanctity of the Sino-Bhutan border close to Sikkim, and are now within a few hundred kilometres of the <span class=\"n-term\">Siliguri Corridor<\/span>. India undertook responsibility for Bhutan&#8217;s defence because of China&#8217;s actions in Tibet and its assertive stance along contested borders.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Doklam \u2014 where exactly is the trijunction?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India and Bhutan<\/span> \u2014 The trijunction lies at <span class=\"n-term\">Batang La<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Root of it<\/span>: rival readings of the <span class=\"n-term\">1890 Calcutta Convention<\/span> between Britain and China<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">China<\/span> \u2014 The trijunction lies about <span class=\"n-term\">6.5 km<\/span> south, at <span class=\"n-term\">Gymochen<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Rule in force<\/span>: under the <span class=\"n-term\">2012 India-China agreement<\/span>, both must hold the status quo until competing claims are resolved in consultation with the third party, Bhutan<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>June 2017 \u00b7 Operation Juniper \u2014 India confronts road-building towards the plateau and aligns with Bhutan&#8217;s position<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Lacking any treaty describing the boundary, Bhutan and China continue to negotiate an alignment; the most contentious discrepancies lie in Bhutan&#8217;s west along the Chumbi Valley. India accused China of building a road towards the Doklam plateau, a concern also raised by the Royal Bhutanese Army.<\/li>\n<li>China&#8217;s expansionary attitude can be explained through its <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;Middle Kingdom complex&#8221;<\/span> \u2014 the Chinese treat their country as the <em>centre of the world<\/em> and their culture and civilisation as the greatest, and hold that a &#8216;subdued neighbourhood&#8217; is necessary for stability. The actions at Doklam align with a strategy of intimidating smaller neighbours. China did not appear to anticipate India&#8217;s intervention; the Communist leadership is angered by India&#8217;s refusal to join its signature projects and displeased with New Delhi&#8217;s closeness to Washington and Tokyo.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Explain the defence and foreign policy of India to address the challenges emerging out of the current India-China standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/explain-the-defence-and-foreign-policy-of-india-to-address-the-upsc-psir-2020-4204\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"challenges-hydropower-debt-generational-change\">Challenges \u2014 hydropower, debt, generational change<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Chinese engagement<\/span> \u2014 boundary negotiations and infrastructure near sensitive trijunction areas create strategic uncertainty. <span class=\"n-term\">Samaranayake<\/span> (2019) warns that any shift in Bhutan&#8217;s alignment could expose India to vulnerability.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Hydropower dependency<\/span> \u2014 concern about over-dependence on the Indian market, delays in projects, and tariff disagreements. <span class=\"n-term\">Economic diversification<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan wishes to reduce dependence on India for trade and to diversify partnerships, including with Bangladesh, as part of building a more resilient economy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Debt and perception<\/span> \u2014 loans, grants, lines of credit and hydropower projects have made Bhutan more dependent rather than promoting a self-sustaining economy. India&#8217;s use of Indian labour, capital, technology and goods rather than local resources has drawn criticism, as have imports of hydropower electricity at below market prices. Delay has increased Bhutan&#8217;s costs and debt: <span class=\"n-term\">94% of Bhutan&#8217;s current debts relate to hydropower projects alone<\/span>, on top of a continuing trade deficit with India. The result is a perception that India is taking back whatever it invests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Cost overruns<\/span> \u2014 the three major ongoing projects, Mangdechhu, Punatsangchhu-I and Punatsangchhu-II, cost approximately <span class=\"n-term\">\u20b912,300 crore<\/span>, accounting for 77% of the contribution. The 720 MW Mangdechhu project nearly doubled in cost over two years of construction; Punatsangchhu-I and II, each 1,200 MW, tripled in cost and were delayed by more than five years. Interest accrues on projects funded as 30% grant and 70% loan at 10% annual interest.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Tariff dispute<\/span> \u2014 Indian negotiators propose rates up to <span class=\"n-term\">\u20b93.90<\/span> per unit while Bhutan seeks closer to <span class=\"n-term\">\u20b94.40<\/span>, in line with the <span class=\"n-term\">cost-plus model<\/span> used for the 1020 MW Tala project.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Generational change<\/span> \u2014 while the older generation stayed loyal to India, the young are eager to see Bhutan play a global role; their sense of identity and ideology is still forming, which makes them open to different views of foreign policy. Chinese applications have become popular despite security loopholes, exposing young people further to anti-Indian sentiment. Some sections perceive India as a hurdle in border negotiations with China, citing Bhutan&#8217;s refusal of the &#8216;package deal&#8217; and alleged Indian involvement in the 2013 elections. During Doklam, some Bhutanese criticised both India and China on social media and called out their own government for overreliance on India; there are those who find India&#8217;s economic embrace &#8220;suffocating&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">People-to-people frictions<\/span> \u2014 tensions over issues such as demonetisation or cross-border trade regulation, generally resolved diplomatically.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;\u2026 there are high chances of being accused of the same sort of &#8216;debt trapping&#8217; that China is accused of today.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Suhasini Haidar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"bhutan-theory-scholars-policy\">Bhutan \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lenses:<\/span> Realism \u00b7 Sociological Liberalism \u00b7 Functionalism<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>What it explains<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Realism<\/td>\n<td>Strategic security and territorial integrity; India protecting its interests in the region.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sociological Liberalism<\/td>\n<td>People-to-people ties, cultural exchange and shared values.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Functionalism<\/td>\n<td>Cooperation in economic and developmental sectors producing mutual benefit and regional stability.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Views of scholars<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 despite diversifying bilateral ties, Bhutan will politically continue to consider India its only major strategic ally; New Delhi should recognise Thimphu&#8217;s concerns and not take it for granted. The cornerstone lies in hydropower, but both must strengthen science and technology education, healthcare and other domains. New Delhi should be vigilant about strategic powers engaging Bhutan, as indicated by high-level visits from China and the United States. In a world of expanding choices, prioritising each other&#8217;s concerns remains in the best interests of both.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya G. Shivamurthy<\/span> \u2014 Prime Minister <span class=\"n-term\">Lotay Tshering<\/span> in 2023 denied Chinese intrusions and installations within Bhutanese territory and said China is as much a stakeholder as India and Bhutan in the Doklam issue. India-China competition and China&#8217;s assertive stance have influenced shifts in Bhutan&#8217;s foreign policy, though recent developments show a strong element of continuity. After nearly forty years there is some optimism within Bhutan for demarcating its borders with China, barring the Doklam trijunction, and the denial of intrusions suggests Bhutan may be contemplating ceding certain territories in the Northern and Western disputed sectors for a broader settlement. There are reports that India urged Bhutan to resolve its dispute so that a <span class=\"n-term\">tripartite engagement<\/span> in the trijunction region could become possible. They warn that Beijing will keep using intimidation to set the regional agenda, and that with trust in China at a historic low and Doklam unresolved, the India-Bhutan-China triangle faces another stress test. In their assessment, <span class=\"n-term\">India-China competition is increasingly going to be the primary determinant of the foreign policy of South Asian countries<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Phunchok Stobdan<\/span> \u2014 New Delhi&#8217;s coercive business diplomacy pushes Bhutan towards China; yet these economic ties are vital for Bhutan&#8217;s growth and integral to India&#8217;s energy needs.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanak Mani Dixit<\/span> \u2014 India and Bhutan share a relationship based on mutual respect, not dominance, resting on sovereignty and fair trade. <span class=\"n-sch\">K.P.S. Nair<\/span> \u2014 India has played a key role in Bhutan&#8217;s security and economic development, demonstrating soft power in the region.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy suggestions for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Reetika Sharma<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Ramvir Goria<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan&#8217;s trade beyond South Asia is just <span class=\"n-term\">10%<\/span> and must increase; exports must be diversified, and medicinal plants may hold the key for research in medical technology. Economic growth with electoral democracy holds a bright future, and engagement with different nations including India is a must for raising <em>Gross National Happiness<\/em>. To ensure durability, India must pursue a flexible approach, as it did in renewing the clauses of the Friendship Treaty.<\/li>\n<li>India must meet deadlines, keep project costs within affordable limits, and renegotiate electricity tariffs.<\/li>\n<li>Respect Bhutan&#8217;s sovereignty and autonomy. Resentment among younger Bhutanese about the 1949 Treaty led to its revision in 2007; the 2007 security arrangement was the basis on which Indian forces stood against China in Bhutanese territory at Doklam. Strategic experts note Bhutan&#8217;s misgivings about becoming another Sikkim or meeting the fate of Tibet. Just as India pursues strategic autonomy, Bhutan wants the same from India.<\/li>\n<li>Follow a <span class=\"n-term\">developmental stance<\/span> and use a <span class=\"n-term\">functionalist approach<\/span> to explore cooperation beyond government initiatives by giving more space to the private sector. <span class=\"n-term\">Strategic dialogue<\/span> \u2014 consider trilateral dialogue with Bhutan and China to ease border tensions. <span class=\"n-term\">Economic diversification<\/span> \u2014 encourage Bhutan to move beyond hydropower into fintech, space and pharmaceuticals.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span> urges an equal and sensitive approach addressing Bhutan&#8217;s aspirations for sovereignty and modernisation while protecting India&#8217;s security interests. <span class=\"n-term\">Cultural engagement<\/span> \u2014 Buddhist diplomacy, education exchanges and tourism, with figures such as <span class=\"n-term\">Guru Rinpoche<\/span> revered in both countries. <span class=\"n-term\">Responsiveness<\/span> \u2014 remain responsive to Bhutan&#8217;s developmental priorities and align with the <em>Gross National Happiness<\/em> philosophy; the recent financial support of \u20b910,000 crore is a step in this direction.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashok Sajjanhar<\/span> \u2014 invite a larger number of Bhutanese youth to study in India at all levels, from high school to professional and technical courses, since China and Western countries are stealing a march. Media is a powerful instrument to reach Bhutanese decision-makers and ordinary people with the assurance that India will stand by them according to their own wishes and aspirations. Bhutanese are proud of never having been colonised or subjugated, and India should not behave like a big brother.<\/li>\n<li>India must cement ties so that China cannot drive a wedge; the Doklam impasse produced a more confident and resolute relationship, and most analysts believe India conducted its diplomacy well. <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> declared in Parliament that aggression against Bhutan would be seen as aggression against India, and that security guarantee has been reaffirmed since. New trade routes should be opened, such as the June 2020 route between Jaigaon in India and Pasakha in Bhutan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"sri-lanka-the-love-hate-relationship\">Sri Lanka \u2014 the love-hate relationship<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Per the Ministry of External Affairs, the relationship is more than <span class=\"n-term\">2,500 years old<\/span>, built on a legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and linguistic interaction. Tamils and Buddhism both reached the island from India, and demography, religion, language and culture bear the imprint of Indian influence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">K.M. Panikkar<\/span> emphasised the <span class=\"n-term\">strategic unity<\/span> of India and Sri Lanka and argued for closer union. