{"id":3592,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:11","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-the-usa\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:58","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:58","slug":"india-and-the-usa","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-the-usa\/","title":{"rendered":"India and the USA"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and the USA<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and the USA<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5<\/b> \u2014 India and the Global Centres of Power : USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"five-relationships-that-carry-disproportionate-weight\">Five Relationships That Carry Disproportionate Weight<\/h3>\n<p>India\u2019s external strategy is built around five: the <span class=\"n-term\">United States, Russia, Japan, Europe, China<\/span>. Each was shaped by a distinct Cold War experience; each has been reworked since 1991.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Two constants<\/span> \u2192 the search for <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>, and the search for capital, technology and security partners to sustain domestic transformation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Two variables<\/span> \u2192 the structure of the international system, and India\u2019s own domestic capacity.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Where the bargaining happens<\/span> \u2192 not the bilaterals alone but the triangles: India\u2013US\u2013China, India\u2013Russia\u2013US, India\u2013China\u2013Russia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Centres of power<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Those states and groupings whose capabilities allow them to set rules, supply security or capital, and shape outcomes beyond their own region. The set is no longer confined to the West.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"features-of-the-present-order\">Features of the Present Order<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Feature<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Multipolarity<\/span><\/td>\n<td>No single superpower shapes the system. The US remains central, but China\u2019s economic expansion, Russia\u2019s assertive foreign policy, and the growing strategic footprint of India, Brazil and Turkey have diversified the centres of power.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic shifts<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Emerging economies have altered the global economic balance. BRICS presses for reform in the World Bank and the IMF.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical realignments<\/span><\/td>\n<td>NATO and the EU under re-evaluation; new alignments in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, the Quad the clearest instance. In West Asia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel recalibrated after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Syrian conflict.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Crisis and conflict<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The Ukraine war (2022) revived Cold War-era tensions, deepened NATO\u2019s role in Eastern Europe, and pushed Russia to reassert influence in Central Asia and West Asia.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Technology and environment<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Competition over 5G, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, chiefly US\u2013China; climate negotiations generate both cooperation and friction, with India and China asserting themselves.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-place-in-the-emerging-order\">India\u2019s Place in the Emerging Order<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 world politics is in transition from bipolarity to a new, as yet indeterminate order; the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018unipolar moment\u2019<\/span> is giving way. Two futures: a <span class=\"n-term\">new bipolarity<\/span> (US and China atop the great-power hierarchy), or a <span class=\"n-term\">re-emergence of multipolarity<\/span> \u2014 historically the most common configuration \u2014 with BRICS states along with Germany, Japan and Turkey as potential poles.<\/li>\n<li>States vary on a continuum from <span class=\"n-term\">status quo<\/span> to <span class=\"n-term\">revisionist<\/span>. China\u2019s place on it is among the liveliest debates in international affairs; its projection of a <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018peaceful rise\u2019<\/span> expresses the aspiration to become a world power without threatening the US-led order, and to appear a responsible \u2018stakeholder\u2019.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Gilpin<\/span> \u2192 as new states climb the great-power hierarchy they eventually try to alter existing rules and norms \u2014 rules created by other, now declining, great powers for their own purposes. Aspiring great powers try to reshape prevailing norms to suit their interests, which can spark instability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Scholar readings of the five relationships<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>On<\/th>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span><\/td>\n<td>United States<\/td>\n<td>Grown from strategic partnership to a comprehensive global partnership \u2014 defence, trade, technology.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>China<\/td>\n<td>Deep economic ties coexist with geopolitical tension along the border; India balances economic engagement with cautious defence posturing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>European Union<\/td>\n<td>A critical partner in global governance reform, climate change and terrorism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sreeram Chaulia<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia<\/td>\n<td>Defence technology and energy keep the relationship substantial despite shifting global alignments.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sachin Chaturvedi<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Emerging economies<\/td>\n<td>The IBSA Dialogue Forum illustrates India\u2019s strategy of building collective influence among developing countries for a more inclusive global order.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"levels-of-analysis-the-working-frame\">Levels of Analysis \u2014 the Working Frame<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Kenneth Waltz<\/span>\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">three levels of analysis<\/span> \u2014 individual, domestic (state), systemic \u2014 runs through this chapter, following <span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> (United States), <span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> (Russia) and <span class=\"n-sch\">Manjeet S. Pardesi<\/span> (Japan, China).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three levels \u2014 use them to structure any bilateral answer<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Individual<\/th>\n<th>Domestic (State)<\/th>\n<th>Systemic<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Dominance of a single decision-maker \u2014 Nehru\u2019s near-total control of external affairs is the clearest Indian case<\/td>\n<td>Economic model, parliamentary and media pressure, entrenched constituencies, business lobbies<\/td>\n<td>Bipolarity, alliance formations, balance of power, the rise of China<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"nature-of-the-relationship\">Nature of the Relationship<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The organising insight<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span>: India wants to be treated like an ally of the United States without actually being an ally of the United States. It seeks the advantages and security of aligning with the world\u2019s dominant power but wishes to avoid the complications such an alliance could bring, particularly concerning China. Indian strategic elites do not explicitly articulate this.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2192 despite shared affinities of constitutional democracy, liberal politics and civic nationalism, the two have not enjoyed consistently warm relations since formal ties began. During the Second World War, Roosevelt reached out to the Indian nationalist movement to convey American support for independence; India\u2019s leadership hoped for a productive relationship after <em>swaraj<\/em>. Expectations were not met \u2014 not primarily through direct conflict, but owing to <span class=\"n-term\">divergent worldviews, disparities in national priorities, and imbalances in power capabilities<\/span>, pronounced until the Cold War ended. Neither country proved critical to the vital interests of the other, though the power gap meant New Delhi would always depend more on Washington than the reverse.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> \u2192 the history is as complex as it is varied, distinguished by a largely unsuccessful search for common ground. Like the proverbial blind men and the elephant, both nations spent five decades construing the relationship in ways that mystified and displeased the other. Leaders on both sides called this era <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018the fifty wasted years\u2019<\/span> or <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018the lost half-century\u2019<\/span>. Nehru, on his 1949 visit, called India and the USA <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018natural allies\u2019<\/span> \u2014 a sentiment later repeated by PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three phases, three labels \u2014 the standard scholarly shorthand<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Estranged \u2192 Entente \u2192 Engaged.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Estranged Democracies<\/span> (<span class=\"n-term\">Dennis Kux<\/span> \u2014 much of the Cold War) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Entente Phase<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2014 after the 2005\u201308 civil-nuclear breakthrough) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Engaged Democracies<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> \u2014 present \u2014 China\u2019s rise, Russia\u2019s resurgence, West Asian volatility, India\u2019s post-1991 liberalisation).<\/p>\n<p>During PM Modi\u2019s 2023 visit, US President <span class=\"n-sch\">Joe Biden<\/span> called the partnership among the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cmost consequential in the world\u201d<\/span>.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The relationship moved from bilateral engagement to a <span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership<\/span> without any mutual defence obligation. India\u2019s opposition to US positions on Russia, Iran and Syria, where they clash with Indian interests or regional peace, shows the partnership operates without subordination.<\/li>\n<li>Alliance would impose restrictions on India\u2019s freedom of manoeuvre and contradict its long-standing non-aligned position; India demands equality, mutual respect and independent decision-making. Deep in capability, shallow in obligation \u2014 and both sides currently prefer it that way.