{"id":3596,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:13","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-russia\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:57","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:57","slug":"india-and-russia","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/india-and-russia\/","title":{"rendered":"India and Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>India and Russia<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">India and Russia<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5<\/b> \u2014 India and the Global Centres of Power : USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"nature-of-the-relationship\">Nature of the Relationship<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">David M. Malone<\/span> \u2192 the Indo-Russian relationship does not extend as far back as those with the colonial powers. The Himalayas and the Hindu Kush insulated India from meaningful early contact. Much of the relevant history is the <em>\u2018Great Game\u2019<\/em> of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Russia sought to challenge Britain\u2019s supremacy in South Asia, parts of Central Asia and Iran. The Caucasus and Afghanistan, both central to the Great Game, formed a powerful buffer, leaving India well beyond the Soviet sphere. During the Cold War, conflict with China and the unreliability of the United States drew India into a comprehensive relationship with Moscow, culminating in the <span class=\"n-term\">1971 treaty of friendship<\/span> \u2014 yet Delhi worked hard to stay independent and was never included entirely in the Soviet camp.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span> \u2192 Russia has been a steadfast friend and a <span class=\"n-term\">very special and privileged partner<\/span> for decades \u2014 assistance in industrial development, energy, education, space, atomic energy and defence equipment; affordable Soviet credit and rupee trade; political support at decisive moments over Kashmir, Goa, Sikkim and Bangladesh. India continues to procure aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and weapon systems unavailable elsewhere.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajan Menon<\/span> \u2192 American containment extended to Asia after the Korean War, creating overlapping interests between Moscow and New Delhi. Moscow sought a gap in Washington\u2019s <em>cordon sanitaire<\/em>, which required ties with non-aligned countries; India, as leader of the non-aligned movement, became a potential partner and a progressive force.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Raj Kumar Sharma<\/span> \u2192 since 1947 India had a large friendly country to its north that dominated the Eurasian landmass and helped it deal with China. That prospect is now under scrutiny, as Russia and China assert a <em>\u2018no-limit partnership\u2019<\/em>. During the Cold War, Russia acted as a <span class=\"n-term\">balancer<\/span> in India-China ties while an internationally beleaguered China accommodated India\u2019s concerns. Today China is not hampered by Russian power, and Beijing may not be willing to address New Delhi\u2019s concerns \u2014 which is why PM Modi has given up past inhibitions toward the United States.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nivedita Kapoor<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Nandan Unnikrishnan<\/span> \u2192 ties seem to be stagnating as both countries try to define their roles in a changing world. Despite the 2010 \u2018special and privileged strategic partnership\u2019, drift was evident \u2014 India-Russia trade was merely <span class=\"n-term\">US$20 billion in 2015<\/span> while Russia-China trade had reached <span class=\"n-term\">US$107 billion in 2018<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Srinath Raghavan<\/span>, on the regret and nostalgia generated by the 2016 Russia-Pakistan exercises \u2192 fellow Indians should clear the cobwebs from their minds. The relationship, undeniably significant, was not without complexities; Moscow\u2019s interactions with New Delhi were consistently influenced by its strategic interests. There is no necessity to romanticise the relationship, and <span class=\"n-term\">nostalgia alone is not a sustainable basis for policy<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cEvery child in India knows that Russia is our best friend.\u201d<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, on a relationship resting on equality, trust and mutual benefit<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Distinctive features<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Stable without major fluctuations despite changes of government or socio-political system in either country.<\/li>\n<li>No bilateral disputes, no threat perceptions, positive popular perception on both sides.<\/li>\n<li>Similar security concerns on terrorism; similar positions on Afghanistan and Syria.<\/li>\n<li>Russian support for a permanent UNSC seat and NSG membership.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-interests-in-russia\">India\u2019s Interests in Russia<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Defence and security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The USSR and later Russia as the principal source of weaponry and technology transfer over an extended period.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Consistent support for a permanent UNSC seat and NSG membership; unequivocal support on Kashmir.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Multipolar order<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Both call for a multipolar order centred on the UN and the rule of law; both have high stakes in avoiding US-China bipolarity. At the <span class=\"n-term\">Sochi Summit<\/span> both agreed that the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership is an important factor for global peace and stability.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Diversification of sources; <span class=\"n-term\">ONGC<\/span> has invested nearly $3 billion in the <span class=\"n-term\">Sakhalin<\/span> fields, Rosneft has invested in India, and an Indian consortium has a presence in the Siberian Arctic.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Science and technology<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Space, nuclear science, defence technology.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Regional and multilateral<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Terrorism, climate change, regional peace and security, BRICS, SCO, multilateralism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"the-five-phases-vidya-nadkarni-s-frame\">The Five Phases \u2014 Vidya Nadkarni\u2019s Frame<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From no contact to a pragmatic, market-driven partnership.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">I \u00b7 to 1953<\/span> (Great Game inheritance; Stalin\u2019s indifference) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">II \u00b7 1953\u201371<\/span> (Khrushchev\u2019s recalibration; Bhilai; arms) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">III \u00b7 1971\u201391<\/span> (Treaty tilt; 1971 war; 85% arms share) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">IV \u00b7 Post-Soviet decade<\/span> (Drift, then the 1993 reset) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">V \u00b7 21st century<\/span> (Anti-unipolarity; 2000 Strategic Partnership)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase I (up to 1953) \u2014 from pre-independence to Stalin<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 until independence, ties between British India and Imperial Russia were shaped by two British preoccupations \u2014 securing the Indian colony from southward Russian expansion, and later the rise of Germany, which triggered a British entente with France and Russia.<\/li>\n<li>Beginnings trace to the early nineteenth century, when the Tsar expanded into Central Asia; the British fought the Afghan wars to create a buffer, producing the <span class=\"n-term\">Great Game<\/span>. The <span class=\"n-term\">Anglo-Russian Convention (1907)<\/span> ended it; the <span class=\"n-term\">Bolshevik Revolution (1917)<\/span> then superimposed <span class=\"n-term\">ideological antipathies<\/span> on earlier geopolitical competition.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 early Soviet leaders were not keen on supporting the Indian national movement, judging it bourgeois-led and lacking revolutionary potential; Russia was also preoccupied with internal concerns and Western opposition to Bolshevik rule.