{"id":3595,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:13","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-china\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:57","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:57","slug":"india-and-china","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-china\/","title":{"rendered":"India and China"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and China<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and China<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5<\/b> \u2014 India and the Global Centres of Power : USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"nature-two-civilizational-states-one-paradox\">Nature \u2014 two civilizational states, one paradox<\/h3>\n<p>Both are civilizational states with long historical legacies that still shape perception. <span class=\"n-term\">Alka Acharya<\/span>: Buddhism travelled from India to China with the legends of Fa Xian, Xuan Zhang and Kumarajiva; in the 16th\u201317th centuries both were strong trading empires; the 19th\u201320th brought decline under imperialism.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Pardesi\u2019s core claim<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Manjeet S. Pardesi<\/span>: India and China have been locked in intense strategic rivalry since the late 1940s. They hold the world\u2019s longest unmarked land border and grapple with Tibet, China\u2019s tie to Pakistan, and military-nuclear disparities. The rivalry is a contest for <span class=\"n-term\">influence and status in overlapping spheres<\/span> \u2014 South and South-East Asia, the Tibetan plateau, the Himalayan states, parts of Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>The <span class=\"n-term\">yin and yang<\/span> of the relationship is a paradox \u2014 expanding engagement and rising trade alongside low mutual trust, with a persistent belief that Beijing aims to impede India\u2019s ascension.<\/p>\n<p><cite>Alka Acharya<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Typologies scholars use<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Zorawar Daulet Singh<\/span>: competition\u2013cooperation\u2013discord. <span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span>: the four C\u2019s \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">conflict, competition, cooperation, containment<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span>: a \u201ccold peace\u201d turned icy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span>, on China\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Middle Kingdom complex<\/span>: China sees itself as the civilized centre; India never claimed such centrality (Bharatvarsha, with India as one petal, Jambudwipa) \u2014 a worldview gap that makes confrontation likelier than cooperation, worsened by India\u2019s poor familiarity with China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Samir Saran<\/span>: China wants to be the sole continental power \u2014 a Chinese adage, \u201cone mountain cannot contain two tigers.\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">Zhao Gancheng<\/span>: a prisoner\u2019s dilemma left by the 1962 worst-case start; Panchsheel idealism no longer works.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-four-phases-what-actually-drove-each\">The four phases \u2014 what actually drove each<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Phase (Waltz level)<\/th>\n<th>Core developments<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>I \u00b7 1947\u201359 (individual level)<\/td>\n<td>Nehru backed Tibetan independence \u2018under Chinese suzerainty\u2019 (a British legacy, per <span class=\"n-sch\">K.P.S. Menon<\/span>); <span class=\"n-sch\">K.M. Panikkar<\/span> advised recognising Tibetan independence in 1948, Nehru declined. The <span class=\"n-term\">PRC annexed Tibet (1950-51)<\/span>, making China contiguous. Border: the <span class=\"n-term\">McMahon Line<\/span> (Simla 1913-14) in the east, rejected by all Chinese governments; no accepted western frontier. Per <span class=\"n-sch\">S.A. Hoffman<\/span>, India decided in 1953 that Aksai Chin belonged to J&amp;K (the Dogra kingdom). With Panchsheel India recognised Tibet as China\u2019s; Nehru equated Chinese silence on maps with acquiescence. The <span class=\"n-term\">Dalai Lama\u2019s escape (Mar 1959)<\/span> and asylum brought the border to the fore.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>II \u00b7 1959\u201362 (domestic politics)<\/td>\n<td>Parliament pushed Nehru toward assertiveness. Nehru had held the border settled; in Sep 1959 <span class=\"n-term\">Zhou publicly claimed the entire border unmarked<\/span> and laid claim to 40,000 sq mi. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sumit Ganguly<\/span>: the <span class=\"n-term\">Forward Policy<\/span> was a strategy of <span class=\"n-term\">compellence<\/span> \u2014 forward posts to reclaim ground \u2014 but the army was ill-prepared. China attacked <span class=\"n-term\">20 Oct 1962<\/span>, declared a unilateral ceasefire (21 Nov), re-established the McMahon Line as the LAC in the east and consolidated Aksai Chin. Six non-aligned states framed the <span class=\"n-term\">Colombo Proposals<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>III \u00b7 1962\u201388 (systemic)<\/td>\n<td>India aligned first with the US, then the USSR; China with Pakistan, and with tacit US backing after 1971. The US refused the <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear umbrella<\/span> and imposed an arms embargo (1965); China threatened a <span class=\"n-term\">second front<\/span> in 1965. The <span class=\"n-term\">1971 Treaty<\/span> with the USSR answered the US\u2013China\u2013Pakistan alignment. The 1969 Sino-Soviet clashes drew the US toward Beijing; the <span class=\"n-term\">USS Enterprise<\/span> entered the Bay of Bengal (1971). The Karakoram Highway, Siachen (1984) and the <span class=\"n-term\">Sumdorong Chu<\/span> crisis followed; the 1987 Sino-Soviet border accord shocked Delhi.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>IV \u00b7 Since 1988 (systemic + domestic)<\/td>\n<td>China\u2019s rising power and the China\u2013Pakistan tie as constant threats; India\u2019s growth building a constituency for engagement and internal balancing; latterly, convergence with the US while keeping strategic autonomy. Rajiv Gandhi\u2019s 1988 visit set up the JWG; the 1993 and 1996 agreements reduced tension but produced <span class=\"n-term\">no political settlement<\/span> (<span class=\"n-term\">Pardesi<\/span>). Repair came via Jaswant Singh\u2019s 1999 visit after the 1998 tests.