{"id":3582,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:08","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/saarc-past-performance-and-future-prospects\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:04","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:04","slug":"saarc-past-performance-and-future-prospects","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/saarc-past-performance-and-future-prospects\/","title":{"rendered":"SAARC: past performance and future prospects"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>SAARC: past performance and future prospects<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">SAARC: past performance and future prospects<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 3<\/b> \u2014 India and South Asia : (a) Regional Co-operation : <span class=\"cur\">SAARC<\/span>-past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India\u2019s \u201cLook East\u201d policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation : River water disputes; illegal cross border migration; Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; Border disputes.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-south-asian-paradox\">The South Asian Paradox<\/h3>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cWe cannot change history, but we cannot change geography either.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Atal Bihari Vajpayee<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>South Asia is the one region where India\u2019s power is unquestioned and its influence least secure.<\/li>\n<li>India holds <span class=\"n-term\">over 75%<\/span> of the region\u2019s GDP and <span class=\"n-term\">over 70%<\/span> of its population \u2192 an <span class=\"n-term\">asymmetry<\/span> that produces dependence and resentment together.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Muchkund Dubey<\/span>: a country\u2019s foreign policy can be judged by its relations with its neighbours.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> (<em>How India Sees the World: From Kautilya to the 21st Century<\/em>) \u2192 friendly relations with neighbours reduce India\u2019s security dilemmas; the logic of geography is unrelenting.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya\u2019s<\/span> formulation treats immediate neighbours as natural enemies. In an age of <span class=\"n-term\">complex interdependence<\/span> that premise has to be reworked \u2014 not discarded.<\/li>\n<li>The region is described as an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201carc of instability\u201d<\/span> \u2014 three unsettled boundaries, two nuclear rivals, several fragile democracies, and a rising extra-regional power with money and patience.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"neighbourhood-first-design-and-purpose\">Neighbourhood First \u2014 design and purpose<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Background<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Neighbourhood policy has always been central to India\u2019s foreign relations; fresh momentum after <span class=\"n-term\">2014<\/span>, roots much earlier.<\/li>\n<li>Rests on three legs \u2014 civilisational thought (<span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya\u2019s<\/span> <em>raja-mandala<\/em>), the <span class=\"n-term\">Gujral Doctrine<\/span> of non-reciprocity, and post-liberalisation economic logic.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The policy<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Took shape around <span class=\"n-term\">2008<\/span> \u2192 strong neighbourhood relations on a <span class=\"n-term\">consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented<\/span> approach.<\/li>\n<li>Deliverables: connectivity, infrastructure, energy, security cooperation, disaster response.<\/li>\n<li>The maritime extension is <span class=\"n-term\">MAHASAGAR<\/span> \u2014 Modi, Mal\u00e9, July 2025: the Maldives \u201cholds an important place in India\u2019s \u2018Neighbourhood First\u2019 policy and \u2018MAHASAGAR\u2019 vision.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Has <span class=\"n-term\">no formal institutional structure<\/span> \u2192 precisely what makes it a convenient instrument for India to work across South Asia while bypassing Pakistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Significance \u2014 seven heads<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Head<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Regional integration to counter China and to hold India\u2019s own vision of the region.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Global South<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Credibility in demanding reform of global governance (UNSC, IMF) depends on standing in one\u2019s own region.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Multilateralism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Working through SAARC, BIMSTEC, BBIN, IORA.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Soft power<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Cultural and historical ties as an instrument of influence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, transnational organised crime.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic &amp; energy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Regional trade, investment, cross-border infrastructure; Nepal and Bhutan\u2019s hydropower potential.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Northeast<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Kaladan project; Akhaura\u2013Agartala rail link.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-five-principles\">The Five Principles<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Influence through cooperation rather than coercion.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Samman<\/span> (Respect \u2014 all neighbours equal partners regardless of size) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Samvad<\/span> (Dialogue \u2014 sustained talks, summits, people-level contact) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Shanti<\/span> (Peace \u2014 regional stability, counter-terrorism, border management) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Samriddhi<\/span> (Prosperity \u2014 trade, aid, connectivity; blunts external influence) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Sanskriti<\/span> (Culture \u2014 shared heritage, language, tradition as a base for trust)<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Samman<\/span> carries forward the <span class=\"n-term\">Gujral Doctrine<\/span> of non-reciprocity \u2014 India offers without expecting immediate return.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Samvad<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span>: geographical closeness is not by itself enough.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"concerns-in-the-neighbourhood-policy\">Concerns in the Neighbourhood Policy<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Concern<\/th>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>The reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Domestic instability next door<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nitin Pai<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Myanmar, Afghanistan, Nepal often convert internal difficulty into bargaining power against India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Neglect of neighbours\u2019 aspirations<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<td>The \u2018big brother\u2019 attitude leaves a strategic gap that China fills.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Historical narrative &amp; identity<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The subcontinent\u2019s historical narrative encourages a <em>non-Indian<\/em> identity among neighbours, which feeds anti-India sentiment.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic unpredictability<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Ad-hoc decisions damage India\u2019s image; compared to Nixon\u2019s \u2018Madman Theory\u2019.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Rising Chinese influence<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India stays focused on regional matters while China extends influence through infrastructure and military power, shrinking India\u2019s strategic space.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Labels for the posture<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Zorawar Daulat Singh<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u201cEquidistance\u201d; the second urges a \u201cdual-track foreign policy\u201d.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Security-centric policy<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">P. Stobdan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A zero-sum, security-first approach benefits China and over-securitises terrorism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Limited engagement capacity<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Absence of sustained, multi-level engagement.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Global-power focus<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Preoccupation with the United States, China and Pakistan diverts attention from other neighbours.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Stalemate &amp; connectivity<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<td>The India\u2013Pakistan deadlock and poor connectivity damage both trade and people-to-people contact.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"strategies-for-strengthening-relations\">Strategies for Strengthening Relations<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Prescription<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Greater attention to bilateral, sub-regional and trans-regional groupings \u2014 BIMSTEC, SASEC.