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-interests-in-the-united-states\">India\u2019s Interests in the United States<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A free, open and rules-bound Indo-Pacific; the Quad; rapid growth in arms sales, co-development and technology sharing. Broad convergence between India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> and the USA\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">rebalancing to Asia<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s ambition to be a regional hegemon and <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018net security provider\u2019<\/span>; China\u2019s rise challenges this, creating convergence. US support for reform of global governance institutions and for a permanent UNSC seat.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Large trade and investment potential; commerce serves not only monetary gain but a mutually consonant geo-strategic agenda. India\u2019s economic rise benefits the USA; American technological strength helps India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Science, technology, space<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Space, defence, medicine, agriculture, health.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Climate &amp; disaster management<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Mitigation and adaptation, renewable energy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Higher education<\/span><\/td>\n<td>University collaboration, Fulbright-Nehru fellowships, student exchange, to tap the fourth industrial revolution.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"relations-during-the-cold-war\">Relations during the Cold War<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2192 structural realities placed Washington and New Delhi in <span class=\"n-term\">antinomic positions<\/span>. The U.S. was the global hegemon and protagonist of capitalism; India a weak polity facing structural challenges at home and abroad, an aspiring \u2018great power\u2019 needing a peaceful environment for development.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 India was a <span class=\"n-term\">discontented middle power<\/span> with the grand strategy of <span class=\"n-term\">non-alignment<\/span>. New Delhi saw US-Soviet competition in the subcontinent as challenging its pre-eminence as the \u2018natural\u2019 successor to the British Raj and its rightful role as postcolonial South Asia\u2019s security manager. India\u2019s developmental burden and its status as a civilizational-state marked by <em>Kantian pacifism<\/em> pushed it to seek the advantages of alignment with stronger powers while avoiding the restrictive commitments that come with it.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Nehru\u2019s formulation<\/span>: non-alignment ensured the freedom to choose \u2018when the choices come to it\u2019. <span class=\"n-sch\">Appadorai<\/span> \u2192 Nehru held that non-alignment did not preclude preferential partnerships; India could be closer to some countries than others, provided it did not get stuck in ideological blocs.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The alliance architecture that damaged ties<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Pact<\/th>\n<th>Members &amp; purpose<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Baghdad Pact (1955)<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan<\/span>, Iran \u2014 to prevent communist incursions and secure peace in West Asia; renamed <span class=\"n-term\">CENTO<\/span> in 1959 after Iraq withdrew.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">SEATO (Sept 1954)<\/span><\/td>\n<td>United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, <span class=\"n-term\">Pakistan<\/span> \u2014 to prevent communism from gaining ground.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2192 the non-alignment associational model made sense from India\u2019s viewpoint but could not persuade the United States at the peak of Cold War rivalry. Washington wanted India inside the capitalist alliance; India\u2019s frequent criticism of the U.S. on international issues made harmony untenable. US admission of Pakistan into anti-Soviet alliances imposed heightened defence burdens on New Delhi when it could least afford them. <span class=\"n-term\">US support for Pakistan and rapprochement with China<\/span> became the most acute irritant, and a principal reason ties never reached the epitome of friendship.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Other Cold War irritants<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India saw the U.S. as the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018heir\u2019 to British imperialism<\/span> rather than a champion of post-colonial states \u2014 a perception strongest under the Eisenhower administration.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Nehru\u2019s socialist outlook<\/span> \u2014 attraction to the Soviet planned command economy, dislike of the capitalist model he associated with colonialism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Pokhran-I (1974)<\/span> \u2014 the first nuclear explosion outside the NPT framework, souring ties for over thirty years.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Aneek Chatterjee<\/span> \u2192 the U.S., despite sharing liberal democracy with India, followed a different discourse of pulls and pressures during the Cold War, driven by national interest. It had no hesitation in aligning with Pakistan, ruled for long spells by military dictatorships, and later with communist China. From <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> to <span class=\"n-sch\">Chandra Shekhar<\/span>, no Indian Prime Minister of the Cold War era succeeded in building intimate relations with the United States. Major areas of difference \u2014 US zeal to contain communism; India\u2019s rejection of bloc-building; American branding of India as a Soviet supporter and Indian perception of American hegemony; US funding of Pakistan; the non-proliferation regime, which India condemned as unfair and unequal; and the mismatch between Indian socialism and the American market economy.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"relations-after-the-end-of-the-cold-war\">Relations after the End of the Cold War<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India had to reorient foreign policy away from Nehruvian roots toward a posture compatible with the Western world order. The disintegration of the USSR removed the security umbrella; the balance of payments crisis and domestic upheaval made restructuring unavoidable.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 the upward trajectory began when <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Gandhi<\/span> explored new cooperation with the United States in late 1984. With the global revolution in information technology, India needed electronics, computer software and telecommunications \u2014 areas where America vastly outperformed the Soviet Union. Washington had its own reasons: the Reagan administration was eager to drive wedges between Moscow and its allies.<\/li>\n<li>India dovetailed its reform agenda with the Clinton administration\u2019s grand strategy of <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018engagement and enlargement\u2019<\/span>, helped by the political clout of a growing and prosperous Indo-American community.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 military collaboration began with the 1995 <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018Agreed Minute on Defence Relations\u2019<\/span>; between 1995 and 1998 came joint naval exercises, an air force pilot exchange programme and cooperative military training. US IMET funding for India doubled over the same years.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Aneek Chatterjee<\/span> \u2192 \u201copposing foreign policy objectives and national interest continued to keep the two democracies apart even after the end of the Cold War\u201d. The 1998 tests and India\u2019s refusal to sign the NPT and CTBT allowed the U.S. to stay away; human rights became a disturbing area during the Rao period.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">De-hyphenation<\/span> of India and Pakistan was the decisive shift \u2014 drivers included the Kargil misadventure of 1999, the military coup, Pakistan\u2019s patronage of the Taliban, and evidence of nuclear leakage to North Korea. Clinton\u2019s 2000 visit signalled a regional orientation away from the Cold War alliance with Pakistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"relations-in-the-twenty-first-century\">Relations in the Twenty-First Century<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>After <span class=\"n-term\">9\/11<\/span>, India offered air bases, refuelling and maintenance support, overflight rights, intelligence cooperation and port facilities. Washington hesitated because it needed Pakistan for <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Enduring Freedom<\/span>, but the offer showed Cold War habits of mind were fading. <span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2192 since the early twenty-first century, security relations have matured beyond the inhibitions of the Cold War.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">NSSP (2004)<\/span> eased restrictions on India\u2019s access to US technology in four areas \u2014 dual-use items, civilian nuclear applications, civilian space cooperation, ballistic missile defence.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">2005 ten-year security agreement<\/span> covered planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expansion of two-way defence trade, technology transfer and co-production, and missile defence. Purchases followed \u2014 USS Trenton, six C-130J Hercules, P-8I Poseidon. The crowning achievement was the <span class=\"n-term\">civil nuclear deal<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">NSG waiver<\/span>, making it legal for American firms to supply nuclear technology, fuel, reactors and equipment \u2014 India the only country outside the NPT with nuclear capabilities permitted to participate in nuclear commerce, with at least eight facilities kept outside safeguards for military purposes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u2018It is now official. It is the policy of the United States to help India to become a major world power in the 21st century.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>David Mulford, 2005<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Entente, not alliance \u2014 Devin T. Hagerty<\/span><\/p>\n<p>By 2009 relations had blossomed into an <span class=\"n-term\">entente<\/span>. Compared to alliances, ententes are relatively informal, frequently not articulated in treaties, and leave partners greater flexibility about support in specific instances of threat or aggression.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 a unique constellation of factors changed the relationship \u2014 <em>systemic<\/em> (end of the Cold War, unipolarity, the rise of China); <em>domestic<\/em> (opening of the Indian economy, structural adjustment); <em>political<\/em> (change of government, with the BJP\u2019s pro-West approach and slighter commitment to non-alignment).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> on the second level \u2192 after <span class=\"n-term\">Obama<\/span> took office in 2008 there was a strong perception in India that he might be less committed to the entente than President Bush \u2014 Democratic presidents historically pressed harder on Kashmir and proliferation, Republicans were more pragmatic. Obama\u2019s early Asia policy prioritised US-China relations, and in South Asia, Pakistan, owing to the Afghan war.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018strategic autonomy\u2019<\/span> remains a key determinant. India has appreciated since 1962 the necessity of powerful friends against China, yet colonial history instils caution about alliances that might jeopardise hard-won sovereignty. By default New Delhi engages in what may be characterised as <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018neo-nonalignment\u2019<\/span> \u2014 a grand strategy of exclusion.