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> (<em>Choices<\/em>) refers to Sri Lanka as an <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;aircraft carrier&#8221;<\/span> in the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Eswaran Sridharan<\/span> \u2014 the determinants of the relationship are geography, the legacy of British colonial rule, the inherited relationship, geopolitical alignments, economic relations, and personal relationships between leaders.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> \u2014 relations remain complicated by the history of India&#8217;s prior involvement (support for the Tamil militancy, then a disastrous military intervention ending in ignominious withdrawal) and by India&#8217;s legitimate desire, made urgent by domestic political imperatives, to see Tamil political aspirations accommodated. India&#8217;s prioritisation of the United States and China, and its disproportionate neighbourhood focus on Pakistan, has come at the cost of attention to other neighbours.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">V. Suryanarayan<\/span> terms it a <span class=\"n-term\">love-hate relationship<\/span>, driven above all by India&#8217;s powerful position. India&#8217;s commanding position at the heart of South Asia is both enviable and much-resented; a huge neighbour is loved by no one \u2014 neither do Mexicans love the United States, nor Ukrainians Russia. Historical, cultural and geographical affinity should make the two natural partners, yet the asymmetry made Sinhalese leaders apprehensive of India&#8217;s intentions and capabilities, and Sri Lankan leaders sought external aid against perceived Indian threats rather than close collaboration.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;Every other nation is a friend to Sri Lanka, but India is a relative.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Mahinda Rajapaksa<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why Sri Lanka matters<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The Indian Ocean handles around <span class=\"n-term\">30% of global trade<\/span>; Sri Lanka sits between West Asia and Southeast Asia with abundant natural resources, and can contribute to <span class=\"n-term\">marine space surveillance<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">maritime security<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Increasing Chinese footprint<\/span> \u2014 Sri Lanka is part of the <span class=\"n-term\">BRI<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Maritime Silk Road<\/span>, checking India&#8217;s rise as a &#8216;net security provider&#8217; and &#8216;regional hegemon&#8217;. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2014 China sees India&#8217;s engagement in Sri Lankan affairs as a way to &#8220;manage&#8221; the country and gain &#8220;regional hegemony&#8221; in South Asia, and also to &#8220;eradicate the influence of other countries&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Ethnic and familial ties<\/span> \u2014 unlike China, India cannot act on purely commercial motives.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Outside powers<\/span> \u2014 the Indian Ocean, once regarded as a Zone of Peace, has become a Zone of Conflict; strategic compulsion now pushes India to collaborate with the United States, France, Britain, Japan and Australia, of which <span class=\"n-term\">QUAD<\/span> is one outcome.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">External balancing by Sri Lanka<\/span> \u2014 wary of Indian pre-eminence, Colombo used the United States earlier and uses the <em>China card<\/em> now, both to balance India and to raise its bargaining power.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> describes the relationship as a <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;fraternal friendship&#8221;<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"chronology-1948-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 1948 to the present<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Year<\/th>\n<th>Marker<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>1948<\/td>\n<td>Ceylon becomes independent; the <span class=\"n-term\">Soulbury constitution<\/span> sets up a unitary state under Sinhalese majority control.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1949<\/td>\n<td>Tamils disenfranchised.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1964<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Sirimavo\u2013Shastri accord<\/span> \u2014 India to confer citizenship on 5,25,000 people of Indian origin and their natural increase, Ceylon on 3,00,000 and theirs, in a <span class=\"n-term\">7:4 ratio<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1971 (Apr)<\/td>\n<td>India assists during the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna revolt.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1971 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td>Sri Lanka provides refuelling facilities to Pakistani aircraft during the East Pakistan crisis.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1972<\/td>\n<td>Ceylon renamed Sri Lanka; Buddhism made the foremost religion.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1974<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sirimavo\u2013Indira accord<\/span> fixes numbers for repatriation; India recognises Sri Lankan sovereignty over <span class=\"n-term\">Katchatheevu<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1976<\/td>\n<td>Maritime Agreement \u2014 both sides agree not to fish in each other&#8217;s waters. LTTE formed under <span class=\"n-term\">Velupillai Prabhakaran<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1983<\/td>\n<td>Ethnic war begins.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1987<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Sri Lankan Accord<\/span>; the <span class=\"n-term\">Thirteenth Amendment<\/span> and the provincial council system; <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Pawan<\/span> and the IPKF.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1988<\/td>\n<td>Citizenship to Stateless Persons (Special Provisions) Act 39.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1998 \/ 2000<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement<\/span> signed; operational from 2000.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2006\u201309<\/td>\n<td>China and Pakistan establish a diplomatic presence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2009 (May)<\/td>\n<td>The armed conflict ends; India votes against a human rights motion at the UN.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2012, 2013<\/td>\n<td>India votes against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2014<\/td>\n<td>India abstains on a resolution for international investigation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2015<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Maithripala Sirisena<\/span> visits India; a return visit to Colombo follows in March, the first stand-alone visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. <span class=\"n-term\">Civil Nuclear Cooperation<\/span> agreement signed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2016<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Open Sky Agreement<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2021<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Air Bubble Agreement<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2022<\/td>\n<td>Unprecedented <span class=\"n-term\">economic crisis<\/span>; India extends about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 4 billion<\/span> in credit lines.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2023<\/td>\n<td>President <span class=\"n-term\">Ranil Wickremesinghe<\/span> visits India; connectivity and cooperation agreements signed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2024 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td>President <span class=\"n-term\">Anura Kumara Dissanayake&#8217;s<\/span> first foreign trip, 15\u201317 December; joint statement on a shared future.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2025 (Apr)<\/td>\n<td>Colombo visit of 4\u20136 April; the first India\u2013Sri Lanka <span class=\"n-term\">defence-cooperation MoU<\/span>; the Trincomalee energy hub pact with the UAE; the 120 MW Sampur solar project.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2025 (Nov)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Cyclone Ditwah<\/span>; <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sagar Bandhu<\/span> launched on 28 November.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2025 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td>A <span class=\"n-term\">USD 450 million<\/span> relief package offered on 23 December.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"sridharan-s-four-phases-and-the-current-one\">Sridharan&#8217;s four phases \u2014 and the current one<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Eswaran Sridharan<\/span> (<em>Indo-Sri Lanka Relations<\/em>, in <em>Engaging the World<\/em>) holds that of the three levels of analysis \u2014 systemic, domestic and personal \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">domestic level<\/span> has been most significant in shaping Indian policy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The arc of the relationship, phase by phase.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">I \u00b7 1948\u20131982<\/span> (Normal but not cordial \u2014 statelessness, Katchatheevu, security perceptions) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">II \u00b7 from 1983<\/span> (Deterioration \u2014 ethnic violence, civil war, Colombo&#8217;s tilt to the West) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">III \u00b7 since 1991<\/span> (Restoring friendship \u2014 LTTE banned, liberalisation, ISFTA) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">IV \u00b7 2009\u20132015<\/span> (After the LTTE \u2014 China and Pakistan enter; the <span class=\"n-law\">13th Amendment<\/span> stalls) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Current<\/span> (SAGAR and Neighbourhood First \u2014 crisis assistance, the five-pillar vision)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase I (1948\u20131982) \u2014 three issues dominated<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Statelessness of Indian Tamils<\/span> \u2014 those who went to the island during colonial rule to work on plantations faced a citizenship crisis in 1948 as the Sinhalese elite whittled down their political rights. The <span class=\"n-term\">Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949<\/span> were rigid and restrictive, denying citizenship to all not indisputably indigenous; Tamil speakers were gradually marginalised in public employment and, from the early 1970s, in university admissions through the &#8216;standardisation policy&#8217;. Ceylon sought repatriation to India; <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> resisted, unwilling to set a precedent for other overseas Indian populations. The <span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">1974<\/span> accords fixed numbers for repatriation, the rest being granted citizenship. <span class=\"n-sch\">Eswaran Sridharan<\/span> \u2014 these agreements aligned with the Nehruvian approach to overseas Indians: promote them as responsible citizens of host countries and encourage host nations to grant full citizenship, avoiding friction with states India sought relations with.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Katchatheevu dispute<\/span> \u2014 a tiny barren island in the Palk Strait. Every piece of historical evidence indicates it was under the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad in Tamil Nadu; Sri Lanka claimed that British Indian authorities had tacitly accepted its ownership. Successive Indian leaders showed a lack of active concern; Nehru and his successors minimised the disagreement in the interest of good relations. In the <span class=\"n-term\">1974 Agreement<\/span> India recognised Sri Lankan sovereignty, against objections by the DMK government in Tamil Nadu; the <span class=\"n-term\">1976 Maritime Agreement<\/span> barred fishing vessels of either country in the other&#8217;s waters, introducing a new irritant. <span class=\"n-sch\">Eswaran Sridharan<\/span> \u2014 both settlements owed much to the <span class=\"n-term\">personal relationship between Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike<\/span>, but lacked foresight: they missed that relations could still deteriorate because of Sri Lanka&#8217;s discriminatory domestic policies and their repercussions in India, and that depletion of fish stocks would later cause trans-maritime poaching and tension.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Security perceptions<\/span> \u2014 Sri Lankan leaders perceived India as a potential threat and justified the <span class=\"n-term\">1947 Sri Lanka\u2013UK defence agreement<\/span> on that ground; Nehru tried to allay these fears with assurances of goodwill. Colombo&#8217;s persistence showed extra-strategic considerations in the defence policy that <span class=\"n-term\">D.S. Senanayake<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">John Kotelawala<\/span> preferred \u2014 counterpoising India&#8217;s pre-eminence through military cooperation using the island&#8217;s locational advantage. The <span class=\"n-term\">Indira doctrine<\/span> of the 1970s made clear that India aimed at pre-eminence in the region, and Indian geostrategic thinking sought to push Cold War meddling by the United States a safe distance from India&#8217;s borders.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase II \u2014 deterioration from the early 1980s<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The July <span class=\"n-term\">1983 ethnic violence<\/span> and the ensuing civil war between the Sri Lankan army and the <span class=\"n-term\">LTTE<\/span> decisively affected bilateral relations. India&#8217;s concern over civilian deaths and its desire to protect Sri Lankan Tamils created fear in Colombo, which went in search of global security guarantees in 1983\u201384. India adopted a two-pronged strategy of persuasion and coercion towards both the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil groups, aiming at a negotiated political settlement.