{"id":3585,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:09","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/river-water-disputes\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:02","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:02","slug":"river-water-disputes","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/river-water-disputes\/","title":{"rendered":"River water disputes"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>River water disputes<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">River water disputes<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 3<\/b> \u2014 India and South Asia : (a) Regional Co-operation : SAARC-past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India\u2019s \u201cLook East\u201d policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation : <span class=\"cur\">River water disputes<\/span>; illegal cross border migration; Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; Border disputes.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-indus-waters-treaty\">The Indus Waters Treaty<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 \u2014 how the basin was divided<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th><span class=\"n-lab\">EASTERN RIVERS<\/span> \u2014 to India<\/th>\n<th><span class=\"n-lab\">WESTERN RIVERS<\/span> \u2014 to Pakistan<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Sutlej \u00b7 Beas \u00b7 Ravi. Full use by India.<\/td>\n<td>Indus \u00b7 Jhelum \u00b7 Chenab. India may use about <span class=\"n-term\">20%<\/span> for non-consumptive purposes; no storages permitted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Background<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Signed in <span class=\"n-term\">1960<\/span> between <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Ayub Khan<\/span>, brokered by the <span class=\"n-term\">World Bank<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ramaswamy R. Iyer<\/span> notes the original logic: irrigation networks then had to be developed in western Punjab, now part of Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li>Restrictions were also placed on the extension of irrigation in India.<\/li>\n<li>Institutional machinery \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Permanent Indus Commission<\/span>, with neutral expert determination and <span class=\"n-term\">Permanent Court of Arbitration<\/span> referral; data exchange on project operation and irrigated agriculture. Under <span class=\"n-term\">Article V<\/span> India paid approximately <span class=\"n-term\">\u00a362.06 million<\/span>; international financial assistance went to Pakistan for irrigation works.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Contention<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan has objected to Indian projects on the western rivers, for example the <span class=\"n-term\">Tulbul project<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Indian resentment centres on having conceded about <span class=\"n-term\">80%<\/span> of the water; <span class=\"n-term\">Article XII<\/span> says the treaty <em>may from time to time be modified<\/em>, but this requires ratification by both.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Iftikhar A. Drabu<\/span> \u2014 the treaty has withstood an acrimonious relationship and three wars, and is considered one of the most successful water-sharing arrangements in the world. It survived the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999 and the standoffs of 1987, 2001\u201302, 2008, 2016 and 2019.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Options and considerations<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> \u2192 renegotiate to reflect changed geopolitical realities; India is disadvantaged as upper riparian.<\/li>\n<li>Using the treaty as a pressure point \u2192 suspend Permanent Indus Commission meetings; maximise use of the allocated share; contemplate withdrawal, particularly in response to Chinese dams on the Indus.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">TCA Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 future negotiation is possible, including a <span class=\"n-term\">joint river basin authority<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">UNDP<\/span> has called on India to share the water deficit from the western rivers during lean seasons.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Is stopping the flow practical?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Blocking flow means blocking the three western rivers, which carry more than 80% of the Indus basin\u2019s flow \u2014 achievable only by storage or diversion.<\/li>\n<li><em>Diversion<\/em> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Iftikhar A. Drabu: 117 BCM<\/span> would inundate nearly <span class=\"n-term\">120,000 sq km<\/span> to a height of one metre every year, or the whole Kashmir valley to seven metres in a single year. Diverting any one river needs a man-made river running hundreds of kilometres.<\/li>\n<li><em>Storage<\/em> \u2192 a single Tehri-sized storage takes nearly a decade; even thirty simultaneous projects would impound water only around 2030.<\/li>\n<li>Either way Pakistan feels no impact for at least the next <span class=\"n-term\">30 to 50 years<\/span>, and the environmental cost of both is catastrophic.