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 after the 2010 review of Afghan policy, the U.S. shifted focus back to India, reaffirming the Bush commitment to support India\u2019s ascent to great-power status and recognising India as a central player in the future administration of Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Rebalance to Asia<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Not a foreign policy or military doctrine but a <span class=\"n-term\">grand-strategic concept<\/span>, identifying broad US strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific and guiding diplomatic, economic and defence priorities.<\/li>\n<li>Not fundamentally new \u2014 a restoration of the high priority accorded to the Asia-Pacific since 1941, when the U.S. maintained <span class=\"n-term\">forward engagement<\/span> through the Second World War and the Cold War.<\/li>\n<li>Announced in 2011 as a <span class=\"n-term\">hedging strategy<\/span> driven by China\u2019s growing power, rhetorical arrogance during the US financial crisis, and assertion of claims in the South China Sea.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hillary Clinton<\/span> in New Delhi urged her hosts <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018not just to look East, but to engage East and act East as well\u2019<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Leon Panetta<\/span> \u2192 defence trade should move beyond the buyer-seller relationship to substantial co-production and eventually high-technology joint research and development.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"relations-in-the-modi-years\">Relations in the Modi Years<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Kashish Parpiani and Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Under PM Narendra Modi, India has moved from its historical fixation with <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018strategic autonomy\u2019<\/span> \u2014 a ghost of its non-aligned past \u2014 to <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018strategic alignment\u2019<\/span>. Autonomy has been redefined \u201cas an objective that is attainable through strengthened partnerships instead of avoiding partnerships.\u201d The shift reflects pragmatism and realism based on \u2018enlightened self-interest\u2019. India therefore has no hesitation in finding common ground with China to defend globalisation against America First protectionism, while embracing the United States on other issues.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The doctrinal move that most 15-markers now turn on<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>STRATEGIC AUTONOMY<\/th>\n<th>STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>autonomy by avoiding partnerships \u2014 the non-aligned inheritance<\/td>\n<td>autonomy through strengthened partnerships \u2014 \u2018enlightened self-interest\u2019<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Appadorai<\/span> \u00b7 neo-nonalignment (<span class=\"n-sch\">Hagerty<\/span>)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Parpiani<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Chikermane<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li>Growing convergence on a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cfree and open\u201d Indo-Pacific<\/span>, with consensus in India\u2019s strategic community that the U.S. is India\u2019s \u201cmost important partner\u201d. The alignment also has realpolitik relevance: even amid relative economic decline, the United States is positioned to dominate militarily.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2014<\/span> \u2014 Modi\u2019s vision statement, \u2018<em>chalein saath saath<\/em>, forward together we go\u2019.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Jan 2015<\/span> \u2014 Obama\u2019s visit adopts the <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region<\/span>, the first joint articulation of regional challenges.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2016<\/span> \u2014 address to Congress; relations have overcome the <em>\u201chesitations of history\u201d<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2017<\/span> \u2014 Modi\u2019s visit covers Afghanistan, North Korea, West Asia, Pakistan, the Indo-Pacific, export control regimes, the UNSC, cyberspace, reaffirmation of <span class=\"n-term\">Major Defence Partner<\/span> status, and US observer membership of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Biden years<\/span> \u2014 Biden opposed sanctions after 1998, urged their removal in 2001, and helped seal the nuclear deal in 2008. As President he upgraded the Quad to summit level and launched <span class=\"n-term\">I2U2<\/span> (India, Israel, UAE, United States). A framework on critical and emerging technologies followed the July 2022 joint statement.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2022<\/span> \u2014 the U.S. <span class=\"n-term\">National Defense Strategy<\/span> recognises the importance of partnership with India. India does not join US condemnation or sanctions on Russia; the U.S. shows understanding of India\u2019s compulsions and expresses interest in being \u2018partner of choice\u2019 in virtually any field.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Feb 2023<\/span> \u2014 Air India\u2013Boeing deal for over 200 American-made aircraft. <span class=\"n-term\">Sept 2023<\/span> \u2014 the U.S. response to the Canadian allegations against India is restrained despite Canada being a critical ally. <span class=\"n-term\">Oct 2023 onward<\/span> \u2014 the Israel-Hamas conflict may delay the proposed Middle East-India transport corridor and I2U2 initiatives.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Nov 2023 2+2<\/span> \u2014 countering China through military and non-military tools; strengthening India\u2019s military; reducing technological dependence on China; trade, clean energy, higher education and health; the long-run viability of India\u2019s Russia ties.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Chikermane<\/span> \u2192 Modi inherited a US$2 trillion economy and strategic goodwill from nuclear cooperation, and used both. This convergence of size, strategy and policy has been timely for the U.S. as it seeks a partner of trust, disengages from Pakistan and de-risks from China.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"trump-2-0-tariffs-repair-and-the-hemispheric-turn\">Trump 2.0 \u2014 Tariffs, Repair and the Hemispheric Turn<\/h3>\n<p>Within months of 2025 Washington placed a cumulative <span class=\"n-term\">50 per cent<\/span> tariff on Indian goods, part of it a penalty for buying Russian oil, and claimed a mediating role in the India\u2013Pakistan clash of May 2025. The question that runs through the episode: a passing crisis that multi-alignment could absorb, or a strain on strategic autonomy itself?<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Tariff escalation and India\u2019s restraint<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Date<\/th>\n<th>Measure<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2 Apr 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Executive Order 14257<\/span> set a baseline <span class=\"n-term\">10%<\/span> reciprocal tariff; steel and aluminium duties rose to <span class=\"n-term\">50%<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Aug 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A <span class=\"n-term\">25%<\/span> reciprocal tariff on Indian goods took effect.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">6 Aug 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">EO 14329<\/span> added a <span class=\"n-term\">25%<\/span> penalty over Russian oil (effective 27 August), reaching the <span class=\"n-term\">50%<\/span> cumulative rate. It was the first US <span class=\"n-term\">\u201csecondary tariff\u201d<\/span> \u2014 penalising one country for its trade with another.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Legal basis<\/span> \u2014 the penalty invoked <span class=\"n-term\">IEEPA<\/span> and a \u201cnational emergency\u201d first declared in EO 14066 (2022). EO 14329 found India \u201cdirectly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s rebuttal<\/span> \u2014 the MEA (6 August 2025) called the tariffs <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cunfair, unjustified and unreasonable\u201d<\/span> and framed oil imports as energy security for 1.4 billion people. India did <span class=\"n-term\">not retaliate<\/span>, and issued no further statement after the second tariff round.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The February 2026 settlement \u2014 contested and unfinished<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2 Feb 2026<\/span> \u2014 Trump and Modi announced a framework for an <span class=\"n-term\">Interim Agreement<\/span>; the reciprocal rate was cut to <span class=\"n-term\">18%<\/span> from the 50% peak, and India signalled intent to buy <span class=\"n-term\">$500 billion<\/span> of US goods over five years. An executive order of 6 February 2026 removed the Russian-oil penalty, effective 7 February.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Statement carried no explicit Indian commitment on Russian oil<\/span>, even as Washington claimed one.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">20 Feb 2026<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">US Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA \u201creciprocal\u201d tariff authority<\/span>. On 24 February the US imposed a temporary <span class=\"n-term\">10% blanket tariff<\/span> on all partners for 150 days, expiring 24 July 2026. As of mid-2026 the interim pact remained unsigned. Modi and Trump met at the <span class=\"n-term\">G7 in France on 17 June 2026<\/span>, their first meeting in over a year.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The hemispheric turn \u2014 NSS 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">National Security Strategy<\/span> (December 2025) named the <span class=\"n-term\">Western Hemisphere<\/span> the top priority and America\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cstrategic rear\u201d<\/span>, reviving the <span class=\"n-term\">Monroe Doctrine<\/span> through a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cTrump Corollary\u201d<\/span>; US actions over Venezuela and Greenland followed.<\/li>\n<li>India was named <span class=\"n-term\">four times<\/span> \u2014 against seven in 2022 and eight in 2017 \u2014 described as a Quad partner for balancing China. The <span class=\"n-term\">2026 National Defense Strategy made no mention of India or the Quad<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s diversification<\/span> \u2014 a trade agreement with the United Kingdom (July 2025); an FTA with the European Union announced (January 2026) alongside a security and defence partnership with the EU; Modi at the SCO summit (September 2025); Putin in Delhi (December 2025); and a renewed <span class=\"n-term\">ten-year India\u2013US defence framework<\/span> (October 2025).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The argument \u2014 autonomy eroded or vindicated?<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shoumitro Chatterjee<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The episode proves that India\u2019s post-2017 inward turn had raised the cost of relying on the home market.