{"id":3600,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:15","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/afghanistan-iraq-and-west-asia\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:55","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:55","slug":"afghanistan-iraq-and-west-asia","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/afghanistan-iraq-and-west-asia\/","title":{"rendered":"Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 8<\/b> \u2014 Recent developments in Indian Foreign Policy : India\u2019s position on the recent crises in <span class=\"cur\">Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia<\/span>, growing relations with US and Isreal; Vision of a new world order.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-setting-india-s-western-arc\">The Setting \u2014 India\u2019s Western Arc<\/h3>\n<p>India\u2019s western neighbourhood \u2014 the Gulf, the wider West Asia and Afghanistan \u2014 carries the country\u2019s energy lifeline, its largest diaspora, and its most active theatre of great-power contestation.<\/p>\n<p>West Asia holds <span class=\"n-term\">47.7%<\/span> of the world\u2019s oil and <span class=\"n-term\">42.7%<\/span> of natural gas; more than <span class=\"n-term\">60%<\/span> of the world\u2019s oil flows through the <span class=\"n-term\">Strait of Hormuz<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Chinnaya R Gharekhian<\/span>).<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201c\u2026to shed a drop of blood for every drop of oil.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Winston Churchill<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cAn attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and will be repelled by any means necessary including military force.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Jimmy Carter, January 1980 (the Carter Doctrine)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>India\u2019s engagement has moved from an ideologically-driven Non-Aligned posture to one built on <span class=\"n-term\">pragmatism<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>. Two phrases mark the shift: <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span>\u2019s \u201cThink West and Act East,\u201d and the \u201cLook West\u201d \/ \u201cLink and Act West\u201d turn under <span class=\"n-sch\">Narendra Modi<\/span>.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Organising principle today<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Independent, issue-based partnerships with each country \u2014 Arab Gulf, Israel and Iran \u2014 without being trapped by their rivalries or by the prism of Pakistan.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"why-west-asia-matters-five-stakes\">Why West Asia Matters \u2014 Five Stakes<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Stake<\/th>\n<th>Substance<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geo-strategic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Proximity to India\u2019s western border \u2014 an extended neighbourhood directly affecting security; the Arabian Sea a bridge, regional stability a precondition for India\u2019s own.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geo-economic<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Nearly two-thirds of oil from <span class=\"n-term\">GCC<\/span> states (import dependency above <span class=\"n-term\">80%<\/span> in 2018); diaspora over <span class=\"n-term\">7 million<\/span> (some estimates ~8 million); remittances of roughly <span class=\"n-term\">US$40 billion<\/span> a year; sea-lane security across the Gulf, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Maritime<\/span><\/td>\n<td>As the US security role evolves, space opens for India \u2014 the Navy\u2019s anti-piracy work in the Gulf of Aden; presence near <span class=\"n-term\">Hormuz<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Bab-el-Mandeb<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Internal security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Religious extremism and groups like ISIS pose spillover risk to domestic stability.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Higher growth needs a peaceful periphery; India balances Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel at once to prevent escalation that could hit global markets.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Expert readings<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Shivshankar Menon<\/span> \u2014 a more active forward policy to pursue India\u2019s geo-strategic interests.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Manoj Joshi<\/span> \u2014 careful handling for maximum gain while avoiding political minefields.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Bhatia<\/span> \u2014 pragmatism as the guiding principle of the transformation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">People-first strand<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Protecting nationals in conflict zones is a first-order priority: during the 2025 Israel\u2013Iran crisis, <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sindhu<\/span> evacuated Indian citizens from both Iran and Israel \u2014 humanitarian outreach as statecraft, without formally aligning against any party.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Write a brief note on India\u2019s interests in West Asia.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/write-a-brief-note-on-indias-interests-in-west-asia-upsc-psir-2019-4901\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"evolution-of-india-s-west-asia-policy\">Evolution of India\u2019s West Asia Policy<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Nehruvian phase<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-aligned values \u2014 sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span> organised the first <span class=\"n-term\">Asian Relations Conference<\/span> (New Delhi, March 1947); Oman signed a defence pact with India in 1972.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Nehru\u2013Nasser<\/span> alliance \u2014 India backed the Arabs against Western interference over Palestine and the 1956 Suez Crisis.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The 1990 Gulf Crisis \u2014 a turning point<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Iraq\u2019s invasion of Kuwait (2 August 1990) confronted the <span class=\"n-sch\">V.P. Singh<\/span> government with a dilemma \u2014 Iraq was an ideological ally that backed India on Kashmir, but new economic openings pointed the other way.<\/li>\n<li>India did not formally condemn Iraq, stressing the safety of <span class=\"n-term\">185,000<\/span> stranded Indian expatriates; it later supported <span class=\"n-term\">UNSC Resolution 678<\/span> (November 1990).<\/li>\n<li>January 1991: India allowed American planes to refuel at Indian facilities \u2014 a signal of alignment. <span class=\"n-sch\">Muchkund Dubey<\/span> called the crisis a US \u201ctest of friendship.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The pragmatic turn<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Post-1991 unipolarity narrowed options and pushed a shift from geopolitics to <span class=\"n-term\">geo-economics<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Modi<\/span>\u2019s \u201cLink and Act West\u201d policy \u2014 cooperative bilateralism and multi-alignment.<\/li>\n<li>Instruments: <span class=\"n-term\">CEPA<\/span> (India\u2013UAE), Rupee\u2013Dirham \/ Local Currency Settlement, e-Migrate linked with Saudi e-Thawtheeq, and minilaterals like <span class=\"n-term\">I2U2<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201c\u2026from the ideologically-driven Non-Aligned Movement to a policy based on greater pragmatism.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Meher Wadhawan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Three phases of India\u2019s West Asia policy.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Nehruvian<\/span> (Non-alignment \u00b7 Nehru\u2013Nasser \u00b7 Palestine, Suez 1956) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">1990 Gulf Crisis<\/span> (V.P. Singh dilemma \u00b7 185,000 evacuees \u00b7 Res 678) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Pragmatic turn<\/span> (Geo-economics \u00b7 Link &amp; Act West) \u2192 <span class=\"n-lab\">Today<\/span> (Issue-based ties \u00b7 CEPA, I2U2, IMEC)<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"reading-the-region-three-lenses\">Reading the Region \u2014 Three Lenses<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>School<\/th>\n<th>Core claim<\/th>\n<th>Regional reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Realist<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Morgenthau, Waltz<\/span><\/td>\n<td>States pursue survival and power in an anarchic system.<\/td>\n<td>Saudi\u2013Iran rivalry (Sunni\/Shia; <span class=\"n-term\">MBS<\/span> versus Iran\u2019s Hezbollah, nuclear programme and soft power) \u2014 ties restored in 2023, China-mediated; Saudi\u2013US friction over Khashoggi softened once Biden took office; Saudi\u2013Russia via OPEC+; Iraq asserts control; Qatar hedges, the UAE turns assertive.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Liberal<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Kant, Locke<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Cooperation, trade and institutions promote peace.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Abraham Accords<\/span>; the Oslo Accords (1993) \u2014 PLO\u2013Israel recognition; the GCC persists despite the 2017 Qatar blockade; Vision 2030 and Saudi outreach to China (BRI).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Constructivist<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Wendt<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Ideas, identities and shared norms shape behaviour.