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Arguments against manipulation<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Asma Yaqoob<\/span> \u2192 the treaty is legally a \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">non-exit<\/span>\u201d partnership; denying Pakistan access would damage India\u2019s global reputation and unsettle China and Nepal, with whom India is itself a downstream recipient.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Maya Mirchandani<\/span> \u2192 calls to abrogate are knee-jerk emotional responses; abrogation would alarm other countries with rights over rivers flowing from India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sayanangshu Modak<\/span> \u2192 by keeping to the treaty India strengthens its standing as a responsible upstream riparian when engaging China. Equally, since neither goodwill nor friendship \u2014 the preamble\u2019s stated spirit \u2014 now exists, critics argue India has no obligation to continue.<\/li>\n<li>Without Pakistan actually feeling any impact, abrogation would only feed lobbies within Pakistan that want relations to deteriorate.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amit Ranjan<\/span> \u2192 the widening supply-demand gap has produced <span class=\"n-term\">water nationalism<\/span>; militant groups have taken up the issue, with March 2010 rallies in Muzaffarabad and Lahore denouncing India\u2019s \u201ctheft\u201d of waters through \u201cillegal dams\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Blood and water can\u2019t flow together.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, after Uri, 2016. In 2019 India\u2019s water minister threatened to let \u201cnot even a single drop of water\u201d reach Pakistan.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-suspension-of-april-2025\">The suspension of April 2025<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>On <span class=\"n-term\">23 April 2025<\/span> India <span class=\"n-term\">suspended<\/span> the treaty, triggered by the <span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam attack<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Legal basis<\/span> \u2192 India invoked <span class=\"n-term\"><span class=\"n-law\">Article 62<\/span> of the Vienna Convention<\/span>, arguing a <span class=\"n-term\">fundamental change of circumstances<\/span> caused by Pakistan\u2019s support for terrorism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">What India gains<\/span> \u2192 the way opens to untapped hydropower on the western rivers, an estimated <span class=\"n-term\">18,000 MW<\/span>, feeding energy needs and development in Jammu and Kashmir.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Suspension, not revocation<\/span> \u2192 this allows continued diplomatic engagement and possible renegotiation; India can halt data-sharing and pause dispute mechanisms without outright abrogation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Implications for Pakistan<\/span> \u2192 threatens water security in Punjab and Sindh, deepening economic crisis and political instability.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Diplomatic risk<\/span> \u2192 international backlash, damage to India\u2019s standing as a reliable partner in transboundary water agreements, and a precedent for future disputes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Environmental and technical constraints<\/span> \u2192 ecosystem and sediment effects, and the geological difficulty of building in the seismic Himalayan region, requiring substantial investment and time.<\/li>\n<li>Pending Indian projects \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Shahpurkandi Dam<\/span> on the Ravi, the <span class=\"n-term\">Ujh Dam<\/span> in Jammu and Kashmir and the <span class=\"n-term\">Ravi\u2013Beas link<\/span> in Punjab \u2014 need to be expedited to feed the food bowls of India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cDespite the differences between India and Pakistan on various issues, Indus Water Treaty has stood the test of times.\u201d In the light of this statement, discuss the recent developments over this issue.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/despite-the-differences-between-india-and-pakistan-on-various-upsc-psir-2017-4101\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"abeyance-the-word-the-law-the-capacity\">Abeyance \u2014 the word, the law, the capacity<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The word India chose<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India said <span class=\"n-term\">abeyance<\/span>, not suspension and not termination \u2014 the choice was deliberate. <span class=\"n-term\">Article XII(4)<\/span> keeps the treaty in force until replaced by another ratified treaty; there is no exit clause, so a stated withdrawal would have been a plain breach.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s letter of <span class=\"n-term\">24 April 2025<\/span> cited <span class=\"n-term\">significantly altered population demographics<\/span> and the need to accelerate clean-energy development, and accused Pakistan of refusing modification talks and of breaching the treaty through sustained cross-border terrorism.