{"id":3589,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:10","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-africa\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:57:00","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:27:00","slug":"india-and-africa","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-africa\/","title":{"rendered":"India and Africa"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and Africa<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and Africa<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 4<\/b> \u2014 India and the Global South : Relations with Africa and Latin America; Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-global-south-the-idea-and-the-setting\">The Global South \u2014 the idea and the setting<\/h3>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cThe commerce between India and Africa will be of ideas and services, not of manufactured goods against raw materials after the fashion of Western exploiters.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Mahatma Gandhi<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Working definition<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The Global South is not only a geographical label. It is a political and ideological position built on <span class=\"n-term\">postcolonial solidarity<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">developmental justice<\/span> and a demand for reform of global governance.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s engagement rests on shared histories of colonial rule, comparable developmental challenges and a common interest in a more equitable global order.<\/li>\n<li>Foundational role in the <span class=\"n-term\">Non-Aligned Movement<\/span>; consistent support for <span class=\"n-term\">South\u2013South cooperation<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Movement over time \u2192 from <span class=\"n-term\">symbolic participation<\/span> to <span class=\"n-term\">institutional leadership<\/span>, marked by proactive diplomacy, strategic partnerships and a reformist agenda.<\/li>\n<li>Three theatres in this unit \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Africa<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Latin America<\/span>, and the <span class=\"n-term\">multilateral trade order<\/span> centred on the WTO.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cThe world system is a world of unequal relations.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Immanuel Wallerstein<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>This remains the structural setting within which India\u2019s Southern engagement operates.<\/em><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"south-south-cooperation-meaning-basis-importance\">South\u2013South Cooperation \u2014 meaning, basis, importance<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Meaning<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Collaboration among developing countries across various fields, especially <span class=\"n-term\">economic development<\/span>.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Basis<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Shared histories of colonialism and economic exploitation.<\/li>\n<li>Common challenges \u2192 inadequate infrastructure, illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, lack of technology.<\/li>\n<li>Treated by developing countries as a <span class=\"n-term\">self-reliant alternative<\/span> to traditional aid from developed nations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Importance<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<th>Scholar \/ instance<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Unified strategy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developing countries act together on common challenges; NAM is the classic instance, uniting them against colonialism and for collective interests<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Frantz Fanon<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Gopalika Arora<\/span> and postcolonial scholars \u2014 a collective approach to counter colonial legacies and neo-colonial influence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Mutual understanding<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Similar historical experience builds trust; the India\u2013Africa Forum Summit is institutionalised cooperation<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Edward Said<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">contrapuntal thinking<\/span>, moving past the traditional North\u2013South divide<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Historical injustices<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Pressure for a fairer global economic order and fairer trade practices<\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">G77<\/span>, established in <span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Collective self-reliance<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trade, investment, technology transfer and knowledge sharing<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">African Continental Free Trade Area<\/span> \u2014 raising intra-regional trade, reducing dependence on external markets<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-in-south-south-cooperation-instruments-challenges-asse\">India in South\u2013South Cooperation \u2014 instruments, challenges, assessment<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Instruments:<\/span> ITEC \u00b7 Development assistance \u00b7 Lines of credit \u00b7 IBSA \u00b7 BRICS \u00b7 SAARC \u00b7 BIMSTEC \u00b7 Technology transfer<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">ITEC<\/span> \u2192 technical assistance and training for professionals from developing nations.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Development assistance<\/span> \u2192 grants, concessional loans and project support to Least Developed Countries in agriculture, healthcare, education and infrastructure. <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> acknowledges India\u2019s effort here.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Lines of credit<\/span> \u2192 favourable terms, low interest, for critical development projects.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Technology transfer<\/span> \u2192 information technology, agriculture, healthcare, space technology.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Challenge<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Neo-colonial influence<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developed countries retain economic dominance and unequal trade relations, weakening the autonomy of developing states<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">P. Stobdan<\/span> \u2014 the major obstacle<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Impact of globalization<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Integration into the global economy shifts national priorities and dilutes the economic agenda of South\u2013South cooperation<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Decline of NAM<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Once the principal vehicle of collective self-reliance, now less effective<\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Dominance of global financial institutions<\/span><\/td>\n<td>World Bank and IMF dominated by developed countries; limited space for developing-country priorities<\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Regulation of MNCs<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developing states struggle to control multinationals within their borders \u2192 exploitation and unfair distribution of benefits<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic disparities<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Gains from globalization have been uneven; the gap between countries has widened<\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Traditional approaches have run into difficulty; mechanisms such as <span class=\"n-term\">IBSA<\/span> still hold promise.<\/li>\n<li>As some Southern states succeed in growth and technology, they can share that experience with others.<\/li>\n<li>Diversification of economic activity opens newer areas \u2192 the ground for a revitalised South\u2013South agenda.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cIndia\u2019s Research and Information System for Developing Countries\u201d (RIS) is a major initiative in the area of South-South Cooperation. Discuss.<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-resurgence-why-africa-returned-to-the-front-rank\">The resurgence \u2014 why Africa returned to the front rank<\/h3>\n<p>As per <span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>, keeping certain controversies aside, the Indo-African relationship has experienced a <span class=\"n-term\">resurgence<\/span>, particularly since the turn of the twenty-first century. The economic as well as strategic importance of the continent to India has risen.