{"id":3588,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:10","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/border-disputes\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:00","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:00","slug":"border-disputes","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/border-disputes\/","title":{"rendered":"Border disputes"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Border disputes<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Border disputes<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 3<\/b> \u2014 India and South Asia : (a) Regional Co-operation : SAARC-past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India\u2019s \u201cLook East\u201d policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation : River water disputes; illegal cross border migration; Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; <span class=\"cur\">Border disputes<\/span>.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"kashmir-symptom-not-cause\">Kashmir \u2014 symptom, not cause<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>A territorial conflict over the Kashmir region, primarily between India and Pakistan, with China claiming portions of PoK and Aksai Chin. Dates from <span class=\"n-term\">22 October 1947<\/span>; on the United Nations agenda since partition.<\/li>\n<li>Both claim the entire region; three wars (1947\u201348, 1965, 1999) and repeated skirmishes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Basrur<\/span> \u2014 Kashmir is more a <span class=\"n-term\">symptom<\/span> than a cause; the main contradiction is a conflict of identity. It is a battle of identities, not only of territory.<\/li>\n<li>India is relatively <span class=\"n-term\">status-quoist<\/span>, Pakistan <span class=\"n-term\">revisionist<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Pervez Musharraf<\/span> treated Kashmir as Pakistan\u2019s jugular vein; for India the core issue is cross-border terrorism.<\/li>\n<li>Pakistan argues for self-determination and cites human rights violations while ignoring Balochistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why each side holds on<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>For India<\/em> \u2192 strengthens secular identity; strategic location for security and for countering Chinese designs; freshwater availability.<\/li>\n<li><em>For Pakistan<\/em> \u2192 part of Islamic identity; Muslim brotherhood; water resources.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Where it stands<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s August 2019 move is stuck in Pakistan\u2019s political throat: it can neither swallow it nor spit it out. Pakistan\u2019s current Kashmir debate is about finding a way out.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2014 even if Kashmir were settled, Pakistan is unlikely to give up jihadi terrorism, since the Army\u2019s grievances are too deeply rooted to forego its most effective instrument for bleeding India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-other-three-territorial-disputes\">The other three territorial disputes<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Dispute<\/th>\n<th>India\u2019s position<\/th>\n<th>Pakistan\u2019s position<\/th>\n<th>Where it stands<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Siachen Glacier<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Recognise the <span class=\"n-term\">Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)<\/span> first, then demilitarise. Reads the Simla Agreement \u2014 beyond the last demarcated point <span class=\"n-term\">NJ9842<\/span> the line runs \u201cthence north to the glaciers\u201d \u2014 as placing Pakistan only up to the <span class=\"n-term\">Saltoro Ridge<\/span>. Sequence: demarcation \u2192 delineation \u2192 demilitarisation.<\/td>\n<td>The line runs north-east from NJ9842 to the <span class=\"n-term\">Karakoram Pass<\/span>. Demilitarisation first, by withdrawal to 1972 positions, and only then demarcation.<\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Karachi Agreement of 1949<\/span> gave a vague demarcation and unspecified authority; the glacier has been contested since.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sir Creek<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Green Line is indicative only. Relies on a <span class=\"n-term\">1925<\/span> map placing the boundary mid-channel, supported by mid-channel pillars built in 1924, and invokes the <span class=\"n-term\">Thalweg Principle<\/span>. Answers that the creek is navigable at high tide and used by fishing trawlers.<\/td>\n<td>Claims the whole creek on the basis of the <span class=\"n-term\">Bombay Government Resolution of 1914<\/span>, under which the eastern flank \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Green Line<\/span> \u2014 was the boundary. Says Thalweg applies only to navigable channels.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">92 km<\/span> of marshy land separating <span class=\"n-term\">Gujarat<\/span> from <span class=\"n-term\">Sindh<\/span>, never properly surveyed. Matters for fishing rights, hydrocarbons, the <span class=\"n-term\">EEZ<\/span> and as flamingo habitat; the <span class=\"n-term\">UNCLOS<\/span> deadline has passed.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Gilgit-Baltistan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Part of undivided Jammu and Kashmir. The May 2020 grant of \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">provisional provincial status<\/span>\u201d is <span class=\"n-term\">illegal<\/span>; so is the handing of parts of the region to China in <span class=\"n-term\">1963<\/span> and CPEC work there, treated as an <span class=\"n-term\">attack on sovereignty<\/span>.<\/td>\n<td>Administers the region and upgraded it in May 2020 from a \u201cprovisional autonomous region\u201d. With China, has agreed to build five large dams in Pakistan \u2014 one of them here \u2014 under <span class=\"n-term\">One Belt One Road<\/span>.<\/td>\n<td>The territorial dispute that carries the China factor directly inside it.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Thalweg Principle<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Where a boundary is a waterway, it follows the centre of the principal navigable channel. India invokes it at Sir Creek; Pakistan\u2019s reply is that the creek is not a navigable channel at all.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Siachen \u2014 possible solutions<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 the two came close thrice, in <span class=\"n-term\">1989, 1992 and 2006<\/span>, and failed each time over trust deficit. He favours a settlement: the glacial region is a most inhospitable theatre and the extraordinary human and material costs on troops would justify a review.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> proposed making Siachen a \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">mountain of peace<\/span>\u2019 with joint exploration; the Indian Army opposed it.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Stephen P. Cohen<\/span> considers the dispute futile and remarks that the conflict is like two bald persons fighting over a comb.<\/li>\n<li>Options discussed \u2192 a \u2018glacier of peace\u2019 occupied by neither side; mutual withdrawal without delineation (undesirable and unlikely); <span class=\"n-term\">mutual withdrawal after jointly recording current military positions<\/span> and exchanging them as an annexure without prejudice to stated positions, pending final settlement of the LoC and AGPL \u2014 the most workable, since Pakistan agreed to it in 1992; conversion into an international site for glacial research.