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic gestures to the West<\/span> annoyed India further. Under <span class=\"n-term\">J.R. Jayewardene<\/span> (1978\u201389) and <span class=\"n-term\">Ranasinghe Premadasa<\/span> (1989\u201393), Sri Lanka allowed the United States to set up a <em>Voice of America<\/em> transmitting station, suspected of intelligence gathering and electronic surveillance of the Indian Ocean; extended refuelling and recreation facilities to visiting US naval ships; and granted a contract for leasing oil storage tanks at the strategic harbour of <span class=\"n-term\">Trincomalee<\/span> to a Singapore-based US company \u2014 scrapped under the 1987 Accord. Jayewardene even sought British involvement by reviving the 1947 defence agreement, which India&#8217;s firm stand against external involvement prevented.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase III \u2014 restoring friendship, since 1991<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Eswaran Sridharan<\/span> dates this phase from the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the banning of the LTTE in India in 1992. From the election of the Narasimha Rao government in June 1991, India launched a long-term <span class=\"n-term\">economic liberalisation programme<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Departing from its traditional stand against external involvement in South Asia, India supported <span class=\"n-term\">Norwegian facilitation<\/span> of the peace process, alongside the United States, the European Union and Japan. With the LTTE, India wanted no relations.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Pro-US shift<\/span> \u2014 post-liberalisation growth needed Western capital and technology; strategically, the Soviet collapse removed the implicit guarantee against China embodied in the <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971<\/span>, while the Kashmir insurgency from December 1989 kept war a possibility.<\/li>\n<li>From the time of <span class=\"n-term\">I.K. Gujral<\/span> (1997\u201398) India followed a <span class=\"n-term\">dual track<\/span> \u2014 South Asian regional cooperation alongside improved bilateral ties, with economic growth and security both in focus. Sri Lankan policy shifted under <span class=\"n-term\">Chandrika Kumaratunga<\/span> from 1994; she proposed federal solutions in 1995, 1997 and 2000, the last an improvement on the Thirteenth Amendment.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement of 1998<\/span>, operational from 2000, was part of a wider shift in foreign economic policy running parallel to SAPTA and SAFTA. Relations grew rapidly during the boom years of 2003\u201308; by 2012 Sri Lanka was India&#8217;s biggest trading partner and the leading destination for Indian investment in South Asia.<\/li>\n<li>The NDA government broadly followed the Accord&#8217;s approach \u2014 a negotiated solution based on devolution, discouraging a military solution. The UPA minority government from 2004 followed a <span class=\"n-term\">hands-off policy<\/span> while promoting trade and investment. India&#8217;s stated position remains a political resolution within a unified Sri Lanka that addresses the wishes of all communities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase IV \u2014 after the LTTE, 2009\u20132015<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Begins with the defeat of the LTTE and the destruction of its leadership in May 2009. <span class=\"n-term\">China<\/span> and, to a lesser extent, <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan<\/span> established a diplomatic presence; Pakistan supplied pilots and arms during the final phase of the Eelam War (2006\u201309) and China supplied arms on a larger scale.<\/li>\n<li>India exercised restraint, given its earlier experience of fighting the LTTE, uncertainty about Colombo&#8217;s intentions towards the Tamils, and public sentiment in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka has since played the <span class=\"n-term\">China card<\/span> to ward off pressure for full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, involving devolution of land, police and fiscal powers.<\/li>\n<li>Economic integration proceeded quickly, with trade reaching <span class=\"n-term\">$5 billion<\/span> in 2011\u201312, and constrained political options.<\/li>\n<li>The Rajapaksa regime&#8217;s failure to implement the Thirteenth Amendment and more \u2014 that is, <span class=\"n-term\">13 plus<\/span> \u2014 pushed India to vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in March 2012 and March 2013. In mid-2013 <span class=\"n-term\">Mahinda Rajapaksa<\/span> considered doing away with the Amendment altogether or diluting it. India warned against dilution or cancellation of the first <span class=\"n-term\">Northern Provincial Council<\/span> elections due in September 2013, and threatened to boycott the <span class=\"n-term\">CHOGM<\/span> in Colombo in November 2013 and take stronger action at the UNHRC. Elections were held and the <span class=\"n-term\">Tamil National Alliance<\/span> won resoundingly; Prime Minister Manmohan Singh skipped CHOGM.<\/li>\n<li>The defeat of Rajapaksa and the election of <span class=\"n-term\">Maithripala Sirisena<\/span> in January 2015 improved relations, as he sought to loosen the embrace of China and reorient policy towards the West and India. The fishing rights issue and the ceding of Katchatheevu revived with frequent shooting and arrests of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy, especially after the civil war.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Current phase<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">SAGAR<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Security and Growth for All in the Region<\/span> \u2014 prioritises the Indian Ocean for India&#8217;s peace, stability and prosperity. Its goals: a climate of trust and openness; addressing regional concerns; increasing maritime cooperation; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and adherence by all Indian Ocean states to international maritime rules and norms.<\/li>\n<li>In line with &#8216;Neighbourhood First&#8217; and SAGAR, New Delhi attaches <em>&#8220;a special priority&#8221;<\/em> to Colombo. India&#8217;s outreach to the Rajapaksas began in 2018 when the SLPP swept the local elections.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Ranil Wickremesinghe<\/span> set himself a deadline of Independence Day, 4 February, to announce an <span class=\"n-term\">ethnic package<\/span>; no such package has been finalised. The &#8216;vision document&#8217; adopted during his visit rests on five pillars: <span class=\"n-term\">maritime connectivity; air connectivity; energy and power connectivity; trade, economic and financial connectivity; and people-to-people connectivity.<\/span><\/li>\n<li>The Tamil diaspora and refugees in Indian camps look for a comprehensive package: an international inquiry, a Peace and Reconciliation Commission on the South African model, demilitarisation, return of civilian land, and compensation for war victims.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-1987-accord-and-the-thirteenth-amendment\">The 1987 Accord and the Thirteenth Amendment<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Provisions of the Accord<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Merger of the northern and eastern provinces, where Tamils were in a majority, into a single province.<\/li>\n<li>Substantial devolution of power to the Northern Province.<\/li>\n<li>Dissolution of the LTTE and surrender of arms within a very short time.<\/li>\n<li>The Indian army to aid the Sri Lankan government if requested.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Thirteenth Amendment<\/span> to create provincial councils, and to make Sinhalese and Tamil national languages while retaining English as the link language.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What the Thirteenth Amendment is<\/span><\/p>\n<p>A new <span class=\"n-term\">constitutional arrangement for power sharing<\/span> between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, and between centre and provinces \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">Provincial Council system<\/span>, a constitutional structure providing the substance of federalism.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Consequences<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Peace Keeping Force<\/span> played a role in controlling the insurgency, but <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Pawan<\/span> turned into a thankless venture.<\/li>\n<li>Hated by Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese alike, the IPKF was characterised as an army of occupation by the <span class=\"n-term\">Premadasa<\/span> regime. India protected Sri Lanka&#8217;s national interest at heavy cost without acknowledgement, and the Premadasa administration used unconventional methods to force the IPKF out.<\/li>\n<li>Despite the failure, the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment was a significant step towards devolution across the island.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation-2\">Areas of cooperation<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">ISFTA<\/span>, implemented in 2000, substantially increased trade; the legal framework also includes a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement. India was Sri Lanka&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">largest trading partner<\/span>, with bilateral merchandise trade of <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 5.45 billion<\/span> in 2021 against US$ 3.6 billion in 2020 \u2014 an increase of about 48%. India is among the <span class=\"n-term\">top four investors<\/span> \u2014 petroleum retail, IT, financial services, real estate, telecommunications, hospitality and tourism, banking, food processing, metals, tyres, cement, glass and infrastructure \u2014 with cumulative FDI from India surpassing <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 2.2 billion<\/span>. India has been the largest source market for tourists; the <span class=\"n-term\">Air Bubble Agreement<\/span> (2021) and the <span class=\"n-term\">Open Sky Agreement<\/span> (2016) eased travel, the latter allowing Sri Lankan Airlines unlimited flights to Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Bengaluru and Chennai. Recent agreements cover the <span class=\"n-term\">Blue Economy<\/span> and the UPI payment system.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Cultural<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Exchanges date back 2,500 years; Buddhism is a strong pillar, and the two jointly commemorated the 2600th year of the Buddha&#8217;s enlightenment. The <span class=\"n-term\">Cultural Cooperation Agreement<\/span> of 1977 provides for periodic Cultural Exchange Programmes; the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Cultural Centre<\/span> in Colombo teaches music, dance and Hindi; the <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Sri Lanka Foundation<\/span> works through civil society exchanges.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Defence &amp; security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Sri Lankan Defence Dialogue<\/span> since 2012; joint exercises <span class=\"n-term\">Mitra Shakti<\/span> (military) and <span class=\"n-term\">SLINEX<\/span> (naval); defence training for Sri Lankan forces. A <span class=\"n-term\">trilateral maritime security cooperation<\/span> agreement between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives on surveillance, anti-piracy and marine pollution. Cooperation against drug and human trafficking.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Infrastructure<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Hybrid power projects on northern islands (2022); development projects at <span class=\"n-term\">Kankesanthurai<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Trincomalee<\/span> ports; the Cultural Centre at Jaffna and restoration of the Thiruketheeswaram Temple; housing for internally displaced persons; rehabilitation of the Northern Railway lines and wreck removal; vocational training centres; funding for power projects and north\u2013south railway development.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Multilateral<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Both are in SAARC, BIMSTEC and IORA, and in the UN, WTO, WHO, IMF and World Bank. Sri Lanka supports India&#8217;s bid for a permanent UNSC seat.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"contestation-the-fishermen-and-the-ethnic-question\">Contestation \u2014 the fishermen and the ethnic question<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Fishermen and Katchatheevu<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India recognised Sri Lankan sovereignty over Katchatheevu in 1974 without adequate safeguards for traditional fishing rights; Indian fishermen retained access for rest and drying of nets, not for fishing.<\/li>\n<li>Attacks on and arrests of Indian fishermen have increased, driven partly by depletion of marine resources on the Indian side; Sri Lanka protests the use of big trawlers and <span class=\"n-term\">bottom trawling<\/span>, which is illegal in its waters and damaging to marine ecosystems.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">International Maritime Boundary Line<\/span> is demarcated but fishermen on both sides cross it. Incidents have included the Sri Lankan navy firing on Indian fishermen, contrary to <span class=\"n-term\">UNCLOS<\/span> principles.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Measures<\/span> \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Working Group<\/span> on fisheries; a direct hotline between coast guards; release of detained fishermen and boats on humanitarian grounds; development of deep-sea fishing skills to reduce pressure on traditional grounds. The issue should be treated &#8220;as a purely humanitarian and livelihood concern&#8221;, with force never resorted to.<\/li>\n<li>A proposal for <span class=\"n-term\">licensed fishing<\/span> for southern Tamil Nadu fisherfolk in Sri Lankan waters met stiff resistance from Northern Province fishers, backed by MPs cutting across party lines. Possible approaches include a formal lease arrangement for the island or other cooperative resource management.