<\/li>\n<li>After independence, Nehru\u2019s idealism and disdain for realpolitik coloured policy until the early 1960s \u2014 faith in a <span class=\"n-term\">new Asian path<\/span>, replacing European-style power politics with <span class=\"n-term\">peaceful coexistence<\/span>, and the search for the <span class=\"n-term\">moral high ground<\/span>. Even in the tight bipolarity of the 1940s, non-alignment isolated India from the high tables of decision-making: neither Stalin nor Truman would accept it. <span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2014 the pursuit of autonomy meant India had <span class=\"n-term\">no powerful international sponsors<\/span> to protect its interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase II (1953\u20131971) \u2014 beginning of engagement<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-alignment and the mixed economy under centralised planning closed doors to full Western engagement. The West refused assistance for a public sector <span class=\"n-term\">steel plant at Bhilai<\/span>, pushing India toward the aid agreement of <span class=\"n-term\">1955<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 unlike Stalin, who viewed India\u2019s leaders as capitalist lackeys, <span class=\"n-term\">Khrushchev<\/span> saw the value of enlisting India as an anti-imperialist ally. This <span class=\"n-term\">recalibration of doctrine and policy<\/span> toward the Third World opened the door to Soviet economic and military assistance. While elite preference for non-alignment would have predicted divergence, a <span class=\"n-term\">key domestic variable<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">mixed economy<\/span>, closer to the Soviet model \u2014 facilitated improved ties. The India-Soviet nexus is, in effect, a legacy of Nehru\u2019s early policy choices.<\/li>\n<li>The USSR offered diplomatic backing on Kashmir and the Sino-Indian boundary. During the <span class=\"n-term\">1962 war<\/span> however, Moscow reversed its earlier support, parroted the Chinese view that India\u2019s border position was a legacy of British imperialism, and counselled a negotiated ceasefire on Chinese terms. Military help came only after the war, but began an arms relationship that replaced Britain as India\u2019s primary supplier and helped repel Pakistan in 1965.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 the Soviet Union feared that American and British military aid during the 1962 war might tilt New Delhi toward the West, so a renewed push was given after 1962.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Sino-Soviet conflict<\/span>, brewing since the late 1950s, broke openly in 1963, drawing India and the USSR closer. The estrangement eventually paved the way for <span class=\"n-term\">Sino-American rapprochement<\/span> through Kissinger\u2019s 1971 trip. Since Pakistan was the indispensable intermediary, India feared a hostile <span class=\"n-term\">Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis<\/span>, and Moscow saw the reconciliation as a threat to Soviet interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase III (1971\u20131991) \u2014 strategic engagement<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 these systemic developments led to the twenty-year <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship<\/span> (August 1971), cementing a pronounced tilt. Generous Soviet military aid allowed India to defeat Pakistan in the <span class=\"n-term\">1971 war<\/span>, dismember the Pakistani state through the creation of Bangladesh, and establish India as the pre-eminent power in South Asia.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979)<\/span> shook New Delhi as an unwarranted incursion into India\u2019s sphere of influence, though India stayed publicly uncritical. By the 1980s, Soviet arms constituted <span class=\"n-term\">85 per cent<\/span> of India\u2019s imports.<\/li>\n<li>In the mid-1980s, <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Gandhi<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Mikhail Gorbachev<\/span> both began economic liberalisation, Gorbachev under the banner of <span class=\"n-term\">perestroika<\/span>. Both leaders were committed to the relationship, yet the cumulative effect of domestic reform in both countries attenuated ties by the end of the decade.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase IV \u2014 the post-Soviet decade<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Gorbachev\u2019s \u2018new thinking\u2019 (1987)<\/span> produced a reappraisal of unqualified support for India \u2014 even-handedness between India and Pakistan, concern expressed on Kashmir, and a Soviet vote for a Pakistani-sponsored UN resolution on a nuclear-free zone. In 1991 the twentieth anniversary of the Indo-Soviet treaty was not officially acknowledged in either capital.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Smita Purushottam<\/span> \u2192 with the end of the Soviet Union and further decline of the Russian economy, ties underwent a reset. Russia focused on nurturing relations with the West and neglected its old relationship with India. The West could not move beyond bipolar mindsets and attributed the double collapse of the USSR to its \u2018containment\u2019 policies. Western structural adjustment and liberalisation contributed to Russia\u2019s further decline and relegated it from a geopolitical pole to a mid-level power.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 by early 1993 Russia was disenchanted with the United States and Europe and began to rekindle ties with India. A key reason was the American decision to expand <span class=\"n-term\">NATO<\/span> and undertake \u2018out-of-area\u2019 operations in the Balkans, which decisively ended Moscow\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018romance with the West\u2019<\/span>. During Yeltsin\u2019s 1993 visit both signed the twenty-year Treaty of Indo-Russian Friendship and Cooperation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Irritants<\/span> \u2014 curtailment of <span class=\"n-term\">space cooperation<\/span> owing to American fears about India\u2019s ballistic missile programme, leading to cancellation of cryogenic engine supply, though Moscow honoured existing contracts for seven engines; and application of the full range of safeguards to future <span class=\"n-term\">nuclear supply<\/span> agreements.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Taliban\u2019s seizure of power in 1996<\/span> worried both, and India and Russia began supporting the opposition <span class=\"n-term\">Northern Alliance<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2014 convergence in Afghanistan, a shared preference for a polycentric world, and a common disinclination toward violating state sovereignty through humanitarian intervention warmed ties by the late 1990s. Putin steered Russian foreign policy in a pragmatic direction, producing the <span class=\"n-term\">strategic partnership agreement of 2000<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Phase V \u2014 the twenty-first century<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 the relationship that went haywire in the 1990s was reconstituted on a new footing, with antipathy toward the emerging <span class=\"n-term\">unipolar world<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">American unilateralism<\/span> as the prime movers. India\u2019s preference for a <span class=\"n-term\">multipolar order<\/span> made convergence possible at the macro level.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajan Menon<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Eugene Rumer<\/span> \u2192 the most important driver of realignment was political and economic dynamics in India. Liberalisation, coinciding with global trends, expanded India\u2019s economic and political relations with the United States; Clinton\u2019s 2000 visit was a milestone.<\/li>\n<li>At the policy level, India\u2019s growing appetite for weapons and Russia\u2019s interest in rescuing its cash-strapped defence industry provided a synergy both were eager to exploit. India\u2019s growing strength propelled it toward wider strategic engagement with the United States and Japan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Smita Purushottam<\/span> \u2192 Russia\u2019s tight embrace of China in the early decades of this century was driven by system-level factors \u2014 opposition to unilateralism, NATO expansion, and ballistic missile defences on its doorstep. Russian technological expertise and Chinese finance made them suitable partners. After Crimea and Ukraine the embrace tightened further, against India\u2019s interest in Russia as a strong independent pole.