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Voice<\/th>\n<th>Formulation<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Manmohan Singh<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Milan Vaishnav<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s relations with Africa are rooted in the history of solidarity against colonialism and apartheid; he noted the distance travelled since the days of Mahatma Gandhi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Traces the relationship to centuries of exchange across the Western Indian Ocean; ties have recently <span class=\"n-term\">entered a new phase<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Connections go beyond mere transactions; they embody solidarity born of a common struggle. Indian support has been <span class=\"n-term\">without conditionality or hidden agenda<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Narendra Modi<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Warmth and depth of these connections as a pillar of India\u2019s foreign policy, producing a \u201cstrong emotional link\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Tony Blair<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Once described the continent as a \u201cscar on the conscience of humanity\u201d; Africa has since moved from <em>a hopeless continent<\/em> to <em>a hopeful continent<\/em> \u2014 demographics, resources, market potential<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>Shared civilisational vocabulary \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Ubuntu<\/span> (I am because we are). The days of Africa as a \u201cdark continent\u201d are over.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Explaining the resurgence \u2014 the \u2018levels of analysis\u2019 approach<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Systems level<\/span> \u2192 end of the Cold War; globalization; growing interdependence; rise of non-state actors; newer challenges such as terrorism and climate change.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Domestic politics<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s opening of the economy through the LPG reforms.<\/li>\n<li>Cooperation runs at <span class=\"n-term\">bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral<\/span> levels, across economic, developmental and politico-strategic fields.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Hamid Ansari\u2019s four imperatives for cooperation:<\/span> Common historical experience &amp; cultural links \u00b7 Complementarities in strengths \u00b7 Common approach to development \u00b7 Convergence on global matters<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-interests-in-africa\">India\u2019s interests in Africa<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Interest<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical<\/span><\/td>\n<td>African states hold large and increasing diplomatic weight where India\u2019s core interests are at stake \u2014 trade and investment regulation, migration, intellectual property, environmental policy. The absolute weight of <span class=\"n-term\">50+ states<\/span> matters for global governance, UNSC reform and a permanent seat, competition with China, and cooperation on terrorism, climate and WTO reform<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Search for resources, especially minerals and energy, and market access for Indian exports. Some of the fastest growing economies are African; <span class=\"n-term\">16 countries<\/span> have recorded over five per cent growth. India must recognise the weight of rising economies and <span class=\"n-term\">emerging middle-classes<\/span> for its export-intensive sectors<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Oil, coal and other resources feed India\u2019s energy mix; Nigeria, Angola, Egypt and Algeria reduce dependence on the Gulf and West Asia. ONGC, and private groups such as Reliance, Tata and Jindal, have made unprecedented forays into Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan, often with governmental support. Between <span class=\"n-term\">2004 and 2013, 33 per cent<\/span> of India\u2019s operative lines of credit for Africa were in the energy sector. Uranium from Niger, South Africa and Namibia<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u201cFor India, the rise of Africa is key to <span class=\"n-term\">global rebalancing<\/span>\u201d<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>East Coast African countries matter for peace and prosperity in the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Ocean region<\/span>, for trade, and for the diaspora. Piracy, transnational crime, safety of sea lanes, protection of expatriate citizens and strategic investments \u2192 India must fulfil its role as a <span class=\"n-term\">net security provider<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Pacific<\/span><\/td>\n<td>IOR littoral African states are important for India\u2019s regional aspirations; strengthen the QUAD and develop a similar security arrangement with East African nations. For India to become a regional hegemon, cooperation with African countries is <em>sine qua non<\/em><\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Countering China<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Sino-Indian competitive dynamic at the structural level affects relations in <span class=\"n-term\">third spaces<\/span>, beyond Asia. To move from regional to global power India must displace China from its dominant position. The <span class=\"n-term\">Maritime Silk Road<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Belt and Road Initiative<\/span> carry huge influence; China is developing <span class=\"n-term\">47 ports<\/span> in sub-Saharan Africa. India must shed its inhibitions \u2192 joint infrastructure, military involvement, continued developmental work; <span class=\"n-term\">hard power and soft power together<\/span>, soft power alone will not work<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Soft power<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developmental work under <span class=\"n-term\">Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam<\/span>; the approach has not been that of a <em>white man\u2019s burden<\/em> or a neo-colonialist one, but of sharing knowledge and developmental experience for mutual benefit<\/td>\n<td>\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Identify the drivers of India\u2019s new interest in Africa.<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the major drivers of India\u2019s interests in Africa.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-major-drivers-of-indias-interests-in-africa-upsc-psir-2023-4405\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"chronology-of-india-africa-relations\">Chronology of India\u2013Africa relations<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Year<\/th>\n<th>Landmark<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1893<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Mahatma Gandhi goes on an assignment to Africa<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1927<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Indian National Congress, at its Calcutta session, decides to open offices overseas including Africa. Jawaharlal Nehru participates in the <span class=\"n-term\">League against Imperialism<\/span> in Brussels \u2014 this shapes India\u2019s attitude to Africa\u2019s struggle and to <span class=\"n-term\">Afro-Asian solidarity<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1937<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u2018Ethiopia Day\u2019 observed by the Congress against Italian imperialistic aggression (Mussolini attacked Ethiopia in 1936)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1946<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India cuts ties with <span class=\"n-term\">South Africa<\/span> over the <span class=\"n-term\">Ghetto Act<\/span>; not revived till 1994, when apartheid is abolished<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1955<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Asian-African Conference<\/span> at Bandung, Indonesia; India among the key organizers<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India takes up the fight against apartheid in the UN, which resonates across Africa<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span><\/td>\n<td>NAM Summit at Cairo; African nations do not support Indian resolutions against China on renouncing the use of force and on nuclear disarmament<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Launch of the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)<\/span> programme<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1981<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Caracas Program of Action<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1982<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India accords full diplomatic status to SWAPO (Southwest Africa People\u2019s Organisation)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1986<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India establishes the <span class=\"n-term\">AFRICA Fund<\/span> for material assistance against apartheid in South Africa and Namibia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1990<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Establishment of the <span class=\"n-term\">Africa-India Development Association<\/span> by India and Kenya<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1995<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Creation of the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)<\/span>, 18 members, including four East African states (South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya) with Madagascar and <span class=\"n-term\">Mauritius<\/span>, which hosts the permanent secretariat<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2002<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Focus