{"id":3591,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:11","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/leadership-role-in-the-demand-for-nieo-and-wto-negotiations\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:59","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:59","slug":"leadership-role-in-the-demand-for-nieo-and-wto-negotiations","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/leadership-role-in-the-demand-for-nieo-and-wto-negotiations\/","title":{"rendered":"Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 4<\/b> \u2014 India and the Global South : Relations with Africa and Latin America; <span class=\"cur\">Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations<\/span>.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-ibsa-dialogue-forum\">The IBSA Dialogue Forum<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Origin<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum was established in <span class=\"n-term\">2003<\/span>, formalised by the <span class=\"n-term\">Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003<\/span>, with the inaugural summit in Brazil. Formation was motivated by dissatisfaction with the stagnation of the <span class=\"n-term\">Doha Development Agenda<\/span> in 2001. India\u2019s objective \u2192 reassert leadership among developing countries while avoiding the anti-Western stance characteristic of NAM.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Areas of cooperation<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Advancing a democratic global order and pressing for reform of global governance institutions to increase the representation and influence of developing nations.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">IBSA Fund<\/span> \u2014 each member contributing <span class=\"n-term\">$1 million annually<\/span> for small-scale projects in developing countries across infrastructure, healthcare, education and poverty alleviation. Managed with <span class=\"n-term\">UNOSSC and UNDP<\/span>, it has crossed <span class=\"n-term\">US$50 million<\/span> in cumulative contributions and allocations and operates across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.<\/li>\n<li>Active working groups \u2192 Defence, Blue Economy, Energy, Trade\/Investment\/Infrastructure, Agriculture, Tourism, Customs\/Tax.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Significance and challenges<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Valuable for developing nations through a <span class=\"n-term\">bottom-up approach<\/span> emphasising consultation, expertise sharing and community involvement; the Fund\u2019s projects earned the <span class=\"n-term\">MDG Award in 2010<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>IBSA has encountered difficulty and is currently in a period of <span class=\"n-term\">inactivity<\/span>. The summit scheduled for Delhi in <span class=\"n-term\">2012<\/span> was postponed indefinitely.<\/li>\n<li>Shifting national priorities, increased bilateral engagement and changing geopolitical dynamics have reduced momentum. Member priorities sometimes diverge \u2014 on the pace of trade liberalisation, and on obligations to regional blocs such as MERCOSUR and SACU. The rise of an expanded <span class=\"n-term\">BRICS<\/span> can overshadow IBSA\u2019s bandwidth.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Renewal<\/span> requires political will from all three members, building on past achievements in sustainable development, climate change, technology transfer and trade.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sachin Chaturvedi<\/span><\/td>\n<td>IBSA\u2019s success stems from \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">trilateral solidarity<\/span>\u201d, which builds democratic global institutions and amplifies the voice of developing countries<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Renu Modi<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Sankalp Gurjar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">triangular cooperation<\/span> model offers a more inclusive approach to development, using the diverse expertise and resources of each member<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>IBSA holds significant potential as an alternative to the diminishing relevance of NAM. Unlike NAM, which was a <span class=\"n-term\">reactive<\/span> stance during the Cold War, IBSA represents <span class=\"n-term\">proactive<\/span> cooperation among emerging economies, positioned to shape global agendas<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Ian Taylor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>IBSA-style alliances \u201ccreated a new dynamic in international relations\u201d and raise important questions for global governance; such coalitions \u201cmay allow African economies to bypass the conditionalities imposed\u201d by western-led international financial institutions<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-and-the-wto-the-record\">India and the WTO \u2014 the record<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>After 1947 India adopted a protectionist model built on <span class=\"n-term\">import substitution<\/span>; this shifted in the early 1990s after the balance of payments crisis, towards liberalization and integration.<\/li>\n<li>India joined <span class=\"n-term\">GATT in 1948<\/span> as one of the original <span class=\"n-term\">23<\/span> countries, which laid the foundation for its later engagement with the WTO.<\/li>\n<li>The WTO, established in <span class=\"n-term\">1995<\/span> as successor to GATT, promotes predictable, non-discriminatory trade through tariff-cutting and rules on non-tariff barriers, with principles such as <span class=\"n-term\">Most-Favoured-Nation<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">national treatment<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">special and differential treatment<\/span> for developing members, and a dispute settlement system.<\/li>\n<li>The WTO comprises <span class=\"n-term\">166 member states<\/span>, accounting for over <span class=\"n-term\">98 per cent<\/span> of global trade.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s participation offers advocacy for developing countries, influence on trade rules in agriculture and services, support for regional trade negotiation, and space to press for trade policies aligned with sustainable development.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-doha-round-and-the-north-south-divide\">The Doha Round and the North\u2013South divide<\/h3>\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">Doha Development Agenda<\/span>, launched in <span class=\"n-term\">2001<\/span>, set out to place development at the core of multilateral trade reform \u2014 agriculture, industrial tariffs (NAMA) and services, alongside rules on subsidies, trade remedies and special and differential treatment. Progress has stalled because developed and developing countries prioritise different outcomes and interpret development obligations differently.