{"id":3593,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:12","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-the-eu\/"},"modified":"2026-08-11T23:02:13","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T17:32:13","slug":"india-and-the-eu","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-the-eu\/","title":{"rendered":"India and the EU"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and the EU<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and the EU<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5<\/b> \u2014 India and the Global Centres of Power : USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"nature-of-the-relationship-and-the-european-union\">Nature of the relationship \u00b7 and the European Union<\/h3>\n<p>India\u2019s engagement is principally with the <span class=\"n-term\">European Union<\/span> and its member states, most of them in Western Europe.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The European Union at a glance<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Founders:<\/span> Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Capital:<\/span> Brussels. A <span class=\"n-term\">supranational<\/span> political-economic union of <span class=\"n-term\">27 member states<\/span> \u2014 the world\u2019s largest trade bloc, about a fifth of global trade.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Historical depth.<\/span> <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span>: ties reach back to the Roman Empire \u2014 Kerala\u2019s Roman port Muziris, and a first-century-BCE Lakshmi ivory found at Pompeii.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How scholars frame it<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Christian Wagner<\/span>: often called <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018natural partners\u2019<\/span> for shared democracy, plural society and counter-terrorism; frequent summits since the 1996 Enhanced Partnership place India among a select group with Russia, the US, China, Canada and Japan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajendra K. Jain<\/span>: the association is many-sided \u2014 the EU is India\u2019s top trading partner, a large FDI source, a donor, a technology source and host to a big diaspora; India now sees it as a political player, not only a trade bloc.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span>: Indians dislike being lectured to; Europe\u2019s tendency to preach on human rights \u2014 which India treats as a domestic matter \u2014 is a recurring irritant. <span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span>: no part of Indian foreign policy is harder than its underwhelming tie with Europe.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Christian Wagner<\/span> also collects the sceptics\u2019 labels \u2014 a \u201ccharade\u201d (<span class=\"n-sch\">Jaffrelot<\/span>), a \u201cloveless arranged marriage\u201d (<span class=\"n-term\">Khandekar<\/span>), at \u201crisk of stagnation and political marginalization\u201d (<span class=\"n-term\">von Muenchow-Pohl<\/span>), and marked by \u201cfriendly disinterest\u201d (<span class=\"n-term\">Gr\u00f6ning<\/span>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"why-europe-matters-for-india\">Why Europe matters for India<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Largest bloc and market; France and the UK are nuclear powers and <span class=\"n-term\">P5<\/span> members; Germany is a strong UNSC-expansion candidate; four EU states sit in the G-8.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dhruva Jaishankar<\/span>: as a single entity the EU mirrors India\u2019s federal, multilingual structure; European states broadly share India\u2019s liberal-democratic, secular, multicultural values; Britain and France are key defence suppliers; Europe hosts a diaspora above <span class=\"n-term\">1.7 million<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Complementarity:<\/span> India\u2019s market, cost-competitiveness, services growth and demography against Europe\u2019s technology, stability and ageing population; Europe is a source of strategic technology and gives India room to bargain with the US, Russia and China.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"cold-war-era-why-the-partnership-underperformed\">Cold-War era \u2014 why the partnership underperformed<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span>: India\u2019s early encounters with Europe were rooted in maritime trade; Portuguese naval forces arrived in 1498, and four colonial powers followed over four and a half centuries. Indian forces fought under the British across both World Wars.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajendra K. Jain<\/span>: India took little interest in European unification early; attention came only when Britain sought Common Market membership (1961). <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> argued the EEC would deepen Cold-War divisions, widen the rich\u2013poor gap and weaken the Commonwealth.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">C. Raja Mohan on the causes of difficulty<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Seeing the continent <span class=\"n-term\">through British eyes<\/span>; alignment with the USSR skewed the view.