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-modi-years-and-post-2020-deterrence\">The Modi years \u00b7 and post-2020 deterrence<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The first year began badly \u2014 China left out of the swearing-in; Modi\u2019s Arunachal visit drew objections. <span class=\"n-term\">Xi\u2019s Sep 2014 visit<\/span> brought a $20 bn pledge but coincided with a Ladakh incursion; Modi declined APEC. Boundary talks (Doval\u2013Yang Jiechi) produced little.<\/li>\n<li>At <span class=\"n-term\">Raisina 2017<\/span> China pressed OBOR; India objected to <span class=\"n-term\">CPEC<\/span> through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and refused to join. The <span class=\"n-term\">Doklam standoff (Jun 2017)<\/span> raised alarm near the Siliguri Corridor. The <span class=\"n-term\">Wuhan (2018)<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Mahabalipuram (2019)<\/span> informal summits were largely inconsequential.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why Galwan mattered (Mayuri Banerjee)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">June 2020<\/span> \u2014 20 Indian soldiers killed. It broke the <span class=\"n-term\">1988 consensus<\/span> that had kept the border separate from the wider relationship, moving the frontier to the centre of ties; with the border-management framework severely compromised, interaction becomes more adversarial and volatile.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>After Pelosi\u2019s Taiwan visit India refused to reiterate its \u2018one-China\u2019 policy; <span class=\"n-term\">Tawang clashes (Dec 2022)<\/span> followed a new land-border law and objections to the India-US <span class=\"n-term\">Yudh Abhyas<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The disengagement (21 Oct 2024).<\/span> Agreement on patrolling in <span class=\"n-term\">Depsang and Demchok<\/span> \u2014 the last two of six points the PLA had blockaded since 2020 (Galwan, Pangong Tso, Gogra and Hot Springs the others); it restored patrolling and grazing rights and added coordinated patrols to avoid face-offs. Two days later Modi and Xi met at <span class=\"n-term\">Kazan<\/span> (BRICS, 23 Oct 2024), the first bilateral since 2019, and directed the <span class=\"n-term\">Special Representatives<\/span> to meet.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The thaw.<\/span> Jaishankar told the Lok Sabha (3 Dec 2024) disengagement was \u201cachieved in full\u201d in eastern Ladakh, with de-escalation the next step (17 WMCC meetings, 21 senior-commander rounds since June 2020); the <span class=\"n-term\">23rd SR<\/span> round (Doval\u2013Wang Yi, Dec 2024) revived the channel. At <span class=\"n-term\">Tianjin<\/span> (SCO, 31 Aug 2025) \u2014 Modi\u2019s first China visit in seven years \u2014 the two called themselves \u201cdevelopment partners and not rivals\u201d, and Modi invited Xi to the <span class=\"n-term\">2026 BRICS Summit in India<\/span>. Direct flights, the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and eased rare-earth-magnet curbs followed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Disengagement is not resolution<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The pool reads the deal as a pause, not a settlement. <span class=\"n-term\">Saheb Singh Chadha<\/span> (Carnegie India) shows progress came only when leader-level meetings framed the talks, with over <span class=\"n-term\">100,000 troops<\/span> still facing off; <span class=\"n-sch\">Arzan Tarapore<\/span> holds it did not restore the status quo ante \u2014 disengagement has not led to de-escalation or de-induction; <span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> notes it restored patrolling rights, but the harder task of thinning the massed forces (roughly 20,000\u201330,000 PLA forward-deployed, surge near 50,000) still lies ahead.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Two meanings of \u2018normalcy\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India holds that <span class=\"n-term\">the state of the border sets the state of the relationship<\/span> (\u2018border first, development always\u2019); China wants the boundary question <span class=\"n-term\">not to define or hold back<\/span> the overall picture. <span class=\"n-sch\">Swaran Singh<\/span> places ties in <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018management mode\u2019<\/span> \u2014 neither breakdown nor recovery; <span class=\"n-term\">Ghulam Ali<\/span> reads the rapprochement as durable, <span class=\"n-sch\">Shanthie Mariet D\u2019Souza<\/span> as unstable given deep distrust.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cThey reaffirmed that the two countries were development partners and not rivals, and that their differences should not turn into disputes.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>PMO \/ PIB, Tianjin readout, 31 August 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cWith China you have to compete, cooperate, co-exist, confront and contest.\u201d \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Gen. Upendra Dwivedi, Chanakya Defence Dialogue, 1 October 2024<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-boundary-dispute-three-sectors\">The boundary dispute \u2014 three sectors<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Sector<\/th>\n<th>Line \/ disputed areas<\/th>\n<th>Status<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Eastern<\/td>\n<td>The <span class=\"n-term\">McMahon Line<\/span> (Simla 1913-14); overlooked until Aitchison\u2019s 1937 edition. China claims Arunachal as \u201cSouth Tibet,\u201d keen on <span class=\"n-term\">Tawang<\/span> on cultural-religious grounds (Dalai Lama\u2019s birthplace).<\/td>\n<td>China acknowledges the line as the LAC but disputes the watershed principle.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Middle<\/td>\n<td>Barahoti (Uttarakhand) and pockets in Uttarakhand and Himachal; the Sikkim sector.<\/td>\n<td>China accepted Sikkim as an Indian state only after 2005; Nathu La reopened for trade.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Western<\/td>\n<td>No accepted frontier in Kashmir at 1947. India claims <span class=\"n-term\">Aksai Chin<\/span> (~38,000 sq mi it accuses China of occupying; a cold desert of ~50,000 sq km); the Western Highway (1957); the Shaksgam Valley ceded by Pakistan.