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The ethnic question<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Jaffna Province<\/span> has a large concentration of Tamils who began demanding a national homeland, a Republic of Eelam, over about <span class=\"n-term\">18,000 sq km<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Two categories of Tamils \u2014 about a million <span class=\"n-term\">Ceylon Tamils<\/span> whose forefathers migrated in ancient times, and about a million who went during the nineteenth century, many without citizenship, whose status dominated early relations.<\/li>\n<li>The Sinhalese fear of Tamil domination is the principal reason behind the conflict; Tamil youth who lost faith in non-violence organised themselves into the Liberation Tigers, seeking a sovereign Eelam.<\/li>\n<li>The earliest attempt at settlement was the <span class=\"n-term\">1953 Nehru\u2013Kotelawala agreement<\/span>; Tamils alleged it was not implemented sincerely and many became &#8216;stateless persons&#8217;. The 1956 language disturbances aggravated tensions, and the 1983 violence was described as an &#8216;<span class=\"n-term\">ethnic explosion<\/span>&#8216;.<\/li>\n<li>India continues to favour a peaceful solution within the framework of Sri Lanka&#8217;s sovereignty and territorial integrity, through negotiation and without outside interference, and welcomes devolution to areas largely inhabited by the Tamil minority.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-chinese-angle-why-beijing-gained-ground\">The Chinese angle \u2014 why Beijing gained ground<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>China follows a policy of non-interference, in contrast to Indian diplomacy dubbed arrogant and meddlesome. Indian assistance is viewed with scepticism, Chinese assistance as a positive balancer. China&#8217;s unconditional support at the UNHRC and its ability to shield Colombo from Western pressure on human rights, accountability and reconciliation work in its favour.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;China has managed to project itself as a disinterested neighbour and a remarkably attractive alternative to big brother India.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Kanti Bajpai<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>A former Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka has said that &#8220;China has never tried to dominate, undermine or destabilise Sri Lanka and has come to rescue with timely assistance on several occasions when Sri Lanka&#8217;s security and territorial integrity was threatened&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Reciprocity<\/span> \u2014 Sri Lanka follows a one-China policy on Taiwan and Tibet and, despite being a Buddhist state, denied the Dalai Lama a visa. <span class=\"n-term\">Mahinda Rajapaksa<\/span> in May 2014: &#8220;I assure you that our policies towards China have never changed and won&#8217;t change.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>India&#8217;s own record contributed \u2014 the IPKF and insistence on a political solution reinforced the &#8216;big brother&#8217; image; India&#8217;s partnership with the United States is read as a device for continued dominance; India did not sell weapons during Eelam War IV and China filled the gap.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Initially Sri Lanka offered Hambantota to India, and India&#8217;s response was lukewarm<\/span>; the offer then went to China. Sri Lanka also offered <span class=\"n-term\">Trincomalee<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Batticaloa<\/span>; bureaucratic apathy meant India could not develop them. India&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">delivery deficit<\/span> pushed Colombo towards Beijing.<\/li>\n<li>India makes investment conditional on policy reform, competitive bidding, transparency and human rights; China does not. Chinese bidders are mostly state-owned and backed by state financial institutions, prioritising strategic advantage, diplomatic mileage and goodwill over profit. Domestic compulsions constrain India \u2014 Tamil Nadu politics is always a factor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Extent of the footprint<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Hambantota port<\/span> is a pearl in the <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;string of pearls&#8221;<\/span>, located at the southern extremity overlooking South Asia&#8217;s vital sea lanes. Colombo&#8217;s assurance that it will remain civilian and under Sri Lankan control finds no takers in New Delhi.<\/li>\n<li>China is building the <span class=\"n-term\">Colombo international container terminal<\/span>, a <span class=\"n-term\">17-km elevated highway<\/span> in Colombo, and the <span class=\"n-term\">Colombo Port City Project<\/span>; a Chinese firm won a contract for energy projects on three islands off the northern <span class=\"n-term\">Jaffna peninsula<\/span>, close to Rameswaram. China has become the largest investor with funding and investment of nearly <span class=\"n-term\">$15 billion<\/span>; Sri Lanka endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Debt, investment and trade<\/span> \u2014 China has been the second-largest foreign lender over the last decade and a half, financing the Colombo\u2013Katunayake expressway, Hambantota port and Mattala Airport; the largest foreign investor during 2010\u201320; and now the top import partner, surpassing India. In 2020 Chinese imports fell 8% under Sri Lanka&#8217;s import restrictions while Indian imports fell about 19%.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Comparison<\/span> \u2014 India has never been a major lender and cannot lend on China&#8217;s scale; running a trade deficit above $100 billion, its support rests largely on export credits, and Indian FDI has been small. Trade is the strongest leg: only 10\u201320% of Indian exports are routed through the ISFTA, and China overtook India as the largest exporter without any FTA. Sri Lanka&#8217;s exports to China were 2.3% of its total in 2020 against 6.1% to India, so it relies more on India as an export market. In ships, boats and floating structures, China&#8217;s share of Sri Lankan imports rose from 1% in 2007 to <span class=\"n-term\">96% in 2017<\/span>, against India&#8217;s under 1% \u2014 a clear sector for India to build capability.<\/li>\n<li>Sri Lanka states three pillars of its &#8216;non-alignment&#8217; \u2014 strategic security priority to India; a posture of neutrality with global powers; and equidistance from the declining West, a rising India and China. Despite reiterating &#8216;<span class=\"n-term\">India first<\/span>&#8216;, there is a perceived tilt.<\/li>\n<li>Closeness to China slowed Indian and Japanese projects, including the Japanese-funded light rail, and Sri Lanka &#8216;unilaterally&#8217; pulled out of the <span class=\"n-term\">2019 tripartite agreement<\/span> on the East Coast container terminal. There are reports of a Chinese hand behind anti-India sentiment around Indian projects.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">R.P. Rajagopalan<\/span> \u2014 much like in the Maldives, <span class=\"n-term\">China&#8217;s interests in Sri Lanka are more strategic than economic<\/span>; India-China competition there will continue to grow and India will find it difficult to match Chinese pockets. Unless India does more for its neighbours and enlists other partners, China will remain a significant strategic challenge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Despite deep ties, India&#8217;s relations with Sri Lanka have seen strains due to China&#8217;s growing influence in Sri Lanka through investments and economic dominance. Analyse.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/despite-deep-ties-indias-relations-with-sri-lanka-have-seen-upsc-psir-2024-4206\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-2022-economic-crisis-and-india-s-response\">The 2022 economic crisis and India&#8217;s response<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>From April 2019 Sri Lanka underwent its worst economic crisis since independence \u2014 unprecedented inflation, near-depletion of foreign exchange reserves, shortages of medical supplies and rising prices of necessities. Total debt stood at <span class=\"n-term\">$64 billion<\/span>, with almost <span class=\"n-term\">95%<\/span> of government revenue going to debt repayment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Causes<\/span> \u2014 the pandemic&#8217;s impact on tourism, a high debt burden, mismanagement of funds and governance failures. Between 2009 and 2018 the trade deficit grew from $5 billion to $12 billion; tax cuts, interest rate changes and a ban on fertiliser and pesticide imports worsened matters, and a credit rating downgrade closed off international markets. A political crisis followed \u2014 violent clashes, resignations, emergency declarations and restrictions on social media.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How India helped<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Supply of essentials from January 2022; monetary support of over <span class=\"n-term\">USD 1.4 billion<\/span> \u2014 a USD 400 million currency swap, USD 500 million loan deferment and a USD 500 million line of credit for fuel imports, with discussions on a further USD 1 billion package.<\/li>\n<li>In all, over <span class=\"n-term\">$3.5 billion<\/span> in financial assistance, including a $500 million oil line of credit and a $1 billion credit line for essential commodities and food; medicines worth around $6 million and nearly <span class=\"n-term\">40,000 tonnes<\/span> of rice, milk powder and kerosene.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 Delhi&#8217;s unstinting material and financial support during the crisis generated much goodwill and offers a major opportunity to reframe ties with Colombo. The visits of the Nepali and Sri Lankan leaders showed strong commitments to deeper economic integration with India, and deep-seated political resistance to commercial partnership with India is shifting.<\/li>\n<li>India was earlier complacent about China&#8217;s economic presence and now offers competition through a bouquet of regional infrastructure projects, working with like-minded partners to present credible alternatives to neighbours who had seen Beijing as the only game in town.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Implications for India, and mitigation<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Sri Lanka&#8217;s trade with China surpasses its trade with India, affecting Indian trade interests; Chinese investments have been criticised for opacity and strategic consequence.<\/li>\n<li>Disruption at Colombo Port would affect India&#8217;s container traffic and exports; Indian investments in real estate, manufacturing and petroleum refining could suffer. Around <span class=\"n-term\">75%<\/span> of Colombo port&#8217;s transshipment business is linked to India. A refugee influx into India would raise security and political concerns.<\/li>\n<li>As a major creditor, India can offer debt relief, a repayment moratorium or restructuring, which would also blunt Chinese influence. Strengthening trade through the FTA promotes stability; over the longer term India should help Sri Lanka reduce dependence on China and integrate better into the global economy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"sri-lanka-after-2024-the-dissanayake-reset-and-its-limits\">Sri Lanka after 2024 \u2014 the Dissanayake reset and its limits<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Why the reset was doubted<\/span> \u2014 Sri Lanka elected <span class=\"n-term\">Anura Kumara Dissanayake<\/span>, whose Marxist party had long opposed Indian influence. The <span class=\"n-term\">Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna<\/span> began as an anti-Indian, Sinhala-nationalist force and led two insurrections, the second against the IPKF; its rise raised doubts about Colombo&#8217;s tilt.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The ORF reading<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya G. Shivamurthy<\/span> argued that pragmatism would prevail and that Colombo would keep balancing between India and China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">December 2024<\/span> \u2014 Dissanayake&#8217;s first foreign trip, <span class=\"n-term\">15\u201317 December<\/span>, with Delhi talks on the 16th and a joint statement, <em>Fostering Partnerships for a Shared Future<\/em>. Both sides agreed to give &#8220;primacy to each other&#8217;s security concerns&#8221;, and Colombo reaffirmed that its territory would not be used against India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">What India put on the table<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">USD 4 billion<\/span> in crisis support, co-chairmanship of the <span class=\"n-term\">Official Creditors&#8217; Committee<\/span>, and conversion of some credit-line loans into grants.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">April 2025<\/span> \u2014 the Colombo visit of <span class=\"n-term\">4\u20136 April<\/span>: the <span class=\"n-term\">first-ever India\u2013Sri Lanka defence-cooperation MoU<\/span> and seven agreements exchanged; an <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013UAE\u2013Sri Lanka<\/span> pact to build <span class=\"n-term\">Trincomalee<\/span> as an energy hub; the <span class=\"n-term\">120 MW Sampur solar project<\/span> launched; and the conferment of the <span class=\"n-term\">Mithra Vibhushana<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The limits, a year on<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya G. Shivamurthy<\/span> noted a weakening government: an opposition regaining ground, cancelled energy projects, and criticism of the very defence MoU.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Cyclone Ditwah<\/span> \u2014 struck in late <span class=\"n-term\">November 2025<\/span>; over <span class=\"n-term\">640 deaths<\/span> and more than <span class=\"n-term\">three million<\/span> people affected. India launched <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sagar Bandhu<\/span> on <span class=\"n-term\">28 November<\/span> and on <span class=\"n-term\">23 December 2025<\/span> offered a <span class=\"n-term\">USD 450 million<\/span> package (USD 350m credit, USD 100m grant). The disaster cut Colombo&#8217;s bargaining room and pulled China back in with a fresh highway loan, even as the Indian package deepened the reset.