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"relations-in-the-modi-years\">Relations in the Modi Years<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Signs of stagnation were already evident in <span class=\"n-term\">2014<\/span>, when the U.S. displaced Russia as top arms supplier. India\u2019s designation as a <span class=\"n-term\">Major Defence Partner<\/span> (2016) caused consternation in Moscow; India began the 2+2 dialogue (2018) and signed LEMOA (2016) and COMCASA (2018).<\/li>\n<li>In reaction, Russia overturned decades-old policy and supplied China with the <span class=\"n-term\">Sukhoi 35<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">S-400<\/span>, conducted <span class=\"n-term\">military exercises with Pakistan<\/span> (2016), and sold <span class=\"n-term\">Mi-35 attack helicopters<\/span> to Pakistan (2016).<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Sochi informal summit (2018)<\/span> and the annual summit that followed produced decisions on S-400 supply, the start of FTA negotiations between the Eurasian Economic Union and India, a single-window service in Russia for Indian companies, <em>Russia Plus<\/em> in India to facilitate Russian investment, the India-Russia Business Summit, the Far East Agency in Mumbai, <em>\u2018India-Russia Economic Cooperation: The Way Forward\u2019<\/em>, and LNG supply from Gazprom.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajan Menon<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Eugene Rumer<\/span> \u2192 Russia is adjusting its long-standing India-centred South Asia policy in response to New Delhi\u2019s closer security ties with Washington, without abandoning India, whose global strategic heft exceeds that of Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Institutional structure<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission<\/span> rests on two pillars: <span class=\"n-term\">IRIGC-TEC<\/span>, co-chaired by India\u2019s External Affairs Minister and a Russian Deputy Prime Minister, and <span class=\"n-term\">IRIGC-MTC<\/span>, co-chaired by both Defence Ministers. The <span class=\"n-term\">Annual Summit<\/span> is the highest institutionalised dialogue mechanism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-23rd-annual-summit-putin-in-new-delhi-december-2025\">The 23rd Annual Summit \u2014 Putin in New Delhi, December 2025<\/h3>\n<p>President Putin\u2019s state visit of <span class=\"n-term\">4\u20135 December 2025<\/span> was his first to India since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and marked the <span class=\"n-term\">25th anniversary<\/span> of the October 2000 Declaration on Strategic Partnership. It met under heavy external pressure \u2014 a 50 per cent US tariff wall, half of it tied to Russian crude, and US sanctions on Russia\u2019s largest oil companies. <span class=\"n-term\">16 intergovernmental agreements and 15 MoUs<\/span> were signed; the \u201cSpecial and Privileged Strategic Partnership\u201d was reaffirmed.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Theme<\/th>\n<th>Outcome<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Trade<\/span><\/td>\n<td>FY2024\u201325 trade about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 68.7 billion<\/span>; revised target <span class=\"n-term\">USD 100 billion by 2030<\/span>. Heavily favours Russia \u2014 Indian exports only about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 4.8 billion<\/span>. <span class=\"n-term\">Programme 2030<\/span> adopted to diversify beyond oil. Putin said almost <span class=\"n-term\">96 per cent<\/span> of bilateral trade is settled in national currencies.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russian oil rose from under 1 per cent of India\u2019s crude imports to a peak near <span class=\"n-term\">36 per cent<\/span> (FY2024\u201325); <span class=\"n-term\">Rosneft<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Lukoil<\/span> together supply about 60 per cent of it. Putin pledged \u201cuninterrupted\u201d supply; imports fell to a <span class=\"n-term\">38-month low<\/span> by December 2025.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">US and EU pressure<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The 25 + 25 = <span class=\"n-term\">50 per cent<\/span> tariff, the second tranche tied to Russian oil. The US sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil (announced 22 October, effective 21 November 2025). The EU\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">19th sanctions package<\/span> (October 2025) named several Indian entities.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Defence<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">SIPRI<\/span>: Russia\u2019s share of India\u2019s arms imports fell from <span class=\"n-term\">70%<\/span> (2011\u201315) to <span class=\"n-term\">51%<\/span> (2016\u201320) to <span class=\"n-term\">40%<\/span> (2021\u201325); India remained the world\u2019s second-largest arms importer at 8.2 per cent of the global total. <span class=\"n-term\">No major new arms deal<\/span> was signed; the <span class=\"n-term\">Su-57<\/span> remained only a proposal. Of the 2018 S-400 deal (about USD 5.4 billion), three systems were delivered and two delayed to 2026.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Other outcomes<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Migration and Mobility Agreement<\/span> for skilled Indian workers, with a parallel anti-irregular-migration pact; a <span class=\"n-term\">UralChem<\/span> MoU with RCF, NFL and Indian Potash for a urea joint venture in Russia; nuclear talks on remaining <span class=\"n-term\">Kudankulam<\/span> units, a second site and VVER reactors against a target of <span class=\"n-term\">100 GW by 2047<\/span>; connectivity through the <span class=\"n-term\">INSTC<\/span>, the <span class=\"n-term\">Chennai\u2013Vladivostok Corridor<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Northern Sea Route<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Multilateral<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia backed India\u2019s UNSC seat and its <span class=\"n-term\">2026 BRICS chairship<\/span>. After the India\u2013US trade framework of 2 February 2026, Trump claimed India would stop buying Russian oil; <span class=\"n-term\">India did not confirm that claim<\/span>. The India\u2013EAEU free trade agreement remained under negotiation, unsigned.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Resilience or stagnation \u2014 the central debate<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Alexei Zakharov<\/span> \u2192 the relationship is <span class=\"n-term\">paradoxical<\/span>: sustainable through old ties, yet <span class=\"n-term\">stagnant<\/span> because no new areas have been defined; the record trade is imbalanced and rests almost wholly on oil, and the ties lack novel drivers for the long haul.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Pravesh Kumar Gupta<\/span> \u2192 the same event reads as reassurance \u2014 the visit reaffirmed a time-tested partnership built on political trust. The gap is one of emphasis: Zakharov weighs the missing deals, the VIF view weighs durability under pressure.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span> \u2192 autonomy works only when the major powers get along; as US\u2013Russia ties soured, India\u2019s links with Moscow drew fresh scrutiny. His long-run reading is a <span class=\"n-term\">managed decline<\/span> \u2014 short-term handling of US pressure, medium-term defence diversification, long-term deepening of Western ties.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 India asserted autonomy without harming its Western ties; the visit signalled independence to Washington while reassuring a domestic audience. <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> calls India\u2019s approach <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cfreedom of choice\u201d<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vrinda Sahai<\/span> \u2192 discounted Russian crude rose from about 2.5 per cent of India\u2019s imports before 2022 to roughly 36 per cent by FY2024\u201325; sanctions and tariffs pushed refiners toward Saudi, Iraqi and American crude. Dropping Russian oil entirely is not practical, so India follows an <span class=\"n-term\">economy-first<\/span> course \u2014 and because trade is so oil-dependent, any fall in crude purchases directly caps the headline trade figure.