<\/td>\n<td>China occupied it in 1962; markers absent, terrain uninhabited.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">China\u2019s package proposal, and Shyam Saran\u2019s formula<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>In 1985 China reinterpreted the <span class=\"n-term\">package proposal<\/span> \u2014 India to concede in the east (the largest disputed area) for undefined western concessions \u2014 and made an explicit demand for the \u201crestitution\u201d of Tawang, hardening its position.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> suggests an <span class=\"n-term\">LAC-plus<\/span> solution \u2014 a limited Chinese territorial concession on the Indian side against free access to Tawang for Chinese pilgrims \u2014 a \u2018Package Proposal without Tawang\u2019 meeting somewhere in the middle.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Reforms (China 1978, India 1991) built trade: China is India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">third-largest<\/span> trading partner, India China\u2019s thirteenth; two-way trade crossed <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 100 bn (2022)<\/span> and reached <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 127.7 bn<\/span> by FY2024\u201325. Investment rose in IT, pharma and automobiles; a combined market of 2.7 billion people and 20% of world GDP holds large potential.<\/li>\n<li>The tie is deeply <span class=\"n-term\">asymmetric<\/span> \u2014 India exports raw materials while importing manufactures; the trade deficit reached a record <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 99.2 bn<\/span> in FY2024\u201325.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Multilateral, climate &amp; energy<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both work through the <span class=\"n-term\">G20<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">BRICS<\/span> (NDB, CRA), the <span class=\"n-term\">AIIB<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">SCO<\/span>, the Russia-India-China trilateral and <span class=\"n-term\">BASIC<\/span> to dilute Western dominance of the IMF, WTO and World Bank.<\/li>\n<li>At <span class=\"n-term\">COP26<\/span> they aligned to turn a coal \u2018phase-out\u2019 into \u2018phase-down\u2019; both sit in BASIC and the Like-Minded Group. China is the largest solar manufacturer, and India depends on it for panels and chips.<\/li>\n<li>Energy: the Oil Buyers\u2019 Club (2018), a Joint Working Group on energy (2019), ITER, and GAIL\u2019s 10% stake in China Gas Holdings.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-contestation-and-competition\">Areas of contestation and competition<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The trade deficit<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">FY2024\u201325 was a record<\/span> \u2014 the deficit reached <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 99.2 bn<\/span> on two-way trade of US$ 127.7 bn (imports US$ 113.5 bn against exports US$ 14.25 bn), with India dependent on China for about <span class=\"n-term\">70% of pharmaceutical ingredients<\/span>. Causes \u2014 dumping of steel and low-quality goods, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, undervalued farm exports, curbs on Indian pharmaceuticals even where US, EU and Japanese regulators approve, and limited IT market access.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Amit Kumar<\/span> (Takshashila) argues almost all Chinese exports to India are substitutable, so Beijing\u2019s coercive room is limited and <span class=\"n-term\">de-risking<\/span>, not decoupling, is the sensible course; after 2020 India used investment screening and app bans, but the 2024 Economic Survey and business lobbies pushed to ease curbs to serve \u2018Make in India\u2019 \u2014 selective opening under caution, the deficit itself a standing concern.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Structural contests<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Political<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s reluctance to endorse the <span class=\"n-term\">One-China policy<\/span> on Taiwan and Tibet; Chinese opposition to India\u2019s permanent UNSC seat and NSG entry.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Regional<\/span> \u2014 rival influence in South Asia (Sri Lanka, Gwadar) and the Indo-Pacific.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Cyber &amp; technology<\/span> \u2014 alleged cyberattacks and espionage; concern over Chinese telecom equipment such as <span class=\"n-term\">Huawei<\/span> in 5G.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Perception, military build-up and investment<\/span> \u2014 mutual encirclement fears, the enduring effect of 1962, escalation risk, and apprehension about Chinese investment in sensitive sectors.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-china-pakistan-axis\">The China\u2013Pakistan axis<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The axis has damaged India\u2019s rise and complicated its Afghanistan policy. Boundaries were demarcated before 1962; an entente formed before 1965; China threatened a second front in 1965.<\/li>\n<li>China has assisted Pakistan\u2019s nuclear programme across three decades \u2014 fissile material in the 1980s, missiles in the 1990s, reactors thereafter \u2014 and in 1969 set up a \u2018coordination bureau\u2019 to arm Indian insurgents; <span class=\"n-term\">Andrew Small<\/span> holds this policy was never fully abandoned.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>Pakistan\u2019s real value is that \u201can India that is forced to look nervously over its shoulder at its western neighbour is easier for Beijing to manage.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Andrew Small<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cChina-Pak friendship is higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the deepest sea in the world and sweeter than honey.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Nawaz Sharif<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>After the abrogation of <span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span>, China helped internationalise Kashmir; <span class=\"n-term\">CPEC<\/span>, Gwadar and OBOR through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir are read as encirclement using Pakistan as a proxy. <span class=\"n-sch\">Manjeet S. Pardesi<\/span>: Gilgit-Baltistan borders China, and PLA presence there has raised talk of \u2018de facto control\u2019. Pakistan is thus both a <span class=\"n-term\">Chinese pawn<\/span> against India and a platform for power projection.