{"id":3601,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:15","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/growing-relations-with-us-and-israel\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:54","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:54","slug":"growing-relations-with-us-and-israel","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/growing-relations-with-us-and-israel\/","title":{"rendered":"Growing relations with US and Israel"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Growing relations with US and Israel<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Growing relations with US and Israel<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 8<\/b> \u2014 Recent developments in Indian Foreign Policy : India\u2019s position on the recent crises in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Isreal; Vision of a new world order.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"growing-relations-with-the-united-states\">Growing Relations with the United States<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>From post-Cold War suspicion to close cooperation \u2014 the US is among India\u2019s largest trade and investment partners.<\/li>\n<li>Maritime and defence anchor: the Malabar exercise grew from bilateral to a quadrilateral with Japan and Australia; the <span class=\"n-term\">QUAD<\/span> and the institutional <span class=\"n-term\">2+2 dialogue<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The India\u2013US Civil Nuclear Agreement reshaped the strategic equation (India gave up the IPI pipeline for it).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s Indo-Pacific concept<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">SAGAR<\/span> \u2014 \u201cSecurity and Growth for All in the Region\u201d \u2014 and the Indo-Pacific Oceans\u2019 Initiative (<span class=\"n-term\">IPOI<\/span>, 2019), built on seven pillars, anchored on \u201cAct East\u201d and \u201cAct West.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The partnership coexists with <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>: India rejected US mediation on Kashmir and refused to criticise Russia over Ukraine, becoming the second-largest importer of Russian oil. The wider web runs through Japan, Vietnam, Australia and France, with ASEAN centrality at its core.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India maintains strong ties with countries that will assure a free and open Indo-Pacific and guarantee greater connectivity with the rest of the world. Analyze.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-maintains-strong-ties-with-countries-that-will-assure-a-upsc-psir-2025-4909\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-a-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting the US\u2019 offer of mediation on the Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-continues-to-invoke-its-time-tested-policy-of-strategic-upsc-psir-2025-5007\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India\u2019s reluctance to perceive any \u2018existential threat\u2019 inevitably made the multilateral path to nuclear security a \u2018default option\u2019 until it decided to cross the nuclear Rubicon in 1998. Identify and analyze some of the major reasons behind this shift in India\u2019s position on the nuclear question.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/indias-reluctance-to-perceive-any-existential-threat-inevitably-upsc-psir-2025-5008\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"relations-in-the-modi-years\">Relations in the Modi Years<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Kashish Parpiani and Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Under PM Narendra Modi, India has moved from its historical fixation with <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018strategic autonomy\u2019<\/span> \u2014 a ghost of its non-aligned past \u2014 to <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018strategic alignment\u2019<\/span>. Autonomy has been redefined \u201cas an objective that is attainable through strengthened partnerships instead of avoiding partnerships.\u201d The shift reflects pragmatism and realism based on \u2018enlightened self-interest\u2019. India therefore has no hesitation in finding common ground with China to defend globalisation against America First protectionism, while embracing the United States on other issues.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The doctrinal move that most 15-markers now turn on<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>STRATEGIC AUTONOMY<\/th>\n<th>STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>autonomy by avoiding partnerships \u2014 the non-aligned inheritance<\/td>\n<td>autonomy through strengthened partnerships \u2014 \u2018enlightened self-interest\u2019<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Appadorai<\/span> \u00b7 neo-nonalignment (<span class=\"n-sch\">Hagerty<\/span>)<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Parpiani<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Chikermane<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li>Growing convergence on a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cfree and open\u201d Indo-Pacific<\/span>, with consensus in India\u2019s strategic community that the U.S. is India\u2019s \u201cmost important partner\u201d. The alignment also has realpolitik relevance: even amid relative economic decline, the United States is positioned to dominate militarily.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2014<\/span> \u2014 Modi\u2019s vision statement, \u2018<em>chalein saath saath<\/em>, forward together we go\u2019.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Jan 2015<\/span> \u2014 Obama\u2019s visit adopts the <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region<\/span>, the first joint articulation of regional challenges.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2016<\/span> \u2014 address to Congress; relations have overcome the <em>\u201chesitations of history\u201d<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2017<\/span> \u2014 Modi\u2019s visit covers Afghanistan, North Korea, West Asia, Pakistan, the Indo-Pacific, export control regimes, the UNSC, cyberspace, reaffirmation of <span class=\"n-term\">Major Defence Partner<\/span> status, and US observer membership of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Biden years<\/span> \u2014 Biden opposed sanctions after 1998, urged their removal in 2001, and helped seal the nuclear deal in 2008. As President he upgraded the Quad to summit level and launched <span class=\"n-term\">I2U2<\/span> (India, Israel, UAE, United States). A framework on critical and emerging technologies followed the July 2022 joint statement.