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">P. Stobdan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A top-down approach on the Chinese and Russian model.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Regain prominence in SAARC; play a constructive role without interfering in domestic politics.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Zorawar Daulat Singh<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Strategically shape relationships and define clear redlines.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Katju<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A comprehensive neighbourhood doctrine with strategic redlines.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sharat Sabharwal<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Turn India\u2019s growth into shared prosperity; engage Indian border states, fulfil commitments, expedite projects.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Pramit Pal Chaudhary<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Partner countries such as Japan with strong project-implementation records.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Address neighbours\u2019 grievances to earn reciprocity; widen engagement into a broader Indo-Pacific frame.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Study China\u2019s approach to ASEAN before defining India\u2019s role in SAARC.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"views-of-scholars-the-differentiated-approach\">Views of Scholars \u2014 the differentiated approach<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 the Indian subcontinent is a cohesive geopolitical and ecological space, marked by shared history, cultural bonds and economic interdependence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s challenge is not to compete with China in South Asia but to manage <span class=\"n-term\">complex interdependence<\/span> with its neighbours; strategic vision must be joined to tactical finesse.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span> \u2014 the region is poorly connected and the India\u2013Nepal border is open \u201cmostly on paper\u201d. India must move from a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cright of first refusal\u201d<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201ccapacity of first delivery\u201d<\/span>; there are no permanent pro-India factions, only leaders balancing several powers at once.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Rajiv Sikri \u2014 one size does not fit all<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Category<\/th>\n<th>Handling<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Small vulnerable neighbours<\/span> \u2014 Bhutan, Maldives<\/td>\n<td>Extra care for their sensitivities; reduce dependence while keeping friendship.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Middle-sized neighbours<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Myanmar<\/td>\n<td>Subtle and sophisticated handling; respect as sovereign states; economic ties without expecting reciprocity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan and China<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Distinct historical and geopolitical complexities; a tailored approach.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>A peaceful neighbourhood is the precondition for India to concentrate on its global ascent.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"foundations-objectives-principles\">Foundations, Objectives, Principles<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Interdependence Theory<\/span> holds that economic and political connections between states reduce the likelihood of conflict; <span class=\"n-term\">Communication Theory<\/span> stresses dialogue and mutual understanding in resolving disputes and improving regional cohesion. SAARC embodies both.<\/li>\n<li>Established with the signing of the <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC Charter in Dhaka, 1985<\/span>; <span class=\"n-term\">Secretariat at Kathmandu<\/span>. It operates in a conflict-prone region often called the \u201carc of instability\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Seven founding members<\/span> \u2014 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. <span class=\"n-term\">Afghanistan<\/span> joined as the eighth in <span class=\"n-term\">2007<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Objectives<\/span> \u2192 promote peace and prosperity in South Asia; raise living standards by encouraging self-sufficiency and mutual assistance; strengthen cooperation with other regional and global organisations.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Foundational principles<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Panchsheel<\/span> \u2014 mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence; and the principle of <span class=\"n-term\">consensus<\/span>, ensuring collective and unanimous decision-making.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cI dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived, and that is how I want our grandchildren to live.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Manmohan Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"issues-with-saarc-functionality\">Issues with SAARC Functionality<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>South Asia often lacks a cohesive identity; effectiveness is impeded by <span class=\"n-term\">structural asymmetry<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">geopolitical tensions<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Structural asymmetry stems from a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cnegative mindset\u201d<\/span> that contests India\u2019s regional pre-eminence rather than cooperating with it.<\/li>\n<li>India is perceived as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbullying big brother\u201d<\/span> and an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cimperialist power\u201d<\/span>, producing the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbig brother, small brother\u201d syndrome<\/span>. Smaller members fear that closer integration means Indian dominance \u2014 a perception fuelled by the integration of Sikkim, the formation of Bangladesh, the IPKF mission in Sri Lanka, and blockades in Nepal and Bhutan. India in turn fears that smaller countries might collectively \u201cgang up\u201d against it.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Bimal Prasad<\/span>: smaller states show interest in friendly relations with India yet view it as the \u201cmain source of threat to their security\u201d. India sees its neighbours as essential components of its security framework while they see it as a danger to theirs \u2014 a perception that has let outside powers such as China and the United States establish a presence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitically<\/span>, SAARC is caught in the <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013China rivalry<\/span>, which worsens tensions and undermines cohesive integration.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Economic asymmetry<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">inward-looking policies<\/span> \u2014 preference for self-reliance, reluctance to engage in meaningful interdependence; <span class=\"n-term\">SAFTA<\/span> continues to languish in implementation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Soft power<\/span> \u2192 India is often seen to lack soft power projection commensurate with its regional weight, while China\u2019s emergence as a counterweight introduces a new dimension requiring recalibrated responses.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Consensus requirement<\/span> \u2192 any decision needs agreement from all, which prevailing mistrust makes hard to achieve. <span class=\"n-sch\">Joyeeta Bhattacharjee<\/span>: at the 18th Summit in Kathmandu (2014) the signing of the <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement<\/span> was stalled because Pakistan declined.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Afghanistan<\/span> \u2014 absence of consensus on recognising the Taliban makes convening a summit itself difficult.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">International alignments<\/span> compel developing countries to maintain strong affiliations with developed powers; Pakistan\u2019s need for good relations with the United States does not allow mutual trust to grow.<\/li>\n<li>In <span class=\"n-term\">39 years<\/span>, SAARC has held only <span class=\"n-term\">18 summits<\/span>, and could not advance beyond <span class=\"n-term\">SAPTA (1995)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">SAFTA (2004)<\/span> despite an international environment favourable to regionalism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Charter constraint<\/span> \u2014 SAARC\u2019s mandate expressly forbids it from taking up bilateral disputes, which removes precisely the issues that matter most.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Institutional weakness<\/span> \u2014 a feeble secretariat and inadequate funding.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>SAARC is a \u201cjammed vehicle\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>Its central dysfunction is the inability to convene regular summits \u2014 none since 2014 \u2014 which reflects institutional paralysis and erodes confidence in its capacity.<\/em><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cSAARC was established to strengthen cooperation between the South Asian countries and to act as a mechanism for regional integration in South Asia. However, SAARC has always been hostage to the India-Pakistan conflict.