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-china-the-united-states-and-the-russia-triangle\">India, China &amp; the United States \u00b7 and the Russia triangle<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manjeet S. Pardesi<\/span>: China\u2019s biggest concern is India\u2019s growing strategic link with the US \u2014 it noted Clinton\u2019s call to India to \u2018engage East and Act East\u2019 and resented the 2008 <span class=\"n-term\">NSG waiver<\/span> for a non-NPT India.<\/li>\n<li>China equates the <span class=\"n-term\">Quad<\/span> with <span class=\"n-term\">AUKUS<\/span>; India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Yudh Abhyas 2022<\/span> within 100 km of the LAC was a show of strength, and the Tawang clash followed. The trade war since 2018 helped push Beijing toward the <span class=\"n-term\">Wuhan<\/span> reset.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>To check China, India needs a <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018Go West\u2019<\/span> strategy \u2014 using its Gulf goodwill \u2014 while the security dilemma risks a \u201cvicious cycle of competition, arms race and conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>C. Raja Mohan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The India\u2013China\u2013US triangle and hedging<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Atul Kumar<\/span> describe a <span class=\"n-term\">triangle of apprehension<\/span> held together by mutual mistrust, each power fearing it will be outflanked; they read Modi\u2019s China outreach as <span class=\"n-term\">hedging and calibrated multi-alignment<\/span>, sharpened by a sharp downturn with Washington \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">50% US tariffs<\/span> (Aug 2025: a 25% reciprocal tariff plus a 25% Russian-oil penalty), the revoked <span class=\"n-term\">Chabahar<\/span> waiver and a <span class=\"n-term\">US$100,000<\/span> H-1B levy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Anna Maria Treifeldt<\/span> (ICDS) reads the same outreach as continuity, not departure \u2014 a return to India\u2019s familiar hedging inside the older US\u2013China\u2013USSR triangle; <span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> is the sceptic \u2014 Washington\u2019s hope of turning India against China stays unrealised, and multi-alignment limits any joint effort. Both hedging readings agree: the China opening buys room to manage Washington, and is <span class=\"n-term\">no strategic tilt to Beijing<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>\u201cNew Delhi\u2019s aim is simply to maintain short-term stability with Beijing while it manages uncertainty with Washington.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><cite>Anna Maria Treifeldt, ICDS, 2026<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India in the Russia\u2013China\u2013US triangle<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India manages this through <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>, but the Sino-Russian \u201cno-limits\u201d convergence unsettles Delhi: Russia turned to China after Western isolation; India\u2019s Russian arms share fell from 60% to 45%; Russia and China together rejected a G20 consensus statement under India\u2019s chair.<\/li>\n<li>India promotes itself as a Global South leader and has rejected the BRI; China remains its top strategic rival. <span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span>: Delhi is a Eurasian swing power \u2014 military ties with Moscow, economic weight of Beijing, America as counterweight.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-china-the-neighbourhood-the-five-fingers\">India, China &amp; the neighbourhood \u2014 the \u2018five fingers\u2019<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span>: a state secures itself only as a <span class=\"n-term\">regional hegemon<\/span>, and a rising power seeks to change the order \u2014 a pessimistic reading of China\u2019s rise. <span class=\"n-term\">Ye Hai Lin<\/span>: Indian and Chinese \u2018surrounding areas\u2019 overlap, and South Asia is the contested space.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The five-finger policy<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Attributed to Mao\u2019s vision \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Tibet is the palm<\/span>, the five fingers are Ladakh \u00b7 Nepal \u00b7 Sikkim \u00b7 Bhutan \u00b7 Arunachal<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Country picture:<\/span> Bhutan (a Buddha statue built; China wants diplomatic ties), Nepal (connected to Tibet), Bangladesh (loans, BCIM), Myanmar (junta-era help), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives (drift), Pakistan (Gwadar, CPEC). <span class=\"n-sch\">T. Singh<\/span>: Chinese naval presence has narrowed India\u2019s sphere (Djibouti base, Hambantota). <span class=\"n-term\">Pattnaik<\/span>: today\u2019s competition is fiercer than before through large BRI projects; <span class=\"n-term\">RN Ravi<\/span> calls it neocolonialism through debt traps.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Bhutan \u2014 the border as India\u2019s security issue<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Bhutan is one finger; the <span class=\"n-term\">470 km<\/span> boundary is disputed in four areas \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Doklam<\/span> (west), Charithang, Sinchulimpa and Dramana. China seeks the western sector near the tri-junction, close to India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Siliguri Corridor<\/span> (the \u2018chicken\u2019s neck\u2019); the Chumbi Valley matters equally to China. Japan will open a mission in Thimphu, and Bhutan is no longer an Indian protectorate \u2014 Indian policy must be carefully calibrated.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"competition-in-the-indo-pacific-and-the-south-china-sea\">Competition in the Indo-Pacific \u00b7 and the South China Sea<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Indian Ocean sea lanes and chokepoints \u2014 Hormuz and Malacca carry more than half the world\u2019s maritime oil. India is the region\u2019s most important naval power and aspires to be the <span class=\"n-term\">net security provider<\/span>; its Andaman &amp; Nicobar position gives it a hold over Chinese commerce through Malacca, which is why the maritime theatre suits Indian strategy better than the continental one.