Africa Programme<\/span> \u2014 financial assistance to trade associations, export promotion councils and trade promotion organizations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2003<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India, Brazil and South Africa form the <span class=\"n-term\">IBSA Dialogue Forum<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2008<\/span><\/td>\n<td>First <span class=\"n-term\">India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS)<\/span>, held once every three years<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2008<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Launch of the <span class=\"n-term\">Indian Ocean Naval Symposium<\/span> with officials from 35 countries, 13 of which form its East African littoral sub-group<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2010<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Pan-Africa e-Network Project<\/span> \u2014 satellite-based connectivity for health and education<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2011<\/span><\/td>\n<td>2nd India-Africa Forum Summit at Addis Ababa<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2013<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Africa Dialogue Forum<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2015<\/span><\/td>\n<td>3rd India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2017<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)<\/span> proposed by India, Japan and African countries<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2017<\/span><\/td>\n<td>4th India-Africa Hydrocarbons Conference \u2014 oil exploration, refining, drilling technology; new strategy announced as \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">Africa for Bharat and Bharat for Africa<\/span>\u201d (<span class=\"n-term\">ABBA<\/span>)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Feb 2020<\/span><\/td>\n<td>First <span class=\"n-term\">India-Africa Defence Ministers\u2019 Conclave<\/span>, with <span class=\"n-term\">DEFEXPO INDIA<\/span>, institutionalising defence cooperation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Jan 2021<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)<\/span> comes into force<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"three-phases-the-levels-of-analysis-frame\">Three phases \u2014 the levels-of-analysis frame<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span> uses the \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">levels of analysis<\/span>\u2019 approach \u2014 systemic factors, domestic factors, and the role of individual leaders \u2014 and divides the relationship into three phases.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three phases of India\u2013Africa relations.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">I \u00b7 To 1947<\/span> (Anti-colonial struggles in India and Africa) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">II \u00b7 1947 \u2013 early 1990s<\/span> (Support for African independence movements, till the end of the Cold War and the opening of the economy) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">III \u00b7 Early 1990s onward<\/span> (Western ideology dominant, NAM\u2019s relevance wanes; India as a democratic, growing alternative to China\u2019s expanding presence)<\/p>\n<p>India\u2013Africa relations are rooted in cultural and historical ties. As per <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span>, connections are strongest with societies on the eastern coast, nurtured by the monsoon-driven ecosystem of the Indian Ocean. Western imperialism intensified these connections in paradoxical ways: Indian labourers were recruited for colonial infrastructure and business, producing cultural exchange and a modern diaspora, while shared oppression fed a collective aspiration for freedom.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"phase-i-history-up-to-independence-1947\">Phase I \u2014 history up to independence, 1947<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Systemic factor: colonialism<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: the relationship rests on <span class=\"n-term\">pre-colonial trade<\/span> dating back at least to the fourteenth century, and on forced and indentured labour sent to Africa from India in the nineteenth century.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">shared experience of colonial subjugation<\/span> by the Portuguese, French and particularly the British was the most important systemic factor.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Woodrow Wilson\u2019s<\/span> Fourteen Points speech of 1918, arguing <span class=\"n-term\">democracy<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">self-determination<\/span> as war aims, inspired India\u2019s nationalist leaders to champion the rights of others under imperial rule.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> organised and served as the sole Congress delegate at the League against Imperialism conference, Brussels, 1927.<\/li>\n<li>Through the 1930s Congress resolutions denounced imperialism including in Africa; \u2018Ethiopia Day\u2019 was observed against Italian aggression. By the Second World War, India\u2019s interactions with African nations were rooted in its own quest for independence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Domestic factors \u2014 negligible in this phase<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Slavery was abolished in British territories in 1870; thereafter Indian workers were sent in thousands to British Africa on <span class=\"n-term\">indentured servant contracts<\/span>, often differing little from slaves.<\/li>\n<li>The presence of Indians in Africa gained national attention only after the First World War and Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s return from South Africa in 1915.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2013Africa trade was minimal, perhaps less important than in the pre-colonial period, since both British India and African colonies traded mainly with the metropolitan colonizer.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Individual level<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Mahatma Gandhi<\/span> \u2192 worked primarily for the Indian community in South Africa; his later sympathy for subjugated Africa made him a hero across the continent. Became the earliest link between nationalist leaders in Africa and India; his struggle inspired African leaders of the twentieth century, notably <span class=\"n-sch\">Nelson Mandela<\/span>. His South African experience broadened the worldview of the Indian freedom movement.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> \u2192 where Mahatma Gandhi approached the colonial histories of India and Africa from the perspective of <span class=\"n-term\">individual rights<\/span>, Jawaharlal Nehru viewed them through the lens of a <span class=\"n-term\">collective struggle against global imperialism<\/span>. He argued that international peace could not coexist with colonial oppression: so long as one nation dominates another, there will be persistent attempts to undermine the established structure, and lasting stability will remain unattainable. Peace can never emerge from systems of imperialism and capitalism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"phase-ii-1947-to-the-early-1990s\">Phase II \u2014 1947 to the early 1990s<\/h3>\n<p>As per <span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>, most of Africa was still under colonial rule at the time of India\u2019s independence. <span class=\"n-term\">Decolonization<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">emergence of NAM<\/span> were the two decisive systemic factors.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Supporting the decolonization of Africa<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Franklin D. Roosevelt\u2019s<\/span> push for anti-colonialism and self-determination strengthened the Congress argument. Indians in the British Indian army fought the Italians in Ethiopia and the Italians and Germans in North Africa during the Second World War \u2192 this cemented post-independence ideological support for decolonization.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M. Ayoob<\/span>: support for decolonization also rested on the practical concern that India\u2019s own foreign affairs could be autonomous only if it interacted with fully independent states.<\/li>\n<li>India established formal relations with independence movements and set up diplomatic representation in <span class=\"n-term\">Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya<\/span> even before independence; it sent non-combatant troops and a special representative to Congo during its civil war.<\/li>\n<li>From the early 1950s India focused on South\u2013South cooperation; in 1955 it played a significant role at the <span class=\"n-term\">Asian-African Conference<\/span> in Bandung.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The 1962 turn<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">A. Ghosh<\/span>: despite the rhetoric of decolonization, India\u2019s effort at Afro-Asian solidarity suffered a setback when, during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, only <span class=\"n-term\">Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Libya<\/span> expressed support.