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2022<\/span> \u2014 the U.S. <span class=\"n-term\">National Defense Strategy<\/span> recognises the importance of partnership with India. India does not join US condemnation or sanctions on Russia; the U.S. shows understanding of India\u2019s compulsions and expresses interest in being \u2018partner of choice\u2019 in virtually any field.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Feb 2023<\/span> \u2014 Air India\u2013Boeing deal for over 200 American-made aircraft. <span class=\"n-term\">Sept 2023<\/span> \u2014 the U.S. response to the Canadian allegations against India is restrained despite Canada being a critical ally. <span class=\"n-term\">Oct 2023 onward<\/span> \u2014 the Israel-Hamas conflict may delay the proposed Middle East-India transport corridor and I2U2 initiatives.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Nov 2023 2+2<\/span> \u2014 countering China through military and non-military tools; strengthening India\u2019s military; reducing technological dependence on China; trade, clean energy, higher education and health; the long-run viability of India\u2019s Russia ties.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Gautam Chikermane<\/span> \u2192 Modi inherited a US$2 trillion economy and strategic goodwill from nuclear cooperation, and used both. This convergence of size, strategy and policy has been timely for the U.S. as it seeks a partner of trust, disengages from Pakistan and de-risks from China.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"trump-2-0-tariffs-repair-and-the-hemispheric-turn\">Trump 2.0 \u2014 Tariffs, Repair and the Hemispheric Turn<\/h3>\n<p>Within months of 2025 Washington placed a cumulative <span class=\"n-term\">50 per cent<\/span> tariff on Indian goods, part of it a penalty for buying Russian oil, and claimed a mediating role in the India\u2013Pakistan clash of May 2025. The question that runs through the episode: a passing crisis that multi-alignment could absorb, or a strain on strategic autonomy itself?<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Tariff escalation and India\u2019s restraint<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Date<\/th>\n<th>Measure<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">2 Apr 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Executive Order 14257<\/span> set a baseline <span class=\"n-term\">10%<\/span> reciprocal tariff; steel and aluminium duties rose to <span class=\"n-term\">50%<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Aug 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A <span class=\"n-term\">25%<\/span> reciprocal tariff on Indian goods took effect.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">6 Aug 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">EO 14329<\/span> added a <span class=\"n-term\">25%<\/span> penalty over Russian oil (effective 27 August), reaching the <span class=\"n-term\">50%<\/span> cumulative rate. It was the first US <span class=\"n-term\">\u201csecondary tariff\u201d<\/span> \u2014 penalising one country for its trade with another.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Legal basis<\/span> \u2014 the penalty invoked <span class=\"n-term\">IEEPA<\/span> and a \u201cnational emergency\u201d first declared in EO 14066 (2022). EO 14329 found India \u201cdirectly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s rebuttal<\/span> \u2014 the MEA (6 August 2025) called the tariffs <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cunfair, unjustified and unreasonable\u201d<\/span> and framed oil imports as energy security for 1.4 billion people. India did <span class=\"n-term\">not retaliate<\/span>, and issued no further statement after the second tariff round.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The February 2026 settlement \u2014 contested and unfinished<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">2 Feb 2026<\/span> \u2014 Trump and Modi announced a framework for an <span class=\"n-term\">Interim Agreement<\/span>; the reciprocal rate was cut to <span class=\"n-term\">18%<\/span> from the 50% peak, and India signalled intent to buy <span class=\"n-term\">$500 billion<\/span> of US goods over five years. An executive order of 6 February 2026 removed the Russian-oil penalty, effective 7 February.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Joint Statement carried no explicit Indian commitment on Russian oil<\/span>, even as Washington claimed one.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">20 Feb 2026<\/span> \u2014 the <span class=\"n-term\">US Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA \u201creciprocal\u201d tariff authority<\/span>. On 24 February the US imposed a temporary <span class=\"n-term\">10% blanket tariff<\/span> on all partners for 150 days, expiring 24 July 2026. As of mid-2026 the interim pact remained unsigned. Modi and Trump met at the <span class=\"n-term\">G7 in France on 17 June 2026<\/span>, their first meeting in over a year.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The hemispheric turn \u2014 NSS 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">National Security Strategy<\/span> (December 2025) named the <span class=\"n-term\">Western Hemisphere<\/span> the top priority and America\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cstrategic rear\u201d<\/span>, reviving the <span class=\"n-term\">Monroe Doctrine<\/span> through a <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cTrump Corollary\u201d<\/span>; US actions over Venezuela and Greenland followed.<\/li>\n<li>India was named <span class=\"n-term\">four times<\/span> \u2014 against seven in 2022 and eight in 2017 \u2014 described as a Quad partner for balancing China. The <span class=\"n-term\">2026 National Defense Strategy made no mention of India or the Quad<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s diversification<\/span> \u2014 a trade agreement with the United Kingdom (July 2025); an FTA with the European Union announced (January 2026) alongside a security and defence partnership with the EU; Modi at the SCO summit (September 2025); Putin in Delhi (December 2025); and a renewed <span class=\"n-term\">ten-year India\u2013US defence framework<\/span> (October 2025).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The argument \u2014 autonomy eroded or vindicated?<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shoumitro Chatterjee<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The episode proves that India\u2019s post-2017 inward turn had raised the cost of relying on the home market.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Konark Bhandari<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s response was <span class=\"n-term\">tactical altruism<\/span> \u2014 offering concessions without demanding an immediate return.