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">South China Sea:<\/span> China claims the <span class=\"n-term\">Nine Dash Line<\/span> (71% of cargo passes through); the <span class=\"n-term\">Hague Tribunal (2016)<\/span> rejected it in <em>Philippines v. China<\/em>, and China rejects UNCLOS. India\u2019s position rests on <span class=\"n-term\">freedom of navigation<\/span> (the 2015 Joint Strategic Vision), Vietnam oil exploration, and opposition with Japan to any unilateral change of status quo.<\/li>\n<li>Restraint is deliberate \u2014 India is more reserved on the South China Sea and Taiwan than on the LAC, which invites the criticism of asymmetry with its own insistence on rules at the border.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"scholars-theory-policy-china\">Scholars \u00b7 theory \u00b7 policy (China)<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Views of scholars<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manjeet S. Pardesi<\/span>: a contest over both territory and status; India should deal with China <span class=\"n-term\">as a great power and an independent pole<\/span> by building its own power. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span>: \u2018manage\u2019 ties \u2014 both negotiate assuming a better future position, so neither closes the deal; the modus vivendi \u201cno longer holds.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span>: the asymmetry keeps widening; India must field asymmetric capabilities and enmesh itself in the US-led coalition. <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span>: <span class=\"n-term\">cooperate wherever possible, contain wherever necessary<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> labels Beijing\u2019s posture the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018three-no\u2019<\/span> policy; <span class=\"n-sch\">Kanti Bajpai<\/span> lists the <span class=\"n-term\">4 Ps<\/span> \u2014 perceptions, perimeters, partnerships, power.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Ashok Kantha<\/span>: build capacity and deterrence rather than confront head-on; <span class=\"n-term\">B. Chengappa<\/span>: use soft power and shed the image of an \u201carrogant, overbearing patriarch.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>India must be open-minded and imaginative; the <span class=\"n-term\">trade deficit is unsustainable<\/span>, the border is best managed by infrastructure and asymmetric capabilities, and equilibrium needs \u201cthree mutuals\u201d \u2014 respect, sensitivity and interest.<\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theoretical lenses:<\/span> Realism \/ realpolitik \u00b7 Balance of power \u00b7 Complex interdependence \u00b7 Constructivism \u2014 identity \u00b7 Security dilemma<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy direction<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India works from <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018peaceful coexistence\u2019<\/span>, China from Mao\u2019s \u2018five fingers\u2019. Both block each other \u2014 China on the UNSC and NSG, India on OBOR and the Quad. China prefers to <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cmanage\u201d not \u201cresolve\u201d<\/span> the boundary, Tibetan refugees and river-water sharing, and is reluctant to build a consultative mechanism for South Asia even as it opposes Japanese investment in Arunachal while investing in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.<\/li>\n<li>Practical steps: blend deterrence, agile deployment and diplomacy; shift competition seaward through naval modernisation and coalitions (Quad, SAGAR, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative); and deliver faster on connectivity under <span class=\"n-term\">Neighbourhood First<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"assessment-where-each-relationship-stands\">Assessment \u2014 where each relationship stands<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What the five have in common<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Each was frozen by the Cold War and thawed by the same three events \u2014 the Soviet collapse, the 1991 reforms, and the rise of China. The <span class=\"n-term\">systemic level explains the direction<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">domestic level the pace<\/span>, and India\u2019s economy sets how much it can absorb.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Relationship<\/th>\n<th>One-line placement<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>United States<\/td>\n<td>Deepest in capability, shallowest in obligation \u2014 an <span class=\"n-term\">entente, not an alliance<\/span>; strongest in defence technology, maritime security and supply chains; weakest on trade, mobility and third-country questions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Russia<\/td>\n<td>Narrowest in content, widest in trust \u2014 defence and hydrocarbons carry it; the Sino-Russian embrace is the structural problem and diversification the only durable answer.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Japan<\/td>\n<td>Least encumbered by dispute, most under-realised \u2014 investment, infrastructure and technology are real; defence-industrial and trade content lag the political warmth.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Europe<\/td>\n<td>Largest economic partner, narrowest strategic one until the Indo-Pacific supplied a shared frame \u2014 bilateral tracks with France, Germany and the UK outweigh the Brussels track.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>China<\/td>\n<td>The only relationship where the primary question is <span class=\"n-term\">security, not opportunity<\/span> \u2014 trade has grown while trust has fallen, and after 2020 the border conditions everything else.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The three triangles<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s real bargaining now runs through <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013US\u2013China<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Russia\u2013US<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">China\u2013Russia\u2013India<\/span>; India\u2019s room to manoeuvre rests on being wanted by more than one party and committed to none. The binding constraint across all three is <span class=\"n-term\">capability<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> on the widening asymmetry with China, <span class=\"n-term\">Paul Staniland<\/span> on the limits of what a hard-pressed power can deliver.