<\/td>\n<td>Iran\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Umm al-Qura<\/span> theory; Erdogan\u2019s neo-Ottoman vision; many Arab states now see Iran, not Israel, as the greater threat; the Saudi\u2013Iran thaw stressed shared Islamic identity; MBS\u2019s social reforms; Iran\u2019s Mahsa Amini protests (2022).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The Hobbesian reading of international politics as a \u201cstruggle for power\u201d without a common authority still holds. Realism dominates, but liberal and constructivist currents grow stronger; the region\u2019s course turns on how these paradigms interact under multipolarity.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"security-architecture-which-way-does-it-order\">Security Architecture \u2014 Which Way Does It Order?<\/h3>\n<p>The recent Israel\u2013Iran war was aerial \u2014 the most advanced air force against the most advanced ballistic-missile capability \u2014 sharpening one question: bipolar, multipolar, or hybrid order?<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Israeli primacy set against a multipolar diplomatic web<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Bipolar pull<\/th>\n<th>Multipolar pull<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Israel the unmatched actor \u2014 precision air force, multilayer missile defence, covert reach; a weakened \u201caxis of resistance\u201d (Hezbollah stocks slashed, Iran\u2019s limits exposed).<\/td>\n<td>Arab capitals resist hard alignment; Russia\u2019s Gulf security blueprint, Iran\u2019s Hormuz Peace Endeavour, China\u2019s Global Security Initiative \u2014 non-bloc, UN-anchored.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Signals of bipolarity:<\/span> Israel\u2019s 2025\u201326 doctrine of pre-emption, rapid manoeuvre and US tie-ups; Syria tied down.<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Signals of multipolarity:<\/span> Riyadh\u2019s Palestinian-state condition; Qatar mediates; Bahrain alone joined strikes on the Houthis; the UAE hedges between Washington and Beijing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><em>Net: hard-power balance almost bipolar \u00b7 diplomatic-economic web multipolar \u2192 a hybrid order<\/em><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"key-developments-in-the-region\">Key Developments in the Region<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Development<\/th>\n<th>What it did<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Abraham Accords (2020)<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Israel normalised relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco \u2014 breaking the Arab consensus that recognition awaits a Palestinian settlement. Drivers: shared concern over Iran, economic opportunity, changing global dynamics.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Indo-Abraham Accords \/ \u201cNew Quad\u201d<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India, Israel, the UAE and the USA \u2014 a \u201cminilateral.\u201d India shifts from managing each country separately to a unified regional approach, mirroring the Indo-Pacific. <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> reads it as extending India\u2019s influence; members treat the region as a \u201cZone of Opportunity,\u201d not a \u201cZone of Conflict.\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Israel\u2013Hamas War<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Escalated October 2023 after a surprise Hamas attack and Israel\u2019s declaration of war; a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza. A US-facilitated ceasefire (January 2025) turned on prisoner exchanges and improved security.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The deeper churn \u2014 the \u2018Arab Street\u2019 reading<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Roots in nineteenth-century European imperialism and imposed liberal-secular institutions displacing Sharia \u2014 culminating in <span class=\"n-term\">Kemal Ataturk<\/span>\u2019s abolition of Sharia in Turkey (1924).<\/li>\n<li>Rapid top-down Westernisation left people \u201cstranded both materially and spiritually\u201d (<span class=\"n-sch\">Pankaj Mishra<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Talmiz Ahmad<\/span>: the twentieth-century Islamic discourse \u201cwas an oppositional concept that functioned outside the prevailing state order.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Outcomes uneven \u2014 resilient authoritarianism persisted; the long-run effect ran through political economy (Vision 2030, geo-economics, new partners like China).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"implications-of-instability-for-india\">Implications of Instability for India<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Energy shock is first-order<\/span> \u2014 India imports ~<span class=\"n-term\">85%<\/span> of its crude; Iraq has been among its top-three suppliers, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.<\/li>\n<li>Oil spikes widen fiscal and current-account deficits, raise fertiliser and freight costs, and inflate the subsidy bill.<\/li>\n<li>Supply-chain disruption \u2014 threats to shipping raise freight rates and consumer prices.<\/li>\n<li>Maritime security \u2014 Houthi drone strikes and hijackings in the Red Sea threaten freedom of navigation at <span class=\"n-term\">Hormuz<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Bab-el-Mandeb<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Risks to expatriates and remittances; a standing evacuation imperative.<\/li>\n<li>Spillover of extremism (ISIS-type) into internal security.<\/li>\n<li>Delay to connectivity \u2014 the India\u2013Middle East\u2013Europe Economic Corridor (<span class=\"n-term\">IMEC<\/span>) and Chabahar exposed to disruption.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-iran\">India\u2013Iran<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<p>A deep historical and cultural bond; <span class=\"n-sch\">Modi<\/span> calls it \u201ca friendship as old as history.\u201d India\u2019s ~25 million Shias and ~70,000 Parsis add a civilisational dimension.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cFew people have been closely related in origin and throughout history than the people of India and Iran.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why Iran matters<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Geography and energy \u2014 a major oil supplier bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan; a key alternative route when transit through Pakistan is blocked; a junction of South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, opening onto the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.<\/li>\n<li>Strategic and cultural mutualities \u2014 India\u2019s Shia population and NAM leadership align with Iran\u2019s diplomatic goals; India\u2019s balance offsets a Pakistan aligned with the US and Saudi Arabia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The US factor &amp; sanctions history<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Post-1979 revolution and the hostage crisis reordered Iran\u2019s ties with the world.<\/li>\n<li>US pressure repeatedly constrained India \u2014 Reliance pressured over a ~<span class=\"n-term\">US$900 million<\/span> US Exim Bank loan (<span class=\"n-sch\">S Samuel C Rajiv<\/span>); India\u2019s 2006 <span class=\"n-term\">IAEA vote<\/span> against Iran; discontinuation of the Asian Clearing Union swap (December 2010); oil-import cuts of 11% (2012) and ~15% annually thereafter.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">IPI \u201cpeace pipeline\u201d<\/span> \u2014 a 2,775-km Iran\u2013Pakistan\u2013India gas project \u2014 could never be realised under US pressure; India instead signed the India\u2013US Civil Nuclear Agreement.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Under Modi and after<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Modi\u2019s May 2016 visit (first by an Indian PM in fifteen years \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Ankit Panda<\/span>) produced ~12 agreements, chiefly on <span class=\"n-term\">Chabahar<\/span> and a Trilateral Transport and Transit Corridor with Iran and Afghanistan; a US$150 million Exim credit line; IRCON on the ~500-km Chabahar\u2013Zahedan railway.<\/li>\n<li>Chabahar bypasses Pakistan and counters China\u2019s Gwadar; goods reach Afghanistan via the Delaram\u2013Zaranj highway.<\/li>\n<li>Trump\u2019s May 2018 JCPOA withdrawal and renewed sanctions forced India to cut Iranian oil imports (<span class=\"n-sch\">Ravi Joshi<\/span>, ORF).<\/li>\n<li>Foreign Secretary <span class=\"n-sch\">Vijay Gokhale<\/span> reframed strategic autonomy as \u201cissue-based\u201d alignment; India secured written US assurance for ~US$85 million of Chabahar equipment.<\/li>\n<li>Frictions \u2014 <span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span>; India\u2019s Israel\u2013UAE\u2013US coalition role; Iran\u2019s limited Taliban support (<span class=\"n-sch\">Samuel Ramani<\/span>); the Farzad-B gas field.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>India has been, and will likely \u201cremain on the tightrope.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Anita Inder Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">2020 &amp; 2025 flashpoints<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2020<\/span> \u2014 the US killing of Quds Force commander <span class=\"n-term\">Qasem Soleimani<\/span> near Baghdad raised fears of full-blown Iran\u2013US conflict, threatening energy security for India, China, Japan and South Korea.