<\/li>\n<li>Some prominent African leaders, particularly in Kenya, openly supported China. India\u2019s approach of peaceful methods for attaining independence began losing appeal against China\u2019s open support for armed liberation. <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s defeat weakened its soft power in Africa.<\/span><\/li>\n<li>After Jawaharlal Nehru\u2019s death in 1964, policy continued to support decolonization and South\u2013South cooperation but became <span class=\"n-term\">selective and pragmatic<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">ITEC<\/span> was launched in 1964 as the main instrument of <span class=\"n-term\">bilateral foreign assistance<\/span>, resting on economic foundations.<\/li>\n<li>By the late 1980s nearly all African countries had achieved independence. India continued the campaign against apartheid, while post-independence idealism gave way to a pragmatic approach built on economic cooperation. ITEC built up generations of civil servants and policymakers from African countries trained in India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Non-Aligned Movement<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.B. Bhattacharya<\/span>: NAM was largely the idea of Jawaharlal Nehru and took shape at the <span class=\"n-term\">1955 Bandung Conference<\/span>. The first NAM conference of 1961 established the common ideological ground between India and Africa, visible in the <span class=\"n-term\">anti-colonial and anti-racism<\/span> agenda.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: non-alignment was initially successful, meeting fertile ideological ground in newly independent African countries trying to ward off external political interference. In 1986 NAM helped set up the <span class=\"n-term\">Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism, and Apartheid (AFRICA) Fund<\/span>; India was a large contributor, and Indo-African cooperation produced many UN General Assembly resolutions condemning racism and apartheid.<\/li>\n<li>Indirect outcomes \u2192 diplomatic status to the <span class=\"n-term\">African National Congress<\/span> in 1967 and to <span class=\"n-term\">SWAPO<\/span> in 1985; indirect funding of African independence movements through the <span class=\"n-term\">Organization of African Unity<\/span> and various <span class=\"n-term\">United Nations funds<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The critical counterpoint (<span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>) \u2192 most newly independent African countries did not adhere to non-alignment and instead aligned with a superpower to secure development and military financing.<\/li>\n<li>NAM became increasingly <span class=\"n-term\">factionalized<\/span> and even <span class=\"n-term\">radicalized<\/span> during the 1970s and 1980s, while India in the post-Nehru era turned to domestic issues.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Domestic and individual factors<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: domestic factors played <span class=\"n-term\">no significant role<\/span> in shaping India\u2019s Africa policy, at least until the 1990s. Trade with Africa between the 1950s and 2010 accounted for less than <span class=\"n-term\">11 per cent<\/span> of both exports and imports; since 2010 exports rose faster, though the total remained below 11 per cent in 2014-15. India\u2019s closed economy kept domestic economic factors marginal.<\/li>\n<li>Nehruvian policy on the diaspora instructed non-resident Indians in Africa that their <span class=\"n-term\">loyalties should reside with their African homelands<\/span> and that they should not seek privileges at the cost of opportunities for Africans.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> enjoyed a virtual carte blanche in foreign policy; he viewed Africa as a neighbour across the ocean, even a sister continent. Friendships with <span class=\"n-sch\">Kwame Nkrumah<\/span> of Ghana and <span class=\"n-sch\">Gamal Abdel Nasser<\/span> of Egypt cemented that commitment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Indira Gandhi<\/span>, from 1966, directed attention towards a few nations that had backed India in 1962, prioritising economic cooperation while keeping domestic matters primary. By the time <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Gandhi<\/span> became Prime Minister in 1984, Africa policy was no longer associated with any individual.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S.B. Bhattacharya<\/span>: relations did not break down. The 1971 war, the 1974 nuclear test and the Green Revolution raised India\u2019s prestige in Africa; through the 1970s and 1980s a rising sense of shared development challenges renewed the articulation of South\u2013South cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u2018Afro Asian countries became the principal arena for India\u2019s policy and diplomacy during the 1950s\u2019<\/p>\n<p><cite>Muni (1991:862)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"phase-iii-india-and-africa-since-the-early-1990s\">Phase III \u2014 India and Africa since the early 1990s<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Systemic factors \u2014 the geopolitical realignment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>With the end of the Cold War in 1989-90, India\u2019s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa changed. Reach extended from traditional Anglophone Africa to <span class=\"n-term\">Francophone<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Lusophone<\/span> countries; closer politico-military engagement was sought to counter rising regional threats, including China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: the end of the Cold War left the US as sole superpower; in a <span class=\"n-term\">unipolar world order<\/span> India had to reposition itself in Africa and seek new friends, and to differentiate its policies from China.<\/li>\n<li>New embassies were opened; the <span class=\"n-term\">India-Africa Forum Summit<\/span> was started. India sought <span class=\"n-term\">more adequate representation in the voting and management mechanisms<\/span> of the UNSC, the World Bank and the IMF.<\/li>\n<li>The NAM forum of the Cold War era was replaced by <span class=\"n-term\">regional organizations<\/span> addressing particular issues \u2192 ECOWAS, NEPAD, TEAM-9, and the <span class=\"n-term\">IBSA Dialogue Forum<\/span> (2003).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Economic imperatives<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The 1991 crisis led to neoliberal LPG reforms, which reshaped the relationship. India needed new resources and markets. <span class=\"n-term\">Focus Africa<\/span> (2002) provided financial assistance to trade bodies and export promotion councils.<\/li>\n<li>For much of the <span class=\"n-term\">twentieth century<\/span> Indian assistance took the form of <span class=\"n-term\">technical assistance<\/span> and training slots through ITEC and its corollary, the <span class=\"n-term\">Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme<\/span>, along with grants largely to Anglophone countries.<\/li>\n<li>In the <span class=\"n-term\">twenty-first century<\/span>, development cooperation is increasingly focused on <span class=\"n-term\">lines of credit<\/span> through the <span class=\"n-term\">Export-Import Bank of India<\/span>. Indian economic diplomacy now covers all sub-Saharan African countries; China has engaged similarly since the turn of the century \u2192 rivalry between the two rising Asian powers for primacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three domestic drivers<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Driver<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Africa is the world\u2019s third largest region of oil production and supply. Political volatility in the Middle East increased India\u2019s need to diversify. By 2013 more than <span class=\"n-term\">20 per cent<\/span> of Indian oil and gas imports came from Africa \u2014 mainly Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco \u2014 and these resources made up nearly <span class=\"n-term\">two-thirds<\/span> of India\u2019s imports from Africa (WTO and CII data)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Search for new markets<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Indian trade with African countries rose through 2014-15, growing at <span class=\"n-term\">32.4 per cent<\/span> between 2008 and 2011, outpacing bilateral trade growth with China. Under the pan-African e-network for tele-education and telemedicine, Indian institutes and hospitals are paid for distance learning and medical advice through a <span class=\"n-term\">$125 million<\/span> initial grant<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Indian Ocean security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The vast majority of Indian trade moves by sea; rising piracy off the eastern African seaboard and dependence on African energy make securing global shipping lanes a domestic priority. The <span class=\"n-term\">2008 Mumbai attacks<\/span>, where terrorists entered from the sea, made maritime security in the Indian Ocean Rim a large priority<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Declining individual factors<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Domestic pressures drove the UPA government to rejuvenate Africa policy in 2004 \u2192 a large increase in development cooperation, public and private investment, more regional Indo-African organizations, and more frequent summits.