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"conclusion\">Conclusion<\/h3>\n<p>India\u2019s engagement with the great powers is no longer about choosing sides but about managing several relationships that pull in different directions at once \u2014 the US supplies technology and maritime weight; Russia, platforms and a veto; Japan, capital and a stake in the Indo-Pacific; Europe, markets, standards and investment; China, both the largest trading relationship and the principal security threat.<\/p>\n<p>None can be treated in isolation, because each is now a variable in the others. What holds the strategy together is neither non-alignment nor alignment, but the insistence on retaining the <span class=\"n-term\">freedom to choose<\/span> \u2014 and that freedom is a function of capability.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p>Partnerships convert into influence only to the extent that India can absorb technology, deliver projects, and close the power gap \u2014 India will be judged by the <span class=\"n-term\">quality of its delivery<\/span>.<\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"india-the-united-states-and-china\">India, the United States and China<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> \u2192 a growing India, a declining Pakistan and an increasingly powerful China combined to motivate the entente. One feature of the new American South Asia policy was the conceptual decoupling of India and Pakistan; <span class=\"n-term\">China<\/span>, not Pakistan, gradually emerged as the third party in the relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u2018when the first and second-ranked powers fight, the first often ardently courts the third.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Ashutosh Varshney, on \u2018a new triangle\u2019<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Shared concerns<\/span> \u2014 China\u2019s rapid growth, heavy investment in <span class=\"n-term\">military capabilities<\/span>, and progress in <span class=\"n-term\">artificial intelligence<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">5G telecommunications<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Condoleezza Rice<\/span>, well before the rebalance, argued the U.S. should pay closer attention to India as \u2018an element in China\u2019s calculation\u2019. The Bush administration recalibrated South Asia policy, counting India among the \u2018major powers\u2019 with Russia and China, and grooming India to support the U.S. against a rising China, in censuring Iran, and as a partner in controlling the Indian Ocean.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Hillary Clinton<\/span> in Hanoi (July 2010) \u2192 \u201cthe United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia\u2019s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Technology hedging<\/span> \u2014 both banned <span class=\"n-term\">Huawei<\/span>, a company with suspected links to the PLA, protecting domestic 5G capability; Western companies moved out of China toward other Asian countries including India; the U.S. tightened market access for China after realising that increased trade had strengthened Beijing\u2019s hand, an area where India had already banned Chinese companies and apps.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Partnership for Quality Infrastructure<\/span> in the Indo-Pacific. America\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">national security strategy<\/span> under Biden reaffirmed China as its greatest threat.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> \u2192 there has been a conviction that a true India-US strategic partnership serves India\u2019s national interests in the changed geopolitical situation; though neither states it explicitly, China\u2019s ascent has been a significant motivating factor.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Doctrinal overlap<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span> against America\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">ARIA<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">FOIP<\/span>; a declassified <span class=\"n-term\">2018 US Indo-Pacific strategy paper<\/span> called for India to become \u201ca net security provider\u201d.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 India is \u201ckey to US efforts to preserve a stable balance in the Indo-Pacific\u201d, yet may keep the \u201cprincipled distance\u201d that safeguards strategic autonomy. Limits of \u2018natural\u2019 convergence: India\u2019s ties with Russia and Iran, the S-400 and CAATSA, trade and visa frictions, and Indian insistence on strategic autonomy.<\/li>\n<li>Residual worry in India that Washington does not share its concern over Chinese irredentism in the Himalayas and splits attention toward Russia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2016 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Comment on India\u2019s growing relationship with USA in the background of constrained relations between India and China.<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">The natural behaviour of India and the United States is likely to serve each other\u2019s interests. Hence, a deliberate strategy of dovetailing their efforts will obviously benefit both. Elaborate.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-natural-behaviour-of-india-and-the-united-states-is-likely-to-upsc-psir-2017-4502\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific\">From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical imagination<\/span><\/p>\n<p>A mental map in which there is no single way of framing the world \u2014 and power contests change this mental topography. \u201cAsia-Pacific\u201d and \u201cIndo-Pacific\u201d are two such constructs defining twenty-first century geopolitics; despite overlap and efforts to change the official vernacular, a tension remains between them.