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2025<\/span> \u2014 India welcomed the June Israel\u2013Iran ceasefire, praised US and Qatari mediation (\u201cthere is no alternative to dialogue and diplomacy\u201d), distanced itself from the SCO\u2019s condemnation of Israel, and launched Operation Sindhu. <span class=\"n-sch\">P.R. Kumaraswamy<\/span> called the stance \u201ccalculated, nuanced, and matured\u201d; <span class=\"n-sch\">Shanthie Mariet D\u2019Souza<\/span> warned that strategic ambiguity works only while conflicts stay within India\u2019s core interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Abraham Accords \u2014 effect on India\u2013Iran<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Positive:<\/span> validate strategic autonomy; a calmer Israel\u2013Gulf equation gives India more room. <span class=\"n-term\">Negative:<\/span> closer Israel\u2013Gulf ties may strain India\u2013Iran, sharpen sectarian tension, and pressure India to keep Israel ties from overshadowing Iran.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Iran: four decades on the tightrope.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1979<\/span> (Revolution &amp; hostage crisis) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2006<\/span> (India\u2019s IAEA vote) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2012<\/span> (Oil cuts under sanctions) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2016<\/span> (Chabahar \u00b7 12 pacts) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2018<\/span> (US exits JCPOA) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2025<\/span> (Ceasefire \u00b7 Op Sindhu)<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How is the current standoff between the USA and Iran affecting India\u2019s energy security?<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">What are the challenges and limitations in India\u2013Iran relations?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/what-are-the-challenges-and-limitations-in-india-iran-relations-upsc-psir-2023-5005\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-united-arab-emirates\">India\u2013United Arab Emirates<\/h3>\n<p>Ties run back centuries through Indian Ocean trade and migration; formal relations from 1972. <span class=\"n-sch\">Modi<\/span>\u2019s 2015 visit established the <span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive Strategic Partnership<\/span>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Track<\/th>\n<th>Convergence<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economic \/ trade<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India is the UAE\u2019s second-largest partner, the UAE India\u2019s third-largest; trade ~<span class=\"n-term\">US$85 billion<\/span> since the 2022 <span class=\"n-term\">CEPA<\/span>; UAE sovereign-wealth investment in infrastructure, renewables and technology; <span class=\"n-term\">IMEC<\/span> to cut transport costs; the Rupee\u2013Dirham \/ Local Currency Settlement cuts third-currency dependence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Energy \/ security<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Oil supply, strategic petroleum reserves, upstream projects; maritime security, counter-terrorism, defence production and intelligence-sharing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Tech \/ education \/ soft power<\/span><\/td>\n<td>ISRO\u2013UAE Space Agency links; an IIM Ahmedabad campus in the UAE; a <span class=\"n-term\">3.5-million<\/span>-strong diaspora, the largest expatriate community there.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Geopolitical<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s Look West Policy aligns with the UAE\u2019s Vision 2021 and Economic Vision 2030.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Challenges<\/span><\/p>\n<p>CEPA trade still concentrated in gems, petroleum and electronics rather than technology and green energy; the Kafala system and slow labour reforms. <span class=\"n-sch\">Talmiz Ahmad<\/span> reads engagement as shaped by economic realities and shifting Gulf security; the Atlantic Council cautions on the institutional capacity to deliver.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThis is not just a transactional relationship \u2014 it\u2019s a meeting of visions, backed by determined leadership.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Dr. Muneer Ahmed, IPCS<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"india-afghanistan\">India\u2013Afghanistan<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">History &amp; setting<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The \u201cgraveyard of empires\u201d \u2014 from Alexander to the USSR and the US; ties trace to the Indus Valley (a Seleucid successor state passed to the Maurya Empire, 305 BCE).<\/li>\n<li>The nineteenth-century <span class=\"n-term\">Great Game<\/span> cast Afghanistan as a buffer state; British India and the Afghan Amir signed the MoU on the <span class=\"n-term\">Durand Line<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>India recognised the Republic of Afghanistan on 19 July 1973; both were founding NAM members; the <span class=\"n-term\">Strategic Partnership Agreement<\/span> (October 2011) deepened ties; the fall of Kabul (August 2021) forced a rethink.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Scholars: <span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> (use Iran for alternate access beyond Pakistan); <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajiv Sikri<\/span> invokes <span class=\"n-sch\">Kautilya<\/span>\u2019s Mandala \u2014 a friend is the neighbour\u2019s neighbour; <span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span> (soft power alone is not enough, and India lacks a Plan B); <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan<\/span> (the Afghan-led \/ Afghan-owned line isolated India); <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Chadha<\/span> (a stable Afghanistan curbs terrorism).<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s footprint \u2014 two decades of capacity-building<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>What India built<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Economy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>~<span class=\"n-term\">US$10.8 billion<\/span> in investments by 2012; over US$100 million to expand Chabahar; two air corridors when Pakistan denied ground access.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Commercial<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Biggest South Asian market for Afghan goods; bilateral trade ~US$1.5 billion (CY 2019\u201320); the Air-Freight Corridor carried cargo worth over US$216 million across ~1,000 flights since 2017.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">HICDP<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Since 2005, ~US$120 million; ~<span class=\"n-term\">433<\/span> High Impact Community Development Projects across all <span class=\"n-term\">34 provinces<\/span>, with 110 more under way.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Aid<\/span><\/td>\n<td>~<span class=\"n-term\">US$3 billion<\/span> in humanitarian and reconstruction work to August 2021 \u2014 the Afghan Parliament, the Salma Dam, schools, clinics, power plants and stadiums; 500,000 COVID vaccine doses (Jan 2022); 20,000 tonnes of wheat via Chabahar (Mar 2023); ~14,000 Afghan students in India (2023, ICCR).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why Afghanistan matters<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Internal security (radical ideology, drug trafficking, ISI-proxy safe havens); geo-economic (a transit hub; minerals \u2014 copper, iron, lithium); geo-strategic (a buffer against north-western threats); regional balance versus China and Pakistan; connectivity to Central Asia via Chabahar and the Delaram\u2013Zaranj highway. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2014 development investment ties India to Afghan stability.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why the US left<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Withdrawal finalised 30 August 2021 \u2014 Operation Enduring Freedom (post-9\/11) had targeted the Taliban for aiding Al-Qaeda.<\/li>\n<li>Re-prioritisation from Central Asia to the Asia-Pacific (Quad); over <span class=\"n-term\">US$3 trillion<\/span> spent on the \u201cWar Against Terror\u201d; a Democratic 2020 priority \u2014 Biden clarified the US was not there for nation-building.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M. K. Narayanan<\/span> \u2014 the US left Afghanistan worse than it found it after spending more than US$1 trillion, the government collapsing and the Taliban taking control quickly and bloodlessly.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Transforming Afghanistan into a modern democracy was \u201can unrealistic and overly ambitious objective.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Henry Kissinger<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From 9\/11 to the fall of Kabul.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">9\/11<\/span> (Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Enduring Freedom<\/span> (Taliban toppled) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Bonn 2001<\/span> (Top-down state-building) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">20-yr war<\/span> (&gt; US$3 trillion) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">30 Aug 2021<\/span> (US withdrawal) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Kabul falls<\/span> (Taliban 2.0)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Taliban 1.0 vs 2.0<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Taliban 1.0<\/th>\n<th>Taliban 2.0<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Reliant on donations and ISI backing; the pre-2001 pariah regime.<\/td>\n<td>Seeks to shed the terrorist label and gain legitimacy (Doha office, peace process); runs its own economy (drug trade, taxes, extortion); improved training, weapons and equipment.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s stakes under Taliban rule<\/span><\/p>\n<p>More elusive than China, Russia and Iran \u2014 a product of competing realpolitik and principle; its emphasis on morality now \u201ctempered by a more pragmatic discourse.