<\/li>\n<li>India is <span class=\"n-term\">not a party to the Vienna Convention<\/span> on the Law of Treaties, and the IWT predates it \u2014 which is why the two sides argue past each other on <span class=\"n-law\">Articles 60 and 62<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Vikram Misri, Foreign Secretary, on the CCS decision, 23 April 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Is it lawful? Three positions<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nishant Sirohi<\/span> (ORF)<\/td>\n<td>Legal statecraft, not a breach \u2014 a proportionate and reversible countermeasure grounded in customary law. India has neither withdrawn nor diverted flows; it has paused procedural cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rishabh Bajoria<\/span> (EJIL:Talk!)<\/td>\n<td>The opposite view \u2014 abeyance works like suspension and would likely fail the tests in VCLT <span class=\"n-law\">Articles 60 and 62<\/span>, since a militant attack is neither a treaty breach nor a fundamental change of circumstances.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Uttam Kumar Sinha<\/span> (MP-IDSA)<\/td>\n<td>India never signed the VCLT and has only re-evaluated its adherence rather than abrogated the treaty. Abeyance is a deliberate administrative action, not a symbolic gesture.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Intent versus capacity \u2014 the gap that decides the question<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The treaty allows India only <span class=\"n-term\">3.6 million acre-feet<\/span> (about 4.4 km\u00b3) of storage on the western rivers, against some <span class=\"n-term\">182 km\u00b3<\/span> flowing to Pakistan yearly. India has built about <span class=\"n-term\">0.7 MAF<\/span> of that entitlement.<\/li>\n<li>Permitted plants are <span class=\"n-term\">run-of-river<\/span> and hold little water; new large storage would take years, some to 2032. So the real pressure today is <span class=\"n-term\">informational, not hydrological<\/span> \u2014 halting flood data and technical exchange hurts Pakistan more than any dam can at present.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Action since abeyance<\/span> \u2192 sediment-flushing at <span class=\"n-term\">Baglihar, Salal and Dulhasti<\/span> on the Chenab without notifying Pakistan; fast-tracked Chenab hydropower \u2014 Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624), Kwar (540), Ratle (850), Sawalkote (1,856). J&amp;K\u2019s installed hydropower is set to rise about 46%, from 3,540 MW to 5,164 MW, by December 2026.<\/li>\n<li>No confirmed evidence yet that aggregate flows have changed; the shift so far is legal and procedural.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Unable for now to block water flows to Pakistan, India can, however, halt the flow of information. In some ways, this could be India\u2019s most powerful current card.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>David Michel, CSIS, 1 May 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The arbitration clash<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Court of Arbitration<\/span> case (PCA No. 2023-01), chaired by <span class=\"n-sch\">Sean D. Murphy<\/span>, ruled on <span class=\"n-term\">27 June 2025<\/span> that abeyance does not remove the Court\u2019s competence.<\/li>\n<li>India did not appear and calls the Court <span class=\"n-term\">illegally constituted<\/span>, while accepting the parallel <span class=\"n-term\">Neutral Expert<\/span> track (Michel Lino) that it had itself requested \u2014 two tracks running at once on the same dams.<\/li>\n<li>A further <span class=\"n-term\">Maximum Pondage award<\/span> (15 May 2026) went against India, which the Ministry of External Affairs dismissed as <span class=\"n-term\">null and void<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The clash is less about any single dam than about whether a party can walk out of a binding dispute system by relabelling its exit.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The text of the Treaty, therefore, does not provide for the unilateral \u2018abeyance\u2019 or \u2018suspension\u2019 of the Treaty.<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Court of Arbitration, Supplemental Award on Competence, 27 June 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">One year on \u2014 2026<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Positions have hardened and diverged: India says the treaty is in abeyance, Pakistan says it is <span class=\"n-term\">fully operational and effective<\/span>. Home Minister <span class=\"n-sch\">Amit Shah<\/span> has said it will never be restored; President Zardari objected on World Water Day, 22 March 2026.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan raised the issue at a <span class=\"n-term\">UN Security Council Arria-formula meeting<\/span> on 30 January 2026.<\/li>\n<li>The basin lost about <span class=\"n-term\">24.8%<\/span> of perennial snow and ice cover between 2001 and 2021 \u2014 the argument that climate stress leaves both states no real alternative to cooperation, whatever the treaty\u2019s legal status.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theory \u2014 how to frame it in an answer<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amal Chandra<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">coercive treaty retaliation<\/span>: a treaty becomes an instrument for imposing costs on a state accused of sponsoring terrorism \u2014 a move from liberal institutionalism toward realism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Medha Bisht<\/span> \u2192 coercive diplomacy displacing <span class=\"n-term\">strategic idealism<\/span>, which had assumed that cooperation breeds stability. Her caution: this framing may make future cooperation harder, because it pushes aside the ecological view of shared rivers.