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Niranjan Marjani<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Thirty-nine years, eighteen summits.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1985<\/span> (Charter signed at Dhaka; Secretariat at Kathmandu) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1995<\/span> (SAPTA \u2014 preferential trade) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2004<\/span> (SAFTA \u2014 tariff reduction) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2014<\/span> (18th Summit, Kathmandu \u2014 the last one) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2016<\/span> (Islamabad summit cancelled after Uri) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2020<\/span> (Leaders\u2019 video conference on COVID-19)<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-india-pakistan-question-in-saarc\">The India\u2013Pakistan Question in SAARC<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> calls Pakistan the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201ccamel in the caravan of SAARC\u201d<\/span> \u2014 a vivid metaphor for its role as a hindrance to the region\u2019s progress.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan\u2019s socio-political condition is often described as an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cidentity crisis\u201d<\/span> \u2014 the struggle to reconcile competing narratives and historical legacies within its national consciousness.<\/li>\n<li>The notion that the fruition of SAARC\u2019s objectives would imply a <span class=\"n-term\">de facto nullification of the partition<\/span> explains Pakistan\u2019s apprehension towards initiatives that could dilute its national identity and historical narrative.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">2016 Islamabad summit<\/span> was cancelled after India refused to attend in the wake of the <span class=\"n-term\">Uri<\/span> attack, with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan also withdrawing.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">2025 \u2014 a SAARC instrument itself withdrawn.<\/span> After the <span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025<\/span>, the CCS held the <span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance<\/span> and cancelled <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES)<\/span> entry for Pakistani nationals. <span class=\"n-sch\">Amal Chandra<\/span> reads the treaty move as <span class=\"n-term\">coercive treaty retaliation<\/span>; <span class=\"n-sch\">Medha Bisht<\/span> as coercive diplomacy displacing strategic idealism; <span class=\"n-sch\">Masha Tokas<\/span> applies <span class=\"n-term\">securitization theory<\/span> \u2014 water recast from a technical matter into a security question.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Counterpoint \u2014 informal contact has delivered<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Informal talks between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the <span class=\"n-term\">second SAARC Summit, Bangalore, November 1986<\/span>, diffused tension over India\u2019s military exercise <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Brasstacks<\/span>. India\u2013Sri Lanka talks at the <span class=\"n-term\">1987 SAARC foreign ministers\u2019 meeting<\/span> led to the accord on the Tamil problem.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2016 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cSometimes we visualize that SAARC\u2019s efforts come to halt because of various impediments to regional cooperation.\u201d Elaborate with reasonable examples of impediments.<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"achievements-the-institutional-record\">Achievements \u2014 the institutional record<\/h3>\n<p>SAFTA \u2014 tariff reduction \u00b7 SAPTA \u2014 preferential trade \u00b7 SATIS \u2014 services \u00b7 SAARC Development Fund \u00b7 SAARC University \u00b7 SAARC Arbitration Council \u00b7 SARSO \u2014 standards \u00b7 Food Bank \u00b7 Film Festival \u00b7 Milk Grid \u00b7 Agency for Disasters \u00b7 Federation Games \u00b7 SAARC satellite<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Trade architecture<\/span> \u2014 SAFTA reducing tariffs; SAPTA instituting preferential trade; SATIS liberalising trade in services.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Development and knowledge<\/span> \u2014 the SAARC Development Fund supporting regional development initiatives; the SAARC University as a nexus for academic collaboration.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Dispute and standards<\/span> \u2014 the SAARC Arbitration Council for peaceful dispute resolution; SARSO standardising technical regulations to improve trade efficiency.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Public goods<\/span> \u2014 the Food Bank for food security; the Film Festival for cultural exchange; the Milk Grid optimising dairy distribution; the Agency for Disasters coordinating responses to natural calamities.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Sport and technology<\/span> \u2014 the Federation Games using sports diplomacy; the SAARC satellite improving communication infrastructure.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"saarc-during-covid-19\">SAARC During COVID-19<\/h3>\n<p>Despite dormancy since 2014, SAARC played a role against the pandemic. A <span class=\"n-term\">COVID-19 Emergency Fund<\/span> was established.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Country<\/th>\n<th>Pledge<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India<\/span><\/td>\n<td>USD 10 million<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sri Lanka<\/td>\n<td>USD 5 million<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Pakistan<\/td>\n<td>USD 3 million<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Bangladesh<\/td>\n<td>USD 1.5 million<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Nepal \u00b7 Afghanistan<\/td>\n<td>USD 1 million each<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Maldives<\/td>\n<td>USD 200,000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Bhutan<\/td>\n<td>USD 100,000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li>Partner countries issued and followed specific guidelines, drawing praise from the <span class=\"n-term\">World Bank<\/span> for responding quickly and effectively.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Member proposals<\/span> \u2014 Afghanistan: a shared telemedicine framework; Maldives: long-term cooperation in health and economic sectors; Pakistan: video conferences of health ministers, experts and national authorities for information sharing; Sri Lanka: awareness through a single authority for exchange of information.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC Disaster Management Centre, Gandhinagar<\/span>, created a dedicated website to facilitate interaction between SAARC health and trade officials.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s leadership<\/span> \u2014 holding the conference despite open reservations about talking to Pakistan reflected the attitude of a leader-nation rising above bilateral animosity. India sent army teams and medical health workers to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan; dispatched a <span class=\"n-term\">14-member medical team to the Maldives<\/span>, the first ever Indian medical team sent to another country; proposed a <span class=\"n-term\">Rapid Response Team<\/span> for Nepal; and evacuated more than <span class=\"n-term\">50 citizens of other countries<\/span> \u2014 Maldives, Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, the United States, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, South Africa, Peru \u2014 amid its own evacuations.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span> reads this period as <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC\u2019s Resurrection<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"revival-of-saarc-the-functional-case\">Revival of SAARC \u2014 the functional case<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The organisation\u2019s <em>raison d\u2019\u00eatre<\/em> persists and is likely to be reanimated in propitious circumstances \u2014 the video conference of SAARC leaders convened at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 illustrates this.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">environmental crisis<\/span> strengthens the case. Ecological interdependence in the subcontinent requires regionally structured responses to the retreat of Himalayan glaciers and the spread of extreme weather.<\/li>\n<li>Almost <span class=\"n-term\">800 million people<\/span> in South Asia could face a sharp decline in living conditions from rising greenhouse gas emissions; climate refugees could produce a humanitarian tragedy \u2014 challenges requiring collective action.<\/li>\n<li>The evidence has hardened: the Indus basin lost about <span class=\"n-term\">24.8%<\/span> of perennial snow and ice cover between 2001 and 2021. <span class=\"n-sch\">Medha Bisht<\/span> holds that climate stress leaves no real alternative to cooperation, whatever a treaty\u2019s legal standing.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Hydropower<\/span> \u2192 Nepal has a potential of at least <span class=\"n-term\">40 GW<\/span> against current capacity of a little over 1 GW; Northeast India has installed about <span class=\"n-term\">1.5 GW<\/span> of over <span class=\"n-term\">58 GW<\/span> of potential. This can be realised only through cross-border power exports.<\/li>\n<li>Despite widespread dissatisfaction, <span class=\"n-term\">no member state has withdrawn<\/span>. BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues for economic collaboration but cannot supplant SAARC.