<\/li>\n<li>Non-alignment and criticism of European alliances put Delhi out of touch with Cold-War manoeuvring.<\/li>\n<li>Western alignment with Pakistan pushed India toward Moscow, which then shaped its European lens.<\/li>\n<li>Privileged access to Eastern Europe could not be used under bloc politics.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">East\u2013West divide<\/span> compounded by the <span class=\"n-term\">North\u2013South conflict<\/span>; anti-colonial non-alignment left little room for strategic cooperation.<\/li>\n<li>Socialist policies constrained foreign capital and weakened commercial ties built by 1947.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">Treaty of Rome<\/span> made no reference to the wider Third World; India\u2019s bid for an Association Agreement (1961\u201363) was ruled out for \u201cnon-associates.\u201d<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"after-the-cold-war-the-twenty-first-century-reorientation\">After the Cold War \u00b7 the twenty-first-century reorientation<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span>: the Soviet collapse forced a rethink \u2014 India found ties with the US, Europe, China and Japan all underdeveloped. Reforms drew European interest, but Europe was far more taken with China after Deng\u2019s reforms and found India\u2019s pace frustrating.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">1993 Joint Political Statement<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">1994 Cooperation Agreement<\/span> are foundational; 2004 made both strategic partners \u2014 the EU has such partnerships with only five others (US, Canada, Russia, Japan, China).<\/li>\n<li>Brussels issued an <span class=\"n-term\">India Strategy (2018)<\/span> on four themes \u2014 a rules-based order, sustainable modernisation, foreign-policy coordination, and security. The EU produced its <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021)<\/span>, driven by Chinese assertiveness, supply-chain strain, and the 2020 signing of <span class=\"n-term\">RCEP<\/span>, which raised fears of a China-centred Asian bloc.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>India\u2019s strategy is \u201cengaging with the USA, managing China, cultivating relations with Europe, reassuring Russia, and bringing the Japanese into active participation.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Once a critic of European colonialism, New Delhi is now eager to welcome Europe back into Asia; alongside the <span class=\"n-term\">Quad<\/span> it uses the West Asian <span class=\"n-term\">I2U2<\/span> with Israel, the UAE and the US. In 2022 Modi visited Germany, Denmark and France; the Green Strategic Partnership was the standout of the Denmark leg.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Economic \u2014 the essence of the relationship<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The EU was India\u2019s largest trading partner in 2010 (\u20ac86 bn); by 2021 its third-largest (\u20ac88 bn goods, 10.8%), with India the EU\u2019s 10th (2.1%). EU FDI stock in India reached \u20ac87.3 bn (2020); about <span class=\"n-term\">6,000 European companies<\/span> provide 1.7 million direct jobs.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The two 2025\u201326 trade deals \u2014 CETA and the EU FTA<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2013UK CETA<\/span> \u2014 concluded May 2025, signed 24 July 2025, in force <span class=\"n-term\">15 July 2026<\/span> (with the Double Contribution Convention). The UK removes duties on about <span class=\"n-term\">99%<\/span> of India\u2019s tariff lines from day one (textiles, leather, marine, processed food, engineering and auto parts); services open across 137 sub-sectors; India opens central-government procurement for the first time and, in a first, cut car-import duties from over 100% to 10% within quotas \u2014 while shielding dairy, cereals, millets, edible oils and apples.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2013EU FTA<\/span> \u2014 concluded <span class=\"n-term\">27 January 2026<\/span> at the 16th India\u2013EU Summit, text published February 2026; signing expected end-2026, then European Parliament consent and entry into force in early 2027. India gains preferential access on <span class=\"n-term\">97%<\/span> of EU tariff lines (99.5% of its export value), with nearly <span class=\"n-term\">US$33 bn<\/span> of labour-intensive exports going to zero duty; the EU opens 144 services sub-sectors, India 102, with a social-security framework to follow. India shields dairy, cereals, poultry and soymeal; the EU excludes beef, chicken, rice and sugar; India cuts wine and olive-oil tariffs.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The wider run<\/span> \u2014 India signed with Oman, New Zealand, the UK and the EU across 2025\u201326, adding to the UAE, Australia and EFTA; it now holds FTAs with <span class=\"n-term\">14 of the 16 RCEP economies<\/span>, with only China outside its FTA network.