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Masha Tokas<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">securitization theory<\/span> \u2014 India recast water from a technical matter into a security concern, ending the older habit of keeping the treaty apart from politics. Against this she sets <span class=\"n-term\">regime theory<\/span>, which the treaty exemplified for decades.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>In such scenarios, power trumps principle, and realism supplants liberal institutionalism.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Amal Chandra, Global Policy Journal, 14 May 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Escalation risk<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Pakistan has drawn a red line, treating any real interruption of flows as an <span class=\"n-term\">act of war<\/span> \u2014 which raises the danger of miscalculation between two nuclear states.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dan Haines<\/span> (UCL) \u2192 even symbolic disruption could hurt Pakistani agriculture, close to a quarter of the economy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David Michel<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s upper-riparian advantage could rebound, since China sits above India on the same river system and may copy the tactic on the Brahmaputra; touching a settled water treaty may also unsettle smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh and Nepal.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Any attempt to usurp the water of the lower riparian, or to stop it, or to divert it would be an act of war against Pakistan and would be responded to with full force, including nuclear.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Muhammad Khalid Jamali, Pakistan\u2019s Ambassador<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"contention-ii-water-farakka-and-teesta\">Contention II \u2014 water: Farakka and Teesta<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India and Bangladesh share <span class=\"n-term\">54 common rivers<\/span>. A bilateral <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Rivers Commission (JRC)<\/span> has worked since June 1972 to maximise benefits from common river systems, but only two rivers \u2014 the Ganga and the Teesta \u2014 have been the subject of formal agreement, and the JRC has been <span class=\"n-term\">inactive since 2011<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Farakka Barrage<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nilanjan Ghosh<\/span> \u2192 the Farakka Barrage, long the point of contention in transboundary relations, is now emerging as an <span class=\"n-term\">inter-state<\/span> water dispute. It was planned to enhance the flow of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and revive the port at Kolkata downstream.<\/li>\n<li>Bangladesh was critical from the proposal stage, apprehending that enhanced flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly would reduce the dry season flow of the Ganges\/Padma into Bangladesh.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">What should be done<\/span> \u2192 removal of Farakka would harm ecosystem services in that part of the state. The basic problem is the flawed design of the barrage, which did not consider the <span class=\"n-term\">sediment variable<\/span>; ecologically informed engineering is the need of the hour. River basin commissions with powers above the federal states should be set up to prevent escalation of inter-state conflicts, and outmoded engineering paradigms should be dispensed with.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Teesta<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">315 km<\/span> river rising in the eastern Himalayas near Chunthang in Sikkim, flowing through West Bengal into Bangladesh and on to the Bay of Bengal; a tributary of the Brahmaputra, known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh. It originally flowed south into the Padma and around <span class=\"n-term\">1787<\/span> changed course eastward to join the Jamuna.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The dispute<\/span> \u2192 contested since 1947, when the catchment areas were allotted to India. After the JRC was set up in 1972, an <span class=\"n-term\">ad hoc arrangement of 1983<\/span> gave India <span class=\"n-term\">39%<\/span> and Bangladesh <span class=\"n-term\">36%<\/span>; allocation has been under discussion since 1972, with only 25% of the waters shared and the remainder unevenly divided. Bangladesh seeks a 25% share. Negotiations began in earnest after the <span class=\"n-term\">Ganga Water Treaty of 1996<\/span> and have made limited progress.<\/li>\n<li>Constant dam building along the Teesta in Sikkim has reduced lean season flow into Bangladesh, on which the livelihood of millions depends. As a lower riparian, Bangladesh is naturally sensitive on transboundary issues.