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: the importance of domestic factors has risen since the early 1990s while the impact of individual leaders declined, at least until 2014. Seven governments came to power at the centre between 1990 and 2004; as one-party rule gave way to <span class=\"n-term\">multi-party coalition<\/span> governments, the weight of any single leader declined.<\/li>\n<li>The post-2014 majority government created new openings for individual factors, seen in the 2015 <span class=\"n-term\">India-Africa Summit<\/span> in New Delhi with its large turnout. Indo-African policy from 2004 to 2014 was not associated with one individual; and despite a majority government, PM Modi did not concentrate personally on Africa, preferring to focus on the region.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"developments-under-the-modi-government\">Developments under the Modi government<\/h3>\n<p>As per <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span>, PM Modi brought new thinking and energy to these ties through his perspectives on greater equity and sustainable development, devoting a higher degree of attention, resources and capabilities to this account.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">High-level visits<\/span> \u2192 since 2014, <span class=\"n-term\">34 outgoing visits<\/span> by India\u2019s President, Vice-President and Prime Minister to Africa; over <span class=\"n-term\">100 incoming visits<\/span> from African counterparts.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Diplomatic footprint<\/span> \u2192 since 2018, <span class=\"n-term\">18 new embassies<\/span>, bringing Indian missions and posts on the continent to <span class=\"n-term\">49<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">IAFS elevated in 2015<\/span> through an expanded format with participation of all African states, <span class=\"n-term\">41<\/span> represented at Head of State or Government level. The Covid pandemic interrupted this momentum and the initiative needs restarting.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Ten Guiding Principles<\/span> enunciated at the Ugandan Parliament in July 2018.<\/li>\n<li>Areas of cooperation \u2192 health, green and sustainable development, education including skilling, IT, agriculture, and the digital economy with emerging technologies such as AI, AR and blockchain.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India-Africa Defence Ministers\u2019 Conclave<\/span>, 2020, with DEFEXPO INDIA \u2192 institutionalised defence cooperation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Vaccine Maitri<\/span> \u2192 medicines, vaccines and equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic, in the spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam; training of healthcare workers and paramedical staff for pandemic management.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-ten-guiding-principles-and-agenda-2063\">The Ten Guiding Principles \u2014 and Agenda 2063<\/h3>\n<p>Announced by <span class=\"n-sch\">Narendra Modi<\/span> while addressing the <span class=\"n-term\">Ugandan<\/span> Parliament in <span class=\"n-term\">July 2018<\/span>; these principles form the bedrock for strengthening relations.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Vision<\/span> \u2192 align India\u2019s growth trajectory with <span class=\"n-term\">Africa\u2019s Agenda 2063<\/span> to catalyze mutual resurgence.<\/li>\n<li>India would address Africa\u2019s priorities, demands and needs, rather than impose a unilateral agenda.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Core content<\/span> \u2192 Africa at the top of India\u2019s priorities; demand-driven and consultative projects; respect for sovereignty and ownership; human-centric development; security cooperation against common threats; maritime openness; partnership on global challenges including climate and UNSC reform.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Operational translation<\/span> \u2192 no-conditionality development cooperation; capacity building over extractive models; technology and digital public infrastructure sharing; market access through the <span class=\"n-term\">Duty-Free Tariff Preference<\/span> scheme; multilateral advocacy, including the African Union\u2019s G20 seat.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Africa\u2019s Agenda 2063<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Adopted in <span class=\"n-term\">2015<\/span>, with the vision of a strong, peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa by <span class=\"n-term\">2063<\/span>, marking the 100th anniversary of the African Union. <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span>: India\u2019s Africa policy aligns with Agenda 2063, reflecting shared goals and vision; as the role of the WTO declines, India should use openings such as the <span class=\"n-term\">AfCFTA<\/span>, which encompasses all African nations, to widen economic partnership.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Head<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Trade &amp; investment<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Bilateral trade grew <span class=\"n-term\">9.26 per cent<\/span> in FY 2022-23 to almost <span class=\"n-term\">$100 billion<\/span>, expected to double to <span class=\"n-term\">US$200 billion by 2030<\/span>. India is Africa\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">4th largest trading partner<\/span> and its <span class=\"n-term\">third largest export destination<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">27 African LDCs<\/span> benefit from the <span class=\"n-term\">Duty-Free Tariff Preference<\/span> scheme on a non-reciprocal basis; FTAs and CEPAs are under exploration. In investment India ranks <span class=\"n-term\">fifth<\/span>, cumulative commitment <span class=\"n-term\">USD 70.7 billion<\/span> \u2014 oil and gas, mining, banking, textiles, automotive, agriculture. <span class=\"n-term\">Focus Africa<\/span> (2002), <span class=\"n-term\">TEAM-9<\/span> (2004) and the <span class=\"n-term\">DFTP scheme<\/span> (2008) lifted flows; <span class=\"n-term\">AfCFTA<\/span> (in force January 2021) should raise volumes further<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy, agriculture, minerals<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Collaboration with Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco; renewable energy, especially solar and wind, is an added area. Use of Africa\u2019s agricultural land for India\u2019s food security, with scope in agricultural research, technology transfer and capacity building. Indian industry depends on African iron, copper, aluminium and zinc<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Development cooperation<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Capacity building and human resource development \u2014 scholarships, training, technical assistance. Infrastructure aid and concessional loans for transport, power, telecom and water management. To date India has completed <span class=\"n-term\">189 projects<\/span>, with <span class=\"n-term\">76 in execution<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">68 pre-execution<\/span>, financed by lines of credit of over <span class=\"n-term\">USD 12 billion<\/span> across more than <span class=\"n-term\">41 countries<\/span>; many are the first of their kind in Africa<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Health<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Medical expertise, pharmaceuticals, affordable healthcare, R&amp;D collaboration, manufacture and distribution of essential medicines. A <span class=\"n-term\">US$10 million India-Africa Health Fund<\/span> was announced at IAFS-3 in 2015. <span class=\"n-term\">Pan-Africa e-Network<\/span> (2010) and <span class=\"n-term\">Vaccine Maitri<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Political &amp; diplomatic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Mutual support at the UN and international forums; peacekeeping, capacity building, training and conflict resolution. Most of the <span class=\"n-term\">55<\/span> African nations want India as a permanent member of the UNSC. India, with NAM countries of Africa, championed the demand for a <em>New International Economic Order<\/em> in the 1970s; cooperation continues through IBSA, IOR-ARC and IAFS<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Cultural &amp; people-to-people<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Soft power \u2014 culture, traditional medicine, yoga. The diaspora acts as a vital link across cultural appreciation, economic partnership and interpersonal bonds<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Climate &amp; disaster<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Environmental degradation lies at the core of a majority of conflicts in Chad, Sudan, Darfur and Ethiopia; the drying of the Nile, Orange, Zambezi and Kunene has sparked violent clashes; sea level rise threatens littoral states. India committed to solar technology development at IAFS-3 (2015); through the <span class=\"n-term\">International Solar Alliance<\/span> it has earmarked concessional lines of credit worth <span class=\"n-term\">US$2 billion<\/span> for largely off-grid solar projects and partnered the <span class=\"n-term\">African Development Bank Group<\/span> to develop <span class=\"n-term\">10,000 MW<\/span> of solar power across the Sahel. <span class=\"n-term\">Op Sahayata<\/span> (cyclone-hit Mozambique, 2019) and <span