\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">Dhruva Jaishankar<\/span> \u2014 focused humanitarian aid and global-opinion pressure can shape Taliban conduct on rights; <span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Mukhopadhaya<\/span> \u2014 letting old developmental projects continue keeps India\u2019s foothold and goodwill; <span class=\"n-sch\">Phunchok Stobdan<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Manjeet Pardesi<\/span> \u2014 a dual-track strategy that engages the Taliban while guarding against premature legitimisation.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s engagement since 2021<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Foreign Secretary <span class=\"n-sch\">Vikram Misri<\/span> met Taliban Foreign Minister <span class=\"n-term\">Amir Khan Muttaqi<\/span> \u2014 the highest-level meeting since 2021, ending the phase of \u201ccautious engagement\u201d that Foreign Secretary <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh Vardhan Shringla<\/span> had earlier called \u201climited.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>1.6 tonnes of medicines (December 2021); an official team in Kabul (June 2022); concern over women\u2019s exclusion from universities, citing <span class=\"n-term\">UNSC Resolution 2593<\/span>; the Afghan embassy in New Delhi closed (October 2023).<\/li>\n<li>In May 2025 <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> held a landmark call with Muttaqi after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam attack; visa relaxation followed; bilateral trade surpassed <span class=\"n-term\">US$1 billion<\/span> (2024\u201325) with zero-tariff access for Afghan agricultural exports.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>India works through regional platforms \u2014 the Moscow Format, the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue (November 2021), the India\u2013Central Asia Summit (2022), and SCO-RATS. Its stance is read through <span class=\"n-sch\">Keohane<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Nye<\/span>\u2019s complex interdependence, combined with realist pragmatism and constructivist solidarity.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Way forward \u2014 scholarly compass<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vinash Paliwal<\/span> \u2014 \u201cA pragmatic understanding of the geopolitical reality is what motivates India\u2019s engagement with Afghanistan under Taliban leadership.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Katju<\/span> \u2014 discreet contacts keep India informed but risk legitimising the Taliban; <span class=\"n-sch\">Rakesh Sood<\/span> \u2014 a \u201cno boots on the ground\u201d policy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2014 shift focus from Kashmir to Afghanistan, and seek an understanding among Washington, Moscow and Delhi.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIndia should not try to fish in troubled waters.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>M.K. Bhadra Kumar<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2018 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Do you think that India\u2019s capacity building role in Afghanistan has shrunk the strategic space for Pakistan there? Discuss.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/do-you-think-that-indias-capacity-building-role-in-afghanistan-upsc-psir-2018-5002\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cThe war in Afghanistan is crucial from the point of view of India\u2019s national security. If the Americans withdraw and jihadis emerge with a sense of triumphalism, India will face an increasing onslaught of terrorism.\u201d Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/the-war-in-afghanistan-is-crucial-from-the-point-of-view-of-upsc-psir-2020-4903\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2021 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How does the recent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban impact India\u2019s strategic interests?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/how-does-the-recent-takeover-of-afghanistan-by-taliban-impact-upsc-psir-2021-4905\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"operation-sindoor-the-deterrence-turn-2025\">Operation Sindoor &amp; the Deterrence Turn (2025)<\/h3>\n<p>The Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025; 26 civilians killed \u2014 The Resistance Front, a Lashkar-e-Taiba front) triggered <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sindoor<\/span> on the night of 6\u20137 May; four days of the sharpest India\u2013Pakistan crisis in decades ended in a 10 May ceasefire.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What was new<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Strikes on nine terror sites in Pakistan and PoK \u2014 the Muridke and Bahawalpur headquarters of <span class=\"n-term\">LeT<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">JeM<\/span>; the deepest into Pakistani Punjab since 1971.<\/li>\n<li>First Indian use of <span class=\"n-term\">BrahMos<\/span> and SCALP-EG cruise missiles against Pakistan; the first India\u2013Pakistan clash where both sides used drones.<\/li>\n<li>The 1960 <span class=\"n-term\">Indus Waters Treaty<\/span> held \u201cin abeyance\u201d until Pakistan \u201ccredibly and irrevocably abjures\u201d cross-border terrorism.<\/li>\n<li>Ceasefire (10 May) via DGMO channels; the US role is disputed \u2014 Washington claimed mediation, India insists the pause was bilateral.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The \u201cnew normal\u201d \u2014 Modi\u2019s three pillars (12 May)<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Retaliation for any terror attack, on India\u2019s terms \u00b7 no tolerance of \u201cnuclear blackmail\u201d \u00b7 no distinction between terrorists and the governments that sponsor them.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cTerror and talks cannot go together\u2026 Terror and trade cannot go together\u2026 Water and blood cannot flow together.\u201d<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, Address to the Nation, 12 May 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The debate \u2014 what actually changed<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<th>Argument<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Deterrence by punishment<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Arzan Tarapore<\/span> \u2014 a shift to cumulative deterrence (\u201cmowing the grass\u201d): the strike, not its threat, imposes cost. <span class=\"n-sch\">Happymon Jacob<\/span> \u2014 a tripwire that collapses the sub-conventional \/ conventional line and calls Pakistan\u2019s nuclear bluff.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Calibrated force<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Walter Ladwig III<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Christopher Clary<\/span> \u2014 a calibrated use of force, not brinkmanship; overt nuclear signalling stayed lower than in earlier crises.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Sceptical \/ continuity<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Moeed Yusuf<\/span> &amp; <span class=\"n-sch\">Rizwan Zeb<\/span> \u2014 a commitment trap; \u201ccrises in a nuclearized environment rather than nuclear crises.\u201d <span class=\"n-sch\">Sameer Lalwani<\/span> \u2014 standoff \u201cnon-contact\u201d strikes may not move a proxy-reliant Pakistan.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Pattern, not doctrine<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Soumya Awasthi<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2014 no codified counter-terror doctrine yet; a clearer pattern of behaviour that still awaits institutional permanence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Would you agree with the contention that India\u2019s inclination to lean on a \u2018more aggressive hyper-realist posture\u2019 has gained a new momentum in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist strike? Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/would-you-agree-with-the-contention-that-indias-inclination-to-upsc-psir-2025-4908\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-saudi-arabia\">India \u00b7 Saudi Arabia<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Diplomatic ties formalised in 1947; a <span class=\"n-term\">Strategic Partnership<\/span> from 2010.<\/li>\n<li>Milestones: the Delhi Declaration (2006), the Riyadh Declaration (2010) and the <span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council<\/span> (SPC, 2019) \u2192 a move from routine exchanges to structured cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of India\u2019s most valued partners \u2014 a maritime neighbour, a trusted friend, and a strategic ally\u2026 In a world full of uncertainties, our bond stands strong, as a pillar of stability.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Narendra Modi<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Areas of cooperation<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Track<\/th>\n<th>Substance<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Geo-strategic<\/td>\n<td>Saudi influence over Pakistan gives India traction on terrorism; the joint exercise <span class=\"n-term\">SADA TANSEEQ<\/span> (2024); cooperation on the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz sea-lanes.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Geo-economic<\/td>\n<td>Vision 2030 seeks diversification; Saudi sovereign-wealth funds back projects like the ~US$44 billion Ratnagiri refinery. Bilateral trade ~US$52.76 billion (2022\u201323) and ~US$42.98 billion (2023\u201324), with India as Saudi Arabia\u2019s second-largest partner. Saudi Arabia is India\u2019s third-largest crude supplier (14.3% of oil imports, 2023\u201324) and a major LPG source (18.2%); a US$100 billion investment commitment across sectors.