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Track<\/th>\n<th>Bilateral weight carried by the big three<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>France<\/td>\n<td>36 Rafale and 6 Scorpene (P-75); exercises <span class=\"n-term\">Shakti \/ Varuna \/ Garuda<\/span>; the 2018 Joint Strategic Vision in the IOR and reciprocal logistics; MTCR backing (2016); ISA co-founder; Jaitapur nuclear.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>United Kingdom<\/td>\n<td>Exercises <span class=\"n-term\">Ajeya Warrior \/ Indradhanush \/ Konkan<\/span>; defence-intelligence and counter-terror dialogue; UKIERI, GIAN and the Skills India Mission; the largest ethnic-minority diaspora (~1.5 million).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Germany<\/td>\n<td>A major ODA partner since the 1950s; built IIT Madras; S&amp;T a main pillar since 2007; pledged an extra <span class=\"n-term\">\u20ac10 bn<\/span> (2022) toward India\u2019s 2030 climate targets.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Political, security, climate &amp; technology<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>31 dialogue mechanisms; a Security Dialogue since 2006; the Connectivity Partnership (2021); the India-EU Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility.<\/li>\n<li>Climate: the EU-India Climate Change Dialogue; the EU <span class=\"n-term\">Green Deal<\/span> (carbon neutrality by 2050); the Denmark Green Strategic Partnership (2022); ISA, ITER and Arctic Council observer status.<\/li>\n<li>Technology: Galileo, ITER, New INDIGO (2009), and COVID-era research ties; <span class=\"n-sch\">Anil Wadhwa<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Samir Saran<\/span> see room in AI, biotech and 5G\/6G. The <span class=\"n-term\">Trade and Technology Council<\/span> (2023) runs working groups on strategic technologies, digital governance and clean-energy technologies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-concern-and-brexit\">Areas of concern \u00b7 and Brexit<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Trade, regulation &amp; politics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">CBAM is the sharpest live friction.<\/span> India won no exemption from the EU\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism<\/span>, only an assurance that any flexibility given to third countries would extend to it; iron and steel make up nearly <span class=\"n-term\">90%<\/span> of India\u2019s CBAM-exposed exports, with compliance costs put at US$2\u20134 bn a year against a \u20ac500 m EU green-transition pledge. Other frictions \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">data security<\/span> (the EU withholds \u2018data-secure\u2019 status), IPR and compulsory-licensing limits, opened procurement, and the loss of GSP preferences that had kept Indian textiles competitive with Bangladesh.<\/li>\n<li>Political irritants: criticism of Indian policy on Jammu &amp; Kashmir and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act; divergent expectations over Ukraine.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Trade as a hedge \u2014 the geoeconomic reading<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both deals were settled while the United States, under a second Trump administration, put <span class=\"n-term\">50% tariffs<\/span> on India (peaked 2025) and pressed it over Russian-oil purchases; a February 2026 interim deal cut the reciprocal tariff to 18% and dropped the Russian-oil penalty, and the US Supreme Court later struck down the emergency-power reciprocal tariffs. Many read the deals as <span class=\"n-term\">hedging, not alignment<\/span> \u2014 in <span class=\"n-sch\">Iv\u00e1n Gonzalez-Pujol<\/span>\u2019s terms a mixed strategy of cooperation and competition under uncertainty, with FTAs a means of economic diversification.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span> (Chatham House) and <span class=\"n-term\">Shairee Malhotra<\/span> (ORF) read the run of FTAs as a reaffirmation of <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span> and a shift toward predictable partners. <span class=\"n-term\">Sankalp Gurjar<\/span> frames it through <span class=\"n-term\">geoeconomics<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s strategy since 2019 on three pillars (staying out of RCEP, Atmanirbharta, FTAs with trusted partners), all serving one goal: managing the China challenge. <span class=\"n-term\">Alberto Rizzi<\/span> (ECFR) applies the same lens from Europe\u2019s side; <span class=\"n-term\">Mark Linscott<\/span> is the sceptic \u2014 the \u2018mother of all deals\u2019 label is \u201cpolitical hyperbole\u201d with only a modest near-term return.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cIndia, faced with US tariffs, is pushing for certainty in its trade relations, while Europe is seeking diversification to reduce reliance on an increasingly erratic American administration.