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">For West Bengal<\/span>, the river sustains five northern districts \u2014 Darjeeling, North and South Dinajpur, Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri \u2014 among the poorest farming districts, with about <span class=\"n-term\">12.77%<\/span> of the state\u2019s population. There is also the matter of Kolkata port silting up and needing more water in the lean season.<\/li>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">framework agreement<\/span> under the Manmohan Singh government faced obstacles from coalition politics and objections from West Bengal, along with complications from India\u2019s water agreements with Pakistan. The West Bengal Chief Minister vetoed the proposed treaty in <span class=\"n-term\">2011<\/span> but has more recently said the state is ready to share water if suitable alternatives, such as interlinking of rivers through canals, are explored with the central government.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tariq A. Karim<\/span> \u2192 despite advances in other areas, the Teesta dispute remains a major concern for many Bangladeshis, and this emotional factor exacerbates tensions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jaideep Majumdar<\/span> \u2192 unresolved issues on the Teesta might weaken India\u2019s position on other water disputes, such as the Brahmaputra with China; failure could also undermine opportunities for \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">Blue Water Partnerships<\/span>\u201d in the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2192 broader strategic interests should not be impeded by narrow domestic concerns; the <span class=\"n-term\">Gujral Doctrine<\/span> of good neighbourly relations could serve as a basis for resolution.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Analyze the impact of Hydro politics on Indo Bangladesh relations.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/analyze-the-impact-of-hydro-politics-on-indo-bangladesh-relations-upsc-psir-2020-4102\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the steps required to realise &#8216;hydro-co-operation&#8217; between India and Bangladesh<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-steps-required-to-realise-hydro-co-operation-between-upsc-psir-2022-4104\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"rivers-defence-and-security\">Rivers, defence and security<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">River water sharing<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India&#8217;s first hydropower projects were on the <span class=\"n-term\">Kosi (1954)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Gandak (1959)<\/span>; the Nepalese perceived them as tilted heavily in India&#8217;s favour [<span class=\"n-sch\">Gyawali<\/span>; <span class=\"n-sch\">Shrestha<\/span>]. To accommodate these concerns the agreements were revised in <span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span> (Gandak) and <span class=\"n-term\">1966<\/span> (Kosi).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Akhilesh Upadhyay<\/span> notes a general impression in Nepal that it did not get a fair deal on the Kosi and Gandak. <span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 a deep cleavage of distrust followed, and no major project could be undertaken until the <span class=\"n-term\">Mahakali Treaty<\/span> of 1998.<\/li>\n<li>Implementation of the Mahakali Treaty has barely moved. Out of commercially viable potential of <span class=\"n-term\">45,000 MW<\/span>, Nepal has developed hardly <span class=\"n-term\">600 MW<\/span> \u2014 not enough even for its basic requirements \u2014 so it buys power from India rather than selling.<\/li>\n<li>Both sides have agreed to assemble a team of experts to resolve differences and finalise the detailed project report for the <span class=\"n-term\">6,480 MW Pancheshwar Multipurpose<\/span> bi-national plant on the Mahakali.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Defence and security<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.D. Muni<\/span> \u2014 Nepali territory has been used, given the open border, by cross-border terrorists from Pakistan, criminal gangs, smugglers of both countries, and for the flow of fake Indian currency.<\/li>\n<li>The hijacking of <span class=\"n-term\">IC 814<\/span> from Kathmandu in December 1999 made prevention of such incidents a major Indian concern.<\/li>\n<li>India stresses strengthening the legal framework against common cross-border challenges and has provided liberal assistance for infrastructure, capacity building, equipment and training.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"hydropolitics-of-south-asia-and-the-china-factor\">Hydropolitics of South Asia and the China Factor<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Water flows dynamically and disregards state boundaries, which poses a particular challenge to simplistic notions of state sovereignty. Dams and river management can engineer new flows and affect downstream availability, making transboundary waters a geopolitical problem.<\/li>\n<li>Water is a strategic concern for <span class=\"n-term\">China<\/span>, a key stakeholder in South Asian water relations and in the <span class=\"n-term\">Ganga\u2013Brahmaputra\u2013Meghna Basin<\/span>. The glaciers feeding the Ganga lie in China, and the <span class=\"n-term\">Brahmaputra<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Yarlung Tsangpo<\/span> \u2014 is the lifeline of the region. China\u2019s growing reliance on water shared with neighbours may run counter to its diplomatic efforts to present a positive international image.