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Restructuring, not reduction<\/span> \u2192 the S-400 is already embedded in India\u2019s air-defence network and a follow-on order worth about <span class=\"n-term\">USD 6.1 billion<\/span> was later cleared. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and Zakharov stress that no large new contract was signed and that war and sanctions limit fresh Russian supplies. The result is layered: legacy Russian systems retained, advanced platforms bought from the West, domestic production slowly expanded.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">The China shadow<\/span> \u2192 Russia has grown more neutral on the India\u2013Pakistan rivalry and was ambivalent after the <span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam<\/span> attack. <span class=\"n-sch\">Anil Wadhwa<\/span> argues Russia\u2019s ties with China are tactical and with Pakistan transactional, meant to keep Beijing balanced. Delhi fears that Chinese sway over Moscow could slow spares and technology during a crisis, and that Chinese parts may enter Russian-origin equipment \u2014 which is why India stays non-committal on reviving the <span class=\"n-term\">RIC<\/span> troika.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rahul Pandey<\/span> and the VIF hold that trust, high-end technology and shared multipolarity keep the partnership strong. Whether \u201cdecline\u201d or \u201cdurability\u201d fits better depends on the weight given to oil, China, and the deals that did not happen.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cRussia is ready for uninterrupted shipments of fuel to India.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Vladimir Putin, New Delhi, 5 December 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIndia is not neutral, it stands on the side of peace.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Narendra Modi, 5 December 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIf the US has the right to buy our fuel, why shouldn\u2019t India have the same privilege?\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Vladimir Putin<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe long-term direction of travel is towards a \u2018managed decline\u2019 in relations.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Chietigj Bajpaee, 2 December 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cNeither side has any intention to dilute this relationship, and is ready to withstand any external pressure.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Harsh V. Pant, 5 December 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"relations-through-levels-of-analysis\">Relations through Levels of Analysis<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> on the interplay of individual, state and system levels:<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Level<\/th>\n<th>Working<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Individual<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The relationship bore a strong imprint of decision-making choices in New Delhi. The Nehruvian trinity of socialism, secularism and non-alignment, coloured by idealism, moved India gradually into the Soviet orbit even though Nehru hoped for equidistance. Under <span class=\"n-sch\">Indira Gandhi<\/span>, realism became a guiding principle; she treated close friendship with the Soviet Union as essential and secured diplomatic, economic and military assistance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Systemic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The bipolar international structure imposed restrictions that India\u2019s early leaders did not anticipate. Structural elements such as the US-Soviet rivalry and the emergence of China as a common adversary gave non-alignment a Soviet colouring and provided the impetus for <span class=\"n-term\">classic balancing<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Domestic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Dual impact. Strong pro-Soviet constituencies emerged in the defence and foreign policy communities and later in business, as exporters benefiting from the rupee-rouble arrangement developed a vested interest \u2014 producing an all-party consensus on the value of ties with Russia. New constituencies are emerging on the other side: private industry bidding for indigenous weapons programmes, and expanding trade and military links with the United States. They are nascent and lacking influence, but foreshadow a time when domestic factors may weigh more heavily.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Nadkarni\u2019s forecast<\/span> \u2192 given the present configuration of elite proclivities, pro-Russia domestic constituencies and the strong defence partnership, the relationship is unlikely to be derailed for at least the next decade or two.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of Cooperation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Economic<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>State enterprises have long facilitated interaction in each other\u2019s territory, building comfort among officials since the Cold War.<\/li>\n<li>Bilateral trade around <span class=\"n-term\">$8.1 billion<\/span>, with Russia only <span class=\"n-term\">1%<\/span> of India\u2019s total trade and India a mere <span class=\"n-term\">1.2%<\/span> of Russia\u2019s; targets of <span class=\"n-term\">$30 billion<\/span> in trade and <span class=\"n-term\">$50 billion<\/span> in investment by 2025. Trade declined between 2013 and 2016 and recovered from 2017.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s total investment in Russia stands at <span class=\"n-term\">$13 billion<\/span>; renewed emphasis on hydrocarbons between 2015 and 2017. In later reckoning, trade reached <span class=\"n-term\">$25 billion in 2022<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 68.7 billion in FY 2024-25<\/span> \u2014 about five times the pre-pandemic level \u2014 driven chiefly by discounted oil.<\/li>\n<li>Institutional steps \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">CEO\u2019s Forum<\/span>, liberalised business travel, Russian interest in dedicated freight corridors, industrial clusters, smart cities and engineering services; Indian interest in Russian coal, fertilizers, hydrocarbons, minerals and rare earths. A special notified zone at the <span class=\"n-term\">Bharat Diamond Bourse<\/span> was planned.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Political and international<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Convergence on a <span class=\"n-term\">multipolar order<\/span>, strengthening the UN system, terrorism, and peaceful use of outer space.<\/li>\n<li>Joint projects in third countries \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Rooppur nuclear plant<\/span> in Bangladesh on a trilateral basis with Rosatom and Bangladesh\u2019s Ministry of Science and Technology.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)<\/span> with Iran links the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea to Russia; with <span class=\"n-term\">Sagarmala<\/span> and the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway it can connect Europe and Russia to ASEAN and make India a transit hub.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Energy and nuclear<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India will account for almost <span class=\"n-term\">30 per cent<\/span> of global energy demand growth and <span class=\"n-term\">11 per cent<\/span> of global energy use by 2040, making diversification urgent; Russia is a natural candidate.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">ONGC Videsh<\/span> has been in Russia since 2001 with a <span class=\"n-term\">20 per cent<\/span> stake in <span class=\"n-term\">Sakhalin-I<\/span> and a joint venture in <span class=\"n-term\">Sakhalin-III<\/span> with Rosneft. East Siberian oil via the Kozmino Bay route is a prospective avenue. The sale of a <span class=\"n-term\">98%<\/span> stake in Essar Oil to a Rosneft-led consortium was a significant step in deleveraging Indian corporate balance sheets.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Nuclear<\/span> cooperation dates to the 1960s \u2014 the 1961 RAPS research and development agreements, the 1976 heavy water contract, nuclear fuel for Tarapur in 1982 and 1988, and reactors and light water for <span class=\"n-term\">Kudankulam<\/span> after Pokhran-II.