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"measures-needed-way-forward\">Measures Needed &amp; Way Forward<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Measures needed<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Cultivate a <span class=\"n-term\">sense of common values<\/span> and acknowledge <span class=\"n-term\">shared historical perceptions<\/span>, which requires addressing intrinsic political disparities. Member states must move beyond conventional notions of sovereignty, security and national identity towards a <span class=\"n-term\">transnational, multi-layered and multi-dimensional<\/span> conception of nationhood and regional affiliation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Transparency in bilateral engagement<\/span> \u2014 no country should act as a dominant power or obstruct progress.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India must exhibit proactive leadership<\/span> and go the extra mile, given its demographic and geographic weight.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">No member should internationalise bilateral issues<\/span> beyond the SAARC forum \u2014 which keeps disputes within a framework conducive to resolution and prevents external actors from worsening tension.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Expedite SAFTA<\/span> and expand its ambit; develop hard infrastructure, streamline freight movement facilitation, augment investment opportunities.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Integrate the energy sector<\/span> through a unified electric power grid, pooling technical and financial resources.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Facilitate freer legal movement of people<\/span> for economic and cultural tourism; streamline immigration procedures to build a sense of shared identity.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Combat transnational threats<\/span> \u2014 cross-border illegal migration, terrorism, narcotics trafficking \u2014 through intelligence sharing, border security and law enforcement cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Way forward<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The pandemic underlined the need for a unified approach \u2014 collaboration over confusion, preparation over panic.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Redefining the SAARC Charter<\/span> is essential \u2014 removing excessive safeguards and incorporating the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018SAARC Minus\u2019 concept<\/span> for greater flexibility in decision-making. Priority to trade facilitation, energy trade connectivity and other avenues of integration.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Deeper regional cooperation<\/span> to reduce the trust deficit reflected partly in defence expenditure; <span class=\"n-term\">regional connectivity<\/span> is a necessary condition for land-locked Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan, and for India\u2019s virtually landlocked Northeast, to reach world markets.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Change in production patterns<\/span> \u2192 voluntary shifts towards areas of competitive advantage would avoid the present clash of economic interests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Reducing trade barriers<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">promoting collectivism<\/span> in multilateral negotiations and at the WTO, and insulating the regional economy against external shocks.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Confidence-building measures<\/span> \u2014 easing travel and visa restrictions to promote contact between business communities.<\/li>\n<li>Drawing on <span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya\u2019s<\/span> strategic wisdom: a country cannot thrive while neglecting the challenges faced by its neighbours. A revival of the Kautilyan approach \u2014 pragmatic and consequential decision-making \u2014 is essential.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"background-and-working-mechanism\">Background and Working Mechanism<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation<\/span> promotes collaboration and shared growth among littoral and neighbouring nations of the Bay of Bengal.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Seven members<\/span> \u2014 five South Asian (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) and two Southeast Asian (Myanmar, Thailand).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From BIST-EC to BIMSTEC.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">June 1997<\/span> (BIST-EC \u2014 Bangkok Declaration: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Late 1997<\/span> (BIMST-EC \u2014 Myanmar joins) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2004<\/span> (Nepal and Bhutan join \u2014 present name) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2022<\/span> (BIMSTEC Charter adopted at the fifth summit)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Working mechanism<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC Charter<\/span>, adopted at the fifth summit, supplied the formal charter and organisational design, along with a functional framework for operational objectives and policy making.<\/li>\n<li>Policy is made through two kinds of meetings \u2014 annual <span class=\"n-term\">ministerial meetings<\/span> of foreign and commerce ministers on trade and economic matters, and <span class=\"n-term\">summits every two years<\/span>. Senior officials meet twice a year to oversee operations.<\/li>\n<li>Before its first Secretary General, the Sri Lankan diplomat <span class=\"n-sch\">Sumith Nakandala<\/span>, and the establishment of headquarters at <span class=\"n-term\">Dhaka<\/span> \u2014 2011 and 2014 \u2014 BIMSTEC had neither a formal headquarters nor a secretariat. The <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC Working Group<\/span> is the coordinating body, chaired by a member nation on rotation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The Bay of Bengal region was among the most interconnected in the world until the early twentieth century, but<\/em> <em><span class=\"n-term\">\u201cthe region\u2019s sense of community has almost completely eroded\u201d<\/span><\/em> <em>after the 1940s, when members gained independence and pursued different objectives and alliance structures.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Constantino Xavier &amp; Riya Sinha<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"significance-what-the-bay-delivers\">Significance \u2014 what the Bay delivers<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">1.68 billion people<\/span>, or <span class=\"n-term\">22% of the world\u2019s population<\/span>, live in the BIMSTEC region, whose members generate <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 3.697 trillion<\/span> in GDP annually.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> policy aligns with BIMSTEC, which also serves India\u2019s objective of becoming a significant player in trade and security in the Indian Ocean region, and serves the Quad countries\u2019 focus on the \u201cIndo-Pacific\u201d idea.<\/li>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">2021 research series by the Observer Research Foundation<\/span> \u2192 Sri Lanka sees the objective of becoming a shipping hub in the Indo-Pacific, while Bangladesh may use BIMSTEC to support much-needed economic development.<\/li>\n<li>The two land-locked mountainous members, <span class=\"n-term\">Nepal and Bhutan<\/span>, use it as a route to the sea; <span class=\"n-term\">Thailand and Myanmar<\/span> may view it as a means of lowering excessive reliance on China and as a gateway to a sizeable consumer market.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s gradual expansion<\/span> in the Indian Ocean has helped India establish itself as a major player in the Bay and preserve peace and security. China has BRI projects in every BIMSTEC member except India and Bhutan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Indian foreign policy objectives realised through BIMSTEC<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Objective<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Bay of Bengal is the largest bay in the world, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans and connecting to the Strait of Malacca.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Trade<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Carrying a quarter of global trade, it is an access point for resources including natural gas reserves; securing it matters for enlarging India\u2019s export market.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Blue economy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Regional integration and maritime security allow India to realise its blue economy ambitions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Connectivity<\/span><\/td>\n<td>BIMSTEC enables projects under <span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span> \u2014 economic, maritime and security cooperation through information sharing, surveillance and improved capabilities.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Ideational<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Allows India to present the idea of <em>Multipolar Asia<\/em> and the <em>Gujral Doctrine<\/em>, and to curb the sphere of influence China has expanded.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em>India hosted the BIMSTEC Leaders\u2019 Retreat in Goa in 2016 and the BRICS\u2013BIMSTEC Summit the same year; the first meeting of BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs was held in New Delhi on 21 March 2017, emphasising maritime security cooperation and the Bay of Bengal as a common security space.