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Interdependence<\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">e-Migrate<\/span> linked with Saudi <span class=\"n-term\">e-Thawtheeq<\/span> to ease migration.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Cultural<\/td>\n<td>Hajj facilitation for ~175,000\u2013200,000 Indians; a ~2.7 million diaspora sending over US$11 billion in remittances; a 2021 MoU on Yoga cooperation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>COVID<\/td>\n<td>India supplied 4.5 million COVISHIELD doses (Feb\u2013Mar 2021); the Kingdom sent liquid oxygen during India\u2019s second wave.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Frictions<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Conflicting foreign policies \u2014 the Saudi role in Yemen and growing ties with China.<\/li>\n<li>Delayed investment \u2014 cancellation of Aramco\u2019s planned 20% stake in Reliance; a stalled Ratnagiri\/West Coast refinery.<\/li>\n<li>Energy pricing \u2014 the \u201cAsian Premium\u201d charged by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers.<\/li>\n<li>Labour \u2014 \u201cSaudization\u201d and a \u201cFamily Tax\u201d strain the Indian workforce; the contested <span class=\"n-term\">Kafala<\/span> system.<\/li>\n<li>Trade imbalance \u2014 India\u2019s deficit ~US$31.3 billion (2022\u201323); a stalled India\u2013GCC FTA.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Md. Muddassir Quamar<\/span> reads Saudi Arabia as central to India\u2019s Middle East security and economic integration; <span class=\"n-sch\">Dr. Yogender Singh<\/span> notes expansion across energy, defence, infrastructure, technology and education, driven by leadership-level trust.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe institutionalization of the SPC has transformed ties from ad hoc engagement to a more strategic relationship with strong economic, political, and security components.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Kinda Bakr<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"india-iran-2\">India \u00b7 Iran<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A deep historical and cultural bond. <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span>, in <em>Discovery of India<\/em>, wrote that few peoples have been so closely related in origin and through history as those of India and Iran; <span class=\"n-sch\">Modi<\/span> calls it \u201ca friendship as old as history.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s ~25 million Shias and ~70,000 Parsis add a civilisational dimension.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Why Iran matters<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Geography and energy<\/span> \u2014 a major oil supplier bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan; an alternative route when transit through Pakistan is blocked; a junction of South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, opening onto the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Strategic and cultural mutualities<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s Shia population and NAM leadership align with Iran\u2019s diplomatic goals.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Economic and diplomatic<\/span> \u2014 India a major buyer of Iranian oil; India\u2019s NAM platform aids Iran\u2019s outreach; India\u2019s balance offsets a Pakistan aligned with the US and Saudi Arabia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The US factor and the sanctions history<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The 1979 revolution and hostage crisis reordered Iran\u2019s ties with the world.<\/li>\n<li>US pressure repeatedly constrained India \u2014 Reliance pressured over a ~US$900 million US Exim Bank loan (<span class=\"n-sch\">S Samuel C Rajiv<\/span>); the 2006 IAEA vote against Iran, soon after the India\u2013US civil nuclear understanding; discontinuation of the Asian Clearing Union swap (December 2010); oil-import cuts of 11% (2012) and ~15% annually thereafter.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">IPI<\/span> (\u201cpeace pipeline\u201d) \u2014 a 2,775-km Iran\u2013Pakistan\u2013India gas project \u2014 could never be realised under US pressure; India instead signed the India\u2013US Civil Nuclear Agreement.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Under Modi and after<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Modi\u2019s May 2016 visit (the first by an Indian PM in fifteen years, per <span class=\"n-sch\">Ankit Panda<\/span>) produced ~12 agreements, chiefly on <span class=\"n-term\">Chabahar<\/span> and a Trilateral Transport and Transit Corridor with Iran and Afghanistan; a US$150 million Exim credit line; and IRCON\u2019s role in the ~500-km Chabahar\u2013Zahedan railway.<\/li>\n<li>Chabahar bypasses Pakistan and counters China\u2019s Gwadar; goods reach Afghanistan via the Delaram\u2013Zaranj highway.<\/li>\n<li>Trump\u2019s May 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA and renewed sanctions (August and November 2018) forced India to cut Iranian oil imports (<span class=\"n-sch\">Ravi Joshi<\/span>, ORF).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vijay Gokhale<\/span> reframed strategic autonomy as <span class=\"n-term\">issue-based<\/span> alignment rather than ideological non-alignment; India secured written US assurance for banks to facilitate ~US$85 million of Chabahar equipment.<\/li>\n<li>Frictions: <span class=\"n-law\">Article 370<\/span> and India\u2019s place in the Israel\u2013UAE\u2013US coalition; Iran\u2019s limited support for the Taliban (<span class=\"n-sch\">Samuel Ramani<\/span>); the Farzad-B gas-field dispute. <span class=\"n-sch\">Anita Inder Singh<\/span>: India will \u201cremain on the tightrope.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">2020 and 2025 flashpoints<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2020<\/span> \u2014 the US killing of Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport raised fears of full-blown Iran\u2013US conflict, threatening energy security for India, China, Japan and South Korea.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2025<\/span> \u2014 India welcomed the June 2025 Israel\u2013Iran ceasefire and praised US and Qatari mediation, holding that \u201cthere is no alternative to dialogue and diplomacy\u201d; it distanced itself from the SCO\u2019s condemnation of Israel, launched <span class=\"n-term\">Operation Sindhu<\/span> to evacuate nationals, and read the crisis through the same lens as the Ukraine war. <span class=\"n-sch\">P.R. Kumaraswamy<\/span> called the stance \u201ccalculated, nuanced, and matured\u201d; <span class=\"n-sch\">Shanthie Mariet D\u2019Souza<\/span> flagged that strategic ambiguity works only while conflicts stay within India\u2019s core interests; <span class=\"n-sch\">Meena Singh Roy<\/span> ties the relationship\u2019s potential to resolving Farzad-B; <span class=\"n-sch\">Sumitha Narayanan Kutty<\/span> sees India expanding energy, connectivity and trade to secure its interests and balance rival powers.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Current \u2014 the Twelve-Day War, the 2026 escalation &amp; the Iran hedge<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Twelve-Day War (13\u201324 June 2025)<\/span> \u2014 Israel\u2019s Operation Rising Lion struck Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan and Arak and killed the IRGC head and nine nuclear scientists; Iran\u2019s Operation True Promise 3 fired over 550 missiles and 1,000+ drones (Israel claimed 80\u201390% intercepted). On 22 June the US bombed Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan (Operation Midnight Hammer) and Iran struck the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar; a ceasefire followed on 24 June with US and Qatari involvement. <span class=\"n-sch\">Prasanta Kumar Pradhan<\/span> (MP-IDSA) reads the war as reaffirming American primacy \u2014 Russia, tied down in Ukraine and weakened by Assad\u2019s fall, could not help Iran, and China condemned the strikes but sent no material support.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The 2026 escalation<\/span> \u2014 from 28 February 2026, US\u2013Israel strikes (Epic Fury \/ Roaring Lion) killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz on 4 March 2026; a memorandum to end the war was signed on 17 June 2026. India did not condemn the killing and sent only its foreign secretary to sign the condolence book; with the strait shut, it used <span class=\"n-term\">Chabahar<\/span> as an evacuation route.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The hedge under American pressure<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Nirupama Subramanian<\/span> traces India\u2019s caution to the 2005 IAEA vote against Iran and recalls that Iran had shielded India at the UN over Kashmir in 1994; she reads the refusal to condemn the strikes as autonomy narrowed into dependence, while <span class=\"n-sch\">Kabir Taneja<\/span> reads the same silence as deliberate hedging that protects a pending trade agenda. India kept roughly five per cent of its energy basket from Iran despite sanctions (<span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span>), and Iran sits under the foreign ministry\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">PAI<\/span> (Pakistan\u2013Afghanistan\u2013Iran) desk.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2013Iran: four decades on the tightrope.