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic Vision<\/span> for peaceful uses of atomic energy signed by the Department of Atomic Energy and <span class=\"n-term\">Rosatom<\/span> (December 2014); Russia proposed involving India in building Russian-designed plants in third countries, joint extraction of natural uranium, fuel production and waste elimination, and offered to build over 20 units, up from twelve. Units 1 and 2 of Kudankulam are operational, with 3 and 4 under construction. Eight years after India legitimised foreign collaboration in civil nuclear energy, Russia remained the <span class=\"n-em\">only<\/span> foreign nation involved in nuclear power production in India.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Defence and security<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Defence relations began after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and have moved from a <span class=\"n-term\">buyer-seller<\/span> framework to <span class=\"n-term\">joint research, development and production<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>More than <span class=\"n-term\">70%<\/span> of Indian defence equipment is of Russian origin; Cold War purchases through rupee-rouble arrangements saved foreign exchange; technology transfers supported India\u2019s domestic industry from the 1980s.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Flagship projects<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">BrahMos<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">Sukhoi Su-30MKI<\/span>, <span class=\"n-term\">T-90<\/span> tanks, the fifth-generation fighter programme, modernisation of MiG-29s and Kamov-31 helicopters, the Multi Transport Aircraft, Talwar-class frigates under Project 11356, MiG-29K shipborne aircraft, and the aircraft carrier inducted as <span class=\"n-term\">INS Vikramaditya<\/span> (2013).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">S-400<\/span> supply; frigates under Project 1135.6; a joint venture for <span class=\"n-term\">Ka-226T<\/span> helicopters; <span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Russian Rifles Pvt. Ltd.<\/span> at Korwa producing <span class=\"n-term\">AK-203<\/span> rifles under \u2018Make in India\u2019, with 48,000 units delivered by mid-2025.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Exercises<\/span> \u2014 the tri-services <span class=\"n-term\">INDRA<\/span> and the naval <span class=\"n-term\">Indra Navy<\/span>; frequent exchanges between defence ministers, service chiefs and defence secretaries.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Counter-terrorism, space, science, culture<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Counter-terrorism<\/span> \u2014 Moscow, in light of its wars in Chechnya, has been sympathetic to India\u2019s position: the 1994 <span class=\"n-term\">Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States<\/span>; Yeltsin\u2019s 1997 assurance; Putin\u2019s 2000 commitments and joint support for the Northern Alliance; and the <span class=\"n-term\">Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism (2001)<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Space<\/span> \u2014 cooperation spans about four decades: satellite launches, <span class=\"n-term\">GLONASS<\/span>, remote sensing and societal applications. <span class=\"n-term\">Aryabhata<\/span> launched in 1975 with Soviet help, beginning India\u2019s space programme; <span class=\"n-term\">Bhaskara-1<\/span> launched in 1979 aboard a C1-Intercosmos vehicle. A 2007 framework agreement; a 2015 MoU on expanded cooperation; an ISRO-ROSCOSMOS MoU on human spaceflight at the 19th Bilateral Summit, with cooperation on <span class=\"n-term\">Gaganyaan<\/span>, space systems, rocket engines, propellants, spacecraft and launch vehicles.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Science and technology<\/span> \u2014 three institutional mechanisms: the Working Group on Science and Technology under IRIGC-TEC, the <span class=\"n-term\">Integrated Long-Term Programme<\/span>, and the Basic Science Cooperation Programme, with inter-academy exchanges. Initiatives include the India-Russia Bridge to Innovation, telemedicine, the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, GIAN, and the Russia India Network of universities; cooperation under the <span class=\"n-term\">Arctic Council<\/span> framework with the Russian Scientific Centre at Spitsbergen, Svalbard.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Cultural<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre<\/span> works with leading Russian institutions; about 20 Russian institutions teach Hindi to around 1500 students; Tamil, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, Urdu, Sanskrit and Pali are also taught. JNCC conducts yoga, dance, music and Hindi classes for about 500 students a month; the six-month <em>\u201cFestival of India in Russia\u201d<\/em> (2018-19) across 22 cities featured 34 performances by 10 groups; regular exchanges since 2015 including the Festival of Russian Culture and <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cNamaste Russia\u201d<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u2018Relations between India and Russia are rooted in history, mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation.\u2019 Discuss.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/relations-between-india-and-russia-are-rooted-in-history-mutual-upsc-psir-2021-4506\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"areas-of-concern-and-contestation\">Areas of Concern and Contestation<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Defence procurement \u2014 the Gorshkov case<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A 2004 contract for <span class=\"n-term\">$1.5 billion<\/span> with delivery expected in August 2008; infrastructure problems and underfunding of Russian shipbuilding produced delays and cost overruns; a renegotiated contract in March 2010 reset the cost to <span class=\"n-term\">$2.34 billion<\/span>; induction as <span class=\"n-term\">INS Vikramaditya<\/span> followed only in November 2013.<\/li>\n<li>Recurring concerns over quality, delivery delays and upgrades; problems with spare parts and maintenance, partly because Indian negotiators failed to build <span class=\"n-term\">life-cycle perspectives<\/span> into agreements; equipment becoming obsolete after a few years, with production plants shut and spares unavailable. Cost and time overruns pushed India to diversify toward Israel, France and the United States.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Weak economic base<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Commercial ties are not diverse: defence and nuclear energy dominate. Diversification is needed into films, education, research and development, and textiles.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Barriers<\/span> \u2014 geographical distance and absence of direct connectivity, which do not constrain India-Europe or India-China trade; lack of awareness of commercial opportunities; sudden changes in legal and tax regimes, as faced by <span class=\"n-term\">Sistema<\/span> in India and <span class=\"n-term\">ONGC<\/span> in Russia; the near-absence of Indian IT firms in Russia and Russian energy firms in India; customs barriers.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Comparative scale<\/span> \u2014 bilateral trade of only <span class=\"n-term\">$11 billion<\/span>, with military equipment the most significant element; in 2020 Russian non-weapons exports to India were under <span class=\"n-term\">$6 billion<\/span> and Indian exports to Russia under <span class=\"n-term\">$3 billion<\/span>, against Russia-China trade of just over <span class=\"n-term\">$100 billion<\/span> and US-India trade of <span class=\"n-term\">$120 billion<\/span>. Total Russian investment in India from 2000 to 2021 was <span class=\"n-term\">$1.26 billion<\/span>, against US FDI estimated at <span class=\"n-term\">$42 billion<\/span> \u2014 making the $50 billion target for 2025 unattainable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Divergent foreign policy priorities<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nivedita Kapoor<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Nandan Unnikrishnan<\/span> \u2192 the most prominent divergence is Russian displeasure at the ideation of the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cIndo-Pacific\u201d<\/span>, which Russia calls an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cartificially imposed construct\u201d<\/span> promoted by the U.S., Australia and Japan to contain China \u2014 despite PM Modi\u2019s Shangri-La formulation of an Indo-Pacific based on \u201cinclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity\u201d. Divergence also persists over Afghanistan.