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Maritime and fisheries irritants<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The one-year ban on foreign <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;research vessels&#8221;<\/span> \u2014 of the <em>Yuan Wang 5<\/em> and <em>Shi Yan 6<\/em> type \u2014 ended; a <span class=\"n-term\">case-by-case Standard Operating Procedure<\/span> replaced it.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Katchatheevu<\/span>, ceded under the 1974 accord, resurfaced in India&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">2024 election<\/span>; <span class=\"n-term\">178 Indian fishermen and 23 trawlers<\/span> were detained in 2024.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;Recognizing shared security interests of India and Sri Lanka, both leaders acknowledged the importance of regular dialogue based on mutual trust and transparency and giving primacy to each other&#8217;s security concerns\u2026 President Disanayaka reiterated Sri Lanka&#8217;s stated position of not permitting its territory to be used in any manner inimical to the security of India.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Sri Lanka Joint Statement, MEA \/ PIB, 16 December 2024, para 21<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;Sri Lanka will always find India by its side.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Prime Minister Narendra Modi, letter to President Dissanayake on Cyclone Ditwah relief, December 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"sri-lanka-theory-scholars-policy\">Sri Lanka \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lenses:<\/span> Realism \u00b7 Liberalism \u00b7 Constructivism<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>What it explains<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Realism<\/td>\n<td>India&#8217;s security concerns and its interest in safeguarding strategic position in the Indian Ocean against China&#8217;s presence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Liberalism<\/td>\n<td>Cooperative engagement through economic interdependence, trade and multilateral cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Constructivism<\/td>\n<td>Historical and cultural ties shape diplomatic identity and mutual perception.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy suggestions for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>To meet Indian apprehensions on Hambantota, Colombo has tried to confine China to commercial management, with security under Sri Lankan oversight.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">civil nuclear cooperation<\/span> agreement is Sri Lanka&#8217;s first with any country; India is making forays into infrastructure in the Northern and Eastern provinces, with <span class=\"n-term\">Trincomalee Port<\/span> planned as a counterweight to Hambantota.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">V. Suryanarayan<\/span> \u2014 India should refrain from the cynicism and opportunism of China&#8217;s approach. Developments in Sri Lanka are not purely domestic, since they have repercussions in Tamil Nadu. The effectiveness of Indian diplomacy lies not in imposing solutions but in how quickly New Delhi can convince Colombo to devolve significant powers to Tamil regions, allowing Tamils to keep their identity while being proud Sri Lankans. Full bilateral potential \u2014 economic, political, cultural, educational \u2014 can be reached only after ethnic reconciliation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Palk Bay as common heritage<\/span> \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">Palk Bay Authority<\/span> with members from both countries, including experts in fisheries and marine ecology and representatives of fishing communities; the Government of Tamil Nadu, the Northern Province government and the fishermen themselves must be involved.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vijay Sappani<\/span> \u2014 India is a far stronger partner than China in education, healthcare and tourism. Under the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Scheme and the Colombo Plan<\/span>, Sri Lankan nationals can use 400 slots for short and medium-term training. India can establish an Indian Institute of Technology, expand centres like the <span class=\"n-term\">Sri Lanka\u2013India Centre for English Language Training (SLICELT)<\/span> in Kandy, and create jobs by expanding its IT presence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Sen<\/span> \u2014 continue a high quantum of assistance for rehabilitation of the war-ravaged north, organised with oversight of Indian representatives so benefits reach local inhabitants, while avoiding pressure on devolution beyond a point.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">N. Manoharan<\/span> \u2014 India must bring its full weight to bear to secure a meaningful devolution package going beyond the present Thirteenth Amendment framework, with a suitable reconciliation method to build bridges among communities. The fishermen issue must be de-politicised by the provincial governments \u2014 solutions lie not in electoral politics but in statesmanlike handling, and the waters are better seen as common heritage than contested territory. On China, India must know its strengths and weaknesses, take an edge in whichever fields it can \u2014 resettlement, tourism, cultural exchange, trade \u2014 and consciously build constituencies in the neighbourhood.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">CEPA<\/span> should be signed; counter-terrorism training and maritime cooperation, including joint naval patrolling, control of smuggling and piracy, and stronger communication networks, should be deepened.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 recent developments in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan underline the geographic imperative binding India to the subcontinent; aligning with geographic reality has become inevitable amid escalating regional and global crises.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-maldives-why-the-archipelago-counts\">The Maldives \u2014 why the archipelago counts<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Per the <span class=\"n-term\">Ministry of External Affairs<\/span>, India and the Maldives share ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and commercial links steeped in antiquity. India was among the first to recognise the Maldives after its independence in <span class=\"n-term\">1965<\/span> and to establish diplomatic relations; the Indian mission at Mal\u00e9 was established in <span class=\"n-term\">1972<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Located barely <span class=\"n-term\">70 nautical miles<\/span> from Minicoy, the archipelago of 1,200 coral islands lies alongside the main shipping lanes, vital for India&#8217;s maritime security and its wider Indian Ocean strategy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span> \u2014 the Maldives developed a unique national identity through the interplay of influences from India, Sri Lanka and the Persian and Arab world.<\/li>\n<li>Relations ebb and surge mainly because of Maldivian <em>domestic factors<\/em>, especially the nature of the state. By declaring Islam the state religion and forbidding citizens from practising any other faith, the <span class=\"n-term\">1997 constitution<\/span> works as a breeding ground for an intolerant theocratic society; the policies of former President <span class=\"n-term\">Maumoon Abdul Gayoom<\/span>, who used religion for political ends, produced a fundamentalist society.<\/li>\n<li>Going by the <span class=\"n-term\">levels of analysis<\/span>, it is the <em>domestic politics<\/em> of the Maldives that is the dominant factor in its foreign policy decision-making.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;The strength of the Maldives-India diplomatic relationship has ebbed and flowed based on the ruling party or coalition in power in Mal\u00e9. For years now, India has been the dominant regional power by virtue of its being the most powerful in the subregion and, more recently, by its Neighborhood First policy.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rasheeda M. Didi<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India&#8217;s strategic interests<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shayesta N. Ahmed<\/span> \u2014 India is a resident power in the Indian Ocean and aspires to be a <span class=\"n-term\">net security provider<\/span> to its immediate maritime neighbourhood. The <span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span> policy advocates &#8220;a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean Region&#8221;, and the Maldives is an important pillar of India&#8217;s maritime agenda in the Indo-Pacific.<\/li>\n<li>The location ensures uninterrupted flow of energy supplies to China, Japan and India; anti-piracy operations have raised its significance further. India formulated the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)<\/span> as a forum for littoral navies to work towards interoperability.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 proximity to Lakshadweep and to major sea lines of communication makes the Maldives a strategic <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;toll gate&#8221;<\/span>; <span class=\"n-term\">50% of India&#8217;s trade and 80% of its energy imports<\/span> pass through these routes, so instability there would undermine India&#8217;s regional influence and energy security.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">China&#8217;s economic presence<\/span> is a major concern because Chinese investment always carries a strategic element; with the country said to owe <span class=\"n-term\">70% of its external aid<\/span> to China, many believe Yameen did to the Maldives what Rajapaksa did to Sri Lanka.<\/li>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">2015 constitutional amendment<\/span> permitted freehold land ownership by foreigners; a Chinese company secured a 50-year lease on <span class=\"n-term\">Feydhoo Finolhu<\/span> near Mal\u00e9 for $4 million. <span class=\"n-term\">Saudi Arabia<\/span> planned to invest $10 billion in acquiring <span class=\"n-term\">Faafu<\/span>, 19 low-lying islands 120 km south of Mal\u00e9; seen against the growing footprint of radical Islam, increasing Chinese-Saudi defence cooperation is worrying for Indian planners.<\/li>\n<li>During Yameen&#8217;s tenure radicalisation increased rapidly, with the archipelago reportedly having one of the highest per capita numbers of foreign fighters in Syria. The Maldives has a huge <span class=\"n-term\">EEZ<\/span> but lacks defence and surveillance capacity, which is where India can act as net security provider.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Bhadrakumar<\/span> \u2014 a permanent solution is needed; the Maldives is like a floating butterfly, but it stings like a bee quite often at our navel. In these postmodern times the fizz has gone out of the regime-change formula, and India&#8217;s foreign and security establishment should come up with something ingenious \u2014 he suggests something like the Diego Garcia formula.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"chronology-1965-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 1965 to the present<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Year<\/th>\n<th>Marker<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>1965<\/td>\n<td>India among the first to recognise and establish relations.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1976<\/td>\n<td>Maritime boundary agreement.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1981<\/td>\n<td>Comprehensive trade agreement providing for export of essential commodities.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1988 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Operation Cactus<\/span> foils a coup attempt in Mal\u00e9 by a guerrilla outfit from Sri Lanka.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2004<\/td>\n<td>Relief and supplies after the tsunami; the Maldives opens its High Commission in India, its fourth in the world.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2007<\/td>\n<td>Assistance against the security threat from LTTE cadres.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2008<\/td>\n<td>Transition to multiparty democracy; <span class=\"n-term\">Mohammed Nasheed<\/span> becomes the first democratic president.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2009<\/td>\n<td>Naval help at Maldivian request; <span class=\"n-term\">defence cooperation agreement<\/span> \u2014 India to install <span class=\"n-term\">26 radars<\/span> on all atolls for seamless coverage, linked to the Indian coastal command, with joint patrolling and surveillance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2013<\/td>\n<td>President Nasheed resigns and takes shelter in the Indian Embassy; <span class=\"n-term\">Abdulla Yameen<\/span> assumes office and terminates the contract of the Indian company <span class=\"n-term\">GMR<\/span> to build Mal\u00e9 airport.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2014<\/td>\n<td>Yameen visits India in January; relations begin to improve. In December India sends water supplies during the Mal\u00e9 water crisis.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2015<\/td>\n<td>The Prime Minister&#8217;s visit cancelled due to political unrest; the External Affairs Minister visits, with growing alignment between India&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First<\/span> and the Maldives&#8217; <span class=\"n-term\">India First<\/span> policies.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2016<\/td>\n<td>The Maldivian President visits India; a <span class=\"n-term\">Defence Action Plan<\/span> and pacts on tourism, taxation, conservation and the SAARC satellite are signed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2017 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td>The Maldives signs an <span class=\"n-term\">FTA with China<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2018 (Feb)<\/td>\n<td>Proclamation of emergency by President Yameen; Supreme Court judges arrested.