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">1979<\/span> (Revolution and hostage crisis reorder ties) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2006<\/span> (IAEA vote against Iran, after the India\u2013US nuclear understanding) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2010\u201312<\/span> (ACU swap ends; oil-import cuts begin) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2016<\/span> (Chabahar and the trilateral corridor) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2018<\/span> (Trump exits the JCPOA; sanctions return) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">2025<\/span> (Israel\u2013Iran ceasefire; Operation Sindhu)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Abraham Accords \u2014 read-across for India\u2013Iran<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Works for India<\/th>\n<th>Works against India<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Validate strategic autonomy; a calmer Israel\u2013Gulf equation aids regional stability and gives India more room to manoeuvre.<\/td>\n<td>Closer Israel\u2013Gulf ties may strain India\u2013Iran; sharper sectarian tensions; an alignment dilemma for Pakistan; and pressure to keep Israel ties from overshadowing Iran interests.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cOnce we make up our mind, the distance between Kashi and Kashan is just half a step.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Narendra Modi<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">What are the challenges and limitations in India &#8211; Iran relations?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/what-are-the-challenges-and-limitations-in-india-iran-relations-upsc-psir-2023-5005\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-israel\">India \u00b7 Israel<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A deep, expanding partnership built on shared democracy and pluralism and two knowledge-based economies.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Michael Walzer<\/span>, in <em>The Paradox of Liberation<\/em> (2015), observes that both India and Israel underwent similar transitions \u2014 beginning with secular nationalist movements that later gave way to religiously influenced ideologies.<\/li>\n<li>The 30th anniversary of full ties (from 1992) was marked with a commemorative logo pairing the Star of David and the Ashoka Chakra.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Evolution of India\u2019s approach<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India recognised Israel in 1950 and allowed a Mumbai consulate, but withheld full ties until 1992 (established under <span class=\"n-sch\">P.V. Narasimha Rao<\/span>), given anti-colonial alignment and Arab ties.<\/li>\n<li>Shift markers: President Pranab Mukherjee\u2019s 2015 visit; Modi\u2019s 2017 visit (the first by an Indian PM); Netanyahu\u2019s reciprocal 2018 visit \u2192 widening the relationship beyond military cooperation into economy and technology.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Cooperation and divergence<\/span><\/p>\n<p><em>Sectors of cooperation<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Energy<\/span> \u2014 Israel\u2019s Mediterranean gas reserves.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Space<\/span> \u2014 India has launched Israeli spy satellites; the alignment of Israel\u2019s Beresheet and India\u2019s Chandrayaan-2 programmes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Defence<\/span> \u2014 Spyder missile, Barak-8, AWACS.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Intelligence<\/span> \u2014 RAW\u2013Mossad counter-terrorism cooperation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Agriculture<\/span> \u2014 dryland-farming and drip-irrigation know-how; 27 Centres of Excellence across 21 Indian states.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Points of divergence<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Palestinian issue<\/span> \u2014 support for self-determination and a two-state solution; UN votes critical of Israeli settlements (2016, 2018).<\/li>\n<li>Continued dealings with <span class=\"n-term\">Iran<\/span> and resistance to US-backed sanctions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Posture<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s stress on peaceful coexistence and non-interference vs a more aggressive security posture (India sought a ceasefire in the 2014 Gaza conflict).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Domestic politics<\/span> \u2014 since the 1920s Khilafat movement, some nationalist opinion has read Palestine through an Islamic prism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>On Barak-8, its success has \u201cemboldened the hopes \u2026 of both these countries in the field of defense research.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Deeksha Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Current \u2014 the Special Strategic Partnership &amp; Sudarshan Chakra<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Ties were elevated to a <span class=\"n-term\">Special Strategic Partnership<\/span> on 26 February 2026. India\u2019s planned air-defence shield, <span class=\"n-term\">Mission Sudarshan Chakra<\/span> (announced 15 August 2025, with a 2035 target), draws on Israeli systems \u2014 MRSAM, SPYDER, Harop, Rampage and the Phalcon AWACS (<span class=\"n-sch\">Sukhbir Kaur Minhas<\/span>, MP-IDSA); <span class=\"n-sch\">Kabir Taneja<\/span> likens Israel to a one-stop shop for advanced military technology.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Gaza ceiling<\/span> \u2014 the convergence still has limits. Taneja reports that even Israel\u2019s admirers in India recoiled at the scale of destruction in Gaza and that New Delhi has privately conveyed concern; India declined Israeli requests to ban Hamas, citing legal grounds and a large domestic Muslim population.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Israel\u2013Lebanon front<\/span> \u2014 a November 2024 ceasefire followed the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah\u2019s retreat north of the Litani; a US-brokered Framework Agreement in June 2026 opened the first direct Israel\u2013Lebanon talks since 1983.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Beyond defence \u2014 connectivity and geo-economics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">IMEC<\/span> links India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel \u2014 rail, road, port, energy and data \u2014 bypassing Suez as an alternative to the Belt and Road.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">I2U2<\/span> (India, Israel, UAE, US) broadens cooperation to water, energy, transport, space, health and food security. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sameena Hameed<\/span> reads I2U2 and IMEC together as India\u2019s shift from bilateral dealings to minilateral connectivity.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s acquisition of <span class=\"n-term\">Haifa Port<\/span> gives a logistics foothold on IMEC\u2019s Mediterranean end; Indian firms now run the Haifa container terminal once managed by China.<\/li>\n<li>Trade climbed from US$200 million (1992) to US$4.82 billion \u2014 India Israel\u2019s seventh-largest trading partner and third-largest in Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Israel is \u201cin many ways as perhaps our most trusted and innovative partner.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar (2021)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>A \u201cmarriage made in heaven being implemented here on Earth.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Benjamin Netanyahu<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The idea of <span class=\"n-term\">I2T2<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s talent and Israel\u2019s technology \u2014 points to its future orientation; Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam in India mirrors \u2018Tikun Olam\u2019 (\u201cheal the world\u201d) in Israel. <span class=\"n-sch\">Kanchi Gupta<\/span> cautions that India will not abandon its traditional support for Palestinian statehood \u2014 domestic politics and ideology still shape the policy.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Identify the key sectors of cooperation between India and Israel since 2014. Examine their significance in strengthening the bilateral ties between the two countries.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/identify-the-key-sectors-of-cooperation-between-india-and-israel-upsc-psir-2020-5003\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How does India-Israel bilateral ties reflect the autonomy of India\u2019s foreign policy choices?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/how-does-india-israel-bilateral-ties-reflect-the-autonomy-of-upsc-psir-2022-5004\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-palestine\">India \u00b7 Palestine<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Rooted in India\u2019s anti-colonial ethos and a focus on West Asian stability; the Palestinian issue is often called the \u201cmother of all crises.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>India opposed Israel\u2019s creation (1948), supported Palestine\u2019s UN inclusion (1949), recognised the PLO (1974) and formally recognised the State of Palestine (1988) \u2014 among the first non-Arab nations to do so.<\/li>\n<li>India backs a sovereign Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, reflected in UN voting and alignment with the G77 and BRICS.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cPalestine belongs to Arabs in the same way England belongs to the English.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Mahatma Gandhi (1938)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">De-hyphenation<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Engaging Israel and Palestine on independent tracks rather than as a single package \u2014 the frame that lets India deepen ties with one without abandoning the other.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Areas of cooperation<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Budgetary aid totalling ~US$30 million since 1995; the Jawaharlal Nehru Library at Al-Azhar University; the \u201cTURATHI\u201d Women Empowerment Centre; the India-Palestine Super Specialty Hospital.