<\/li>\n<li>Foreign Minister <span class=\"n-sch\">Sergey Lavrov<\/span> has called the QUAD an <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cAsian NATO\u201d<\/span>. Russian outreach to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and the Taliban-led Afghanistan complicates India\u2019s security calculus.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Alexei Zakharov<\/span> \u2192 diverging China- and US-related interests are fraying strategic trust. <span class=\"n-sch\">Srinath Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 post-Cold War ties became largely <span class=\"n-term\">transactional<\/span>, centred on arms sales. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2192 they now lack substantive drivers beyond nostalgia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The India-Russia-US triangle<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Balancing has become harder since the early 2000s. Russia is a time-tested ally; the U.S. has become indispensable for India\u2019s Indo-Pacific interests. Russia\u2019s relative decline and its slide into junior partnership with China complicate India\u2019s vision of the future order.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">S-400<\/span> deal drew CAATSA warnings and strained ties for a period; India proceeded as a mark of strategic autonomy. Full SCO membership in 2017 generated further suspicion in US circles.<\/li>\n<li>Russia\u2019s share of India\u2019s arms imports fell from <span class=\"n-term\">60 per cent<\/span> before the Ukraine war to <span class=\"n-term\">45 per cent<\/span>. Russia and China jointly rejected a consensus statement on Ukraine during India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">G20 presidency<\/span> \u2014 the Sino-Russian \u201cno-limits\u201d partnership making Moscow junior to India\u2019s principal rival.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">The recent differences between India and Russia are the result of misconceptions than facts. Elucidate.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-recent-differences-between-india-and-russia-are-the-result-of-upsc-psir-2017-4501\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Arms trade, economic ties and congruent geo-political interests are no longer the three pillars of India &#8211; Russia relationship in the emerging strategic context. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/arms-trade-economic-ties-and-congruent-geo-political-interests-upsc-psir-2023-4508\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"russia-china-and-india\">Russia, China and India<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>In the early twenty-first century Russia concluded that the West would never let it reclaim superpower status and that Western liberal policies would not work for it, and turned east \u2014 to India and especially China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Smita Purushottam<\/span> \u2192 Russia massively increased military exports to China, supplying <span class=\"n-term\">US$22 billion<\/span> worth of armaments between 2000 and 2010; China extended a <span class=\"n-term\">US$25 billion<\/span> loan to build a spur from the EPSO II pipeline originally destined exclusively for the Pacific coast.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 a friendly Russia was essential for China in the first decade of the century as Beijing sought control over Central Asian energy resources, transportation networks including parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and pipelines \u2014 reducing dependence on sea-routed supplies and petro-dollars as part of a strategy to edge the dollar out as the dominant reserve currency and establish primacy in the eastern hemisphere.<\/li>\n<li>Since the second decade, China has overtaken Russia in economic heft and diplomatic reach. In Central Asia, South Asia and Africa, Russia has become the <span class=\"n-term\">junior partner<\/span>, more so after the SCO, AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative. Moscow turned to China after estrangement from the West over Ukraine; China is a major consumer of Russian energy; Russia has sought military assistance from China as part of the <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cno-limits\u201d<\/span> partnership declared by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.<\/li>\n<li>A Sino-Russian bloc presents a strategic dilemma for India, especially with Moscow as the subordinate partner. <span class=\"n-term\">India wants Russia to be a leading pole in a multipolar order, not a junior partner to China.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Countervailing logic<\/span> \u2192 defence ties are unlikely to change much. Russia will not reduce dependence on India, which is its largest testing ground; as China supplies arms to developing nations and undercuts Russian influence, Russia will need India as a springboard to other developing markets despite India\u2019s tilt to the United States.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"russia-and-pakistan\">Russia and Pakistan<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The 2016 exercise triggered public regret in India that a longstanding \u201cbest friend\u201d was cosying up to the worst neighbour.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Srinath Raghavan<\/span> \u2192 the relationship, while of immense importance to India, was far from a fairy tale; Moscow\u2019s approach was consistently shaped by strategic considerations. The 2016 exercise was not the first instance \u2014 during the 1962 war Moscow shared intelligence on India with Beijing.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Origins of Russian realism<\/span> \u2014 the rift with Beijing from 1959, refusal to support China in its territorial disputes with India, and the offer of MiG-21s; then, during 1962, telling the Chinese there was \u201cno place for neutrality\u201d while putting MiG supply on hold and sharing intelligence with Beijing. It was India\u2019s turn toward the United States, with Nehru seeking support from Kennedy, that led Khrushchev to revert to his earlier stance.<\/li>\n<li>Moscow sought bridges with Pakistan: <span class=\"n-sch\">Lal Bahadur Shastri<\/span> was shocked in May 1965 by Russia\u2019s unwillingness to condemn the Pakistani incursion into the <span class=\"n-term\">Rann of Kutch<\/span>; at <span class=\"n-term\">Tashkent<\/span> the Russians leaned on India to revert to the status quo ante. Later the Soviets sought balance in South Asia, believing that India-Pakistan conflict would play to China\u2019s advantage.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Post-2014<\/span> \u2014 the lifting of a self-imposed arms embargo enabling the <span class=\"n-term\">Mi-35<\/span> sale; <span class=\"n-sch\">Pavel Felgenhauer<\/span> called it an \u201cimportant, key change in Russian policy in the region,\u201d while Russian diplomats described the negotiations as part of ongoing cooperation with Pakistan in defence and counterterrorism.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Limits<\/span> \u2014 there is limited enthusiasm in Moscow for a genuine, long-term, broad-based relationship with Pakistan, since strong ties with Europe, Central Asia, China, India and Iran already meet Russia\u2019s needs.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-and-the-ukraine-conflict\">India and the Ukraine Conflict<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s position<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea and opposed Western sanctions; Indian officials declared that Russia had \u201clegitimate interests\u201d in Ukraine. India abstained on <span class=\"n-term\">UNSC Resolution 2623<\/span> and on successive votes in the General Assembly and Human Rights Council.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s declared positions urged \u201crespect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states,\u201d called \u201cfor the immediate cessation of violence and hostilities,\u201d regretted \u201cthat the path of diplomacy was given up,\u201d urged states to \u201creturn to it,\u201d and reiterated that \u201cdialogue is the only answer to settling differences and disputes, however daunting that may appear at this moment.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Most Indian strategic elites would admit that diplomatic neutrality signifies what one Indian scholar has called <span class=\"n-term\">\u201ca subtle pro-Moscow position.\u201d<\/span> The tightrope walk has been described as <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cstrategic ambivalence\u201d<\/span> \u2014 but it reflects a deliberate, if constrained, choice.