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2018<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Ibrahim Mohamed Solih<\/span> becomes President, championing &#8220;India First&#8221;; the opposition, including Yameen, runs an <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;India Out&#8221;<\/span> campaign. The Prime Minister visits in September; President Solih visits India in December.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2020<\/td>\n<td>COVID-19 assistance; the Maldives signs a defence agreement with the United States, becoming the only country besides India to have one, which India welcomes.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2023 (Sep)<\/td>\n<td>Ibrahim Solih loses to <span class=\"n-term\">Mohamed Muizzu<\/span>, who campaigned on &#8220;India Out&#8221;.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2023 (Dec)<\/td>\n<td>Meeting with President Muizzu on the sidelines of COP28 in the UAE; agreement to set up a &#8220;core group&#8221;.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2024 (Jan)<\/td>\n<td>Three Maldivian officials mock the Indian Prime Minister&#8217;s Lakshadweep photographs on social media, souring relations.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2024 (May)<\/td>\n<td>About <span class=\"n-term\">80 Indian military personnel<\/span> withdrawn, replaced by civilians.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2024 (Oct)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Vision Document<\/span> adopted; twin currency swap of USD 400 million and INR 30 billion; <span class=\"n-term\">RuPay<\/span> launched.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2025 (Jul)<\/td>\n<td>Mal\u00e9 visit of 25\u201326 July; a <span class=\"n-term\">USD 565 million<\/span> line of credit, India&#8217;s first in rupees; debt repayments cut about 40 per cent; FTA talks begin; <span class=\"n-term\">UPI<\/span> launched.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-regime-swing-why-mal-politics-is-the-variable\">The regime swing \u2014 why Mal\u00e9 politics is the variable<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Every president resets the relationship.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Gayoom<\/span> (1978\u20132008 \u00b7 religion used for political ends; Operation Cactus, 1988) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Nasheed<\/span> (2008 \u00b7 first democratic president; resigns 2013, shelters in the Indian Embassy) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Yameen<\/span> (2013 \u00b7 GMR contract cancelled; FTA with China 2017; emergency 2018) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Solih<\/span> (2018 \u00b7 &#8220;India First&#8221;; US$4 billion assistance; &#8220;India Out&#8221; declared a security threat) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Muizzu<\/span> (2023 \u00b7 campaigned on &#8220;India Out&#8221;; 77 Indian personnel to withdraw; agreements under review)<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Maumoon Abdul Gayoom<\/span> was President from 1978 to 2008. In December 1988 India thwarted a coup in Mal\u00e9 orchestrated by a guerrilla outfit from Sri Lanka.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Mohammed Nasheed<\/span> succeeded through democratic elections in 2008, which India welcomed. Relations turned down when he resigned in February 2013 and sought shelter in the Indian Embassy; he was defeated in the November 2013 elections and later convicted in a sedition case and sentenced to 13 years in 2015.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Abdulla Yameen<\/span> assumed office in November 2013. Within two months relations nosedived when his government terminated the <span class=\"n-term\">USD 800 million GMR contract<\/span> for Mal\u00e9 airport, alleging irregularity. He visited India in January 2014 and paid a state visit in April 2016, when several agreements including the <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Maldivian Action Plan for Defence<\/span> were signed and he described the Maldives as pursuing an &#8220;India First&#8221; foreign policy \u2014 a statement that came just after India shielded his government from punitive action by the Commonwealth&#8217;s human rights and democracy oversight body.<\/li>\n<li>In <span class=\"n-term\">December 2017<\/span> the Maldives finalised an FTA with China, becoming the second South Asian country after Pakistan to do so. Its swift approval in a session lasting barely half an hour was read in India as a signal of closer alignment with Beijing. In <span class=\"n-term\">February 2018<\/span> Yameen declared a <span class=\"n-term\">State of Emergency<\/span> after a Supreme Court ruling overturned convictions of nine opposition leaders; it lasted 45 days.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Ibrahim Mohamed Solih<\/span> became President in 2018 and championed &#8220;India First&#8221;, improving relations. India announced <span class=\"n-term\">US$4 billion<\/span> in financial assistance in 2018, an <span class=\"n-term\">USD 800 million<\/span> line of credit in 2019, and a visa facilitation agreement the same year. In August 2022 he reiterated &#8220;India First&#8221; and called India a &#8220;dependable ally to the Maldives, enduring challenges together.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>Relations soured under <span class=\"n-term\">Mohammed Waheed Hassan<\/span> and Yameen, both of whom favoured Beijing, though the decline should not be overstated \u2014 Yameen softened his rhetoric once in power. India&#8217;s advocacy for the release of political prisoners and for the rule of law also created friction, and the Maldives refused to renew a contract for military helicopters.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Mohamed Muizzu<\/span>, a close associate of Yameen who oversaw most Chinese investments during his tenure, requested the withdrawal of <span class=\"n-term\">77 Indian military personnel<\/span> and announced a review of about 100 bilateral agreements. The Prime Minister did not attend his swearing-in, sending a Union Minister instead; Muizzu chose Turkey as his first destination, breaking the tradition of Maldivian presidents visiting India first.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation-3\">Areas of cooperation<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">1981 trade agreement<\/span> facilitates export of essential commodities. India rose from fourth position in 2018 to the Maldives&#8217; <span class=\"n-term\">second-largest trading partner<\/span>, with bilateral trade growing 31% in 2021 despite the pandemic; trade stood at <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 323.9 million<\/span> in 2021, with the balance in India&#8217;s favour. India provided <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 250 million<\/span> in financial assistance in September 2020, and a <span class=\"n-term\">$400 million<\/span> bilateral currency swap between the RBI and the Maldives Monetary Authority in 2019.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Development<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India helped establish the <span class=\"n-term\">Faculty of Engineering Technology<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Faculty of Hospitality and Tourism Studies<\/span>. A <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 100 million<\/span> Stand-by Credit Facility including long-term loans and revolving credit for trade; a <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 40 million<\/span> line of credit for 485 housing units; <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 500 million<\/span> for the <span class=\"n-term\">Greater Mal\u00e9 Connectivity Project<\/span>, the largest civilian infrastructure project in the country; a <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 100 million<\/span> line of credit in 2022; review of construction of 4,000 social housing units in Greater Mal\u00e9. Other projects include training for Maldivian civil servants, cargo vessel services, capacity development for the <span class=\"n-term\">MNDF<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">Gulhifalhu Port Project<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Hulhumal\u00e9 Cricket Stadium<\/span>. A recent <span class=\"n-term\">USD 565 million<\/span> package supports connectivity and urban development; digital partnership includes <span class=\"n-term\">UPI integration<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Defence &amp; security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Joint exercises <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;Ekuverin&#8221;<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;Dosti&#8221;<\/span>, the latter later expanded to include Sri Lanka. The <span class=\"n-term\">2009 defence cooperation agreement<\/span> provides for <span class=\"n-term\">26 radars<\/span> across the atolls linked to Indian coastal command, with joint patrolling and surveillance. India supplied a <span class=\"n-term\">Dhruv helicopter<\/span>, helped establish a <span class=\"n-term\">25-bed military hospital<\/span>, and supplied a <span class=\"n-term\">Dornier maritime surveillance<\/span> aircraft in 2020. India meets approximately <span class=\"n-term\">70%<\/span> of the MNDF&#8217;s defence training needs. The comprehensive <span class=\"n-term\">Action Plan for Defence<\/span> of April 2016; the <span class=\"n-term\">Composite Training Centre<\/span>; the <span class=\"n-term\">Coastal Radar Surveillance System<\/span>; and the new Ministry of Defence headquarters. The <span class=\"n-term\">Uthuru Thila Falhu (UTF)<\/span> naval base development and Operation Cactus (1988) mark India as the primary security provider.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Climate &amp; disaster<\/span><\/td>\n<td>If sea level rise is triggered by global warming, the Maldives would be among the first countries to face submergence. At the <span class=\"n-term\">Delhi High-Level Conference on Climate Change and Technology Transfer<\/span> in October 2009, President Nasheed linked India&#8217;s quest for a permanent UNSC seat with its role on climate change, describing climate change as a bigger threat than Islamic radicalism or piracy. In 2022 India signed two MoUs to help the Maldives achieve <span class=\"n-term\">net zero emissions<\/span> by 2030, including transmission interconnection for renewable power transfer under <span class=\"n-term\">One Sun, One World, One Grid (OSOWOG)<\/span>. India&#8217;s response to the 2004 tsunami and the 2014 drinking water crisis cemented its position as <span class=\"n-term\">net security provider<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">first responder<\/span>. Customised training for the MNDF Fire and Rescue Service; a 14-member Rapid Response Medical team in March 2020; <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sanjeevani<\/span> airlifted 6.2 tonnes of medical supplies on 2 April 2020; 100,000 Covishield vaccines supplied in January 2021.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">People<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Around <span class=\"n-term\">25,000 Indians<\/span> live in the Maldives, working in sectors such as health and education; Maldivians rely heavily on India for healthcare, and the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital was built with Indian assistance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"contestation-china-india-out-radicalisation\">Contestation \u2014 China, &#8220;India Out&#8221;, radicalisation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Chinese presence<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>China established relations in <span class=\"n-term\">1972<\/span>; from 1985 Chinese companies began project contracting, and by the end of 2001 the accumulated value of contracted projects was <span class=\"n-term\">$46.37 million<\/span> with turnover touching $40 million.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">2013<\/span> was the watershed, when Abdulla Yameen and Xi Jinping both became presidents. With the <span class=\"n-term\">Belt and Road Initiative<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Maritime Silk Route<\/span>, the Maldives moved high on China&#8217;s agenda, and Yameen used the &#8216;China card&#8217; to seek concessions from India.<\/li>\n<li>The Maldives has become a significant component of China&#8217;s <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;String of Pearls&#8221;<\/span>. The <span class=\"n-term\">China-Maldives Friendship Bridge<\/span> was funded with <span class=\"n-term\">$200 million<\/span>; China has provided loans of <span class=\"n-term\">$1.25 billion<\/span> for a new airport and a new port, pushing public debt towards nearly <span class=\"n-term\">75% of GDP<\/span> with almost <span class=\"n-term\">70%<\/span> of total debt owed to China.<\/li>\n<li>Chinese and Saudi investors are developing the <span class=\"n-term\">i-Havan<\/span> project, a special economic zone on an island not far from India; reports suggest another port on the southern atoll of <span class=\"n-term\">Laamu<\/span>. China opened its mission in Mal\u00e9 only in 2011, so the growth is remarkable.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 China repeatedly forswears any intention of setting up bases but signalled its intention to maintain a naval presence by a highly visible first visit of three naval vessels to Mal\u00e9 in August 2017. China has often complained about India&#8217;s hegemonic attitude in the Indian Ocean and is determined to demonstrate its assertion that the Indian Ocean is not India&#8217;s ocean.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;Select locations meticulously, make deployments discreetly, give priority to cooperative activities and penetrate gradually.