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Fault line<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Agriculture<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developing countries want steep cuts to trade-distorting farm subsidies in advanced economies and more policy space for food security; developed members seek new market access and disciplines on support programmes. A permanent solution on <span class=\"n-term\">public stockholding<\/span> remains unresolved beyond an interim <span class=\"n-term\">peace clause<\/span>. Disagreement persists over the <span class=\"n-term\">1986-88 external reference price<\/span> used to calculate support, which developing members argue overstates their subsidy levels<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Special &amp; differential treatment<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developing members press for broad, automatic flexibilities; many developed members want targeted differentiation based on objective indicators rather than across-the-board self-designation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Safeguards<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Special Safeguard Mechanism<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Special Products<\/span> carve-outs remain unfinished, keeping agricultural market access stuck<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Industrial goods (NAMA)<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Advanced economies want deeper tariff cuts and fewer exemptions; developing members resist steep linear cuts that could harm nascent industry<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Services and Mode 4<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Developing countries seek easier temporary movement of professionals and recognition of qualifications; many developed members are cautious on labour-market and regulatory grounds<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Rules and new issues<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Some members favour plurilateral or <span class=\"n-term\">joint-statement initiatives<\/span> on e-commerce, investment facilitation and domestic regulation in services. India warns these dilute multilateral consensus and the development focus<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">IP and public health<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Differences endure over the balance between TRIPS protections and access to medicines and technology<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Systemic challenges<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Asymmetric reciprocity expectations<\/span> \u2192 developed members seek market access commensurate with emerging economies\u2019 growth; developing members insist on historical responsibility and policy space.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Erosion of trust<\/span> \u2192 limited delivery on agriculture in earlier rounds has hardened positions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Dispute settlement strain<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">Appellate Body\u2019s paralysis since 2019<\/span> has weakened enforcement credibility and reduced incentives to undertake new bindings.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Where the Round stands<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Some elements have been picked off, such as the elimination of agricultural export subsidies in the <span class=\"n-term\">2015 Nairobi Package<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Core pillars remain unresolved \u2192 agriculture domestic support, SSM and Special Products, meaningful operationalisation of SDT, and balanced NAMA and services outcomes.<\/li>\n<li>Fisheries-subsidies talks have seen partial progress outside the strict Doha template; plurilateral pushes and uneven ministerial outcomes have shifted attention away from a single comprehensive conclusion.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Analyse the stalled progress of Doha Round of WTO negotiations over the differences between the developed and the developing countries.<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-coalitional-diplomacy\">India\u2019s coalitional diplomacy<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s involvement in the WTO is marked by a blend of <span class=\"n-term\">intellectual activism<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">coalition-building<\/span> and a commitment to <span class=\"n-term\">developmental multilateralism<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Through the <span class=\"n-term\">G20, G33 and IBSA<\/span>, India has advocated for Least Developed Countries and developing nations, particularly on <span class=\"n-term\">food security<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">public stockholding rights<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amrita Narlikar<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Alberto Rizzi<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Rajagopalan<\/span> hold that India has perfected the art of coalitional diplomacy, using alliances to punch above its weight. By aligning with other developing countries, India has advocated trade equity and reshaped the discourse around global trade norms; this diplomacy is a model for how smaller nations can exert influence in multilateral negotiations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cDeveloping countries can punch above their weight in multilateral institutions.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Amrita Narlikar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s leadership role at the WTO for the Global South<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Head<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Development-focused agenda<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trade policies and agreements that support economic growth and sustainable development in developing nations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Special &amp; differential treatment<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">Trade Facilitation Agreement<\/span>, where India and other developing countries secured provisions for <span class=\"n-term\">gradual implementation<\/span> matched to capacity limitations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Agricultural subsidies<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Raising concerns about developed-country subsidies that distort trade and hurt farmers in the Global South, including challenges at the <span class=\"n-term\">Dispute Settlement Body<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Market access<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Calls for reductions in tariffs and non-tariff measures to improve export opportunities<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Intellectual property<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Balancing protection with access to essential medicines, technology transfer and agricultural innovation; India has issued <span class=\"n-term\">compulsory licences<\/span> for essential medicines to allow domestic production of affordable generics<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Trade facilitation<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Technical and financial support so that developing countries can engage effectively in global trade<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Public diplomacy and agenda-setting<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s ability to set the global agenda is visible in its consistent use of public diplomacy, through articles in prominent publications and statements by trade negotiators such as <span class=\"n-sch\">Piyush Goyal<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span>. The TRIPS waiver, the debate on food security and the push for a digital economy agenda reflect India\u2019s proactive role as a <span class=\"n-term\">global norm entrepreneur<\/span>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India\u2019s coalitional diplomacy within the WTO has earned it wide appreciation. What accounts for the success of India\u2019s coalitional diplomacy?