<\/li>\n<li>US$1.25 million pledged to UNRWA; scholarships (150 under ITEC, 100 through ICCR); cultural ties through Indian martial arts and Kathak.<\/li>\n<li>Modi\u2019s 2018 visit \u2014 the first by an Indian leader \u2014 reaffirmed support for a sovereign Palestine, alongside a de-hyphenation policy toward Israel.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Continuity and change<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The 1992 opening to Israel and the 1994 post-Oslo trajectory shifted priorities; support for Palestine became \u201cmore symbolic than substantive.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Core continuities persist \u2014 a two-state solution, strategic autonomy, and developmental-needs-driven engagement.<\/li>\n<li>India endorsed a UN resolution (2017) criticising the move to declare Jerusalem Israel\u2019s capital, advocates a two-state solution, and endorses UNSC Resolution 242\u2019s \u201cland for peace.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>During the October 2023 Gaza conflict, India condemned terrorism while voicing concern over civilian casualties; it abstained on the June 2025 UN ceasefire resolution \u2014 keeping ties with both Israel and the Global South.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Current \u2014 the Gaza ICJ case &amp; India\u2019s UN voting<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-law\">South Africa v. Israel at the ICJ<\/span> \u2014 filed 29 December 2023, with provisional measures ordered on 26 January 2024 (and further measures on aid access and the Rafah offensive later that year). Judge <span class=\"n-sch\">Dalveer Bhandari<\/span> sat with the ICJ majority that found some Palestinian rights plausible, while India as a state has stayed out of the interventions filed under the Genocide Convention.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s UN voting on Gaza<\/span> \u2014 India voted for the December 2024 ceasefire resolution but abstained on the Spain-led resolution of 12 June 2025 (149\u201312), becoming an outlier in Asia; Ambassador Parvathaneni Harish defended the abstention by citing India\u2019s earlier votes and its preference for dialogue and diplomacy (<span class=\"n-sch\">Devirupa Mitra<\/span>, <em>The Wire<\/em>).<\/li>\n<li>The gap between the Indian judge\u2019s vote and the government\u2019s silence captures New Delhi\u2019s caution: India supports the ICJ as an institution while keeping its own hands free.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Reading the recalibration<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> reads it as a response to regional change; <span class=\"n-sch\">Suhasini Haidar<\/span> and others warn that abstentionism can look ambiguous or passive, while Brookings\/ORF analysts see a hedged approach that maximises flexibility. Theoretically it is a hybrid of principle and pragmatism, drawing on <span class=\"n-term\">complex interdependence<\/span> (<span class=\"n-term\">Keohane and Nye<\/span>) and constructivism; <span class=\"n-sch\">Amrita Narlikar<\/span> frames India\u2019s foreign policy as coalitional diplomacy and issue-based pragmatism.<\/p>\n<p>On the conflict itself: <span class=\"n-sch\">Jessica Stern<\/span> stresses the psychological toll and the case for nonviolent resistance, urging pressure to protect civilians; <span class=\"n-sch\">Noura Erakat<\/span> critiques the application of international law and points to legal actions to halt arms sales to Israel; <span class=\"n-sch\">Nishank Motwani<\/span> notes the strengthening of India\u2013Israel ties under Modi after 7 October; R. Ravindra, India\u2019s Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, has highlighted the war\u2019s direct impact on India\u2019s economic, energy and maritime interests, stressing de-escalation and continued humanitarian aid.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2017 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Has the recent Indo-Israeli relationships given a new dynamics to India\u2019s stand on Palestinian statehood?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/has-the-recent-indo-israeli-relationships-given-a-new-dynamics-to-upsc-psir-2017-5001\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Critically examine the continuity and change in India\u2019s Palestine policy in the wake of the ongoing Israel-Hamas War.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/critically-examine-the-continuity-and-change-in-indias-palestine-upsc-psir-2024-5006\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-united-arab-emirates-2\">India \u00b7 United Arab Emirates<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Ties go back centuries through Indian Ocean trade and migration; formal relations from 1972. Modi\u2019s 2015 visit gave new momentum and established the <span class=\"n-term\">Comprehensive Strategic Partnership<\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIndia and the UAE have always found common ground because their economic and geopolitical interests align. The past decade has only deepened that trust and cooperation.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Dr. Muneer Ahmed (IPCS)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Areas of convergence<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Domain<\/th>\n<th>Substance<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Economic and trade<\/td>\n<td>India the UAE\u2019s second-largest partner, the UAE India\u2019s third-largest; trade ~US$85 billion since the 2022 <span class=\"n-term\">CEPA<\/span>; UAE sovereign-wealth investment in infrastructure, renewables and technology; IMEC to cut transport costs. The Rupee-Dirham\/Local Currency Settlement reduces dependence on third-party currencies.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Energy and security<\/td>\n<td>Oil supply, strategic petroleum reserves, upstream projects; maritime security, counter-terrorism, defence production and intelligence-sharing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Technology and soft power<\/td>\n<td>ISRO\u2013UAE Space Agency links; an IIM Ahmedabad campus in the UAE; a 3.5-million-strong diaspora, the largest expatriate community there.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Geopolitical alignment<\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Look West Policy<\/span> aligns with the UAE\u2019s Vision 2021 and Economic Vision 2030.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Challenges<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CEPA trade still concentrated in gems, petroleum and electronics rather than technology and green energy; the Kafala system and slow labour reforms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-sch\">Talmiz Ahmad<\/span> reads engagement as shaped by both economic realities and the shifting security dynamics of the Gulf; the Atlantic Council cautions on institutional capacity to deliver on ambitious cooperation. <span class=\"n-sch\">Muneer Ahmed<\/span> calls it \u201cnot just a transactional relationship \u2014 a meeting of visions, backed by determined leadership\u201d; Modi\u2019s framing: the partnership \u201cisn\u2019t just economic \u2014 it\u2019s a global signal.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Debate \u2014 vindicated or strained? India\u2019s multi-alignment across the West Asia crises<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\"><em>Vindicated.<\/em><\/span> <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> holds that balance is now the source of Indian influence and that flexible diplomacy has softened each shock; the former diplomat <span class=\"n-sch\">T. S. Tirumurti<\/span> agrees that India\u2019s space contracts only when it abandons multi-alignment for one camp. Pant names the approach <span class=\"n-term\">calibrated multi-alignment<\/span>, and <span class=\"n-sch\">Patrizia Cogo Morales<\/span> treats multi-alignment as the current form of strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\"><em>Strained.<\/em><\/span> <span class=\"n-sch\">Amitabh Mattoo<\/span> treats strategic autonomy as a test under acute strain, warning that neutrality is becoming a luxury as rival camps demand loyalty at once; <span class=\"n-sch\">Nirupama Subramanian<\/span> goes further, reading India\u2019s silence as strategic dependence. <span class=\"n-sch\">Shanthie Mariet D\u2019Souza<\/span> takes the middle view \u2014 the doctrine still holds, but the ability to balance conflicting partners nears its limit if war drags on.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"india-the-united-states-and-afghanistan\">India, the United States and Afghanistan<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 the withdrawal of US and NATO forces was the most important regional security issue preoccupying Indian strategic elites, with potential follow-on effects on the north-western subcontinent. India feared that, as after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the vacuum would produce the Taliban and terrorism \u2014 fears borne out in <span class=\"n-term\">2021<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M. K. Narayanan<\/span> \u2192 Biden\u2019s decision to fix a withdrawal date regardless of conditions inside Afghanistan facilitated the Taliban takeover. The \u201chorses for courses\u201d mantra in US foreign policy significantly affects India\u2019s strategic and security interests; the hasty withdrawal raised doubts about American credibility.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span> \u2192 the exit told American allies that they count on US support when they most need it at their peril; the withdrawal compromised India\u2019s security.