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why India took this position<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sumit Ganguly<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s decision to avoid a clear-cut position stems in considerable part from dependence on Russia across diplomatic, military and energy questions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Primary driver \u2014 China and Pakistan.<\/span> New Delhi believes that preserving friendship with Moscow helps prevent deepening Russian ties with China and limits Russian temptations to build new ties with Pakistan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Historical reinforcement<\/span> \u2014 Russia as a sturdy friend since 1955, when <span class=\"n-sch\">Nikita Khrushchev<\/span> publicly declared support for Indian claims over Jammu and Kashmir while the West was ambivalent or opposed; <span class=\"n-term\">six Soviet vetoes<\/span> exercised on India\u2019s behalf. India\u2019s posture is consistent with its earlier forbearance over Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Energy<\/span> \u2014 India is the world\u2019s third-largest oil consumer with limited domestic reserves and high price sensitivity; discounted Russian crude addressed supply disruption and inflation. <span class=\"n-term\">Arms<\/span> \u2014 the arsenal is largely Soviet and Russian, ageing equipment requires modernisation, and hardware upgrades are slow.<\/li>\n<li>Historical ties and anti-colonial sentiment; Indian media at times portrays the United States as more responsible than Russia for destabilising Ukraine.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Assessments<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cAs Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine unfolds, India\u2019s national interests have so far dictated a position of formal neutrality.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Ashley J. Tellis<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 \u201cIndia that long relied on Russia to provide a regional balance of power will have to rework its great power sums. This should not be too hard, given India\u2019s improving relations with the US and Europe and its focus on diversifying its defence partnerships.\u201d For Indian diplomacy, 2023 was as much about multilateral diplomacy as about adapting to a potentially historic shift in great power relations, with the endgame of the war the decisive variable.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> \u2192 the crisis introduced a new element of discomfort as India seeks to maintain its traditional relationship with Russia without spoiling its growing partnership with the United States, and is uncomfortable with the tightening Russia-China embrace.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Stanly Johny<\/span> \u2192 for the West, an authoritarian Russia\u2019s war on a \u201cdemocratic\u201d Ukraine is an affront to global democracy. Yet India, South Africa, Israel and Turkey all declined to join, partly because sanctions were unilateral and without UN approval; for them the war is a European problem rooted in the post-Cold War security architecture. The morality case falls flat given the invasion of Iraq (2003), the conversion of a UNSC no-fly zone in Libya into a full-scale intervention (2011), the illegal placement of US troops in Syria, and American recognition of Israel\u2019s annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. <span class=\"n-term\">There cannot be two sets of international morality \u2014 one for powerful countries and another for developing ones.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Derek Grossman<\/span> \u2192 \u201cThe bottom line is that India, as a great power, is unlikely to uphold the order in quite the same way as the West\u2014if it does so at all. Much of this will depend on future international circumstances and the state of Indian domestic politics.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">John Joseph Wilkins<\/span> \u2192 \u201cIndia has always had a tradition of balancing world powers, but this year we\u2019ve seen the country\u2019s foreign policy establishment possibly embrace an upgraded form of non-alignment. This has the potential to increase New Delhi\u2019s global influence going forward.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vaasu Sharma<\/span> \u2192 \u201cFor India, the best-case scenario in the prevailing situation would be the initiation of the reconciliation process between Russia and the West as it is hoped that Russia\u2019s peace with the West will not drive the former towards the Chinese camp\u2026\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">Mishra<\/span> \u2192 \u201cIf this initiative for peace is really pushed and Ukraine agrees to come to the negotiation table, the West could ask India to convince Russia to do the same due to India\u2019s G20 role and special relationship with Moscow.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Impact on India<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Samar Shrivastava<\/span> \u2192 higher import bills for energy and fertilizers, adding to global inflation and prompting the RBI to raise rates in tandem with global rates; the net result was higher inflation and lower growth.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dharmashakti Joshi<\/span> \u2192 \u201cThe conflict worsened the growth-inflation mix for India. It pushed up crude prices and caused supply side bottlenecks, thereby putting significant upward pressure on inflation. It also raised the fertiliser bill substantially and threatened to derail the budgetary math.\u201d The fertiliser subsidy bill was expected to rise from <span class=\"n-term\">\u20b91.1 lakh crore<\/span> in the Budget to <span class=\"n-term\">\u20b92.3-2.4 lakh crore<\/span>. Consumer price inflation, averaging 4.5-5.5 per cent in the preceding fiscal year, was expected to end FY23 at <span class=\"n-term\">6.7 per cent<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Offsetting gain<\/span> \u2014 the West began to view India as a partner against China; multinationals building a <span class=\"n-term\">China+1<\/span> strategy, most pronounced in pharma and specialty chemicals, with semiconductors and low-end manufacturing likely to follow.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s diversification agenda<\/span> \u2014 the National Hydrogen Mission and green hydrogen exports as a route to reducing hydrocarbon dependence; comprehensive FTAs sought with the EU, the United Kingdom and Canada, after deals with Australia and the UAE.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"views-of-scholars-theory-policy-india-russia\">Views of Scholars, Theory &amp; Policy \u2014 India\u2013Russia<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Position<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia has been a steadfast, very special and privileged partner across industrial development, energy, education, space, atomic energy and defence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The post-Soviet relationship rests on a pragmatic basis and lacks the deep strategic logic that underpinned the Indo-Soviet nexus; arms and commercial trade are market-driven, and defence trade and investment links are marred by disputes and recriminations on both sides.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nivedita Kapoor<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Nandan Unnikrishnan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Stagnation is visible, and divergences over foreign policy priorities will continue.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Smita Purushottam<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia\u2019s turn to China is driven by system-level factors and works against India\u2019s preferred order.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajan Menon<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Eugene Rumer<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia is adjusting its India-centred South Asia policy without abandoning India.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Raj Kumar Sharma<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia can no longer act as balancer in India-China ties, which has pushed India toward the United States.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Srinath Raghavan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russian policy has always been based on realism, seen through the prism of competition with the United States and China.