<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cNothing is going to move within the WTO negotiations unless India is on board.\u201d Discuss the main reasons behind India\u2019s increased clout in the WTO.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/nothing-is-going-to-move-within-the-wto-negotiations-unless-india-upsc-psir-2024-4406\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-trips-waiver-debate\">The TRIPS waiver debate<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>In <span class=\"n-term\">October 2020<\/span>, India and <span class=\"n-term\">South Africa<\/span> submitted a proposal to the WTO to suspend intellectual property on all COVID-19 <span class=\"n-term\">vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics<\/span> until widespread vaccination could help achieve immunity in low- and middle-income countries. The proposal responded to the <span class=\"n-term\">hoarding<\/span> of essential medical equipment by countries of the global North at the beginning of the pandemic.<\/li>\n<li>After over <span class=\"n-term\">18 months<\/span>, in <span class=\"n-term\">March 2022<\/span>, a \u201ccompromise text\u201d emerged \u2014 the result of high-level consultations between the EU, India, South Africa and the US, coordinated by WTO Director-General <span class=\"n-sch\">Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala<\/span>, and known as the <span class=\"n-term\">WTO DG text<\/span>. Other than the EU, none of the sponsoring quartet publicly expressed official support.<\/li>\n<li>Civil society, public health advocates and academics criticized the text as reflecting the negotiating positions of the EU and US, and as too narrow for the inequities of COVID-19.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The critique in specifics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>New \u201cburdensome, unnecessary, TRIPS-plus requirements for countries seeking to issue a compulsory license\u201d, particularly in notification procedures.<\/li>\n<li>Patents were covered, but the draft did not address barriers arising from <span class=\"n-term\">confidential information and trade secrets<\/span> held by corporations or contained in regulatory submissions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Eligibility requirements<\/span> still excluded too many low- and middle-income countries from producing, supplying, exporting and importing even vaccines.<\/li>\n<li>The measures created <span class=\"n-term\">more legal uncertainty<\/span> than existing TRIPS flexibilities, because of textual ambiguity and a confusing structure.<\/li>\n<li>Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam and the People\u2019s Vaccine Alliance described it as a reiteration of existing TRIPS flexibilities with a narrow export waiver and additional cumbersome requirements, and noted that many affected WTO members were not part of the negotiations.<\/li>\n<li>The final compromise at the <span class=\"n-term\">12th Ministerial Conference in 2022<\/span> relaxed IP rules only for <span class=\"n-term\">COVID-19 vaccines<\/span>, not for diagnostics and therapeutics.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> and India\u2019s own critique hold that the compromise was insufficient because it failed to address systemic issues in <span class=\"n-term\">technology transfer and pandemic preparedness<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> argues existing IP rules still hinder the ability of developing countries to respond swiftly to health emergencies. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> emphasise that the initiative was about <span class=\"n-term\">saving lives<\/span>, not simply negotiating trade terms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Explain India\u2019s position on the waiver of intellectual property rights on COVID-19 vaccines in WTO.<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Why is the compromise reached at WTO regarding the Covid-19 vaccine manufacturing not a Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver?<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-wto-and-the-global-south\">The WTO and the Global South<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jagdish Bhagwati<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Konark Bhandari<\/span> highlights the benefits the Global South can derive from the system: participation in global trade gives access to larger markets, attracts foreign investment, and enables technology transfer. He acknowledges the challenges but holds that the WTO provides a framework for advancing developing-country interests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Special and differential treatment<\/span> \u2192 longer transition periods and preferential market access. The <span class=\"n-term\">Agreement on Agriculture<\/span> gave flexibility in subsidies to support farmers and food security; the <span class=\"n-term\">Agreement on Textiles and Clothing<\/span> helped integrate textile industries into the global trading system.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Technical assistance<\/span> \u2192 help in implementing agreements and building intellectual property regimes compatible with development goals, balancing innovation protection against access to essential medicines.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Capacity building<\/span> \u2192 analysing trade policies, identifying areas for improved competitiveness, strengthening customs administration.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Dispute settlement<\/span> \u2192 developing nations have used it effectively to challenge unfair trade practices of developed countries, with favourable outcomes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Scholarly perspectives<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s approach is rooted in <span class=\"n-term\">constructivist<\/span> principles, reshaping global discourse on public goods and equity.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Keohane<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Nye\u2019s<\/span> theory of <span class=\"n-term\">complex interdependence<\/span> describes the multidimensional character of India\u2019s WTO engagement across trade, security, technology and health.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s leadership in the Doha Round and its role in South\u2013South cooperation reflect developmental priorities and a commitment to inclusive growth, as discussed by <span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Baylis and Smith\u2019s<\/span> work on Global Politics situates India\u2019s position as leader of the Global South within the wider structures of global political order.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cFor India, fairness in global trade is not just policy, it is a principle.