<\/em><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"challenges-and-way-forward\">Challenges and Way Forward<\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li>\n<p>India\u2019s shifting focus from SAARC to BIMSTEC is primarily to diplomatically isolate Pakistan; since its formation in 1997, BIMSTEC has come to life mainly during periods of India\u2013Pakistan tension.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Lack of efficiency and a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201csluggish\u201d<\/span> pace \u2014 the grouping produced its own charter only in <span class=\"n-term\">2022<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>The secretariat suffers from inadequate financial and manpower support.<\/li>\n<li>Poor transborder trade and connectivity \u2014 India\u2019s annual trade with BIMSTEC countries was just <span class=\"n-term\">4%<\/span> of its total foreign trade as of 2020.<\/li>\n<li>No <span class=\"n-term\">Free Trade Agreement<\/span> has been adopted; despite maritime trade and tourism potential, members have not built a shared and lucrative coastal shipment ecosystem.<\/li>\n<li>Progress has been undercut by Bangladesh\u2013Myanmar relations over the <span class=\"n-term\">Rohingya refugee crisis<\/span>, the India\u2013Nepal border issue, and the political situation in Myanmar after the military takeover.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Way forward<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A comprehensive <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement<\/span> would help businesses join global supply chains and lower trade and investment barriers, eventually producing a rules-based multilateral trading system. This requires political will and the fulfilment of <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cconvergence criteria\u201d<\/span> \u2014 the elements tying member objectives together, to be determined over time.<\/li>\n<li>Removal of regulatory obstacles to <span class=\"n-term\">foreign direct investment<\/span> would help expansion and integration of regional and global supply chains.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"can-bimstec-replace-saarc\">Can BIMSTEC Replace SAARC?<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Two different animals<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">SAARC<\/span> \u2014 A naturally formed geographical identity \u2014 cultural, religious, linguistic and culinary resemblance. An <span class=\"n-term\"><em>absolute regional organisation<\/em><\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Shared developmental challenges<\/span> solvable only in unity \u00b7 consensus rule \u00b7 charter bar on bilateral disputes<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">BIMSTEC<\/span> \u2014 Members lack a common identity and history \u2014 an <span class=\"n-term\"><em>interregional economic bloc<\/em><\/span> and a bridge builder connecting South Asia with ASEAN. <span class=\"n-term\">Sector-driven<\/span> \u00b7 different members lead different pillars \u00b7 no FTA yet<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Similarities<\/th>\n<th>Dissimilarities<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Both regions have a diverse economic setup and a demographic dividend.<\/td>\n<td>Unlike SAARC, <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC is a sector-driven institution<\/span>, focused on economic and technical cooperation between South and Southeast Asia.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Both are closely tied in socio-political condition, facing similar threats and challenges.<\/td>\n<td>As a trade bloc BIMSTEC offers wider opportunity and greater trade potential than SAARC.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Both aim at promoting welfare, accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development, and strengthening collective self-reliance.<\/td>\n<td>South Asia is a naturally formed geographical identity, so SAARC is far more reasonably termed an absolute regional organisation; BIMSTEC is more an interregional bloc.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Both suffer an <span class=\"n-term\">absence of a conducive regional environment<\/span>.<\/td>\n<td>All SAARC countries share similar developmental challenges solvable only in unity; BIMSTEC connects South Asia with ASEAN economies as an inter-regional organisation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Both aspire to a Neighbourhood First approach in their individual settings.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC works on different pillars<\/span>, with different member countries leading particular domains \u2014 a design absent in SAARC.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<p>BIMSTEC is a complementing body to SAARC and vice versa; despite overlapping geography and priority areas, they are not equal alternatives. Insofar as their regions of interest overlap, the two complement each other in function and goal. BIMSTEC gives SAARC countries a unique opportunity to connect with ASEAN. Its success does not render SAARC pointless \u2014 it adds a new chapter to regional cooperation in South Asia. BIMSTEC has considerable potential to promote integration across South and Southeast Asia, giving India a strategic platform to interact with its neighbours, build economic development, increase connectivity and address shared issues such as disaster relief and energy security. It may become a major force behind regional stability and prosperity by fortifying its institutional structure and broadening its areas of collaboration.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"regional-integration-and-the-question-of-regionness\">Regional Integration and the Question of \u2018Regionness\u2019<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>South Asia could not advance the notion of regionalism despite a common history and shared cultural traditions. The nature and circumstances of <span class=\"n-term\">state formation during decolonisation<\/span>, and the effects of the <span class=\"n-term\">Cold War<\/span>, were significant in impeding the growth of regionalism.<\/li>\n<li>The primary obstacles were the division of British India into India and Pakistan, Bangladesh\u2019s independence from Pakistan, and the wars fought during these events.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s<\/span> expanding geopolitical and economic commitments across South Asia have rendered a large part of the notion of regional integration obsolete; regional institutions play a smaller role as China widens its sphere of influence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s own trajectory<\/span> \u2192 after initial hesitation India was positive about SAARC\u2019s potential, gradually concluded the organisation might not be useful in accomplishing its declared objectives, and began to distance itself. Its policies after 2014 indicate a lack of interest in SAARC and a preference for two other fronts \u2014 bilateral engagement under Neighbourhood First, and bilateral and multilateral engagement beyond South Asia.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Niranjan Marjani<\/span> \u2192 India has actively sought to isolate Pakistan in the region and has stepped up engagement with other groupings such as BBIN and BIMSTEC.<\/li>\n<li>Under Neighbourhood First, India has engaged Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka while circumventing Pakistan \u2014 stress on mutually beneficial economic engagement and humanitarian assistance, most visibly during the pandemic through <span class=\"n-term\">Vaccine Maitri<\/span>, which prioritised the neighbourhood.<\/li>\n<li>Outside South Asia India has increased engagement with BIMSTEC, BRICS and the G-20, and is expanding outreach through the Act East Policy and the India\u2013Central Asia Dialogue.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Regional integration in South Asia would go ahead \u201cthrough SAARC or outside it, among all of us or some of us.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>India\u2019s position, 18th SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, 2014<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">What are the reasons for lack of \u2018regionness\u2019 in South Asia?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/what-are-the-reasons-for-lack-of-regionness-in-south-asia-upsc-psir-2023-4305\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"where-the-argument-stands-now-2024-to-2026\">Where the Argument Stands Now \u2014 2024 to 2026<\/h3>\n<p>Three smaller neighbours passed through sharp political change, and each tested the claim that Neighbourhood First converts asymmetry into influence.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Country<\/th>\n<th>The reset<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sri Lanka<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Anura Kumara Dissanayake<\/span> elected; his JVP had led two insurrections, the second against the IPKF. First foreign trip to Delhi, December 2024 \u2014 both sides gave <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cprimacy to each other\u2019s security concerns\u201d<\/span>. Modi\u2019s Colombo visit, April 2025: the first-ever <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Sri Lanka defence-cooperation MoU<\/span>, the India\u2013UAE\u2013Sri Lanka <span class=\"n-term\">Trincomalee<\/span> energy hub, the Sampur solar project. After <span class=\"n-term\">Cyclone Ditwah<\/span> (Nov 2025) India ran <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sagar Bandhu<\/span> and offered USD 450 million.