class=\"n-term\">Op Vanilla<\/span> (floods in Madagascar, 2020); India is guided by the <span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span> doctrine and has often been a first responder in HADR situations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Security &amp; defence<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India was associated with the establishment of defence institutions in <span class=\"n-term\">Nigeria, Ethiopia and Tanzania<\/span>; military training teams in Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Uganda, Namibia, Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles. Maritime security cooperation centred on Mauritius and Seychelles now extends to coastal African nations. India is the <span class=\"n-term\">largest contributor of troops<\/span> to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The inaugural <span class=\"n-term\">India-Africa Defence Ministers\u2019 Conclave<\/span> (February 2020) produced the <span class=\"n-term\">Lucknow Declaration<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">AFINDEX-19<\/span> and subsequent AFINDEX army drills, and the <span class=\"n-term\">2025 AIKEYME<\/span> multilateral maritime exercise co-hosted with Tanzania, focus on anti-piracy, interoperability and information-sharing. Peacekeeping in the DRC and Mozambique; Joint Defence Cooperation Committees and MoUs with key African countries<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"itec-the-instrument-of-capacity-building\">ITEC \u2014 the instrument of capacity building<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Established in <span class=\"n-term\">1964<\/span>; the cornerstone of India\u2019s development cooperation with other developing nations. Purpose \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">capacity building and skill development<\/span> through training and technical assistance for professionals and government officials from partner countries.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Features:<\/span> Comprehensive capacity building \u00b7 Support for resource-limited countries \u00b7 Tailored training \u00b7 People-to-people diplomacy \u00b7 Sustainable impact \u00b7 South\u2013South promotion \u00b7 Continuous diversification<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Impact on India\u2013Africa relations<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>ITEC has built strong relations with African nations and established India\u2019s reputation as a trusted partner in Africa\u2019s development journey.<\/li>\n<li>Over <span class=\"n-term\">37,000 Africans<\/span> trained under <span class=\"n-term\">ITEC<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">ICCR scholarship<\/span> programmes.<\/li>\n<li>ITEC alumni networks are one of the instruments India uses to differentiate its engagement from China\u2019s.<\/li>\n<li>The Pan-Africa e-Network has transitioned to the <span class=\"n-term\">e-VidyaBharati and e-AarogyaBharati (e-VBAB)<\/span> project, which continues large-scale enrolments and tele-health services.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cIndia\u2019s capacity building programmes under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) has earned much goodwill for it in Africa.\u201d Discuss.<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"geo-economic-and-geo-strategic-dimensions\">Geo-economic and geo-strategic dimensions<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Geo-economic<\/th>\n<th>Geo-strategic<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Resource abundance<\/span> \u2014 strategic minerals and natural resources<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Maritime security<\/span> \u2014 cooperation with east coast African countries against piracy<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Rapid growth<\/span> \u2014 3.2 per cent in 2019, with six of the world\u2019s fastest-growing economies on the continent<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Net security provider<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s role in the Indian Ocean, regional stability and crisis response<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Reducing dependence on the Gulf<\/span> \u2014 diversification of oil and gas sources<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Peacekeeping<\/span> \u2014 long engagement, including efforts to prevent mass genocide in South Sudan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Expanding trade<\/span> \u2014 from US$4 billion in 2000 to US$80 billion in 2019, making Africa India\u2019s third-largest trade partner; over the longer run from about US$4.5 billion in 2000-01 to approximately US$71.5 billion, a fifteen-fold rise, with exports moving up the value chain into pharmaceuticals, electronics and communication materials<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Security and defence support<\/span> \u2014 patrol vessels, aerial vehicles and surveillance aircraft, which also counterbalance China\u2019s military presence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Critical minerals<\/span> \u2014 cobalt, manganese and copper, essential for India\u2019s manufacturing and green transition goals<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Joint global cooperation<\/span> \u2014 reform of the UN Security Council and the WTO; advocacy for developing-country interests<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Agriculture and food security<\/span> \u2014 partnership secures food supplies<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Naval diplomacy<\/span> \u2014 raising the weight of Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius. First India-Mozambique-Tanzania Trilateral Exercise (2024); India\u2019s first overseas naval base in <span class=\"n-term\">Mauritius (2024)<\/span> under the \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">Necklace of Diamonds<\/span>\u201d strategy; India-Africa Army Chiefs Conclave (2023)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"china-in-africa-and-the-indian-counter-model\">China in Africa \u2014 and the Indian counter-model<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Chinese presence goes back to the Cold War. From the time of <span class=\"n-sch\">Mao Zedong<\/span>, China promoted armed struggle against colonial rule, which appealed to many African states and allowed it to provide economic aid to decolonised nations.<\/li>\n<li>Post-Cold War, China became aggressive in pushing investments and searching for markets and raw materials, focusing on connectivity infrastructure that eases the transport of resources home. The <span class=\"n-term\">Maritime Silk Route<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Belt and Road Initiative<\/span> extend this older strategy.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-sch\">Xi Jinping<\/span> administration uses <em>chequebook diplomacy<\/em> and <em>debt trap diplomacy<\/em> to gain strategic depth in geostrategically important countries.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: China has established a significant presence in infrastructure, mining and energy; India faces stiff competition in investment, trade and influence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span>: beyond punctual differences of form and style, Indian interests significantly overlap with those of China in Africa, producing an implicit competitive dynamic as both powers seek to satisfy domestic growth rates and rising nationalist expectations by consolidating new zones of influence.<\/li>\n<li>Besides operating about <span class=\"n-term\">47 ports<\/span>, China has set up its <span class=\"n-term\">first-ever naval base in Africa at Djibouti<\/span>, read by Indian strategists as an attempt to encircle India as part of the <span class=\"n-term\">String of Pearls<\/span> network.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s FDI in Africa fell from <span class=\"n-term\">$16 billion in 2011-12 to $14 billion in 2016-17<\/span>, while China\u2019s rose from <span class=\"n-term\">$16 billion to $40 billion<\/span> in the same period (UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Two models in Africa \u2014 the structural contrast<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">CHINESE MODEL<\/span> \u2014 State-driven \u00b7 resource-centric \u00b7 enclave firms. Industries and factories set up, Chinese labour exported, resources extracted and moved home on the infrastructure built to connect industry to port. The African state gains limited pecuniary profit through taxation; disenchantment follows, and the state supports the Chinese rather than its own people, becoming a rentier state<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">INDIAN MODEL<\/span> \u2014 Private-sector-led \u00b7 capacity-building \u00b7 locally integrated. Strategies that \u2018result in greater integration into domestic markets and operate extensively through informal channels\u2019, against Chinese strategies that \u2018yield them greater control up and down the production line, resulting in enclave types of corporate profiles, with more limited spillover effects\u2019<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Where India\u2019s comparative advantage lies<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Respect for African sovereignty; a relationship of <em>equal partners<\/em> engaged for <em>mutual benefit<\/em>. India presents itself as the alternative, older and democratic partner for economic development.