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Konark Bhandari<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s response was <span class=\"n-term\">tactical altruism<\/span> \u2014 offering concessions without demanding an immediate return.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Elizabeth Threlkeld, Daniel Markey<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Akriti Vasudeva Kalyankar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The long standoff let China, Russia, Pakistan and Europe each gain ground.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India absorbed the pressure, kept growing, and reached what they call <span class=\"n-term\">greater parity<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Equidistance can read as disengagement, leaving India short of <span class=\"n-term\">strategic indispensability<\/span>; the prescription is a more proactive, less passive autonomy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Milan Vaishnav<\/span> and co-authors<\/td>\n<td>Tactical adjustment rather than strategic rupture \u2014 the volatility of Trump 2.0 confirmed the value of spreading India\u2019s bets.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nivedita Kapoor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trump 2.0 <span class=\"n-term\">strengthened<\/span> rather than weakened the logic of the India\u2013Russia partnership.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sujan R. Chinoy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A break with the post-1945 UN order and a return to sovereignty-first Westphalian thinking, capped by US primacy; India\u2019s four mentions signal a transactional tone, not a real fall in importance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajeesh Kumar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Tracks the hemispheric rise across the 2017, 2022 and 2025 strategies to the rank of America\u2019s strategic rear.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rachel Rizzo<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Burden-shifting<\/span> \u2014 the strategy expects partners to carry regional security themselves, placing new weight on India in the Indo-Pacific while also opening space for a larger Indian role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trump\u2019s appetite for a deal with Beijing revived New Delhi\u2019s fear of a <span class=\"n-term\">US\u2013China condominium<\/span>; Trump 2.0 did not change the structural logic of India\u2019s China policy, but complicated the ground on which it runs.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIndia\u2019s response to Trump 2.0 has been characterized less by strategic rupture than by tactical adjustment.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Milan Vaishnav (ed.), Carnegie Endowment<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe key lesson for India from the recent downturn in relations with the United States is that it needs to develop a more proactive rather than passive approach towards its strategic autonomy.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Chietigj Bajpaee<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of Cooperation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The U.S. is India\u2019s top trading partner at <span class=\"n-term\">$130bn<\/span> in goods; India is Washington\u2019s eighth largest partner. Exports to the U.S. rose <span class=\"n-term\">2.81%<\/span> to USD 78.31 billion in 2022-23 against USD 76.18 billion in 2021-22; imports grew about <span class=\"n-term\">16%<\/span> to USD 50.24 billion.<\/li>\n<li>In 2020-21 the U.S. was India\u2019s largest export destination and second-largest trading partner. India holds a <span class=\"n-term\">trade surplus<\/span> with the United States, a distinction held by few countries, and is the sixth-largest supplier of services imports, near 5% of US services imports.<\/li>\n<li>Bilateral goods and services trade grew more than 10% per annum over two years to <span class=\"n-term\">USD 142 billion in 2018<\/span>. US direct investment about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 44.5 billion<\/span>; Indian FDI in the U.S. about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 18 billion<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Trade surplus of <span class=\"n-term\">$28 billion<\/span> in 2022-23; a declared trade target of <span class=\"n-term\">$500 billion<\/span>; agreement on a transitional approach to the <span class=\"n-term\">Equalization Levy<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Political, geopolitical and multilateral<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Close cooperation in the UN, G-20, ASEAN Regional Forum, IMF, World Bank and WTO; US support for a permanent UNSC seat and for NSG membership.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">QUAD<\/span> with Australia and Japan; India among twelve countries in <span class=\"n-term\">IPEF<\/span>, joining the Overarching Agreement and Pillars 3 (Clean Economy) and 4 (Fair Economy) in 2024.<\/li>\n<li>Hotline between the PMO and the White House (2015). India a member of <span class=\"n-term\">IORA<\/span>, the U.S. a dialogue partner. The U.S. joined the <span class=\"n-term\">International Solar Alliance<\/span> in 2021 and India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Blue Dot Network<\/span> certification of sustainable, transparent infrastructure as an alternative to the BRI; <span class=\"n-term\">Minerals Security Partnership<\/span> for critical mineral supply chains.<\/li>\n<li>Joint condemnation of cross-border terrorism, with calls for Pakistan to act against groups on its territory.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Defence and security<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Defence Policy Group (1995)<\/span> upgraded to the <span class=\"n-term\">New Defence Framework Agreement (2005)<\/span>; a 10-year framework signed 2005 and renewed 2015; Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation 2013.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Major Defence Partner<\/span> designation (2016); <span class=\"n-term\">STA-1<\/span> status (2018), India the third Asian country to receive licence-free access to space and defence technology; support for entry into the <span class=\"n-term\">MTCR (2016)<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Wassenaar Arrangement (2017)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Australia Group (2018)<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Exercises<\/span> \u2014 Yudh Abhyas, Vajra Prahar, Red Flag, Cope India, Tarkash, Tiger Triumph, Blue Flag; <span class=\"n-term\">Malabar<\/span> with the navies since 1992, Japan a permanent participant from 2015; multilateral RIMPAC. India conducts more bilateral exercises with the U.S. than with any other country. The U.S. renamed its Pacific Command <span class=\"n-term\">USINDOPACOM<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Acquisitions<\/span> \u2014 aggregate defence acquisition crossed US$ 16 billion; defence trade climbed from under USD 1 billion in 2008 to over <span class=\"n-term\">USD 25 billion by mid-2025<\/span>, including C-17s, C-130Js, Apaches and Chinooks; the US$ 3bn <span class=\"n-term\">MQ-9B Predator<\/span> deal (2023), to be assembled in India under \u2018Make in India\u2019.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">DTTI (2012)<\/span> for co-development and co-production; negotiations begun on a <span class=\"n-term\">Reciprocal Defence Procurement<\/span> agreement and a <span class=\"n-term\">Security of Supply<\/span> arrangement.<\/li>\n<li>India joined the US-led <span class=\"n-term\">Combined Maritime Forces<\/span> as an associate partner (2023); launched <span class=\"n-term\">INDUS-X<\/span> (2023) linking defence start-ups; and began the <span class=\"n-term\">Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET)<\/span> (2023) covering AI, quantum, space, telecom and semiconductors.<\/li>\n<li>The Indian Navy and US Naval Forces Central Command are deepening maritime cooperation in the <span class=\"n-term\">Western Indian Ocean<\/span>, where Chinese presence at <span class=\"n-term\">Gwadar<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Djibouti<\/span> concerns India. <span class=\"n-term\">Cybersecurity<\/span> \u2014 the India-U.S. Cyber Framework (2016); Cyber Security Dialogue and Joint Working Group on ICT.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Science, technology and space<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">IUSSTF<\/span> (2000); India-US Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (2005); Indo-U.S. Science &amp; Technology Joint Commission.<\/li>\n<li>India contributed <span class=\"n-term\">$250 million<\/span> to the <span class=\"n-term\">Thirty-Meter Telescope Project<\/span> in Hawaii; <span class=\"n-term\">IndiGO<\/span> with the U.S. LIGO Laboratory.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Micron Technology<\/span> to invest up to <span class=\"n-term\">$825m<\/span> in a semiconductor assembly and test facility; <span class=\"n-term\">Lam Research<\/span> to train 60,000 Indian engineers.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Space<\/span> \u2014 first U.S.-manufactured sounding rocket launched from Thumba in 1963; the first four INSAT satellites built by U.S. industry; two NASA instruments on <em>Chandrayaan-1<\/em>; Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation; Mars Orbiter Mission collaboration; <span class=\"n-term\">NISAR<\/span>; Raytheon\u2019s role in <span class=\"n-term\">GAGAN<\/span>; India\u2019s signing of the <span class=\"n-term\">Artemis Accords<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Joint production of <span class=\"n-term\">F414 jet engines<\/span> by General Electric in India; AI-enabled cancer and diabetes research with the U.S. National Cancer Institute.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Energy, climate, civil nuclear<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">U.S.-India Energy Dialogue<\/span> (2005) with six working groups; the <span class=\"n-term\">Strategic Energy Partnership<\/span> (2018) and the Natural Gas Task Force (2018). India began importing US crude in 2017 and LNG in 2018; crude and LNG imports valued at about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 6.7 billion<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The 40-year ban on American oil exports lifted in December 2015; India\u2019s first cargo of 1.6 million barrels arrived in 2017. Reliance, Essar and GAIL invested about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 5 billion<\/span> in US shale assets.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">PACE<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Center<\/span>; Climate Change Working Group; Joint Working Group on Hydrofluorocarbon; <span class=\"n-term\">U.S.-India Partnership for Climate Resilience<\/span>; <span class=\"n-term\">U.S.-India Climate Fellowship Program<\/span>; both members of the ISA.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Civil nuclear<\/span> \u2014 agreement signed October 2008; a Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group on R&amp;D has met ten times; <span class=\"n-term\">Westinghouse<\/span> in discussion with NPCIL for six AP-1000 reactors at <span class=\"n-term\">Kovvada<\/span>. Implementation had stalled in the Indian Parliament over <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear liability<\/span>: the Civil Liability for <span class=\"n-law\">Nuclear Damage Act, 2010<\/span> was incompatible with global practice, which directs liability to plant operators rather than suppliers. The impasse was resolved only in <span class=\"n-term\">January 2015<\/span>, when Obama and Modi announced that all remaining issues stood settled \u2014 domestic legislative politics delaying a systemic-level bargain by half a decade.