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-tariff-shock-and-the-multilateral-trading-system-2025-26\">The tariff shock and the multilateral trading system, 2025\u201326<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Step<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2 April 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Executive Order 14257<\/span> set a baseline <span class=\"n-term\">10 per cent reciprocal tariff<\/span>; steel and aluminium duties rose to <span class=\"n-term\">50 per cent<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">August 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A <span class=\"n-term\">25 per cent reciprocal tariff<\/span> on Indian goods took effect<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">6 August 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">EO 14329<\/span> added a <span class=\"n-term\">25 per cent penalty<\/span> over Russian oil (effective 27 August), reaching a <span class=\"n-term\">50 per cent cumulative rate<\/span>. It was the first US <span class=\"n-term\">secondary tariff<\/span> \u2014 penalising one country for its trade with another<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Legal basis<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The penalty invoked <span class=\"n-term\">IEEPA<\/span> and a \u201cnational emergency\u201d first declared in EO 14066 (2022); EO 14329 found India \u201cdirectly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s response<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The MEA (6 August 2025) called the measures unfair, unjustified and unreasonable, and framed oil imports as <span class=\"n-term\">energy security for 1.4 billion people<\/span>. India <span class=\"n-term\">did not retaliate<\/span> and issued no further statement after the second round<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2 February 2026<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Framework for an <span class=\"n-term\">Interim Agreement<\/span>: the reciprocal rate cut to <span class=\"n-term\">18 per cent<\/span> from the 50 per cent peak; India signalled intent to buy <span class=\"n-term\">$500 billion<\/span> of US goods over five years. An order of 6 February removed the Russian-oil penalty, effective 7 February. The Joint Statement carried <span class=\"n-term\">no explicit Indian commitment on Russian oil<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">20 February 2026<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">US Supreme Court struck down<\/span> the IEEPA \u201creciprocal\u201d tariff authority<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">24 February 2026<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A temporary <span class=\"n-term\">10 per cent blanket tariff<\/span> on all partners for 150 days, expiring 24 July 2026; the interim pact remained <span class=\"n-term\">unsigned<\/span> through mid-2026<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cWe reiterate that these actions are unfair, unjustified and unreasonable. India will take all actions necessary to protect its national interests.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Ministry of External Affairs, 6 August 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How the pool reads it<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shoumitro Chatterjee<\/span> (Carnegie) \u2192 the episode shows that India\u2019s post-2017 inward turn had raised the cost of relying on the home market.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Konark Bhandari<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s conduct was <span class=\"n-term\">tactical altruism<\/span>: concessions offered without demanding an immediate return.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Elizabeth Threlkeld<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Daniel Markey<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Akriti Vasudeva Kalyankar<\/span> (Stimson) \u2192 the long standoff let China, Russia, Pakistan and Europe each gain ground.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span> (ORF) \u2192 India absorbed the pressure, kept growing, and reached <span class=\"n-term\">greater parity<\/span> with Washington.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span> (Chatham House) \u2192 equidistance can read as disengagement; India needs a more <span class=\"n-term\">proactive<\/span> rather than passive strategic autonomy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Milan Vaishnav<\/span> and co-authors (Carnegie) \u2192 tactical adjustment, not strategic rupture; the volatility confirmed the value of spreading India\u2019s bets.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIndia\u2019s response to Trump 2.0 has been characterized less by strategic rupture than by tactical adjustment.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Milan Vaishnav (ed.), Carnegie Endowment, 2026<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>For the Southern argument the significance is structural: tariffs set unilaterally and far above bound commitments, justified by national-emergency powers, bypass the consensus machinery that developing members rely on. The demand to revive the <span class=\"n-term\">Appellate Body<\/span> and restore the two-tiered adjudicative system is therefore a Global South interest before it is a procedural one.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Trump\u2019s unilateral imposition of reciprocal tariffs on scores of countries poses impending threat to the future of the rule-based multilateral global trading system under the WTO. What options do the WTO members have to salvage the organization?<\/span><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"trade-diversification-as-hedge-ceta-the-eu-fta-and-cbam\">Trade diversification as hedge \u2014 CETA, the EU FTA and CBAM<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Agreement<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013UK CETA<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Concluded <span class=\"n-term\">6 May 2025<\/span> after 14 rounds; signed <span class=\"n-term\">24 July 2025<\/span> in London by <span class=\"n-sch\">Piyush Goyal<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Jonathan Reynolds<\/span>. Companion <span class=\"n-term\">Double Contribution Convention<\/span> signed 10 February 2026; both due in force <span class=\"n-term\">15 July 2026<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CETA \u2014 goods<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The UK removes duties on about <span class=\"n-term\">99 per cent<\/span> of India\u2019s tariff lines from day one \u2014 cuts up to 70 per cent on processed food, 21.5 per cent marine, 18 per cent engineering and auto parts, 16 per cent leather, 12 per cent textiles, 8 per cent chemicals and pharma<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CETA \u2014 services and procurement<\/span><\/td>\n<td>UK commitments across <span class=\"n-term\">137 sub-sectors<\/span>; the DCC exemption raised from three to five years; over 75,000 professionals and 900 companies expected to benefit. India opens its <span class=\"n-term\">central-government procurement<\/span> market for the first time; state and local procurement stay excluded<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CETA \u2014 safeguards<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India excludes dairy, cereals, millets, edible oils, oilseeds and apples from tariff cuts; 85 per cent of India\u2019s steel exports fall outside the UK\u2019s steel measures<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013EU