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Constantino Xavier<\/span> locates the advantage in a successful democratic experience \u2014 preserving territorial integrity and delivering socio-economic development for one of the world\u2019s most ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse populations with political pluralism. As Africa transitions to democracy and greater political freedom, the sustainability of the so-called \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">Beijing consensus<\/span>\u2019 of authoritarian and dirigiste growth will become unsustainable. India does not support \u2018democracy promotion\u2019, but is ready to share expertise on electronic voting systems, electoral management, federalism, parliamentary procedures, decentralization, local government, and the training and management of an independent judiciary \u2014 an area of inter-democratic cooperation China cannot tap into soon.<\/li>\n<li>Unlike China, democratic India may benefit from the benign image it enjoys in the United States, Europe and Japan as a potential partner in third regions.<\/li>\n<li>Attractiveness rests on <span class=\"n-term\">soft infrastructure<\/span> \u2014 IT goods and pharmaceutical products \u2014 the global presence of corporates such as the TATA Group, Mahindra &amp; Mahindra and ArcelorMittal, and India\u2019s increasing donor role.<\/li>\n<li>Multi-party democracy, the diaspora and ITEC alumni networks are the differentiating instruments.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss some of the key drivers of India\u2019s new interests in Africa which might help in developing long-term comparative advantage over China.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-some-of-the-key-drivers-of-indias-new-interests-in-africa-upsc-psir-2025-4408\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-concern-contestation-and-other-challenges\">Areas of concern, contestation and other challenges<\/h3>\n<p>Recent controversies over Indian economic investments in sub-Saharan countries such as <span class=\"n-term\">Ethiopia<\/span>, where <span class=\"n-term\">land acquisition<\/span> has been associated with forced resettlement without compensation, raise the question of whether Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s formulation on commerce in ideas and services holds today.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Challenge<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Limited resources<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s presence remains incomparably small against China and other external actors; it does not have deep pockets like China or the USA and must use soft power more effectively. Indian firms may hesitate to invest because of slower growth, high debt and uncertainties in some African business environments<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Lack of connectivity<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Adequate city-to-city connectivity is missing, which hinders people-to-people contact<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Perception and image<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Concerns among African citizens who view Indian investments as neo-colonial or exploitative; <span class=\"n-term\">racial attacks on African nationals in India<\/span> have damaged India\u2019s image. The MEA can designate the diaspora as an unofficial ambassador and publicise good work done in India<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Implementation<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Slow delivery and low disbursement against commitments; reliance on multilateral agencies for project implementation sometimes leaves India without proper credit<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Political instability<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Ethnic and religious conflicts, governance failures, fragile state structures and irregular coups make foreign contributors averse; Indian investors are concerned about radicalism, fundamentalism and terrorism<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Structural weaknesses<\/span><\/td>\n<td>No <span class=\"n-term\">unified Africa policy<\/span>, unlike Look West, Act East or Central Asia Connect; trade challenges from multilateral agreements such as the RCEP; <span class=\"n-term\">trade imbalance<\/span> \u2014 bilateral trade of <span class=\"n-term\">$72 billion<\/span> against China-Africa trade of <span class=\"n-term\">$200 billion<\/span>; absence of a dedicated India-Africa Forum Summit since 2015, with calls for more frequent dialogue and multi-stakeholder engagement<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"policy-suggestions\">Policy suggestions<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Rani D. Mullen<\/span>: there has been a convergence of systemic and domestic factors likely to continue driving enhanced Indo-African ties in the twenty-first century. This deepening engagement should rest on realist assessments of domestic needs. Reforming international multilateral organizations to reflect current realities, and building a multipolar world in which India plays a larger role, become possible through innovative and consistent engagement with <span class=\"n-term\">55 UN-recognized countries<\/span>. India can counter China\u2019s growing influence by promoting South\u2013South cooperation.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u2018India is the world\u2019s largest democracy and has a proud record of regular elections. Many African countries have recently reverted from one party or military to multiparty systems of governments.\u2019<\/p>\n<p><cite>Shashi Tharoor<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">A coherent multi-actor \u2018Africa Policy\u2019 driven by the state<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Identify key stakeholders \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">State, the private sector and the Indian diaspora<\/span> \u2014 and assess how each should engage with African countries on their own terms while keeping India\u2019s economic diplomacy in view. A coordinating forum should be created.<\/li>\n<li>Set broad guidelines for private-sector conduct. Indian firms must be obliged to adhere to labour laws and environmental regulations and attend to social issues; the pharmaceutical sector should be more deeply involved with local health issues and the eradication of diseases such as malaria.<\/li>\n<li>Develop a policy for engagement with <span class=\"n-term\">People of Indian Origin<\/span> in East Africa. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harry Broadman<\/span>: \u2018ethnic networks\u2019 would enhance trade and investment ties by overshadowing the \u2018imperfections and asymmetries of market information\u2019.<\/li>\n<li>Engagement should not be limited to an economic elite with political connections. Indian policy has shifted from complete neglect only to selective engagement. In South Africa, as <span class=\"n-sch\">Sanusha Naidu<\/span> observes, many in the Indian community do not have a political or economic affinity to India; India can use its strengths in education and healthcare to advance this section and strengthen ancestral ties.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Energy policy within sustainable development<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Position energy policy within the wider relationship by linking it to private-sector trade and investment; optimisation should rest on <span class=\"n-term\">mutual dependence<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s need for energy against Africa\u2019s need for investment, technology and capacity building.<\/li>\n<li>Infrastructure development in countries such as Nigeria must be supplemented by transfer of skill and technical knowhow to develop African oil companies themselves. One route is <span class=\"n-term\">Petroleum India International<\/span>, set up to provide technical, managerial and human resource development services in upstream and downstream sectors globally.<\/li>\n<li>Help African countries strengthen governance frameworks in the energy sector, working with the <span class=\"n-term\">New Partnership for Africa\u2019s Development<\/span> under its \u2018Economic and Corporate Governance Programme\u2019, applying India\u2019s own experience of building energy governance in a complicated domestic environment.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Bilateral and multilateral institutional framework<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Give economic engagement with African Indian Ocean Rim countries as much emphasis as defence ties; increase diplomatic visits and build a detailed strategy for diplomatic, cultural and economic engagement.<\/li>\n<li>Revitalize the relatively inactive <span class=\"n-term\">IOR-ARC<\/span>. The disparate nature of its membership and the absence of a strong vision have prevented tangible results; India should capitalize on <span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s non-membership<\/span> and use it to expand economic and defence engagement with East Africa.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Inject bilateralism<\/span> \u2192 one-on-one interaction with African nations. Morocco, for instance, has initiated a moderate Islamic programme for tackling radicalisation. This requires expanding India\u2019s diplomatic strength, currently insufficient.