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Higher education and people-to-people<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>IIT Kanpur established with nine American universities and USAID (1962); <span class=\"n-term\">Fulbright-Nehru<\/span> fellowships with joint funding since 2008, nearly 200 awards annually \u2014 the largest US Fulbright Scholar Program in the world.<\/li>\n<li>About <span class=\"n-term\">130,000<\/span> Indian students pursuing advanced degrees; more than <span class=\"n-term\">200,000<\/span> across courses. Higher Education Dialogue; community colleges for skill development; Technology Enabled Learning and MOOCs; <span class=\"n-term\">GIAN<\/span>, hosting up to 1000 American academics a year.<\/li>\n<li>Negotiations for a <span class=\"n-term\">Cultural Property Agreement<\/span> to prevent trafficking of cultural artefacts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the role of Indian diaspora in promoting Indo-US relations.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-role-of-indian-diaspora-in-promoting-indo-us-relations-upsc-psir-2013-4503\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-four-foundational-agreements\">The Four Foundational Agreements<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The ladder of interoperability \u2014 eighteen years, four agreements.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">GSOMIA \u00b7 2002<\/span> (information security) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">LEMOA \u00b7 2016<\/span> (logistics exchange) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">COMCASA \u00b7 2018<\/span> (secure communications) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">BECA \u00b7 2020<\/span> (geospatial data)<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Agreement<\/th>\n<th>What it does<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">GSOMIA<\/span> 2002<\/td>\n<td>Prescribed security standards and protocols for safeguarding information shared by the Pentagon with India\u2019s defence ministry and by US defence firms with Indian DPSUs. It did <span class=\"n-em\">not<\/span> cover Indian private companies.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">LEMOA<\/span> 2016<\/td>\n<td>Allows both to replenish from each other\u2019s designated military facilities: food, water, billet, transportation, petroleum, oil, lubricants, clothing, medical services, spare parts, repair and maintenance, and training services.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">COMCASA<\/span> 2018<\/td>\n<td>Originally CISMOA, renamed to make it India-specific. Secure military communication; raises the ability to communicate safely with US-made equipment used by foreign militaries such as Japan and Australia. Data acquired cannot be transferred without India\u2019s consent.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">BECA<\/span> 2020<\/td>\n<td>Between the <span class=\"n-term\">National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency<\/span> and India\u2019s Ministry of Defence. Sharing of geomagnetic and gravity data, maps, nautical and aeronautical charts, and imagery; high-quality GPS for navigation and precision targeting, with safeguards on classified satellite and sensor data.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Explain the significance of Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement (BECA) for Indo-US strategic relations.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/explain-the-significance-of-basic-exchange-and-co-operation-upsc-psir-2022-4507\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cBECA is expected to elevate the India-US strategic\/defence partnership to an unprecedented mega level. It is one of the agreements that the US usually signs with its closest partners as it allows the interoperability of armed forces and the exchange of classified sensitive information.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Harris Bilal Malik<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Timing<\/span> \u2192 signed at the third 2+2 Dialogue with Mike Pompeo and Mark Esper, a week before the US election \u2014 an unambiguous political signal that the defence partnership had come of age (<span class=\"n-sch\">Rakesh Sood<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Limits<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Sinha<\/span>: the U.S. is not obliged to provide geospatial data in every circumstance and is unlikely to assist in any venture relating to Pakistan; obligingness on China may not survive a change of administration. <span class=\"n-sch\">Abhijnan Rej<\/span>: significant obstacles remain to seamless interoperability; India\u2019s appetite for Russian weapon systems is a sticking point from Washington\u2019s perspective.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span> \u2192 BECA raises capability and interoperability without creating an alliance obligation \u2014 which suits India\u2019s preference for entente over alliance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the significance of Indo-US strategic partnership and its implications for India\u2019s security and national defence.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-significance-of-indo-us-strategic-partnership-and-its-upsc-psir-2020-4505\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-concern-and-contestation\">Areas of Concern and Contestation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Lingering trust issues<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 Indian strategic elites remain sceptical of US bona fides. Even while acknowledging US support for India\u2019s great-power aspirations and its UNSC bid, the perception of Washington as a historically unpredictable partner cannot be entirely dispelled \u2014<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Episode<\/th>\n<th>What happened<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1965<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Shortly after establishing a military supply line to India after the 1962 Chinese invasion, the U.S. imposed an arms transfer embargo on both India and Pakistan when the 1965 war broke out.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1971<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The U.S. supported Pakistan diplomatically and militarily and sent the <span class=\"n-term\">USS Enterprise<\/span> into the Indian Ocean.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1978<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Washington cancelled fuel supply contracts for <span class=\"n-term\">Tarapur<\/span>, scuttling a promising friendship with the Carter administration.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">1998<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Clinton cancelled military supply licences after India\u2019s nuclear tests.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p>Indian scientists and technocrats who rose during years of technology denial advise vigilance against dependence on Washington for sophisticated weaponry and nuclear fuel. The <span class=\"n-term\">Khobragade affair<\/span> showed residual mutual tone-deafness: Washington and New Delhi have not mastered the language of partners who expect occasional conflicts within a permanently stable relationship.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Trade and economic frictions<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Alyssa Ayres<\/span> \u2192 bilateral trade deficits, previously not a top US concern, became a major focus under the Trump administration. In 2019, India, with a goods deficit of <span class=\"n-term\">$23.3 billion<\/span>, was the eleventh largest for the U.S.<\/li>\n<li>2018 tariffs of <span class=\"n-term\">25%<\/span> on steel and <span class=\"n-term\">10%<\/span> on aluminium; India\u2019s refusal to remove 20% tariffs on ICT products delayed the trade deal; challenges at the WTO on both sides; US complaints about customs clearance procedures.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">GSP withdrawal<\/span> covering around 2,000 items worth <span class=\"n-term\">$6.3 billion<\/span>; India retaliated with tariffs on 28 US products.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Data localisation<\/span> \u2014 the RBI circular mandating in-country storage of payment data with unrestricted central bank access, aimed at MasterCard, Visa, American Express, PayPal, Facebook and Google. India opted out of the <span class=\"n-term\">Osaka Track<\/span> on the digital economy, fearing erosion of consensus-based decision-making and of policy flexibility for digital industrialisation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Services<\/span> \u2014 Indian competitiveness against US market-access barriers such as limits on foreign ownership and local presence requirements; from India\u2019s side, temporary visa policy and worker visa fees; India seeks a <span class=\"n-term\">totalization agreement<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Agriculture<\/span> \u2014 long-standing and among the hardest to resolve. The U.S. exported around $1.5 billion of agricultural products to India in 2018 and imported $2.7 billion. US dairy exports are obstructed by India\u2019s requirement that dairy products come from cows fed a vegetarian diet throughout life.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Investment and IPR<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">USTR<\/span> objects to \u2018Make in India\u2019 and <em>Atmanirbhar Bharat<\/em>; US experts cite a restrictive FDI regime, opaque sectoral policy, high tariffs, limited state-level decision-making authority and exit barriers. India remains on the <span class=\"n-term\">Priority Watch List<\/span>; both are outside CPTPP and RCEP.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Immigration and visas<\/span> \u2014 during the Trump years immigration became a political lightning rod, with an across-the-board decline in international student enrolment. Indians were <span class=\"n-term\">17.9%<\/span> of foreign students in 2017-18, second only to Chinese nationals, contributing <span class=\"n-term\">US$7.5 billion<\/span>. India is the largest user of <span class=\"n-term\">H-1B<\/span> visas (67.4% of FY14 issuances) and among the largest users of <span class=\"n-term\">L1<\/span> (28.2%). Denials rose under \u201cBuy American and Hire American\u201d, with lower issuance of H-4 visas. Visa appointment waits average about <span class=\"n-term\">472 days<\/span> for business or tourist categories.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Defence and technology hurdles<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Breakthrough on <span class=\"n-term\">end-use monitoring<\/span> (July 2009) opened Indian modernisation programmes to US firms; most Indian defence organisations were removed from the \u2018Entity List\u2019 in 2011; DTTI followed in 2012.<\/li>\n<li>Setbacks: India rejected Boeing and Lockheed-Martin fighters in favour of the French <span class=\"n-term\">Dassault Rafale<\/span>; US firms complained of slow, delay-prone Indian assessment; Ambassador <span class=\"n-sch\">Timothy J. Roemer<\/span> complained about the absence of a \u2018two-way street\u2019.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Samir Lalwani<\/span> \u2192 \u201cIndian participants tended to view American concerns as cover for a narrow, self-interested effort to boost US arms sales without regard for optimal Indian defense-planning.