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Maldives<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Mohamed Muizzu<\/span> won on an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cIndia Out\u201d<\/span> platform; India withdrew about 80 military personnel by May 2024. A reserves crisis reversed the calculus \u2014 October 2024 Vision Document, a twin currency swap, and in July 2025 a <span class=\"n-term\">USD 565 million line of credit<\/span>, India\u2019s first denominated in rupees, cutting annual debt repayments about <span class=\"n-term\">40 per cent<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Nepal<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Gen Z protests of September 2025 forced K.P. Sharma Oli out; on <span class=\"n-term\">5 March 2026<\/span> the <span class=\"n-term\">Rastriya Swatantra Party<\/span> took 182 of 275 seats and <span class=\"n-term\">Balen Shah<\/span> became prime minister. From 19 April 2026 Nepal enforced stricter tariffs on Indian goods; the <span class=\"n-term\">Lipulekh<\/span> dispute and the drawn-out fight over BRI financing frame a more transactional phase.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The pattern: hedging, not alignment<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Cheng-Chwee Kuik \u2014 hedging<\/span><\/p>\n<p>\u201cInsurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-\u00e0-vis competing powers to have a fallback position.\u201d<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy<\/span> (ORF) \u2014 pragmatism would prevail; \u201cSri Lanka will continue to balance between India and China.\u201d A year on, Shivamurthy noted a weakening government, cancelled energy projects and criticism of the defence MoU itself.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Gulbin Sultana<\/span> (MP-IDSA) \u2014 Muizzu\u2019s turn is a shift from an \u201cIndia first\u201d to a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cMaldives first\u201d<\/span> policy aimed at cutting dependence; the recalibration \u201cshould not be seen as a zero-sum game for India\u201d, but it is no return to the old line either.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nihar R. Nayak<\/span> (MP-IDSA) \u2014 Nepal is a small, landlocked <span class=\"n-term\">semi-buffer state<\/span> between two Asian powers that have fought a war; its tactics have been mostly hedging in the post-Cold War period. India ties Nepal\u2019s stability to border security and democracy, China to the One China Principle and Tibet.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nilanthi Samaranayake<\/span> (USIP) \u2014 small-state agency is real, but it shrinks as great-power competition intensifies.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Connectivity and sovereignty<\/span> \u2014 India stayed outside the Belt and Road paragraph of the Tianjin Declaration at the SCO, September 2025. Modi there: \u201cConnectivity that by-passes sovereignty, ultimately loses both trust and meaning.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Read against the chapter\u2019s own argument: asymmetry has not gone, but the smaller states now price Indian and Chinese offers against each other rather than choosing between them.<\/em><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"conclusion-the-political-economy-of-separation\">Conclusion \u2014 the political economy of separation<\/h3>\n<p>South Asia\u2019s central paradox: the region with the densest civilisational, linguistic and ecological connections is the least integrated political space in the world. Intra-regional trade at about 5%, no SAARC summit since 2014, and trading costs higher than with partners on the other side of the globe are symptoms of one cause.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three variables shape every bilateral relationship in the region.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Asymmetry<\/span> (Makes India indispensable and resented in equal measure) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Domestic politics<\/span> (Anti-India sentiment as electoral currency \u2014 \u201cIndia Out\u201d in Mal\u00e9, the Madhesi question in Kathmandu, the Tamil question in Colombo) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">China<\/span> (Alternative capital without conditionalities \u2014 raises the price of Indian influence even where it cannot displace it)<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The corrective is not louder assertion.<\/span> Where India has lost ground, it has lost it to delay rather than to Chinese finance \u2014 Hambantota, Trincomalee and Batticaloa were offered to India first; hydropower delays in Bhutan created the debt they were meant to retire; the Teesta remains unsettled after five decades of negotiation. Delivery is the variable India controls.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The intellectual line is consistent<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> on the unrelenting logic of geography, <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> on managing complex interdependence rather than competing with China, <span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> on the cost of micro-management, <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span> on differentiated approaches, and <span class=\"n-sch\">Kanak Mani Dixit\u2019s<\/span> formulation that India must be <span class=\"n-term\">big and a brother<\/span>. All converge on one prescription: convert size into service rather than into a lever.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The 2024\u201326 record cuts both ways<\/span> \u2014 the island resets held and deepened, while Nepal\u2019s nationalist turn and China\u2019s steady economic presence mark the limits of Indian influence. <span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier\u2019s<\/span> warning stands: \u201cIndia is actually doing more than ever, but it is the neighbourhood that is losing India.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Atal Bihari Vajpayee\u2019s<\/span> proposition remains the frame. History cannot be changed and geography cannot be changed; what can be changed is whether proximity is treated as an inheritance to be managed or a resource to be built on.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"saarc\">SAARC<\/h3>\n<p>Founded with the <span class=\"n-term\">SAARC Charter, Dhaka (1985)<\/span>; Secretariat in <span class=\"n-term\">Kathmandu<\/span>; it operates in a conflict-prone region often called the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201carc of instability.\u201d<\/span> Foundational principles: <span class=\"n-term\">Panchsheel<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">consensus<\/span> (unanimous decision-making).<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cI dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Manmohan Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Impediments to functionality<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Structural asymmetry<\/span> \u2014 a \u201cnegative mindset\u201d that challenges India\u2019s regional weight; India seen as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbullying big brother\u201d<\/span> and \u201cimperialist power\u201d \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbig brother, small brother\u201d syndrome<\/span> (Sikkim\u2019s integration, Bangladesh\u2019s creation, the IPKF, Nepal\/Bhutan blockades), while India fears smaller states will \u201cgang up.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2013Pakistan<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> calls Pakistan the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201ccamel in the caravan of SAARC,\u201d<\/span> slowing the traffic; Pakistan\u2019s \u201cidentity crisis\u201d fears that fulfilling SAARC would be a de facto nullification of Partition.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Economic asymmetry<\/span> and inward-looking self-reliance \u2014 SAFTA languishes; intra-regional trade stays below 5%. <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013China rivalry<\/span> and China\u2019s strategic entry deepen tensions. Institutional paralysis \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> calls SAARC a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cjammed vehicle\u201d<\/span>; no summit since 2014.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Improvements, revival and measures needed<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Trade \u2014 SAFTA, SAPTA (preferential), SATIS (services). Institutions \u2014 Development Fund, SAARC University, Arbitration Council, SARSO (standards), Food Bank, Milk Grid, disaster agency, Film Festival, Federation Games, SAARC satellite.<\/li>\n<li>No member has withdrawn; BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues but cannot fully supplant SAARC. India convened a video conference of SAARC leaders during COVID-19 (2020); the Himalayan environmental crisis strengthens the case for revival.<\/li>\n<li>Measures \u2014 shared values and a transnational conception of nationhood; no internationalising of bilateral issues; India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">proactive leadership<\/span>; fast-track SAFTA, a unified power grid, freer movement of people, joint action on terrorism and narcotics; a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cSAARC Minus\u201d<\/span> concept for flexibility; <span class=\"n-sch\">Modi<\/span> \u2014 \u201ccollaboration over confusion, preparation over panic\u201d; a revived <span class=\"n-term\">Kautilyan<\/span>, pragmatic approach.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"bimstec\">BIMSTEC<\/h3>\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation<\/span> links South and Southeast Asia \u2014 seven members: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka (South Asia) and Myanmar, Thailand (Southeast Asia).