FTA<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Negotiations concluded <span class=\"n-term\">27 January 2026<\/span> at the 16th India\u2013EU Summit, New Delhi; full text published late February 2026. Signing expected by end-2026; European Parliament consent still required; entry into force expected <span class=\"n-term\">early 2027<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">EU FTA \u2014 goods<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India gains preferential access on <span class=\"n-term\">97 per cent<\/span> of EU tariff lines, covering <span class=\"n-term\">99.5 per cent<\/span> of India\u2019s export value; nearly <span class=\"n-term\">$33 billion<\/span> of labour-intensive exports go to zero duty. India offers 92.1 per cent of its own lines<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">EU FTA \u2014 services<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The EU opens <span class=\"n-term\">144<\/span> services sub-sectors, India <span class=\"n-term\">102<\/span>; a framework for social-security agreements to follow within five years. India shields dairy, cereals, poultry and soymeal; the EU excludes beef, chicken, rice and sugar<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">CBAM friction<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India won <span class=\"n-term\">no exemption<\/span> from the EU\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism<\/span>, only an assurance to match any flexibility given to third countries. Iron and steel make up nearly <span class=\"n-term\">90 per cent<\/span> of India\u2019s CBAM-exposed exports; compliance may cost <span class=\"n-term\">$2\u20134 billion a year<\/span>; the EU pledged <span class=\"n-term\">\u20ac500 million<\/span> for a green transition<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">The wider run<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Deals with Oman, New Zealand, the UK and the EU across 2025\u201326, adding to earlier pacts with the UAE, Australia and EFTA. India now holds FTAs with <span class=\"n-term\">14 of the 16 RCEP economies<\/span>; only China stays outside its FTA network<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">The argument<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span> (Chatham House) \u2192 the run of agreements reaffirms strategic autonomy: they were settled while Washington raised tariffs and pressed India over Russian oil, and they show a wish to avoid dependence on any single country.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Shairee Malhotra<\/span> (ORF) \u2192 a shift towards more predictable partners, protecting strategic autonomy and economic resilience.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Sankalp Gurjar<\/span> (ORF Occasional Paper No. 542) \u2192 read through <span class=\"n-term\">geoeconomics<\/span>, economic tools deployed for geopolitical ends.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Alberto Rizzi<\/span> (ECFR) \u2192 the same lens from the European side: a wider partner network, less reliance on an unpredictable United States, and a way of keeping India from drifting into a more anti-Western camp.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The sceptical case<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Mark Linscott<\/span> (Atlantic Council) expects only a modest economic effect, since EU tariffs are already low and gains may be offset by the removal of <span class=\"n-term\">GSP preferences<\/span> that kept Indian textiles competitive with Bangladesh; he also notes the final push in the EU talks began before the latest US tariffs. The <span class=\"n-term\">GTRI<\/span> flags the price of concessions: car import duties cut from over 100 per cent to 10 per cent, limits on <span class=\"n-term\">compulsory licensing<\/span> in the IP chapter, and the opening of government procurement \u2014 all of which narrow policy space for Make in India.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Gopalika Arora<\/span> (ORF) \u2192 CBAM is the sharpest unresolved friction, and how it is settled will decide how much the deal finally delivers.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">De-risking, not decoupling<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Amit Kumar<\/span> (Takshashila) finds almost all Chinese exports to India substitutable, so Beijing\u2019s scope for economic coercion is narrow and de-risking is the sensible course.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIndia\u2019s geoeconomics since 2019 rests on three pillars: rejection of the RCEP, strategy of Atmanirbharta for promoting domestic industrialisation, and signing new FTAs with strategically important countries. All three are in service of a single goal: managing its China challenge.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Sankalp Gurjar, ORF Occasional Paper No. 542<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIndia, faced with US tariffs, is pushing for certainty in its trade relations, while Europe is seeking diversification to reduce reliance on an increasingly erratic American administration.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Alberto Rizzi, ECFR<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why this belongs to the Southern account<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">CBAM<\/span> sits in the same North\u2013South argument as TRIPS and agricultural subsidies: a measure written in the developed world whose compliance cost falls on developing-country exporters, met by an assurance rather than an exemption. <span class=\"n-sch\">Iv\u00e1n Gonzalez-Pujol<\/span> supplies the theory \u2014 hedging as a mixed strategy of cooperation and competition under uncertainty, with free trade agreements as its instrument of economic diversification.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-new-international-economic-order\">The New International Economic Order<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The NIEO emerged in the <span class=\"n-term\">1970s<\/span> as a developing-country agenda to correct structural inequities embedded in the post-war economy. Its rationale was that the rules were written when most of the Global South lacked voice and independence.<\/li>\n<li>The UN General Assembly\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO<\/span> and its Programme of Action crystallised these priorities. India, along with other NAM countries of Africa, championed the demand.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Content of the demand:<\/span> Sovereign equality \u00b7 Participation in decision-making \u00b7 Policy space \u00b7 Terms of trade \u00b7 Regulation of TNCs \u00b7 Technology transfer \u00b7 Development finance \u00b7 Monetary reform<\/p>\n<p><em>Operating slogans \u2192 \u201ctrade, not aid\u201d, industrialisation, agricultural support for food security, concessional finance, and access to technology.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From the 1974 demand to the recast agenda.