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Interoperability concerns arising from Russian platforms; American fear that plugging a Russian air defence system into an Indian network carrying US hardware would let Moscow identify features of US platforms.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Sinha<\/span> \u2192 the U.S. is under no obligation to supply technology under <span class=\"n-term\">GSOMIA<\/span>; at the end of the day the U.S. is the giver and India the receiver.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Other concerns<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">RS Yadav<\/span>, in <em>India\u2019s Foreign Policy: Post-Cold War Years<\/em>, flags the S-400 purchase and CAATSA, mutual WTO non-compliance charges, and Indian price restrictions on imported medical devices, alongside the IPR regime as a trade restriction.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashok Malik<\/span> identifies further roadblocks: protectionism in the U.S.; divergent readings of Iran and West Asia, where India treats Iran as the link to Central Asia and Afghanistan while the U.S. treats it as a destabilising influence; the recurring American temptation of a compact with China, seen in Clinton\u2019s post-Pokhran remarks, Obama\u2019s G2 talk and Trump\u2019s early overtures; and American obsession with Russia at a time when India\u2019s economic engagement with Moscow is limited.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M. K. Narayanan<\/span> \u2192 the China-Russia-Pakistan nexus and a hardline Iran under <span class=\"n-term\">Ebrahim Raisi<\/span> all worked to India\u2019s disadvantage. Concerns voiced by some US politicians on human rights in Kashmir risk internationalising the issue.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-the-united-states-and-china\">India, the United States and China<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> \u2192 a growing India, a declining Pakistan and an increasingly powerful China combined to motivate the entente. One feature of the new American South Asia policy was the conceptual decoupling of India and Pakistan; <span class=\"n-term\">China<\/span>, not Pakistan, gradually emerged as the third party in the relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u2018when the first and second-ranked powers fight, the first often ardently courts the third.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Ashutosh Varshney, on \u2018a new triangle\u2019<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Shared concerns<\/span> \u2014 China\u2019s rapid growth, heavy investment in <span class=\"n-term\">military capabilities<\/span>, and progress in <span class=\"n-term\">artificial intelligence<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">5G telecommunications<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Condoleezza Rice<\/span>, well before the rebalance, argued the U.S. should pay closer attention to India as \u2018an element in China\u2019s calculation\u2019. The Bush administration recalibrated South Asia policy, counting India among the \u2018major powers\u2019 with Russia and China, and grooming India to support the U.S. against a rising China, in censuring Iran, and as a partner in controlling the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hillary Clinton<\/span> in Hanoi (July 2010) \u2192 \u201cthe United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia\u2019s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Technology hedging<\/span> \u2014 both banned <span class=\"n-term\">Huawei<\/span>, a company with suspected links to the PLA, protecting domestic 5G capability; Western companies moved out of China toward other Asian countries including India; the U.S. tightened market access for China after realising that increased trade had strengthened Beijing\u2019s hand, an area where India had already banned Chinese companies and apps.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Partnership for Quality Infrastructure<\/span> in the Indo-Pacific. America\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">national security strategy<\/span> under Biden reaffirmed China as its greatest threat.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> \u2192 there has been a conviction that a true India-US strategic partnership serves India\u2019s national interests in the changed geopolitical situation; though neither states it explicitly, China\u2019s ascent has been a significant motivating factor.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Doctrinal overlap<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span> against America\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">ARIA<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">FOIP<\/span>; a declassified <span class=\"n-term\">2018 US Indo-Pacific strategy paper<\/span> called for India to become \u201ca net security provider\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 India is \u201ckey to US efforts to preserve a stable balance in the Indo-Pacific\u201d, yet may keep the \u201cprincipled distance\u201d that safeguards strategic autonomy. Limits of \u2018natural\u2019 convergence: India\u2019s ties with Russia and Iran, the S-400 and CAATSA, trade and visa frictions, and Indian insistence on strategic autonomy.<\/li>\n<li>Residual worry in India that Washington does not share its concern over Chinese irredentism in the Himalayas and splits attention toward Russia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2016 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Comment on India\u2019s growing relationship with USA in the background of constrained relations between India and China.<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">The natural behaviour of India and the United States is likely to serve each other\u2019s interests. Hence, a deliberate strategy of dovetailing their efforts will obviously benefit both. Elaborate.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-natural-behaviour-of-india-and-the-united-states-is-likely-to-upsc-psir-2017-4502\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-russia-and-the-united-states\">India, Russia and the United States<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>With Western sanctions on Russia, Sino-Russian relations have moved from <span class=\"n-term\">enmity<\/span> to <span class=\"n-term\">d\u00e9tente<\/span> and now <span class=\"n-term\">entente<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> \u2192 India does not, and cannot, view deepening Sino-Russian relations as a zero-sum game. It engages both bilaterally and through the <span class=\"n-term\">RIC<\/span> grouping, the SCO and BRICS. Owing to the power imbalance, Russia frequently views India as a mechanism for balancing China.<\/li>\n<li>Sanctions after the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the invasion of Ukraine (2022) pushed Russia toward Chinese trade and investment. Russian investment in China is about <span class=\"n-term\">$1 billion<\/span>; Chinese investment in Russia is about ten times greater. China has extended economic influence westward into the Central Asian states through the SCO and the Belt and Road Initiative.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> \u2192 Russia created the <span class=\"n-term\">Eurasian Economic Union<\/span> as a defensive perimeter against Chinese pressure in the former Soviet space, yet China\u2019s economic weight gives Beijing the upper hand in any EEU-China relationship.<\/li>\n<li>The civil nuclear deal made China uneasy; New Delhi has built substantial military ties with Washington while stopping short of alliance or full endorsement of American Indo-Pacific formulations.<\/li>\n<li>The Ukraine crisis places New Delhi in an awkward midpoint between Russia, a longstanding politico-military legacy partner, and the West, a growing partner in a multipolar context. It has revived debate about what non-alignment, repackaged as \u2018strategic autonomy\u2019, really means.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Dual pressure<\/span> \u2014 from Russia as traditional ally and from the U.S. as Quad partner. India\u2019s economic interests lie largely with the U.S. and Europe; sentiment cannot substitute for interest calculation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-the-united-states-and-afghanistan\">India, the United States and Afghanistan<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 the withdrawal of US and NATO forces was the most important regional security issue preoccupying Indian strategic elites, with potential follow-on effects on the north-western subcontinent. India feared that, as after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the vacuum would produce the Taliban and terrorism \u2014 fears borne out in <span class=\"n-term\">2021<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M. K. Narayanan<\/span> \u2192 Biden\u2019s decision to fix a withdrawal date regardless of conditions inside Afghanistan facilitated the Taliban takeover. The \u201chorses for courses\u201d mantra in US foreign policy significantly affects India\u2019s strategic and security interests; the hasty withdrawal raised doubts about American credibility.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> \u2192 the exit told American allies that they count on US support when they most need it at their peril; the withdrawal compromised India\u2019s security.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Af-Pak<\/span> framing re-hyphenated the subcontinent at a time when India valued de-hyphenation, and rested on American dependence on Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom. India\u2019s response was to invest heavily in Afghan reconstruction and to seek land access to Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. India and Russia had earlier converged in supporting the <span class=\"n-term\">Northern Alliance<\/span>, which became the core of the US-backed resistance forces.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Consequences for India<\/span> \u2014 a strategic setback and a near-term triumph for the Taliban\u2019s chief backer, Pakistan; damage to India\u2019s heavy investments; and jeopardy to the long-standing goal of land access to Central Asia through a port and railway line via Iran and Afghanistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"views-of-scholars-the-united-states\">Views of Scholars \u2014 the United States<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>While convergence is improving, differences over India\u2019s stance on Russia, economic policies and human rights continue to pose challenges to fully realising the partnership\u2019s potential.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Varun Sivaram<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Divergent approaches to climate change commitments and responsibilities add another layer of friction.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Mukesh Aghi<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The removal of GSP benefits and high visa rejection rates are significant concerns, impacting economic and people-to-people linkages.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Aparna Pande<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u201cShared democratic values and converging strategic interests will continue to bind India and US together as partners despite some friction points in the relationship.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Arvind Panagariya<\/span><\/td>\n<td>\u201cRealizing the full potential of ties will depend on India undertaking structural reforms and the US dispelling concerns over reliability as a long-term partner.