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Evolution<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Bangkok Declaration (June 1997)<\/span> created BIST-EC; became BIMST-EC after Myanmar joined, then <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC<\/span> after Nepal and Bhutan joined in 2004. The <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC Charter<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Bangkok Vision<\/span> mark a shift from loose consultation to rules-based regionalism; first Secretary-General, Sri Lankan diplomat <span class=\"n-sch\">Sumith Nakandala<\/span>; Secretariat in Dhaka.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Constantino Xavier and Riya Sinha<\/span> \u2014 the Bay of Bengal was among the world\u2019s most interconnected regions until the early 20th century, but \u201cthe region\u2019s sense of community has almost completely eroded\u201d after the 1940s.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Significance and challenges<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Aligns with India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> policy; bridges SAARC and ASEAN; supports connectivity (Kaladan Multimodal, the Trilateral Highway, the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement); a counter to China\u2019s Indian Ocean expansion and the <span class=\"n-term\">Belt and Road Initiative<\/span> (BRI projects in every member except India and Bhutan).<\/li>\n<li>Challenges \u2014 India\u2019s pivot from SAARC is partly to isolate Pakistan, so BIMSTEC often revives only during India-Pakistan tension; a \u201csluggish\u201d pace (Charter after two decades); an under-staffed, under-funded Secretariat; poor transborder connectivity and low intra-regional trade; no FTA yet; setbacks from the Rohingya crisis, the India-Nepal border issue and the Myanmar junta.<\/li>\n<li>Way forward \u2014 a comprehensive <span class=\"n-term\">BIMSTEC FTA<\/span> meeting the \u201cconvergence criteria\u201d; removal of regulatory obstacles to FDI; integration into global supply chains through a rules-based trading system.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"why-pakistan-is-the-hard-case\">Why Pakistan is the hard case<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan is India\u2019s biggest foreign policy challenge \u2014 a source of threats ranging from nuclear war to lone-wolf attacks and suicide bombings, and a proxy of China. Historically India has faced its bigger threats from the western front.<\/li>\n<li>China is a greater power but a comparatively more responsible member of world politics, with some shared interests with India. Pakistan is termed a \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">mad child with loaded gun<\/span>\u2019 and an example of a rogue state; hence India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">strategic restraint<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span> treats such restraint not as weakness but as a measured response.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The challenges, stated plainly<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Taliban takeover of Afghanistan<\/span> \u2192 Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba now have a friendly regime that may look the other way or offer safe haven. <span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> refers to Pakistan as the <em>\u2018patron saint\u2019<\/em> of Afghanistan\u2019s new regime.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Right-wing Hindu nationalism in India<\/span> \u2192 Pakistan signalled a desire to improve ties in its first-ever National Security Policy while remaining concerned about Indian \u201cmilitary adventurism\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Political instability and military dominance<\/span> \u2192 a deep state with a weak political regime; the military\u2019s interest lies in keeping the situation tense. <span class=\"n-sch\">Christine Fair<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Ayesha Siddiqa<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Hussain Haqqani<\/span> hold that the Pakistani Army derives its sustenance from the Kashmir conflict; so long as it can sustain the perception of India as an existential threat and ideological antithesis, it continues to receive state largesse and political clout.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The obsession with Kashmir<\/span> \u2192 makes long-term peace impossible; since the abrogation of <span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span>, Pakistan has tried every diplomatic means to be heard.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Chinese interference<\/span> \u2192 CPEC, Chinese presence on Pakistani soil, and Beijing\u2019s better relations with the Taliban.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s idealistic foreign policy<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Dogra<\/span> argues that idealist Indian leaders made repeated concessions, after which Pakistan always found new means to undermine Indian interests; India has been \u201chopping in confusion\u201d over non-state actors, without an effective deterrent response or a consistent security posture.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Absence of an innovative counter-terrorism strategy<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Kanwal Sibal<\/span> notes India remains in a bind, caught between peace lobbies asserting <em>\u201cno alternative to dialogue\u201d<\/em> and <em>\u201cwe can choose our friends but not neighbours\u201d<\/em>, and the record of Pakistani behaviour.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Unchanging security dilemma<\/span> \u2192 neither side\u2019s threat perception has fundamentally changed; Pakistan\u2019s first National Security Policy mentions peace briefly and spends the rest debating New Delhi\u2019s \u201chegemonic\u201d goals.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What India should do<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Balance Pakistan in Afghanistan<\/span> \u2192 engage the Taliban realistically and build security cooperation, while bracing for a heightened threat.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Counter China<\/span> \u2192 form counter-alliances on the lines of <span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya\u2019s<\/span> <em>raja-mandala<\/em> and raise issues uncomfortable for Beijing.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Revive SAARC<\/span> \u2192 follow a <em>functionalist<\/em> approach and make Pakistan realise the benefits of cooperation, particularly while it is under economic stress.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization<\/span> \u2192 both are members of a security-focused body; find ways to press Pakistan on terrorism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Neutralise Pakistan strategically<\/span> \u2192 conventional victory has become costly and remote since Pakistan acquired credible deterrence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Take the first initiative<\/span> under \u2018Neighbourhood First\u2019 \u2192 India, as the bigger country, should move first, but with caution.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"possibilities-of-cooperation\">Possibilities of cooperation<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2014 systemic change has created conditions for cooperation. Pakistan\u2019s nuclear weapons neutralised India\u2019s conventional advantage, while India\u2019s rising economic and political power has <span class=\"n-term\">widened the gap<\/span> between them.<\/li>\n<li>The widened gap encourages, though it does not necessitate, long-term cooperation; India needs stability in its immediate environs to play a larger role in Asia and beyond.<\/li>\n<li>Nuclear weapons and economic trans-nationalisation together \u2192 (a) give Pakistan security from attack, reducing its sense of vulnerability; (b) produce sufficient risk to make leaders rethink; (c) create stronger incentives to cooperate.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Toward a democratic peace?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both moved away from zero-sum approaches to Kashmir in the early twenty-first century, loosening controls on cross-LoC movement of people and goods; state-level factors kept the movement a slow crawl.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Mansfield and Snyder<\/span> \u2014 democratising states are war-prone. Pakistan\u2019s unstable hybrid democracy, its mix of populism and military power, and parties outbidding each other in appeasing conservatives, make democratic peace difficult.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The prospects for a \u2018democratic peace\u2019 between India and Pakistan remain limited for the near future. The truism that democracies do not fight one another applies only to developed capitalist societies, and neither is anywhere close to being that.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rajesh Basrur<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Instances of cooperation, and the economics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty<\/span>, in force through several conflicts, seen as a model for international water-sharing; SAFTA and regional cooperation during periods of calm; cultural exchange of artists; Pakistani players in the Indian Premier League; joint hosting of the <span class=\"n-term\">South Asian Games, 2004<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Political tension long kept trade low because Pakistan sought to keep India at arm\u2019s length. Trade growth does not by itself rule out political tension, as United States\u2013China and Japan\u2013China trade show.