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1974<\/span> (UNGA Declaration + Programme of Action; NAM and G77 carry the demand) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Dilution<\/span> (Globalisation shifts national priorities; NAM declines; the collective economic agenda thins) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Integration<\/span> (India moves from demand-side advocate of redistribution to rule-reforming stakeholder that also gains from openness) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Recast<\/span> (Incremental rule-reform, new institution-building, South\u2013South partnership, technology-enabled inclusion)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Continuity and change in India\u2019s position<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Head<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Global financial governance<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Support for quota, voice and leadership reform in the IMF and World Bank to reflect contemporary economic weights; backing for complementary institutions such as the <span class=\"n-term\">AIIB<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">New Development Bank<\/span> to expand long-term development finance without political conditionalities<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Trade multilateralism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Meaningful SDT, a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security, balanced outcomes in agriculture, NAMA and services, and preservation of TRIPS flexibilities<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">South\u2013South institution-building<\/span><\/td>\n<td>IBSA, BRICS, the G77, and engagement with the African Union and small island states; ITEC training, lines of credit, grant projects, and Duty-Free Tariff Preference for LDCs, all on demand-driven and ownership-based principles<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Technology, climate, commons<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Climate equity through <span class=\"n-term\">CBDR-RC<\/span> and just transitions, coalitions such as the International Solar Alliance and disaster resilience initiatives, and affordable, interoperable <span class=\"n-term\">Digital Public Infrastructure<\/span> with open standards as an updated route to technology diffusion<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Market power with safeguards<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Pursuit of FTAs, investment flows and value-chain integration alongside safeguards against volatility, strategic autonomy in critical sectors, and inclusive standard-setting<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s rhetoric is less redistributive than in the 1970s and more focused on practical reform, coalition-building, and delivery through projects and standards.<\/li>\n<li>Tensions arise \u2192 between deeper liberalisation and protection for livelihoods and infant industry, and between stronger IP regimes and access objectives. These are managed through calibrated negotiating positions rather than abandonment of first principles.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s rise has not ended its concern with a New International Economic Order; it has recast that concern \u2014 from sweeping overhaul to incremental rule-reform, new institution-building, South\u2013South partnership and technology-enabled inclusion.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the relevance of the demand for New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the present era of globalisation.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-relevance-of-the-demand-for-new-upsc-psir-2022-4403\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the potential role that India could play as the leader of the Global South in realising the goal of establishing a new international economic order in the 21st century.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-potential-role-that-india-could-play-as-the-leader-of-upsc-psir-2024-4407\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-diplomacy-for-the-global-south\">India\u2019s diplomacy for the Global South<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Platforms into outcomes \u2014 how the diplomacy works.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">PLATFORMS<\/span> (G77 \u00b7 IBSA \u00b7 UNCTAD \u00b7 WTO \u00b7 BRICS \u00b7 G20) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">CONVENING &amp; COALITION<\/span> (Voice of the Global South Summits \u00b7 G20 Presidency \u00b7 technical activism) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">OUTCOMES<\/span> (African Union into the G20 \u00b7 TRIPS waiver campaign \u00b7 DAKSHIN \u00b7 ISA, Mission LiFE, Global Biofuels Alliance). <em>FEEDBACK: delivery and disbursement decide whether summit consensus becomes institutional change.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Institutional platforms<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s commitment to South\u2013South cooperation was institutionalized through the <span class=\"n-term\">Group of 77<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">IBSA Dialogue Forum<\/span>, and active participation in <span class=\"n-term\">UNCTAD<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">WTO<\/span> negotiations. Technical and educational assistance, particularly <span class=\"n-term\">ITEC<\/span>, provided training and capacity building.<\/li>\n<li>Within the G77, the coalition \u201chas the purpose of enabling us to deal on terms of greater equality with an existing Center of Power \u2026 unity is our instrument\u201d.<\/li>\n<li>Recent UN processes show the bloc pressing systemic questions beyond trade rules: members pressed for \u201creform of the international financial architecture\u201d, seeking \u201cincreased participation in the international financial institutions\u201d and more financing.<\/li>\n<li>Capacity constraints are real \u2192 \u201cthe group is not always able to reach a position because of internal disagreements\u201d, and when it does, decision-making can be \u201cimperfect\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cStrategic autonomy has been the defining value \u2026 we must renovate that value for the twenty-first century.\u201d \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and others, Nonalignment 2.0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Voice of the Global South Summits<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Held in <span class=\"n-term\">January and November 2023<\/span>, and again in <span class=\"n-term\">2024<\/span>; over <span class=\"n-term\">120 countries<\/span>, including <span class=\"n-term\">21 Heads of State<\/span>, deliberating on climate change, debt distress and food insecurity.<\/li>\n<li>Rooted in <span class=\"n-term\">Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam<\/span> and in the vision of <em>Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas<\/em> \u2014 inclusive growth and trust-based cooperation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sushil Kumar<\/span> notes that India\u2019s presidency \u201cbrought Voice of the Global South to the centre stage \u2026 including the African Union as a member of the G20\u201d. Summit priorities, \u201csupported by 125 countries\u201d, fed into an agenda on the SDGs, climate finance, digital public infrastructure and debt.<\/li>\n<li>India used the Summit to outline sectors \u2014 health, education, finance, connectivity, climate \u2014 and launched <span class=\"n-term\">DAKSHIN<\/span>, a Global South Centre of Excellence.