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Af-Pak<\/span> framing re-hyphenated the subcontinent at a time when India valued de-hyphenation, and rested on American dependence on Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom. India\u2019s response was to invest heavily in Afghan reconstruction and to seek land access to Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. India and Russia had earlier converged in supporting the <span class=\"n-term\">Northern Alliance<\/span>, which became the core of the US-backed resistance forces.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Consequences for India<\/span> \u2014 a strategic setback and a near-term triumph for the Taliban\u2019s chief backer, Pakistan; damage to India\u2019s heavy investments; and jeopardy to the long-standing goal of land access to Central Asia through a port and railway line via Iran and Afghanistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"after-the-takeover\">After the takeover<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The Taliban takeover has made the regional security situation more fragile; Pakistan-based organisations such as <span class=\"n-term\">Jaish-e-Mohammed<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Lashkar-e-Taiba<\/span> now have a regime that may look the other way or provide safe haven.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">M.K. Narayanan<\/span> refers to Pakistan as the <em>\u2018patron saint\u2019<\/em> of the new regime. Islamabad publicly condemns these organisations while quietly permitting or supporting their operations, seeking indirect control or strategic influence to reduce space for India.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s counter should be to mend ties with the regime realistically, innovatively countering Pakistan\u2019s search for <span class=\"n-term\">strategic depth<\/span> by building security cooperation, while bracing for a heightened threat.<\/li>\n<li>There is still <span class=\"n-term\">no consensus in South Asia on recognising the Taliban<\/span> as the legitimate government, which makes holding a SAARC summit difficult, since barring Pakistan no member would be comfortable sharing the table with its representatives.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"the-new-great-game\">The New Great Game<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Since 2001 China\u2019s policy has moved from a non-engagement <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cobserver\u201d policy (2002\u20132010)<\/span> to an <span class=\"n-term\">economics-centred agenda (2011\u20132017)<\/span> to a <span class=\"n-term\">security-dominated agenda (post-2018)<\/span>, which has remained dominant since August 2021.<\/li>\n<li>Beijing\u2019s primary concerns are curbing regional instability and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for groups it brands terrorist, especially <span class=\"n-term\">Uyghur militants<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>China\u2019s economic interests centre on mining \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">Mes Aynak<\/span> copper mine and oil extraction in <span class=\"n-term\">Faryab and Sar-e-Pol<\/span> \u2014 both long on hold. BRI projects circumvent Afghan territory; Chinese policymakers worry about the effect of instability on their interests in Pakistan and Central Asia.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 closer collaboration between China and Pakistan could be a \u201cserious challenge for India\u201d, given India\u2019s border dispute with China and the treatment of CPEC as a threat to Indian trade and security.<\/li>\n<li>China and Russia share strong mutual interests, both focused on security and violent extremism; Russia is concerned that violence could spill into Central Asia, which it treats as its <span class=\"n-term\">near abroad<\/span> and exclusive sphere of influence. Neither has recognised the Taliban government, and both have criticised the American and European focus on human rights and democracy while scaling down expectations of an inclusive government.<\/li>\n<li>Post-August 2021 China\u2019s main assistance has been humanitarian aid and COVID-19 vaccines; diplomatically it has rallied support for rebuilding, calling for sanctions relief and unfreezing of Afghan assets, with Pakistan urging Western powers to engage.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Dr. Sanjeev Kumar<\/span> notes that a serious study by <span class=\"n-term\">Peking University in 2018<\/span> appreciated the Indian model of delivering major projects in Afghanistan \u2014 India\u2019s aid is more comprehensive and wider in coverage than China\u2019s, and Afghans valued that India had contributed more than the UN and NATO.<\/li>\n<li>India must therefore ensure involvement in Afghanistan\u2019s settlement to protect national interests, check China-Pakistan ambitions and engage Russia without affecting relations with the West.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"views-of-scholars-and-the-2023-question\">Views of scholars \u2014 and the 2023 question<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Sushant Sareen<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">engage, isolate, or oppose<\/span> \u2014 Indian policy should incorporate all three. While engaging the Taliban, India must reach out to its old friends, most of them in exile, to push for reconciliation; it must simultaneously isolate the Taliban without breaking ranks with the international community; and it must oppose the Taliban, not only diplomatically and politically but by covertly supporting anti-Taliban forces \u2014 a <span class=\"n-term\">carrot-and-stick approach<\/span>. There are never any full stops in Afghanistan, and no reason for India to put full stops in its own policy; pragmatism combined with hard-nosed moves is the way to get back in the game.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Katju<\/span> \u2192 the Taliban is here to stay, and India has no alternative but to deal with it even while repeating, if it wishes, the mantra of inclusive government. Maintaining contacts with leaders of the ousted Republic would be unobjectionable, especially as the Taliban itself wants them to return. The sooner India establishes a permanent presence in Kabul the better; this is not evangelism but the cold pursuit of interests, which often requires <span class=\"n-term\">supping with the devil, with a long spoon<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Rudra Chaudhuri<\/span> \u2192 the approach will mean taking risks, assessing costs and expecting failures, and also doing everything possible to address real challenges. Facts must be taken for what they are: that Afghanistan is changing is a fact, and that the United States is leaving is a fact. As <span class=\"n-sch\">Kissinger<\/span> argues, it is not easy to change facts; what is possible is for facts to be used. A state\u2019s decision to recognise a government is a matter of pure discretion premised on larger political gains, and India\u2019s approach should be determined by its geo-strategic interests.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2023 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">What steps has India taken to regain its foothold in Afghanistan since the Taliban has taken over the country in August 2021?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/what-steps-has-india-taken-to-regain-its-foothold-in-afghanistan-upsc-psir-2023-4105\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><span><\/span><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/growing-relations-with-us-and-israel\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Growing relations with US and Israel<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-setting-india-s-western-arc\">The Setting \u2014 India\u2019s Western Arc<\/a><a href=\"#why-west-asia-matters-five-stakes\">Why West Asia Matters \u2014 Five Stakes<\/a><a href=\"#evolution-of-india-s-west-asia-policy\">Evolution of India\u2019s West Asia Policy<\/a><a href=\"#reading-the-region-three-lenses\">Reading the Region \u2014 Three Lenses<\/a><a href=\"#security-architecture-which-way-does-it-order\">Security Architecture \u2014 Which Way Does It Order?<\/a><a href=\"#key-developments-in-the-region\">Key Developments in the Region<\/a><a href=\"#implications-of-instability-for-india\">Implications of Instability for India<\/a><a href=\"#india-iran\">India\u2013Iran<\/a><a href=\"#india-united-arab-emirates\">India\u2013United Arab Emirates<\/a><a href=\"#india-afghanistan\">India\u2013Afghanistan<\/a><a href=\"#operation-sindoor-the-deterrence-turn-2025\">Operation Sindoor &amp; the Deterrence Turn (2025)<\/a><a href=\"#india-saudi-arabia\">India \u00b7 Saudi Arabia<\/a><a href=\"#india-iran-2\">India \u00b7 Iran<\/a><a href=\"#india-israel\">India \u00b7 Israel<\/a><a href=\"#india-palestine\">India \u00b7 Palestine<\/a><a href=\"#india-united-arab-emirates-2\">India \u00b7 United Arab Emirates<\/a><a href=\"#india-the-united-states-and-afghanistan\">India, the United States and Afghanistan<\/a><a href=\"#after-the-takeover\">After the takeover<\/a><a href=\"#the-new-great-game\">The New Great Game<\/a><a href=\"#views-of-scholars-and-the-2023-question\">Views of scholars \u2014 and the 2023 question<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Afghanistan, Iraq<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.8.1","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"8","fx_note_desc":"Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Afghanistan, Iraq","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3600","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3600","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3600\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3784,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3600\/revisions\/3784"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3600"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}