<\/li>\n<li>Both the <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan People\u2019s Party<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)<\/span> favour more trade and investment; <span class=\"n-term\">Basrur<\/span> notes that internal pressures nonetheless held up MFN status, despite economic misfortune and IMF pressure.<\/li>\n<li>Trade figures \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">$521 million<\/span> (2004\u201305) \u2192 about <span class=\"n-term\">$2.35 billion<\/span> (2012\u201313) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">$329.26 million<\/span> (2020\u201321) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">$1.35 billion<\/span> in April\u2013December 2022 against $516.36 million in all of 2021\u201322. One study estimates potential growth of about tenfold.<\/li>\n<li>India imposed <span class=\"n-term\">200% tariffs<\/span> after Pulwama and withdrew MFN status; Pakistan suspended trade after August 2019. Facilitating structures exist \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Wagah\u2013Attari<\/span> crossing and <span class=\"n-term\">SAFTA<\/span> \u2014 but advance only as far as politics allows.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-regional-debate-hedging-the-debt-trap-neighbourhood-firs\">The regional debate \u2014 hedging, the debt trap, Neighbourhood First<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lenses:<\/span> Small-state hedging \u00b7 Buffer-state theory \u00b7 Neorealism<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Small-state hedging<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Cheng-Chwee Kuik<\/span> developed the framework for smaller states caught between great powers; the balancing logic is applied to this neighbourhood by <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya G. Shivamurthy<\/span> on Sri Lanka&#8217;s course and by <span class=\"n-sch\">Nilanthi Samaranayake<\/span> on island-state agency in the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;I define hedging as insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-\u00e0-vis competing powers to have a fallback position.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Cheng-Chwee Kuik, &#8216;Getting Hedging Right: A Small-State Perspective&#8217;, China International Strategy Review, 2021, p. 300<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The debt-trap thesis and its rebuttal<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Hambantota \u2014 strategic seizure, or a domestic failure?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The thesis<\/span> \u2014 Hambantota as strategic seizure \u2014 Brahma Chellaney, and the &#8216;String of Pearls&#8217; reading<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The rebuttal<\/span> \u2014 A Rajapaksa &#8216;white elephant&#8217; \u2014 Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri; a commercial lease, not a seizure<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Nilanthi Samaranayake and colleagues \u2014 small-state agency is real, but it shrinks as great-power competition intensifies<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The thesis in practice<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">N. Sathiya Moorthy<\/span> treats the research-vessels question as a test of exactly this anxiety.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The evidence against<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Lee Jones<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Shahar Hameiri<\/span> show that Sri Lanka&#8217;s debt crisis came mainly from <span class=\"n-term\">Western-market borrowing<\/span>, and that the port now hosts Sri Lanka&#8217;s own <span class=\"n-term\">southern naval command<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;The Hambantota Port case shows little evidence of Chinese strategy, but lots of evidence for poor governance on the recipient side.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Shahar Hameiri, &#8216;Debunking the Myth of China&#8217;s Debt-trap Diplomacy&#8217;, Lowy Institute, 9 Sep 2020<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;The story of Hambantota Port is, in reality, a narrative of political and economic incompetence, facilitated by lax governance and inadequate risk management on both sides.&#8221;<\/em> \u2014 **Lee Jones &amp; Shahar Hameiri, <em>Debunking the Myth of &#8216;Debt-trap Diplomacy&#8217;<\/em>, Chatham House, Aug 2020**<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First \u2014 adaptation or structural strain?<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<th>Case<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Adaptation<\/span> \u2014 Official statements; analysts at ORF and MP-IDSA<\/td>\n<td>The policy adapted and turned each reset into deeper cooperation, retaining India&#8217;s primacy \u2014 the December 2024 statement, the first defence MoU, the rupee line of credit and the 40 per cent debt cut, and the Ditwah response.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Structural strain<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span>, then at Brookings India<\/td>\n<td>The region is poorly connected and the India\u2013Nepal border is open &#8220;mostly on paper&#8221;; India must move from a <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;right of first refusal&#8221;<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">&#8220;capacity of first delivery&#8221;<\/span>. There are no permanent pro-India factions, only leaders balancing several powers at once.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>&#8220;India is actually doing more than ever, but it is the neighbourhood that is losing India. It is the countries of South Asia that are moving on, escaping the traditional region called South Asia with India as its gravitational core.&#8221;<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Constantino Xavier, interview in Scroll.in, 22 August 2020<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Where the record lands<\/span> \u2014 the 2024\u20132026 evidence supports both readings: the island resets held and even deepened after Ditwah, yet Nepal&#8217;s nationalist turn and China&#8217;s steady economic presence mark the limits of Indian influence. India frames its own conduct through <span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First<\/span> and the maritime vision now called <span class=\"n-term\">MAHASAGAR<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-south-asia-the-neighbours\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India and South Asia \u2014 the neighbours<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/south-asia-as-a-free-trade-area\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>South Asia as a Free Trade Area<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-south-asian-paradox\">The South Asian Paradox<\/a><a href=\"#neighbourhood-first-design-and-purpose\">Neighbourhood First \u2014 design and purpose<\/a><a href=\"#the-five-principles\">The Five Principles<\/a><a href=\"#concerns-in-the-neighbourhood-policy\">Concerns in the Neighbourhood Policy<\/a><a href=\"#strategies-for-strengthening-relations\">Strategies for Strengthening Relations<\/a><a href=\"#views-of-scholars-the-differentiated-approach\">Views of Scholars \u2014 the differentiated approach<\/a><a href=\"#foundations-objectives-principles\">Foundations, Objectives, Principles<\/a><a href=\"#issues-with-saarc-functionality\">Issues with SAARC Functionality<\/a><a href=\"#the-india-pakistan-question-in-saarc\">The India\u2013Pakistan Question in SAARC<\/a><a href=\"#achievements-the-institutional-record\">Achievements \u2014 the institutional record<\/a><a href=\"#saarc-during-covid-19\">SAARC During COVID-19<\/a><a href=\"#revival-of-saarc-the-functional-case\">Revival of SAARC \u2014 the functional case<\/a><a href=\"#measures-needed-way-forward\">Measures Needed &amp; Way Forward<\/a><a href=\"#background-and-working-mechanism\">Background and Working Mechanism<\/a><a href=\"#significance-what-the-bay-delivers\">Significance \u2014 what the Bay delivers<\/a><a href=\"#challenges-and-way-forward\">Challenges and Way Forward<\/a><a href=\"#can-bimstec-replace-saarc\">Can BIMSTEC Replace SAARC?<\/a><a href=\"#regional-integration-and-the-question-of-regionness\">Regional Integration and the Question of \u2018Regionness\u2019<\/a><a href=\"#where-the-argument-stands-now-2024-to-2026\">Where the Argument Stands Now \u2014 2024 to 2026<\/a><a href=\"#conclusion-the-political-economy-of-separation\">Conclusion \u2014 the political economy of separation<\/a><a href=\"#saarc\">SAARC<\/a><a href=\"#bimstec\">BIMSTEC<\/a><a href=\"#why-pakistan-is-the-hard-case\">Why Pakistan is the hard case<\/a><a href=\"#possibilities-of-cooperation\">Possibilities of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#the-regional-debate-hedging-the-debt-trap-neighbourhood-firs\">The regional debate \u2014 hedging, the debt trap, Neighbourhood First<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>SAARC: past performance and future prospects for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a SAARC: past performance and future prospects Paper I \u00b7 India and t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.3.2","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"3","fx_note_desc":"SAARC: past performance and future prospects for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a SAARC: past performance and future prospects Paper I \u00b7 India and t","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3582","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3582","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3582\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3799,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3582\/revisions\/3799"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3582"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}