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Two constructs, two centres of gravity<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>ASIA-PACIFIC<\/th>\n<th>INDO-PACIFIC<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>1960s origin \u00b7 institutionalised through APEC in the 1980s \u00b7 excludes India \u00b7 ignores the Indian Ocean<\/td>\n<td>Japan-authored, with Australian and American support \u00b7 joins two oceans into one theatre \u00b7 brings India in<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Preferred by <span class=\"n-term\">Beijing<\/span> \u2014 it keeps China at the centre<\/td>\n<td>Dismissed by <span class=\"n-term\">Moscow<\/span> as an \u201cartificial construct\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Asia-Pacific<\/span> emerged in the 1960s and was institutionalised through the formation of <span class=\"n-term\">APEC<\/span> in the 1980s. Two shortcomings: it was not inclusive of important regional countries such as India, and it did not take into account the growing importance of the Indian Ocean for world maritime trade.<\/li>\n<li>It was <span class=\"n-term\">Japan<\/span> that saw the need to accommodate both shortcomings and, with support from Australia and the United States, championed the concept of the <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Pacific<\/span>. Debate over the shape of the region is far from settled, and with that lies the promise of ongoing rivalry.<\/li>\n<li>The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the <span class=\"n-term\">geopolitical epicentre<\/span> of the twenty-first century, shaping global trade, security dynamics and normative contestations over regional order. It encompasses a vast maritime space stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the western shores of the Americas, hosting nearly <span class=\"n-term\">60% of global GDP<\/span> and facilitating <span class=\"n-term\">two-thirds of global energy flows<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">over 90% of international trade by volume<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Brewster<\/span>, 2021). Its significance lies not only in economic centrality but in the intensifying rivalries that traverse it \u2014 between a rising China and a recalibrating United States, and in the strategic responses of middle powers such as Japan, Australia and, increasingly, India.<\/li>\n<li>The conceptual emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a unified construct represents a shift from the earlier Asia-Pacific paradigm, reflecting the <span class=\"n-term\">securitisation of the maritime commons<\/span> and the growing salience of the Indian Ocean in global power politics. The region houses <span class=\"n-term\">38 states<\/span>, about <span class=\"n-term\">62% of global GDP<\/span> and half of world trade.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Authorship<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shinzo Abe<\/span>\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cconfluence of the two seas\u201d<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbroader Asia\u201d<\/span> supplied the intellectual frame, drawing on Dara Shikoh. Chokepoints such as <span class=\"n-term\">Hormuz<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Malacca<\/span> carry more than half of maritime oil trade.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Strategic content<\/span> \u2014 joining the Pacific and Indian Oceans into a single theatre is what makes the <span class=\"n-term\">Quad<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">FOIP<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">IPEF<\/span> and the EU\u2019s Indo-Pacific Strategy coherent. <span class=\"n-term\">Indian stake<\/span> \u2014 it moves India out of the South Asia box and beyond South-East Asia, where the Look East policy had stopped, and supports the ambition of being net security provider. The change of vocabulary is a change of strategy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s response to the Indo-Pacific<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Formulation<\/span> \u2014 given by PM Modi at <span class=\"n-term\">Shangri-La (June 2018)<\/span>, resting on \u201cinclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity\u201d \u2014 deliberately not a containment framework.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Institutional participation<\/span> \u2014 the Quad, upgraded to summit level; <span class=\"n-term\">IPEF<\/span>, where India joined the Overarching Agreement and Pillars 3 and 4 in 2024; the <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative<\/span>, which the United States has joined; and the Indian Ocean Rim Association.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Doctrinal instruments<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span>, Project Mausam, and the \u201cnet security provider\u201d ambition.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Bilateral architecture<\/span> \u2014 the 2015 Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region with the United States; the <span class=\"n-term\">Act East Forum<\/span> with Japan; the Joint Strategic Vision with France for the Indian Ocean Region (2018).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Maritime capability<\/span> \u2014 Malabar with Japan as a permanent participant since 2015, the Andaman and Nicobar build-up, and associate partnership in the Combined Maritime Forces from 2023.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">European dimension<\/span> \u2014 the EU\u2019s Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021) and the national strategies of France, Germany and the Netherlands have brought Europe back into Asian waters, which New Delhi now welcomes. India has accepted the geography, joined the institutions, and refused the alliance.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Discuss the rationale behind replacing the \u201cAsia-Pacific\u201d strategy with the new term \u201cIndo-Pacific\u201d strategy.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/discuss-the-rationale-behind-replacing-the-asia-pacific-strategy-upsc-psir-2024-4509\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How is India responding to the idea of Indo-Pacific?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/how-is-india-responding-to-the-idea-of-indo-pacific-upsc-psir-2019-4504\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"cpec-and-the-china-factor\">CPEC and the China factor<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">How Sino-Pakistan ties were built<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>1950s\u201360s<\/em> \u2192 contacts at governmental, professional and intellectual levels, thin in political and economic content. Pakistan served as China\u2019s main bridge to the Islamic world and helped bridge the communication gap between the PRC and the West.