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2014 <em>Modi\u2019s World<\/em><\/td>\n<td>No longer defined solely by American priorities but a mutual partnership built on shared concerns over regional security; the 2005 nuclear initiative laid the groundwork for deeper defence and trade cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> \u2014 <em>Choices<\/em><\/td>\n<td>Tensions persist because of India\u2019s pursuit of strategic autonomy and its position on the US military presence in the region; India has used the relationship for its own national interests, particularly in defence and counter-terrorism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> \u2014 <em>The India Way<\/em><\/td>\n<td>India is a strategic partner, not a subordinate ally. \u201cThe India-US relationship is not about finding common ground on everything, but about aligning strategic interests and advancing shared goals.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2014 <em>How India Sees the World<\/em><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s soft power combined with American technological and military power can create a synergistic partnership. \u201cThe India-US partnership has been transformed from a transactional relationship to a more strategic and enduring alliance.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rakesh Sood<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The relationship has moved beyond the nuclear deal and defence to trade, climate change and cyber security.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sujan R. Chinoy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>What facilitated rapid defence development was the Major Defence Partner designation and American willingness to relax high-technology transfer rules through carve-outs such as STA Tier-1.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Yasheng Huang<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Tarun Khanna<\/span> (2003)<\/td>\n<td>\u201cIndia\u2019s homegrown entrepreneurs may give it a long-term advantage over a China hamstrung by inefficient banks and capital markets\u2026 it will also show the limits of the FDI-dependent approach China is pursuing.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India is \u201ckey to US efforts to preserve a stable balance in the Indo-Pacific.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Narendra Modi<\/span><\/td>\n<td>For the India\u2013US partnership \u201ceven the sky is not the limit.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cIndia and USA have become such strong strategic partners that they need not become formal allies.\u201d Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-and-usa-have-become-such-strong-strategic-partners-that-upsc-psir-2024-4510\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"theoretical-perspectives-india-us\">Theoretical Perspectives \u2014 India\u2013US<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Lens<\/th>\n<th>Application<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Realism<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Offensive realism emphasises power and security in shaping alliances. India and the U.S. aligned in response to the growing military threat from China; the Indo-Pacific strategy and defence cooperation illustrate security maximisation. \u201cIndia and the United States\u2019 cooperation is fundamentally driven by the imperative of countering <span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s rise<\/span>, a classical example of <span class=\"n-term\">balance-of-power politics<\/span>.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Liberalism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>International institutions, trade and cooperation matter \u2014 growth in trade and multilateral cooperation on climate change, technology transfer and global governance; participation in the UN and WTO with a focus on global public goods. \u201cThe increasing interdependence between India and the U.S. in trade, technology, and climate change represents the core of <span class=\"n-term\">liberal internationalism<\/span>.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Constructivism<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Ideas, identity and norms shape behaviour. India historically viewed the U.S. with suspicion over Pakistan; identities changed after the Cold War. \u201cThe India-US relationship is not just a function of strategic interests, but also a reflection of a shared <span class=\"n-term\">democratic identity<\/span> and mutual perceptions.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"policy-suggestions-india-us\">Policy Suggestions \u2014 India\u2013US<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> on the <span class=\"n-term\">post-2008 malaise<\/span>: the 2009 change of administration, Obama\u2019s early focus on China and \u2018Af-Pak\u2019, India\u2019s reluctance to compromise strategic autonomy, the policy exhaustion of the Manmohan Singh government, the long passage of the nuclear deal from agreement to execution, bureaucratic delays in arms sales, the rejection of American combat aircraft bids, and the Khobragade affair.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hillary Clinton<\/span> \u2192 less need for dramatic breakthroughs, more need for steady, focused cooperation to address differences and advance shared interests \u2014 daily, weekly and monthly collaboration that is not glamorous but strategically important.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 never stop negotiating and keep making deals, small or big; be ready to compromise, since India\u2019s opening bid tends to remain its final position while Americans split the difference and move on; strengthen economic capability and end protectionism; diversify trade options, including by finalising the <span class=\"n-term\">BTIA<\/span> with the EU.<\/li>\n<li>Create a platform for aspirational bilateral economic conversation \u2014 revive the long-delayed <span class=\"n-term\">U.S.-India Commercial Dialogue<\/span> or the underperforming <span class=\"n-term\">U.S.-India CEO Forum<\/span>. Reinvigorate engagement between <span class=\"n-term\">Parliament and Congress<\/span>; regular contact builds personal bonds that survive changes of government.<\/li>\n<li>The U.S. should announce a formal waiver of potential <span class=\"n-term\">CAATSA<\/span> sanctions over the S-400 and accommodate India\u2019s core policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment; India in turn should be cautious about steps that tangibly deepen strategic ties with Russia. Address the <span class=\"n-term\">visa appointment backlog<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Teresita Schaffer<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Howard Schaffer<\/span> (<em>India at a Global High Table<\/em>) \u2192 current strategic realities create strong imperatives for closer relations, yet India conducts foreign policy in a manner that is <span class=\"n-term\">preachy and prickly<\/span> \u2014 it lacks strategic culture, is known for exceptionalism, and does not always understand its own benefits. There is therefore a limit to which the U.S. can rely on India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The creative tension at the heart of it<\/span><\/p>\n<p>India needs US technology, markets and support to transform itself; the U.S. finds a stronger, more active India useful. India remains an awkward partner because its West Asian interests differ and its stage of development generates economic demands that strain American preferences. For India to function as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cswing state\u201d<\/span> in the Indo-Pacific, friction had to be minimised and the regional arms balance adjusted \u2014 and India\u2019s purchases of Russian oil mitigated the economic impact of the Ukraine war, while the defiant S-400 deal may have raised India\u2019s influence in the global arms market, where it is the largest buyer.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-quadrilateral-security-dialogue\">The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue<\/h3>\n<p>A mechanism facilitating dialogue between four major democracies of the Indo-Pacific \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Australia, Japan, India, the United States<\/span> \u2014 on regional security. It believes in openness, freedom of movement and respect for the rules-based international order.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From a tsunami relief group to a leaders\u2019 summit.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">2004<\/span> (Indian Ocean Tsunami \u2018core group\u2019 \u2014 over 200,000 dead across 14 countries) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2006\u201307<\/span> (Abe\u2019s \u2018arc of freedom and prosperity\u2019; \u2018confluence of the two seas\u2019) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2007<\/span> (First \u2018initial Quad\u2019 meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2021\u201322<\/span> (First in-person dialogue; summit level; Tokyo Summit initiatives)<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Origins<\/span> \u2014 India, Japan, the United States and Australia formed a tsunami \u2018core group\u2019 and began sending relief. Former Foreign Secretary <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> noted that \u2018India\u2019s full capabilities came as a surprise to the world\u2019, highlighting India\u2019s strength, leadership abilities and commitment to the Indo-Pacific. The humanitarian mission ended in mid-January 2005, but a new seedling had emerged.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Function<\/span> \u2014 there is a feeling that the Quad is an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, or a mechanism aimed at containing China, a defensive mechanism to reduce Chinese influence in Asia. China\u2019s continued militarisation of the South China Sea compels members to intensify defence cooperation, while the BRI encounters growing backlash and observers question its fiscal sustainability. The Trump administration identified China as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201crevisionist\u201d<\/span> power in its National Security Strategy, which says China seeks to replace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and reorder the region in its favour. <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cDecoupling\u201d<\/span> became a new foreign policy buzzword \u2014 shorthand for the American commitment, through taxes, tariffs and other punitive measures, to disentangle its companies and their technologies from Chinese supply chains.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Value for India<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span>) \u2014 through the Quad, India can counterbalance China\u2019s growing presence, including the BRI\u2019s port facilities in neighbouring countries that give rise to a sense of <span class=\"n-term\">encirclement<\/span>. With the Quad, India can rise above middle-power status and project influence beyond the Indo-Pacific. Act East and the Extended Neighbourhood policy boost engagement. Bilateral relations with \u2018like-minded\u2019 countries can be strengthened through information sharing agreements, arms exchange agreements and defence ties. Economically, the Quad makes India a preferred destination for investment, especially after COVID-19; in the post-pandemic order India is seen as a significant player because of <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018Vaccine Maitri\u2019<\/span>. The Quad has the potential to boost India\u2019s pharmaceutical prowess and assert its leadership through economic cooperation, shared democratic values and strong defence ties.