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"territorial-disputes-kalapani-lipulekh-susta\">Territorial disputes \u2014 Kalapani, Lipulekh, Susta<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span> sets the frame: &#8216;Indians have taken Nepal too much for granted. India&#8217;s approach towards Nepal has been dismissive and neglectful. The Indian government and public have never shown adequate sensitivity to Nepali pride and uniqueness.&#8217; <span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> adds that Nepal has several concerns beyond worries over excessive Indian interference; Nepalese hold that treaties and agreements are &#8216;unequal&#8217;, which prevents the two from tapping the full potential of cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>After the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir, India published a new map in <span class=\"n-term\">November 2019<\/span> showing <span class=\"n-term\">Kalapani<\/span> as Indian territory. Nepal objected and in 2020 laid claim to the <span class=\"n-term\">Limpiyadhura\u2013Lipulekh<\/span> tri-junction.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Kali<\/span> river delineates the border through the Kalapani region; the dispute covers about <span class=\"n-term\">35 sq km<\/span> where the border is marked by the Mahakali. The <span class=\"n-term\">Gandak<\/span> forms the international boundary elsewhere. The <span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Sugauli (1816)<\/span> is the basis of demarcation, with a Supplementary Boundary Treaty concluded the same year.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Susta<\/span> \u2014 about <span class=\"n-term\">140 sq km<\/span> in Uttar Pradesh at the Terai border, under Indian control and claimed by Nepal; the change of course of the Gandak is the main cause. The <span class=\"n-term\">1981 Boundary Committee<\/span> delineated 98% of the border but not Susta.<\/li>\n<li>India termed the claim a &#8216;unilateral act&#8217; not based on historical facts and evidence. Nepal&#8217;s new political map came in retaliation for the Indian road from <span class=\"n-term\">Dharchula to Lipulekh<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Kalapani \u2014 one river, two readings<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Nepal&#8217;s reading<\/span> \u2014 Limpiyadhura is the source of the Kali \u2014 higher than the rest of the river&#8217;s flow \u2014 which places Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani <em>east<\/em> of the Kali. <span class=\"n-term\">Evidence cited<\/span>: Sugauli 1816 \u00b7 the 2020 political map \u00b7 about 35 sq km at stake<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India&#8217;s reading<\/span> \u2014 The border begins at Kalapani, where the river originates in springs below the Lipulekh pass; the ground north of these streams is not clearly delineated by Sugauli. <span class=\"n-term\">Evidence cited<\/span>: nineteenth-century historical, administrative and revenue records \u00b7 continuous administration since the 1950s \u00b7 infrastructure development \u00b7 a 2015 Chinese statement on expanding trade through the Lipulekh pass<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Sugauli leaves the ground north of the streams undelineated \u2014 that silence is the dispute<\/em><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the future prospects of Indo-Nepal relations in the context of the recent publication of new Nepalese map wrongly claiming Indian territory.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-future-prospects-of-indo-nepal-relations-in-the-upsc-psir-2020-4202\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-boundary-dispute-three-sectors\">The boundary dispute \u2014 three sectors<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Sector<\/th>\n<th>Line \/ disputed areas<\/th>\n<th>Status<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Eastern<\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">McMahon Line<\/span> (Simla 1913-14); overlooked until Aitchison\u2019s 1937 edition. China claims Arunachal as \u201cSouth Tibet,\u201d keen on <span class=\"n-term\">Tawang<\/span> on cultural-religious grounds (Dalai Lama\u2019s birthplace).<\/td>\n<td>China acknowledges the line as the LAC but disputes the watershed principle.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Middle<\/td>\n<td>Barahoti (Uttarakhand) and pockets in Uttarakhand and Himachal; the Sikkim sector.<\/td>\n<td>China accepted Sikkim as an Indian state only after 2005; Nathu La reopened for trade.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Western<\/td>\n<td>No accepted frontier in Kashmir at 1947. India claims <span class=\"n-term\">Aksai Chin<\/span> (~38,000 sq mi it accuses China of occupying; a cold desert of ~50,000 sq km); the Western Highway (1957); the Shaksgam Valley ceded by Pakistan.<\/td>\n<td>China occupied it in 1962; markers absent, terrain uninhabited.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s package proposal, and Shyam Saran\u2019s formula<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>In 1985 China reinterpreted the <span class=\"n-term\">package proposal<\/span> \u2014 India to concede in the east (the largest disputed area) for undefined western concessions \u2014 and made an explicit demand for the \u201crestitution\u201d of Tawang, hardening its position.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> suggests an <span class=\"n-term\">LAC-plus<\/span> solution \u2014 a limited Chinese territorial concession on the Indian side against free access to Tawang for Chinese pilgrims \u2014 a \u2018Package Proposal without Tawang\u2019 meeting somewhere in the middle.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/ethnic-conflicts-and-insurgencies\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies<\/b><\/a><span><\/span><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#kashmir-symptom-not-cause\">Kashmir \u2014 symptom, not cause<\/a><a href=\"#the-other-three-territorial-disputes\">The other three territorial disputes<\/a><a href=\"#territorial-disputes-kalapani-lipulekh-susta\">Territorial disputes \u2014 Kalapani, Lipulekh, Susta<\/a><a href=\"#the-boundary-dispute-three-sectors\">The boundary dispute \u2014 three sectors<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Border disputes for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Border disputes Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Border disputes Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 3 \u2014 India<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.3.8","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"3","fx_note_desc":"Border disputes for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Border disputes Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Border disputes Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 3 \u2014 India","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3588","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3588","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3588\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3793,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3588\/revisions\/3793"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3588"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}