<\/li>\n<li><em>1960s\u201370s<\/em> \u2192 Pakistan\u2019s disenchantment with the West coincided with trouble from India; the relationship was built in the aftermath of the 1962 border war. In <span class=\"n-term\">1963<\/span> Pakistan ceded the <span class=\"n-term\">Shaksgam Valley<\/span> to China, which then supplied arms, materials for the nuclear weapons programme and economic aid.<\/li>\n<li><em>1965 war<\/em> \u2192 of all Pakistan\u2019s supporters China spoke loudest, linking the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan conflicts and asserting a single Indian design of expansionism. In <em>1971<\/em> China treated events in Pakistan as an internal affair to be settled without foreign intervention.<\/li>\n<li><em>1990s<\/em> \u2192 Li Peng\u2019s April 1999 visit defined a broad consensus on regional and international issues.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">CPEC and its consequences<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CPEC, a flagship of the <span class=\"n-term\">Belt and Road Initiative<\/span>, passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Geostrategic<\/span> \u2192 transforms China\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Malacca Dilemma<\/span> into India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Gwadar Dilemma<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Geo-economic<\/span> \u2192 undercuts India\u2019s stance towards Pakistan, shifts Pakistan away from South Asian integration, and reduces the value of economic isolation as an Indian instrument.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">P.S. Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 India could consider participating in regional trade if Pakistan and China open cross-South Asian routes. <span class=\"n-sch\">Hardeep S. Puri<\/span> \u2192 maintain resistance to CPEC to safeguard sovereignty.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>The relationship raises the specter that India may, in the future, face a two-front war, a scenario that would have been implausible a decade ago.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Manjari Chatterjee Miller<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Implications for India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Jayadeva Ranade<\/span> \u2192 with Chinese military power flowing into Pakistan, China straddles India on the northern, eastern and western borders, raising the prospect of a two-front war and positioning China to play a role in Kashmir. Since 2010 Pakistan is the only country with which China has an \u201c<span class=\"n-term\">all-weather strategic partnership<\/span>\u201d.<\/li>\n<li>Under Xi Jinping, China\u2019s earlier practice of managing or deferring contentious issues has been discarded for a direct and aggressive approach.<\/li>\n<li>The \u2018<span class=\"n-term\">Rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation<\/span>\u2019 means \u201cthe recovery of territories that China feels it has lost through the imposition of unequal treaties by hostile foreign powers\u201d \u2014 hence the framing of the border question as a colonial legacy, and claims to Aksai Chin, Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, reinforced by stapled visas.<\/li>\n<li>The relationship is not problem-free \u2192 Chinese wariness about Islamist militants in Xinjiang and their Pakistani links, attacks on Chinese citizens in Pakistan, sporadic opposition to CPEC, and Chinese caution on Kashmir. It is nevertheless no longer a mere relationship but a genuine partnership.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-japan\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India and Japan<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-russia\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>India and Russia<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#nature-two-civilizational-states-one-paradox\">Nature \u2014 two civilizational states, one paradox<\/a><a href=\"#the-four-phases-what-actually-drove-each\">The four phases \u2014 what actually drove each<\/a><a href=\"#the-modi-years-and-post-2020-deterrence\">The Modi years \u00b7 and post-2020 deterrence<\/a><a href=\"#the-boundary-dispute-three-sectors\">The boundary dispute \u2014 three sectors<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-contestation-and-competition\">Areas of contestation and competition<\/a><a href=\"#the-china-pakistan-axis\">The China\u2013Pakistan axis<\/a><a href=\"#india-china-the-united-states-and-the-russia-triangle\">India, China &amp; the United States \u00b7 and the Russia triangle<\/a><a href=\"#india-china-the-neighbourhood-the-five-fingers\">India, China &amp; the neighbourhood \u2014 the \u2018five fingers\u2019<\/a><a href=\"#competition-in-the-indo-pacific-and-the-south-china-sea\">Competition in the Indo-Pacific \u00b7 and the South China Sea<\/a><a href=\"#scholars-theory-policy-china\">Scholars \u00b7 theory \u00b7 policy (China)<\/a><a href=\"#assessment-where-each-relationship-stands\">Assessment \u2014 where each relationship stands<\/a><a href=\"#conclusion\">Conclusion<\/a><a href=\"#india-the-united-states-and-china\">India, the United States and China<\/a><a href=\"#from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific\">From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific<\/a><a href=\"#cpec-and-the-china-factor\">CPEC and the China factor<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and China for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and China Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and China Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014 India<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.5.4","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"5","fx_note_desc":"India and China for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and China Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and China Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014 India","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3595","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3595","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3595\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3789,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3595\/revisions\/3789"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3595"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}