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Chinese response<\/span> \u2014 Beijing equates the Quad with <span class=\"n-term\">AUKUS<\/span> as cliques strengthening the US Indo-Pacific strategy and threatening the Maritime Silk Road. <span class=\"n-term\">Russian response<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Sergey Lavrov<\/span> calls it an \u201cAsian NATO\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Limits<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> warns that coalition arrangements are not seamless and that India must simultaneously manage BRICS, the Quad and other groupings. The Quad remains deliberately non-aligned, which suits India\u2019s strategic autonomy and Japan\u2019s pacifist constitution \u2014 balance without entanglement, its value lying precisely in being a coalition rather than an alliance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Where the Quad stands now<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Strand<\/th>\n<th>Record<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Institutional arc<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Lapsed after 2008; revived at official level in <span class=\"n-term\">2017<\/span>; reached leader level in <span class=\"n-term\">March 2021<\/span>. Leaders\u2019 summits in 2021 (twice), 2022 Tokyo, 2023 Hiroshima, 2024 Wilmington. The India-hosted <span class=\"n-term\">2025 leaders\u2019 summit did not convene<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Wilmington Declaration<\/span> 21 Sept 2024<\/td>\n<td>Fourth in-person leaders\u2019 summit and the most recent leader-level statement to date. Called the Quad <span class=\"n-term\">\u201ca force for good\u201d<\/span> and opposed changing the status quo <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cby force or coercion\u201d<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Maritime deliverables<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Malabar with all four navies (2020); <span class=\"n-term\">HADR Partnership<\/span> (2022); <span class=\"n-term\">Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Maritime Legal Dialogue<\/span> (2024); <span class=\"n-term\">MAITRI<\/span> training initiative (2024).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">IPMDA<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Launched at the 2022 Tokyo Summit; uses commercial satellite radio-frequency data for near-real-time maritime awareness, delivered through the <span class=\"n-term\">Information Fusion Centre\u2013Indian Ocean Region, Gurugram<\/span>; tracks <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cdark shipping\u201d<\/span> and illegal fishing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2026 Foreign Ministers<\/span> 26 May 2026<\/td>\n<td>11th meeting, New Delhi; Jaishankar hosted Wong, Motegi and Rubio. Launched the <span class=\"n-term\">IPMSC<\/span> surveillance initiative, a <span class=\"n-term\">Critical Minerals Framework<\/span> and an <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Pacific Energy Security<\/span> statement.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">AUKUS and the \u201cSquad\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<td>AUKUS (2021: Australia, UK, US) and the Squad (Australia, Japan, Philippines, US) <span class=\"n-term\">both exclude India<\/span>; their harder maritime focus raises questions about the Quad\u2019s traditional-security role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Public goods, or a balancing coalition?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S. L. Narasimhan<\/span> \u2192 no member officially calls the Quad a security grouping; its only security-linked work covers cybersecurity and maritime security, both non-traditional. Two views compete on formalising it \u2014 a counterbalance to China, or like-minded states serving regional development. The second holds among members, so the Quad stays informal.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sayantan Haldar<\/span> \u2192 the grouping has a real maritime record that a narrow, militarised lens misjudges; it is <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cnot a military alliance nor a security bloc\u201d<\/span> but a partnership delivering maritime security as a global good.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span> \u2192 identifies a gradual <span class=\"n-term\">de-securitisation<\/span> of the Quad in traditional security; as AUKUS and the Squad take on harder maritime tasks, India risks becoming <span class=\"n-term\">\u201ca second-tier member\u201d<\/span> of the regional security order.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cweak link\u201d charge<\/span> \u2192 Australia, Japan and the United States are treaty allies, India is not; India has a contested land border with China and has declined freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea. Against that: logistics agreements signed, <span class=\"n-term\">BrahMos<\/span> sold to the Philippines, and the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award backed.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Kelly Grieco<\/span> \u2192 the limits are structural, not simply a Trump effect \u2014 India\u2019s insistence on autonomy caps how far the Quad can align, while Japan and Australia press for a harder security focus; the pledge of 1.2 billion vaccine doses fell short of 800 million. <span class=\"n-sch\">Akriti Vasudeva Kalyankar<\/span> reads the same moment as a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cstreamlined and focused\u201d<\/span> Quad that may deliver better.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe Quad has consistently been better at announcing initiatives than delivering results.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Kelly Grieco, 27 May 2026<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cWe strongly oppose any destabilizing or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>The Wilmington Declaration, 21 September 2024<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"growing-relations-with-the-united-states\">Growing Relations with the United States<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>From post-Cold War suspicion to close cooperation \u2014 the US is among India\u2019s largest trade and investment partners.<\/li>\n<li>Maritime and defence anchor: the Malabar exercise grew from bilateral to a quadrilateral with Japan and Australia; the <span class=\"n-term\">QUAD<\/span> and the institutional <span class=\"n-term\">2+2 dialogue<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The India\u2013US Civil Nuclear Agreement reshaped the strategic equation (India gave up the IPI pipeline for it).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s Indo-Pacific concept<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">SAGAR<\/span> \u2014 \u201cSecurity and Growth for All in the Region\u201d \u2014 and the Indo-Pacific Oceans\u2019 Initiative (<span class=\"n-term\">IPOI<\/span>, 2019), built on seven pillars, anchored on \u201cAct East\u201d and \u201cAct West.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The partnership coexists with <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>: India rejected US mediation on Kashmir and refused to criticise Russia over Ukraine, becoming the second-largest importer of Russian oil. The wider web runs through Japan, Vietnam, Australia and France, with ASEAN centrality at its core.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India maintains strong ties with countries that will assure a free and open Indo-Pacific and guarantee greater connectivity with the rest of the world. Analyze.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-maintains-strong-ties-with-countries-that-will-assure-a-upsc-psir-2025-4909\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-a-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting the US\u2019 offer of mediation on the Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-continues-to-invoke-its-time-tested-policy-of-strategic-upsc-psir-2025-5007\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India\u2019s reluctance to perceive any \u2018existential threat\u2019 inevitably made the multilateral path to nuclear security a \u2018default option\u2019 until it decided to cross the nuclear Rubicon in 1998. Identify and analyze some of the major reasons behind this shift in India\u2019s position on the nuclear question.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/indias-reluctance-to-perceive-any-existential-threat-inevitably-upsc-psir-2025-5008\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><span><\/span><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-the-eu\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>India and the EU<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#five-relationships-that-carry-disproportionate-weight\">Five Relationships That Carry Disproportionate Weight<\/a><a href=\"#features-of-the-present-order\">Features of the Present Order<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-place-in-the-emerging-order\">India\u2019s Place in the Emerging Order<\/a><a href=\"#levels-of-analysis-the-working-frame\">Levels of Analysis \u2014 the Working Frame<\/a><a href=\"#nature-of-the-relationship\">Nature of the Relationship<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-interests-in-the-united-states\">India\u2019s Interests in the United States<\/a><a href=\"#relations-during-the-cold-war\">Relations during the Cold War<\/a><a href=\"#relations-after-the-end-of-the-cold-war\">Relations after the End of the Cold War<\/a><a href=\"#relations-in-the-twenty-first-century\">Relations in the Twenty-First Century<\/a><a href=\"#relations-in-the-modi-years\">Relations in the Modi Years<\/a><a href=\"#trump-2-0-tariffs-repair-and-the-hemispheric-turn\">Trump 2.0 \u2014 Tariffs, Repair and the Hemispheric Turn<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of Cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#the-four-foundational-agreements\">The Four Foundational Agreements<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-concern-and-contestation\">Areas of Concern and Contestation<\/a><a href=\"#india-the-united-states-and-china\">India, the United States and China<\/a><a href=\"#india-russia-and-the-united-states\">India, Russia and the United States<\/a><a href=\"#india-the-united-states-and-afghanistan\">India, the United States and Afghanistan<\/a><a href=\"#views-of-scholars-the-united-states\">Views of Scholars \u2014 the United States<\/a><a href=\"#theoretical-perspectives-india-us\">Theoretical Perspectives \u2014 India\u2013US<\/a><a href=\"#policy-suggestions-india-us\">Policy Suggestions \u2014 India\u2013US<\/a><a href=\"#the-quadrilateral-security-dialogue\">The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue<\/a><a href=\"#growing-relations-with-the-united-states\">Growing Relations with the United States<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and the USA for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and the USA Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and the USA Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.5.1","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"5","fx_note_desc":"India and the USA for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and the USA Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and the USA Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3592","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3592","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3592\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3790,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3592\/revisions\/3790"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3592"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}