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amrita Narlikar<\/span> highlights Delhi as \u201chost to the Voice of the Global South Summit\u201d, where conversations were \u201cserious, solution-oriented\u201d. She argues that moving past a narrow, technocratic WTO lens brings \u201cnational security, development, and ethics\u201d into policy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The G20 presidency and the African Union<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">G20 presidency in 2023<\/span> was a historic milestone; the manner in which India led it reflected its soft power and its commitment to global cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">African Union<\/span> became a permanent member of the G20 under India\u2019s Presidency in <span class=\"n-term\">September 2023<\/span>, embedding Africa\u2019s voice in global governance. <span class=\"n-sch\">Nilimesh Baruah<\/span> stresses that the AU\u2019s entry marked a decisive shift towards an inclusive agenda that amplifies the Global South\u2019s voice, and proposes an Illicit Financial Flows coalition \u201con equal footing\u201d to drive financing reform.<\/li>\n<li>India also advocates Africa\u2019s representation in the UN Security Council, in line with the <span class=\"n-term\">Ezulwini Consensus<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Development instruments<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Lines of credit<\/span> \u2192 concessional finance exceeding <span class=\"n-term\">300 lines of credit worth about US$32 billion<\/span> worldwide, with over <span class=\"n-term\">200 lines of credit worth about US$12 billion across 42 African countries<\/span>, backing rail, power, water, ICT and industrial parks such as the <span class=\"n-term\">Mahatma Gandhi IT &amp; Biotechnology Park in C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Preferential market access<\/span> \u2192 Duty-Free Tariff Preferences for LDCs. <span class=\"n-term\">Climate and technology coalitions<\/span> \u2192 the International Solar Alliance, Mission LiFE and the Global Biofuels Alliance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Development partnerships<\/span> in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia emphasise capacity-building, technology transfer and inclusive growth, offering an alternative to traditional aid frameworks.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Economic engagement<\/span> \u2192 trade with Africa grew from <span class=\"n-term\">$5 billion in 2001 to $90 billion in 2020<\/span>, making India Africa\u2019s third-largest trading partner; trade with Latin America reached <span class=\"n-term\">$50 billion<\/span>, driven by oil imports and exports of pharmaceuticals, engineering goods and automobiles.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Limits of coalition-building<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amrita Narlikar<\/span>: the Global South\u2019s \u201ccollective agenda\u2026 remains a reform (and often more than that: a reboot) of global governance institutions\u2026 and a more equitable distribution of global resources.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Emma Mawdsley<\/span> observes the rise of South\u2013South Cooperation platforms: \u201cNew institutions and summits \u2014 IBSA, the BRICS, FOCAC, the IAFS \u2014 were stages for high profile pageantry and promises.\u201d She points to cooperation narratives becoming increasingly \u201cmuscular\u201d, nationalistic and pragmatic, with difficulties sustaining non-interference and a further erosion of ideational and operational distinctiveness.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ian Taylor<\/span> cautions that as India rises, \u201cits interest in South\u2013South solidarity declines\u201d, and old strategies cannot be carelessly abandoned. Analysis of Latin America likewise finds the political interface largely dominated by BRICS and IBSA, which risks thin outreach beyond Brazil.<\/li>\n<li>Outcomes therefore depend on addressing G77 internal disagreements and converting summit consensus into institutional change in the international financial institutions and UN processes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">What diplomatic steps has India taken to articulate the interests of the Global South in International Politics?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/what-diplomatic-steps-has-india-taken-to-articulate-the-interests-upsc-psir-2023-4404\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"conclusion\">Conclusion<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India cannot match China\u2019s financial depth. Its comparative advantage is <span class=\"n-term\">democratic, institutional and human<\/span> \u2014 the sharing of electoral, federal, judicial and administrative experience, along with strengths in IT, pharmaceuticals and training that no competitor can replicate quickly.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">multilateral track<\/span> remains the highest-value arena. The African Union\u2019s entry into the G20, the TRIPS waiver campaign, and the demand for reform of the international financial architecture show what coalition diplomacy can achieve.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>As India rises, \u201cits interest in South\u2013South solidarity declines\u201d, and \u201cold strategies\u2026 cannot be carelessly abandoned.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Ian Taylor<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-role-in-establishing-the-nieo\">India\u2019s role in establishing the NIEO<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>As a founder of NAM and a leading voice in the G-77, India aligned with the Third World project of correcting global economic imbalance and reshaping the Bretton Woods system\u2019s structural bias.<\/li>\n<li>At the <span class=\"n-term\">1973 Algiers NAM Summit<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Indira Gandhi<\/span> stressed that political independence remained incomplete without <span class=\"n-term\">economic independence<\/span>, tying the NIEO to the aspirations of newly liberated nations. <span class=\"n-sch\">Amartya Sen<\/span> (<em>Development as Freedom<\/em>) read India\u2019s support for the NIEO as part of a wider development concern to reduce dependence on the First World.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Samir Amin<\/span> (<em>Unequal Development<\/em>) recognised India\u2019s advocacy of progressive measures \u2014 stabilising commodity prices, enabling technology transfer \u2014 alongside its diplomacy at UNCTAD.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s Foreign Minister <span class=\"n-sch\">Swaran Singh<\/span>, at the Sixth Special Session, proposed the revaluation of raw-material prices, additional liquidity for affected countries, equitable voting rights in the IMF, and external capital and technical assistance for developing countries.<\/li>\n<li>India helped amend GATT rules to allow import restrictions by developing countries, was central to founding <span class=\"n-term\">UNCTAD<\/span>, embedded its <span class=\"n-term\">Panchsheel<\/span> principles in the Bandung declaration, and today advances NIEO-like aims through <span class=\"n-term\">BRICS, IBSA, RIC and G4<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The NIEO as a political project<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Not only an economic-legal package but a political effort to realign international power in the wake of decolonisation.