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Alberto Rizzi, ECFR<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical strains inside Europe<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">AUKUS<\/span> announcement \u2014 made without consulting France, a day before the EU\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy \u2014 shocked Paris; failures over Crimea (2014) and the 2015 refugee crisis exposed disunity; Brexit weakened cohesion; the EU\u2019s China-market reliance and BRI participation complicate alignment with India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Brexit and India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Concerns: the welfare of a near-three-million diaspora; a large moving population of tourists, professionals and students; and work-visa curbs that had already cut Indian student numbers.<\/li>\n<li>Offsetting gains: the <span class=\"n-term\">Commonwealth<\/span> gains significance; Britain stays a key partner for services trade, defence supply and P5 weight, and has reoriented toward the Indo-Pacific through AUKUS. For the EU tie, Delhi loses its most familiar interlocutor \u2014 which raises the value of engaging Brussels and all 27 members directly.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"scholars-theory-policy-europe\">Scholars \u00b7 theory \u00b7 policy (Europe)<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Views of scholars<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span>: the relationship stands at an inflection point to shape a multipolar, just order. <span class=\"n-sch\">Dhruva Jaishankar<\/span>: Europe is a strong target for India\u2019s multipolar strategy \u2014 a major power centre without the complications of the US and China relationships.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span>: the EU cannot speak with one voice; its faith that foreign policy is merely an outcome of economic policy is a <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018liberal fallacy\u2019<\/span> \u2014 the economic system rests on political order, not the reverse.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Shada Islam<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Samir Saran<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Christian Wagner<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Mehta<\/span>: an ambitious FTA plus 5G\/AI\/biotech and climate\/defence convergence, with two-way mobility and regular high-level engagement, can lift the partnership.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theoretical lenses:<\/span> Realism \u2014 strategic autonomy, balance vs China \u00b7 Liberalism \u2014 interdependence, WTO\/UN \u00b7 Constructivism \u2014 shared values \u00b7 Dependency \u2192 equitable partnership<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy direction<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Spend more energy on <span class=\"n-term\">France<\/span> \u2014 experts argue it can become \u2018the new Russia\u2019 for India (P5, IOR presence, reactors, climate and multilateral convergence); put the best foot forward with <span class=\"n-term\">Britain<\/span>; reorient the <span class=\"n-term\">Eurosceptics<\/span> in Indian officialdom; and improve the trade and regulatory regime European policymakers find restrictive.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> (Bled, 2021): Delhi under-attended to Brussels amid focus on the big countries, and now engages all 27 members and seeks a more \u2018compact\u2019 relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-the-usa\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India and the USA<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-japan\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>India and Japan<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#nature-of-the-relationship-and-the-european-union\">Nature of the relationship \u00b7 and the European Union<\/a><a href=\"#why-europe-matters-for-india\">Why Europe matters for India<\/a><a href=\"#cold-war-era-why-the-partnership-underperformed\">Cold-War era \u2014 why the partnership underperformed<\/a><a href=\"#after-the-cold-war-the-twenty-first-century-reorientation\">After the Cold War \u00b7 the twenty-first-century reorientation<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-concern-and-brexit\">Areas of concern \u00b7 and Brexit<\/a><a href=\"#scholars-theory-policy-europe\">Scholars \u00b7 theory \u00b7 policy (Europe)<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and the EU for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and the EU Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and the EU Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014 In<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.5.2","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"5","fx_note_desc":"India and the EU for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and the EU Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and the EU Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014 In","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3593","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3593","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3593\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3627,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3593\/revisions\/3627"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3593"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}