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The relationship needs substantive drivers beyond nostalgia.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sreeram Chaulia<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Defence technology and energy keep the relationship substantial despite shifting global alignments.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Theoretical perspectives<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Realism<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s stance is driven by power dynamics and strategic interests; balancing regional stability and countering common rivals shapes the partnership.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Alliance theory<\/span> \u2014 historical alliances and shared interests in military and defence matters explain continued collaboration.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Multipolarity<\/span> \u2014 used to analyse how India and Russia manage their relationship amid the influence of China and the United States.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Policy suggestions<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vidya Nadkarni<\/span> \u2192 as long as India remains a major importer of Russian arms and remains important to Moscow as a hedge against a revisionist China, Russia is unlikely to jettison the friendship. On the Indian side, elite preference for autonomy, heavy dependence on Russian arms, and Moscow\u2019s willingness to enter joint weapons production provide a strong impetus. At the regional level both share an interest in stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unless the strategic environment changes radically \u2014 an overtly revisionist China driving India into an American embrace, a tighter Russia-Pakistan nexus, or a seamless Sino-Russian anti-American condominium \u2014 the relationship is unlikely to wither on the vine.<\/li>\n<li>Boost <span class=\"n-term\">bilateral economic ties<\/span> beyond buyer-seller: defence, hydrocarbons and nuclear power favour Russia, so IT and ITES, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, where India is strong, should be encouraged; Russian investment should be sought in defence manufacturing for \u2018Make in India\u2019, and in infrastructure and space technology for Smart Cities and Digital India. Negotiations for the <span class=\"n-term\">India-Eurasian Economic Union FTA<\/span> should be expedited.<\/li>\n<li>Expedite the <span class=\"n-term\">INSTC<\/span> and launch the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018Green Corridor\u2019<\/span> project for customs facilitation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nivedita Kapoor<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Nandan Unnikrishnan<\/span> support President Putin\u2019s proposal for a \u201cmore extensive <span class=\"n-term\">Eurasian partnership<\/span> involving the EAEU and China, India, Pakistan and Iran\u201d. The main challenge is the BRI, which Russia has joined and plans to link to the EAEU; India\u2019s INSTC has languished and could be jointly energised.<\/li>\n<li>India can help address Russia\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">demographic problem<\/span>, particularly in the Far East, by providing workforce in agriculture and construction without permanent settlement, alongside investment in energy and other projects.<\/li>\n<li>Cooperate in the UN, BRICS, SCO, G20 and the <span class=\"n-term\">East Asia Summit<\/span>, while recognising that diverging goals driven by factors beyond the bilateral dimension will continue to pose challenges. Revitalise the earlier agreement on intelligence sharing for a joint counter-terrorism strategy; deepen scientific and technological relations; and use creative means to build the <span class=\"n-term\">RIC<\/span> platform.<\/li>\n<li>To stay relevant in the twenty-first century, both must broaden economic cooperation, promote balanced trade, and expand collaboration in <span class=\"n-term\">energy transition, digital technologies and the Arctic<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-russia-and-the-united-states\">India, Russia and the United States<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>With Western sanctions on Russia, Sino-Russian relations have moved from <span class=\"n-term\">enmity<\/span> to <span class=\"n-term\">d\u00e9tente<\/span> and now <span class=\"n-term\">entente<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> \u2192 India does not, and cannot, view deepening Sino-Russian relations as a zero-sum game. It engages both bilaterally and through the <span class=\"n-term\">RIC<\/span> grouping, the SCO and BRICS. Owing to the power imbalance, Russia frequently views India as a mechanism for balancing China.<\/li>\n<li>Sanctions after the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the invasion of Ukraine (2022) pushed Russia toward Chinese trade and investment. Russian investment in China is about <span class=\"n-term\">$1 billion<\/span>; Chinese investment in Russia is about ten times greater. China has extended economic influence westward into the Central Asian states through the SCO and the Belt and Road Initiative.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> \u2192 Russia created the <span class=\"n-term\">Eurasian Economic Union<\/span> as a defensive perimeter against Chinese pressure in the former Soviet space, yet China\u2019s economic weight gives Beijing the upper hand in any EEU-China relationship.<\/li>\n<li>The civil nuclear deal made China uneasy; New Delhi has built substantial military ties with Washington while stopping short of alliance or full endorsement of American Indo-Pacific formulations.<\/li>\n<li>The Ukraine crisis places New Delhi in an awkward midpoint between Russia, a longstanding politico-military legacy partner, and the West, a growing partner in a multipolar context. It has revived debate about what non-alignment, repackaged as \u2018strategic autonomy\u2019, really means.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Dual pressure<\/span> \u2014 from Russia as traditional ally and from the U.S. as Quad partner. India\u2019s economic interests lie largely with the U.S. and Europe; sentiment cannot substitute for interest calculation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/india-and-china\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>India and China<\/b><\/a><span><\/span><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#nature-of-the-relationship\">Nature of the Relationship<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-interests-in-russia\">India\u2019s Interests in Russia<\/a><a href=\"#the-five-phases-vidya-nadkarni-s-frame\">The Five Phases \u2014 Vidya Nadkarni\u2019s Frame<\/a><a href=\"#relations-in-the-modi-years\">Relations in the Modi Years<\/a><a href=\"#the-23rd-annual-summit-putin-in-new-delhi-december-2025\">The 23rd Annual Summit \u2014 Putin in New Delhi, December 2025<\/a><a href=\"#relations-through-levels-of-analysis\">Relations through Levels of Analysis<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-cooperation\">Areas of Cooperation<\/a><a href=\"#areas-of-concern-and-contestation\">Areas of Concern and Contestation<\/a><a href=\"#russia-china-and-india\">Russia, China and India<\/a><a href=\"#russia-and-pakistan\">Russia and Pakistan<\/a><a href=\"#india-and-the-ukraine-conflict\">India and the Ukraine Conflict<\/a><a href=\"#views-of-scholars-theory-policy-india-russia\">Views of Scholars, Theory &amp; Policy \u2014 India\u2013Russia<\/a><a href=\"#india-russia-and-the-united-states\">India, Russia and the United States<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>India and Russia for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and Russia Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and Russia Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014 In<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.5.5","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"5","fx_note_desc":"India and Russia for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a India and Russia Paper I \u00b7 India and the World India and Russia Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 5 \u2014 In","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3596","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3596","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3596\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3788,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3596\/revisions\/3788"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3596"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}