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Brand-building<\/span> \u2192 spend more diplomatic capital publicising the projects India funds and executes. After the Ebola outbreak India emerged as one of the top donors to Africa, but the effort received inadequate publicity; the same holds for Vaccine Maitri.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Emerging areas<\/span> \u2192 green economy, renewable energy, organic agriculture, public health security and counterterrorism. <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> points to health, digital and green growth as the current emphasis; the private sector has scope in secondary and tertiary hospitals and laboratories.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Diaspora as bridge<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span> calls this link a \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">Third Space<\/span>\u2019. The diaspora is estimated at <span class=\"n-term\">3 million<\/span> across <span class=\"n-term\">46 countries<\/span>, with the largest concentrations in South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. India extends <span class=\"n-term\">e-visa facilities to 33 African countries<\/span> and has emerged as an attractive destination for medical tourism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Four weaknesses to correct<\/span> \u2192 government and private companies do not keep each other\u2019s interests in mind, preventing a coherent policy; policy is not supplemented by a strong and proactive diplomatic thrust; India in some instances emulates China\u2019s aid-for-resources strategy, which is not the best approach for long-term relations; and engagement with politically unstable yet resource-rich countries could threaten Indian interests and taint perceptions.<\/li>\n<li>India needs a long-term vision based on a comprehensive analysis of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, aligned to African developmental needs and social concerns, which will legitimise its presence in the eyes of African people.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Suggest measures so that India\u2019s partnership with Africa becomes a true symbol of South-South Cooperation, delivering clear-cut economic and political dividends to both sides of the equation.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/suggest-measures-so-that-indias-partnership-with-africa-becomes-a-upsc-psir-2017-4401\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"views-of-scholars-africa\">Views of scholars \u2014 Africa<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Africa\u2019s rise is key to global rebalancing; India is a partner for capacity-building rather than an extractive force<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s growing presence allows it to demonstrate global leadership, particularly within South\u2013South cooperation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Avoid the extractive model associated with China; build on strengths in human resource development, entrepreneurship and digital connectivity<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shoumitro Chatterjee<\/span><\/td>\n<td>While Africa admires China, many African nations aspire to India\u2019s democratic model and value its inclusive and sustainable approach. Africa has moved from a modest priority \u2014 less important commercially or politically than the Middle East or Southeast Asia \u2014 to a significant area of focus and a continent for India\u2019s own \u201crebranding\u201d: a forward-thinking benefactor, a source of investment, a partner in development, a donor in humanitarian need, a guide on the new information highway<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The untapped potential of the Indian diaspora, and the persistent problem of timely project implementation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Siddharth Varadarajan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Engage the African diaspora at all levels, enhance diplomatic presence, set red lines for the private sector, promote CSR among Indian companies to address land grabbing<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Mahesh Sachdev<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Mark Linscott<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Address the <span class=\"n-term\">delivery deficit<\/span> and walk the talk; there is a perception that India promises but China delivers. Reliability and follow-through are essential<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Build on strengths in IT, pharmaceuticals, capacity building and technology transfer rather than competing directly with China; use geographical proximity and modernize age-old ties<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shiv Shankar Mukherjee<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Recognise the unique requirements of each African country; a one-size-fits-all policy is inadequate<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sanjay Baru<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Shairee Malhotra<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Break free from the dark-continent stereotype, expand people-to-people contact, reverse India\u2019s sub-continental drift<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theoretical linkages<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">South\u2013South cooperation<\/span> \u2192 the relationship reflects the <span class=\"n-term\">Bandung spirit<\/span> of solidarity and mutual development, countering traditional North\u2013South dynamics, with emphasis on equitable development in climate resilience, food security and development funding.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Complex interdependence<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Keohane<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye<\/span>) \u2192 ties span trade, security, technology and culture, which minimises the risk of single-issue confrontation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Soft power and constructivism<\/span> \u2192 cultural exchange, scholarships and people-centric diplomacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cSoft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Joseph Nye<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><span><\/span><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-latin-america\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>India and Latin America<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-global-south-the-idea-and-the-setting\">The Global South \u2014 the idea and the setting<\/a><a href=\"#south-south-cooperation-meaning-basis-importance\">South\u2013South Cooperation \u2014 meaning, basis, importance<\/a><a href=\"#india-in-south-south-cooperation-instruments-challenges-asse\">India in South\u2013South Cooperation \u2014 instruments, challenges, assessment<\/a><a href=\"#the-resurgence-why-africa-returned-to-the-front-rank\">The resurgence \u2014 why Africa returned to the front rank<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-interests-in-africa\">India\u2019s interests in Africa<\/a><a href=\"#chronology-of-india-africa-relations\">Chronology of India\u2013Africa relations<\/a><a href=\"#three-phases-the-levels-of-analysis-frame\">Three phases \u2014 the levels-of-analysis frame<\/a><a href=\"#phase-i-history-up-to-independence-1947\">Phase I \u2014 history up to independence, 1947<\/a><a href=\"#phase-ii-1947-to-the-early-1990s\">Phase II \u2014 1947 to the early 1990s<\/a><a href=\"#phase-iii-india-and-africa-since-the-early-1990s\">Phase III \u2014 India and Africa since the early 1990s<\/a><a href=\"#developments-under-the-modi-government\">Developments under the Modi government<\/a><a href=\"#the-ten-guiding-principles-and-agenda-2063\">The Ten Guiding Principles \u2014 and Agenda 2063<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#itec-the-instrument-of-capacity-building\">ITEC \u2014 the instrument of capacity building<\/a><a href=\"#geo-economic-and-geo-strategic-dimensions\">Geo-economic and geo-strategic dimensions<\/a><a href=\"#china-in-africa-and-the-indian-counter-model\">China in Africa \u2014 and the Indian counter-model<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-concern-contestation-and-other-challenges\">Areas of concern, contestation and other challenges<\/a><a href=\"#policy-suggestions\">Policy suggestions<\/a><a href=\"#views-of-scholars-africa\">Views of scholars \u2014 Africa<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and Africa for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and Africa Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and Africa Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 4 \u2014 In<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.4.1","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"4","fx_note_desc":"India and Africa for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and Africa Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and Africa Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 4 \u2014 In","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3589","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3589","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3589\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3792,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3589\/revisions\/3792"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3589"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}