<\/li>\n<li>Through the G-77, it advanced the claim that the \u201cdeveloping nations\u201d formed a coherent political group, bound by a shared history of resistance to colonialism and imperialism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-and-the-wto\">India and the WTO<\/h3>\n<p>Since <span class=\"n-term\">1995<\/span> the WTO has been the forum where India advances trade and development goals against larger economies. <span class=\"n-sch\">Amrita Narlikar<\/span> points to India\u2019s role as a <span class=\"n-term\">Global South leader<\/span> on agricultural subsidies and public stockholding.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Food security \u2014 the core fight<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India seeks a <span class=\"n-term\">permanent solution<\/span> to protect procurement at <span class=\"n-term\">Minimum Support Price<\/span> for over <span class=\"n-term\">800 million beneficiaries<\/span>, having secured its programmes through the <span class=\"n-term\">Bali Package (2013)<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>It refuses to dismantle its <span class=\"n-term\">amber-box<\/span> support \u2014 arguing, with <span class=\"n-sch\">Stiglitz<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rodrik<\/span>, that developing countries need <span class=\"n-term\">policy space<\/span> within the rules.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s positions across the agenda<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Opposes a <span class=\"n-term\">China-led investment-facilitation pact<\/span> as outside the WTO\u2019s mandate.<\/li>\n<li>Presses a <span class=\"n-term\">CBDR<\/span> line on fisheries.<\/li>\n<li>Seeks to <span class=\"n-term\">end the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Resists trade linkage with <span class=\"n-term\">labour and the environment<\/span> \u2014 preferring the <span class=\"n-term\">ILO<\/span>, and objecting to the EU\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">carbon border tax<\/span> and deforestation rules.<\/li>\n<li>Co-sponsored a <span class=\"n-term\">dispute-settlement reform proposal with the EU<\/span>; opposed a <span class=\"n-term\">2018 US move<\/span> to bar \u201cdefaulters\u201d from presiding over WTO bodies.<\/li>\n<li>Defends the body\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">consensus-driven<\/span> character, calling it an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cengine for global trade.\u201d<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-new-international-economic-order-2\">The New International Economic Order<\/h3>\n<p>Championed by India in the 1970s and proposed at <span class=\"n-term\">Algiers (1973)<\/span> \u2192 to address the poverty of developing countries and bridge the North\u2013South gap through fair trade, technology transfer and financial assistance.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Restructuring the economic order \u00b7 Control over natural resources \u00b7 Regulation of MNCs \u00b7 Producer associations on the OPEC model<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Main tenets<\/span> \u2192 total restructuring of the economic order; control over natural resources; regulation of MNCs operating in member territories; freedom to form producer associations like OPEC without economic or military resistance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Aims<\/span> \u2192 challenge neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism, curb the negative role of MNCs, and rebuild world economic relations on self-reliance and equality.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Challenges<\/span> \u2192 stiff opposition from industrialized states, who held the existing system adequate; members\u2019 lack of economic and military power; the insecurity dilemma among post-colonial societies; divisions among developing states; and failure to use oil as an economic weapon.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Outcome<\/span> \u2192 no significant economic justice achieved, but the North\u2013South question was established as central to world politics.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-as-a-leader-of-the-global-south\">India as a Leader of the Global South<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Reformed multilateralism<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> (<em>The India Way<\/em>) on reforming the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank and the UN to address the \u201cdemocratic deficit\u201d (<span class=\"n-sch\">Joseph Stiglitz<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Climate justice<\/span> \u2192 CBDR; the International Solar Alliance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">South\u2013South cooperation<\/span> \u2192 the G20 presidency and the inclusion of the African Union.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Alternative institutions<\/span> \u2192 BRICS as an option beyond Western-led bodies.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Global public goods<\/span> \u2192 Digital Public Infrastructure \u2014 UPI shared with African states.<\/li>\n<li>The line to take \u2192 a neoliberal order marginalises the South; India consolidates leadership through equitable representation, climate justice and South\u2013South cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-latin-america\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India and Latin America<\/b><\/a><span><\/span><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-ibsa-dialogue-forum\">The IBSA Dialogue Forum<\/a><a href=\"#india-and-the-wto-the-record\">India and the WTO \u2014 the record<\/a><a href=\"#the-doha-round-and-the-north-south-divide\">The Doha Round and the North\u2013South divide<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-coalitional-diplomacy\">India\u2019s coalitional diplomacy<\/a><a href=\"#the-trips-waiver-debate\">The TRIPS waiver debate<\/a><a href=\"#the-wto-and-the-global-south\">The WTO and the Global South<\/a><a href=\"#the-tariff-shock-and-the-multilateral-trading-system-2025-26\">The tariff shock and the multilateral trading system, 2025\u201326<\/a><a href=\"#trade-diversification-as-hedge-ceta-the-eu-fta-and-cbam\">Trade diversification as hedge \u2014 CETA, the EU FTA and CBAM<\/a><a href=\"#the-new-international-economic-order\">The New International Economic Order<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-diplomacy-for-the-global-south\">India\u2019s diplomacy for the Global South<\/a><a href=\"#conclusion\">Conclusion<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-role-in-establishing-the-nieo\">India\u2019s role in establishing the NIEO<\/a><a href=\"#india-and-the-wto\">India and the WTO<\/a><a href=\"#the-new-international-economic-order-2\">The New International Economic Order<\/a><a href=\"#india-as-a-leader-of-the-global-south\">India as a Leader of the Global South<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO nego<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.4.3","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"4","fx_note_desc":"Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO nego","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3591","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3591","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3591\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3791,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3591\/revisions\/3791"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3591"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}