<\/li>\n<li>China currently shares flood forecasting data with India and Bangladesh during the monsoon, though it briefly stopped the practice with India in <span class=\"n-term\">2017<\/span>, purportedly because of the <span class=\"n-term\">Doklam<\/span> standoff and India\u2019s boycott of the BRI. Such knowledge needs to be shared more frequently, to include other countries, and through mechanisms insulated from wider political tension and the whims of officials.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Beijing\u2019s differentiated behaviour<\/span> \u2192 reluctant to engage in meaningful basin-wide cooperation, and acts differently depending on the basin and the neighbour. To the north it shares rivers with Mongolia, North Korea and Russia, has more bilateral treaties with them than with any others, and typically decides collectively \u2014 vastly different from its treatment of countries to the northwest, south and southeast.<\/li>\n<li>China is a signatory to several bilateral water agreements, but these are often non-binding memorandums on the selling of hydrological data, joint research, navigation and management of river islands. It denounced the <span class=\"n-term\">Mekong River Commission<\/span>, established in 1995 by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, yet established the <span class=\"n-term\">Lancang\u2013Mekong Cooperation<\/span> in 2014 to coordinate sub-regional initiatives and advance connectivity through BRI-funded infrastructure.<\/li>\n<li>This shift does not necessarily indicate a preference for multilateral water cooperation across all basins; Beijing is unlikely to participate in basin-wide cooperation it has not initiated or does not control. Any dam building or diversion on the Tibetan Plateau or along the Yarlung Tsangpo will affect India, Nepal and Bangladesh alike, and both Dhaka and Kathmandu feature prominently in Beijing\u2019s regional ambitions.<\/li>\n<li>China has at times used dam building or the withholding of hydrological data as a <span class=\"n-term\">coercive tactic<\/span>, and could resort to both in the Ganga\u2013Brahmaputra\u2013Meghna Basin. Basin countries therefore need innovative policies for collective action that both initiate discussion and keep participants engaged.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Sindoor spillover<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">David Michel<\/span> (CSIS) warns that India\u2019s upper-riparian advantage could rebound \u2014 China sits above India on the same river system and may copy the tactic on the Brahmaputra. India\u2019s willingness to touch a settled water treaty may also unsettle smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh and Nepal.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Ambika Vishwanath \u2014 the prescription<\/span><\/p>\n<p>India should make common cause with Bangladesh and other basin countries <span class=\"n-term\">as equal partners<\/span>, so as to collectively initiate dialogue with China. India can engage China on issues that are not politically sensitive \u2014 improving water quality, agricultural water usage. The two already have institutional arrangements for data sharing on climate change; joint research on glaciers can be made part of such initiatives.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-s-look-east-policy\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India\u2019s \u201cLook East\u201d policy<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/illegal-cross-border-migration\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Illegal cross border migration<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-indus-waters-treaty\">The Indus Waters Treaty<\/a><a href=\"#the-suspension-of-april-2025\">The suspension of April 2025<\/a><a href=\"#abeyance-the-word-the-law-the-capacity\">Abeyance \u2014 the word, the law, the capacity<\/a><a href=\"#contention-ii-water-farakka-and-teesta\">Contention II \u2014 water: Farakka and Teesta<\/a><a href=\"#rivers-defence-and-security\">Rivers, defence and security<\/a><a href=\"#hydropolitics-of-south-asia-and-the-china-factor\">Hydropolitics of South Asia and the China Factor<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>River water disputes for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a River water disputes Paper I \u00b7 India and the World River water disputes Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.3.5","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"3","fx_note_desc":"River water disputes for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a River water disputes Paper I \u00b7 India and the World River water disputes Syllabus \u00b7 Paper I","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3585","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3585","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3585\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3796,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3585\/revisions\/3796"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3585"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}