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">a Chinese Navy journal, on the Indian Ocean strategy, in a 16-character guideline<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>In 2018 there were indications that China intended to construct a <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Ocean Observation Station<\/span> at <span class=\"n-term\">Makunudhoo<\/span> in the northwest; the plan was put on hold. Speculation about a Chinese naval base has so far remained speculation.<\/li>\n<li>India is worried about the neocolonial character of Chinese investment \u2014 cheque-book and debt-trap diplomacy leading to economic crisis and political instability, as in Sri Lanka. According to former President Nasheed, the Maldives accumulated Chinese debt of nearly <span class=\"n-term\">$3.1 billion<\/span> under Yameen.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">N. Manoharan<\/span> \u2014 the Maldives has emerged as an important &#8220;pearl&#8221; in the String of Pearls; given its location, Beijing has sought a maritime base primarily to secure its sea lanes and the flow of energy supplies from Africa and West Asia. <span class=\"n-sch\">B.R. Deepak<\/span> \u2014 this is part of a broader sphere-of-influence struggle in South Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Political instability and anti-India politics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Political turmoil since 2016 culminated in the declaration of emergency in 2018; the international community and India expressed concern about the effect on security, development and democratic rights.<\/li>\n<li>Regardless of which party is in opposition, there is a tendency to use anti-India protests to secure votes. The <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;India Out&#8221;<\/span> campaign opposed New Delhi&#8217;s developmental funding and urged the government not to &#8220;sell national assets to foreigners&#8221;, and remained a focal point up to the September 2023 elections.<\/li>\n<li>Democratic institutions have weakened, and fragile democracies may become susceptible to radical ideologies.<\/li>\n<li>The two <span class=\"n-term\">Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters<\/span> provided in 2010 and 2015, though used for search, rescue and weather surveillance, are portrayed by critics as evidence of an Indian military presence. Speculation surrounds the <span class=\"n-term\">UTF Harbour Project<\/span>, which some allege might be converted into an Indian naval base. The <span class=\"n-term\">new police academy<\/span> built with Indian support has drawn scepticism over its size; the dockyard and harbour under joint development for the MNDF Coast Guard have drawn concern that Indian technicians and advisers will undermine sovereignty. The opposition contends there has been insufficient transparency about the terms of agreements with India.<\/li>\n<li>The Solih government held that the &#8220;India Out&#8221; campaign was inimical to Maldivian interests, jeopardising relations and the aid the country receives; it signed a decree declaring the campaign a threat to national security.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Terrorism and fundamentalism<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The rise of radical Islam is a serious concern, aggravated by the Maldives being an Islamic Republic. Many Maldivian students have been indoctrinated with <span class=\"n-term\">Salafi-Jihadi<\/span> ideology, and there is concern about Saudi Arabia&#8217;s role in radicalisation.<\/li>\n<li>The Maldives has recorded one of the highest per capita numbers of ISIS recruits, with more than <span class=\"n-term\">200<\/span> Maldivian youths having joined. Protests by Islamists bearing ISIS flags are frequent.<\/li>\n<li>Political instability and socio-economic uncertainty are the main drivers; the same forces are involved in anti-India activity. Developments in West Asia and the Af-Pak region have also influenced radicalisation, and growing radicalisation could allow Pakistan to establish terror launch pads. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> warn that these developments require vigilant monitoring and cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"internal-contradictions-in-the-maldives\">Internal contradictions in the Maldives<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The constitution prevents non-Sunnis from obtaining citizenship and declares Islam the state religion, making the Maldives a <span class=\"n-term\">non-secular state<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>An emerging civil society and a history of patronage produce an unstable polity and a frustrated citizenry.<\/li>\n<li>Rising drug abuse and religious fundamentalist tendencies fuelled by Saudi-based Salafi funding.<\/li>\n<li>A skewed labour market and escalating inequality in an economy heavily reliant on external factors.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-maldives-after-2024-from-india-out-to-recalibration\">The Maldives after 2024 \u2014 from &#8220;India Out&#8221; to recalibration<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The withdrawal, on schedule<\/span> \u2014 India withdrew about <span class=\"n-term\">80 military personnel by May 2024<\/span>, replaced by civilians. Delhi read the moment carefully, keeping food exports flowing and rolling over treasury bills while the troops left.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">What changed the calculus<\/span> \u2014 a severe economic squeeze: reserves fell close to default levels and public debt neared <span class=\"n-term\">116 per cent of output<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">October 2024<\/span> \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">Vision Document<\/span> adopted; a twin currency swap of <span class=\"n-term\">USD 400 million and INR 30 billion<\/span>; the <span class=\"n-term\">RuPay<\/span> card launched.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">July 2025<\/span> \u2014 the Mal\u00e9 visit of <span class=\"n-term\">25\u201326 July<\/span>: a <span class=\"n-term\">USD 565 million<\/span> (Rs 4,850 crore) line of credit, <span class=\"n-term\">India&#8217;s first denominated in Indian rupees<\/span>. An amendatory pact cut annual debt repayments by about <span class=\"n-term\">40 per cent<\/span>, from nearly USD 51 million to about USD 29 million; <span class=\"n-term\">FTA talks<\/span> began and <span class=\"n-term\">UPI<\/span> launched.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Gulbin Sultana<\/span> \u2014 writing for the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, <span class=\"n-sch\">Gulbin Sultana<\/span> reads Muizzu&#8217;s turn as a shift from an <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;India first&#8221;<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;Maldives first&#8221;<\/span> policy aimed at cutting dependence, with early outreach to Turkey and China. She concludes that the recalibration &#8220;should not be seen as a zero-sum game for India&#8221;, though it is no return to the old &#8216;India first&#8217; line either.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;This is the first LOC extended to the Maldives that is denominated in Indian rupees\u2026 the annual debt repayment obligations of the Maldives will reduce by a sharp 40 per cent, from nearly US$51 million annually to about US$29 million.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, MEA Special Briefing, Mal\u00e9, 25 July 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;India is Maldives&#8217; closest neighbour. Maldives holds an important place in India&#8217;s &#8216;Neighbourhood First&#8217; policy and &#8216;MAHASAGAR&#8217; vision.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Prime Minister Narendra Modi, joint press statement, Mal\u00e9, 25 July 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"maldives-theory-scholars-policy\">Maldives \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lenses:<\/span> Realism \u00b7 Liberalism \u00b7 Constructivism<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>What it explains<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Realism<\/td>\n<td>Power dynamics and security concerns; India seeking regional stability and secure maritime routes against Chinese influence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Liberalism<\/td>\n<td>Cooperation based on shared economic interests and the pursuit of regional prosperity through trade, energy security and infrastructure.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Constructivism<\/td>\n<td>Cultural and identity-based ties; shared religious values, ethnic connections and historical exchanges shaping mutual perception.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The intervention debate \u2014 four positions<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Kanwal Sibal<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India should not get into the business of regime change even if it seems to serve strategic interest; deep Chinese investment will itself force China to ensure political stability even if India stays out.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nitin Pai<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Regrets India&#8217;s disinclination to protect its core interests forcefully. During 2017-18 the case for hard intervention was so strong, the international context so conducive and the military equation so favourable that the question was: if not now, when? Should India wait for construction of a foreign naval base at Feydhoo Finolhu before deciding to intervene? He urges India to shed the <em>Panipat approach<\/em>, which will only become costlier, citing the United States, which spends heavily on global military presence because that is cheaper than damage to the homeland.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India should have responded in 2012 to Nasheed&#8217;s appeal when he was forced to resign under duress, paving the way for Yameen&#8217;s seizure of power; Nasheed was the constitutionally elected head of state and intervention to prevent the coup would have been justified.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">The middle view<\/span><\/td>\n<td>There are occasions when safeguarding Indian interests requires swift action despite risk; a wait-and-watch approach can undermine interests through relentless attrition. India has maintained primacy largely through soft power \u2014 funding hospitals and educational institutions, offering scholarships and training.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy suggestions for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The tussle between two aspiring regional hegemons is clear. India has consistently favoured the Maldives; Maldivian behaviour has varied with the regime in power, though Mal\u00e9 is aware it cannot ignore India because of proximity and the multidimensional nature of the relationship.<\/li>\n<li>To challenge Chinese gains, India must complete infrastructure projects on time, collaborate with like-minded countries such as Japan on connectivity while maintaining strategic autonomy and not becoming a junior partner to the United States, and strengthen the <span class=\"n-term\">QUAD<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Use soft power, especially the diaspora<\/span> \u2014 films, music and people-to-people contact.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Anand Kumar<\/span> \u2014 the Maldives faces an existential threat from <span class=\"n-term\">climate change<\/span>, repeatedly highlighted by its leaders, and cannot deal with it alone. India faces similar challenges and is well placed to cooperate; collaboration on climate change can serve as a foundation for a comprehensive and strategic partnership.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Economic cooperation<\/span> \u2014 bilateral trade is at a very low level and there is no <span class=\"n-term\">FTA<\/span>; one should be signed in earnest.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Domestic politics<\/span> \u2014 India must mend ties with both mainstream parties so that anti-India feeling does not become a vote-gathering campaign. <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span>: &#8220;India&#8217;s proximity comes with its problems \u2014 close neighbours often have multiple disputes while a distant power can take a more strategic view of the relationship.&#8221; The rivalry between Asia&#8217;s major powers in the Maldives and Sri Lanka has become intertwined with domestic politics, with factions seeking support from either India or China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Deeper engagement with political sensitivity<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Dunya Maumoon<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> recommend outreach to all Maldivian stakeholders with sensitivity to sovereignty concerns.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Diversify cooperation<\/span> into fintech, green technologies, cultural exchange and education; <span class=\"n-term\">climate and health diplomacy<\/span> through initiatives such as <span class=\"n-term\">Aarogya Maitri<\/span> and joint research; <span class=\"n-term\">people-centric outreach<\/span> through tourism, student exchange and employment to insulate the relationship from political fluctuation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Regional cooperation<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Colombo Security Conclave<\/span>, agreed by India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives in November 2020, identified four pillars: <span class=\"n-term\">Maritime Safety and Security; Terrorism and Radicalization; Trafficking and Organized Crime; and Cyber Security<\/span>. Use of the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium should be deepened, while SAARC remains hindered by India-Pakistan tension.<\/li>\n<li>India is presently engaged in <span class=\"n-term\">45 infrastructure projects<\/span> across the Maldives compared with one by China, ranging from water and sanitation to airport extension and connectivity. Foreign Minister <span class=\"n-term\">Abdulla Shahid&#8217;s<\/span> election as President of the UN General Assembly, which India was the first to endorse, offers an opportunity to deepen cooperation on strengthening multilateralism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Practical steps<\/span> \u2014 smaller-scale projects in the atolls; study of a <span class=\"n-term\">Blue Economy<\/span> model for sustainable coastal development; encouragement of small-scale industry and Indian investment through small grant projects; expansion of skill development institutions in the atolls including English language and vocational training; decentralisation of healthcare beyond Mal\u00e9; consultation with communities and institutions such as the Asian Development Bank; and monitoring and evaluation of existing projects.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 India&#8217;s success will depend on its ability to be <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;an indispensable partner&#8221;<\/span>, sensitive to local realities while safeguarding its own national interests. <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> places the relationship squarely within &#8216;Neighbourhood First&#8217;; <span class=\"n-sch\">Fazlur Rahman<\/span> notes that Indian engagement transcends security to include economic development, infrastructure and energy. India should make the Maldives understand the assurance that New Delhi has been and will continue to be the <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;first responder&#8221;<\/span> to any need or crisis facing the island nation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-regional-debate-hedging-the-debt-trap-neighbourhood-firs\">The regional debate \u2014 hedging, the debt trap, Neighbourhood First<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lenses:<\/span> Small-state hedging \u00b7 Buffer-state theory \u00b7 Neorealism<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Small-state hedging<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Cheng-Chwee Kuik<\/span> developed the framework for smaller states caught between great powers; the balancing logic is applied to this neighbourhood by <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya G. Shivamurthy<\/span> on Sri Lanka&#8217;s course and by <span class=\"n-sch\">Nilanthi Samaranayake<\/span> on island-state agency in the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;I define hedging as insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-\u00e0-vis competing powers to have a fallback position.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Cheng-Chwee Kuik, &#8216;Getting Hedging Right: A Small-State Perspective&#8217;, China International Strategy Review, 2021, p. 300<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The debt-trap thesis and its rebuttal<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Hambantota \u2014 strategic seizure, or a domestic failure?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The thesis<\/span> \u2014 Hambantota as strategic seizure \u2014 Brahma Chellaney, and the &#8216;String of Pearls&#8217; reading<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The rebuttal<\/span> \u2014 A Rajapaksa &#8216;white elephant&#8217; \u2014 Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri; a commercial lease, not a seizure<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Nilanthi Samaranayake and colleagues \u2014 small-state agency is real, but it shrinks as great-power competition intensifies<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The thesis in practice<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">N. Sathiya Moorthy<\/span> treats the research-vessels question as a test of exactly this anxiety.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The evidence against<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Lee Jones<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Shahar Hameiri<\/span> show that Sri Lanka&#8217;s debt crisis came mainly from <span class=\"n-term\">Western-market borrowing<\/span>, and that the port now hosts Sri Lanka&#8217;s own <span class=\"n-term\">southern naval command<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;The Hambantota Port case shows little evidence of Chinese strategy, but lots of evidence for poor governance on the recipient side.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Shahar Hameiri, &#8216;Debunking the Myth of China&#8217;s Debt-trap Diplomacy&#8217;, Lowy Institute, 9 Sep 2020<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;The story of Hambantota Port is, in reality, a narrative of political and economic incompetence, facilitated by lax governance and inadequate risk management on both sides.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 **Lee Jones &amp; Shahar Hameiri, <em>Debunking the Myth of &#8216;Debt-trap Diplomacy&#8217;<\/em>, Chatham House, Aug 2020**<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First \u2014 adaptation or structural strain?<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<th>Case<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Adaptation<\/span> \u2014 Official statements; analysts at ORF and MP-IDSA<\/td>\n<td>The policy adapted and turned each reset into deeper cooperation, retaining India&#8217;s primacy \u2014 the December 2024 statement, the first defence MoU, the rupee line of credit and the 40 per cent debt cut, and the Ditwah response.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Structural strain<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span>, then at Brookings India<\/td>\n<td>The region is poorly connected and the India\u2013Nepal border is open &#8220;mostly on paper&#8221;; India must move from a <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;right of first refusal&#8221;<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;capacity of first delivery&#8221;<\/span>. There are no permanent pro-India factions, only leaders balancing several powers at once.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;India is actually doing more than ever, but it is the neighbourhood that is losing India. It is the countries of South Asia that are moving on, escaping the traditional region called South Asia with India as its gravitational core.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Constantino Xavier, interview in Scroll.in, 22 August 2020<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Where the record lands<\/span> \u2014 the 2024\u20132026 evidence supports both readings: the island resets held and even deepened after Ditwah, yet Nepal&#8217;s nationalist turn and China&#8217;s steady economic presence mark the limits of Indian influence. India frames its own conduct through <span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First<\/span> and the maritime vision now called <span class=\"n-term\">MAHASAGAR<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><span><\/span><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/saarc-past-performance-and-future-prospects\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>SAARC: past performance and future prospects<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#how-the-rivalry-is-read\">How the rivalry is read<\/a><a href=\"#chronology-1947-2025\">Chronology, 1947\u20132025<\/a><a href=\"#level-one-the-system\">Level one \u2014 the system<\/a><a href=\"#two-systemic-changes-of-the-mid-1980s\">Two systemic changes of the mid-1980s<\/a><a href=\"#level-two-identity-and-politics-at-the-state-level\">Level two \u2014 identity and politics at the state level<\/a><a href=\"#level-three-leaders-and-what-they-could-not-do\">Level three \u2014 leaders, and what they could not do<\/a><a href=\"#kashmir-symptom-not-cause\">Kashmir \u2014 symptom, not cause<\/a><a href=\"#the-other-three-territorial-disputes\">The other three territorial disputes<\/a><a href=\"#terrorism-and-ceasefire-violations\">Terrorism and ceasefire violations<\/a><a href=\"#the-indus-waters-treaty\">The Indus Waters Treaty<\/a><a href=\"#the-suspension-of-april-2025\">The suspension of April 2025<\/a><a href=\"#abeyance-the-word-the-law-the-capacity\">Abeyance \u2014 the word, the law, the capacity<\/a><a href=\"#pulwama-and-balakot\">Pulwama and Balakot<\/a><a href=\"#cpec-and-the-china-factor\">CPEC and the China factor<\/a><a href=\"#balochistan\">Balochistan<\/a><a href=\"#why-pakistan-is-the-hard-case\">Why Pakistan is the hard case<\/a><a href=\"#possibilities-of-cooperation\">Possibilities of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#defeat-contain-negotiate-and-the-army-question\">Defeat, contain, negotiate \u2014 and the Army question<\/a><a href=\"#policy-since-2014-and-its-assessment\">Policy since 2014, and its assessment<\/a><a href=\"#where-things-stand-and-the-2025-conflict\">Where things stand \u2014 and the 2025 conflict<\/a><a href=\"#operation-sindoor-the-doctrine-and-the-debate\">Operation Sindoor \u2014 the doctrine and the debate<\/a><a href=\"#theory-scholars-books\">Theory, scholars, books<\/a><a href=\"#how-the-relationship-is-described\">How the relationship is described<\/a><a href=\"#three-dimensions-of-the-relationship\">Three dimensions of the relationship<\/a><a href=\"#what-india-and-bangladesh-have-built\">What India and Bangladesh have built<\/a><a href=\"#contention-i-illegal-migration\">Contention I \u2014 illegal migration<\/a><a href=\"#contention-ii-water-farakka-and-teesta\">Contention II \u2014 water: Farakka and Teesta<\/a><a href=\"#contention-iii-china-in-dhaka\">Contention III \u2014 China in Dhaka<\/a><a href=\"#after-hasina-the-verdict-and-the-extradition-question\">After Hasina \u2014 the verdict and the extradition question<\/a><a href=\"#theory-and-scholars-bangladesh\">Theory and scholars \u2014 Bangladesh<\/a><a href=\"#after-the-takeover\">After the takeover<\/a><a href=\"#the-new-great-game\">The New Great Game<\/a><a href=\"#views-of-scholars-and-the-2023-question\">Views of scholars \u2014 and the 2023 question<\/a><a href=\"#nepal-the-unique-neighbour\">Nepal \u2014 the unique neighbour<\/a><a href=\"#chronology-sugauli-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 Sugauli to the present<\/a><a href=\"#evolution-monarchical-nepal-to-federal-republic\">Evolution \u2014 monarchical Nepal to federal republic<\/a><a href=\"#relations-under-the-present-government-hit-to-super-hit\">Relations under the present government \u2014 HIT to &#8216;Super HIT&#8217;<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation-the-working-relationship\">Areas of cooperation \u2014 the working relationship<\/a><a href=\"#territorial-disputes-kalapani-lipulekh-susta\">Territorial disputes \u2014 Kalapani, Lipulekh, Susta<\/a><a href=\"#the-1950-treaty-the-revision-demand\">The 1950 Treaty \u2014 the revision demand<\/a><a href=\"#chinese-inroads-and-the-trilateral-question\">Chinese inroads \u2014 and the trilateral question<\/a><a href=\"#rivers-defence-and-security\">Rivers, defence and security<\/a><a href=\"#nepal-after-2024-the-gen-z-uprising-and-the-2026-verdict\">Nepal after 2024 \u2014 the Gen Z uprising and the 2026 verdict<\/a><a href=\"#nepal-theory-scholars-policy\">Nepal \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/a><a href=\"#bhutan-the-buffer-that-never-played-the-card\">Bhutan \u2014 the buffer that never played the card<\/a><a href=\"#chronology-1949-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 1949 to the present<\/a><a href=\"#from-sinchula-to-2007-the-treaty-architecture\">From Sinchula to 2007 \u2014 the treaty architecture<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#the-chinese-angle-and-doklam-2017\">The Chinese angle and Doklam, 2017<\/a><a href=\"#challenges-hydropower-debt-generational-change\">Challenges \u2014 hydropower, debt, generational change<\/a><a href=\"#bhutan-theory-scholars-policy\">Bhutan \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/a><a href=\"#sri-lanka-the-love-hate-relationship\">Sri Lanka \u2014 the love-hate relationship<\/a><a href=\"#chronology-1948-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 1948 to the present<\/a><a href=\"#sridharan-s-four-phases-and-the-current-one\">Sridharan&#8217;s four phases \u2014 and the current one<\/a><a href=\"#the-1987-accord-and-the-thirteenth-amendment\">The 1987 Accord and the Thirteenth Amendment<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation-2\">Areas of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#contestation-the-fishermen-and-the-ethnic-question\">Contestation \u2014 the fishermen and the ethnic question<\/a><a href=\"#the-chinese-angle-why-beijing-gained-ground\">The Chinese angle \u2014 why Beijing gained ground<\/a><a href=\"#the-2022-economic-crisis-and-india-s-response\">The 2022 economic crisis and India&#8217;s response<\/a><a href=\"#sri-lanka-after-2024-the-dissanayake-reset-and-its-limits\">Sri Lanka after 2024 \u2014 the Dissanayake reset and its limits<\/a><a href=\"#sri-lanka-theory-scholars-policy\">Sri Lanka \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/a><a href=\"#the-maldives-why-the-archipelago-counts\">The Maldives \u2014 why the archipelago counts<\/a><a href=\"#chronology-1965-to-the-present\">Chronology \u2014 1965 to the present<\/a><a href=\"#the-regime-swing-why-mal-politics-is-the-variable\">The regime swing \u2014 why Mal\u00e9 politics is the variable<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation-3\">Areas of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#contestation-china-india-out-radicalisation\">Contestation \u2014 China, &#8220;India Out&#8221;, radicalisation<\/a><a href=\"#internal-contradictions-in-the-maldives\">Internal contradictions in the Maldives<\/a><a href=\"#the-maldives-after-2024-from-india-out-to-recalibration\">The Maldives after 2024 \u2014 from &#8220;India Out&#8221; to recalibration<\/a><a href=\"#maldives-theory-scholars-policy\">Maldives \u2014 theory, scholars, policy<\/a><a href=\"#the-regional-debate-hedging-the-debt-trap-neighbourhood-firs\">The regional debate \u2014 hedging, the debt trap, Neighbourhood First<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.3.1","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"3","fx_note_desc":"India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3581","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3581","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3581\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3800,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3581\/revisions\/3800"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3581"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}