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Elizabeth Threlkeld, Daniel Markey<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Akriti Vasudeva Kalyankar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The long standoff let China, Russia, Pakistan and Europe each gain ground.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India absorbed the pressure, kept growing, and reached what they call <span class=\"n-term\">greater parity<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Equidistance can read as disengagement, leaving India short of <span class=\"n-term\">strategic indispensability<\/span>; the prescription is a more proactive, less passive autonomy.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Milan Vaishnav<\/span> and co-authors<\/td>\n<td>Tactical adjustment rather than strategic rupture \u2014 the volatility of Trump 2.0 confirmed the value of spreading India\u2019s bets.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nivedita Kapoor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trump 2.0 <span class=\"n-term\">strengthened<\/span> rather than weakened the logic of the India\u2013Russia partnership.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sujan R. Chinoy<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A break with the post-1945 UN order and a return to sovereignty-first Westphalian thinking, capped by US primacy; India\u2019s four mentions signal a transactional tone, not a real fall in importance.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajeesh Kumar<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Tracks the hemispheric rise across the 2017, 2022 and 2025 strategies to the rank of America\u2019s strategic rear.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rachel Rizzo<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Vivek Mishra<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-lab\">Burden-shifting<\/span> \u2014 the strategy expects partners to carry regional security themselves, placing new weight on India in the Indo-Pacific while also opening space for a larger Indian role.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Trump\u2019s appetite for a deal with Beijing revived New Delhi\u2019s fear of a <span class=\"n-term\">US\u2013China condominium<\/span>; Trump 2.0 did not change the structural logic of India\u2019s China policy, but complicated the ground on which it runs.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIndia\u2019s response to Trump 2.0 has been characterized less by strategic rupture than by tactical adjustment.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Milan Vaishnav (ed.), Carnegie Endowment<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe key lesson for India from the recent downturn in relations with the United States is that it needs to develop a more proactive rather than passive approach towards its strategic autonomy.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Chietigj Bajpaee<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"india-israel\">India \u00b7 Israel<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Overview<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A deep, expanding partnership built on shared democracy and pluralism and two knowledge-based economies.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Michael Walzer<\/span>, in <em>The Paradox of Liberation<\/em> (2015), observes that both India and Israel underwent similar transitions \u2014 beginning with secular nationalist movements that later gave way to religiously influenced ideologies.<\/li>\n<li>The 30th anniversary of full ties (from 1992) was marked with a commemorative logo pairing the Star of David and the Ashoka Chakra.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Evolution of India\u2019s approach<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India recognised Israel in 1950 and allowed a Mumbai consulate, but withheld full ties until 1992 (established under <span class=\"n-sch\">P.V. Narasimha Rao<\/span>), given anti-colonial alignment and Arab ties.<\/li>\n<li>Shift markers: President Pranab Mukherjee\u2019s 2015 visit; Modi\u2019s 2017 visit (the first by an Indian PM); Netanyahu\u2019s reciprocal 2018 visit \u2192 widening the relationship beyond military cooperation into economy and technology.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Cooperation and divergence<\/span><\/p>\n<p><em>Sectors of cooperation<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Energy<\/span> \u2014 Israel\u2019s Mediterranean gas reserves.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Space<\/span> \u2014 India has launched Israeli spy satellites; the alignment of Israel\u2019s Beresheet and India\u2019s Chandrayaan-2 programmes.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Defence<\/span> \u2014 Spyder missile, Barak-8, AWACS.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Intelligence<\/span> \u2014 RAW\u2013Mossad counter-terrorism cooperation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Agriculture<\/span> \u2014 dryland-farming and drip-irrigation know-how; 27 Centres of Excellence across 21 Indian states.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>Points of divergence<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">Palestinian issue<\/span> \u2014 support for self-determination and a two-state solution; UN votes critical of Israeli settlements (2016, 2018).<\/li>\n<li>Continued dealings with <span class=\"n-term\">Iran<\/span> and resistance to US-backed sanctions.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Posture<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s stress on peaceful coexistence and non-interference vs a more aggressive security posture (India sought a ceasefire in the 2014 Gaza conflict).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Domestic politics<\/span> \u2014 since the 1920s Khilafat movement, some nationalist opinion has read Palestine through an Islamic prism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>On Barak-8, its success has \u201cemboldened the hopes \u2026 of both these countries in the field of defense research.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Deeksha Singh<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Current \u2014 the Special Strategic Partnership &amp; Sudarshan Chakra<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Ties were elevated to a <span class=\"n-term\">Special Strategic Partnership<\/span> on 26 February 2026. India\u2019s planned air-defence shield, <span class=\"n-term\">Mission Sudarshan Chakra<\/span> (announced 15 August 2025, with a 2035 target), draws on Israeli systems \u2014 MRSAM, SPYDER, Harop, Rampage and the Phalcon AWACS (<span class=\"n-sch\">Sukhbir Kaur Minhas<\/span>, MP-IDSA); <span class=\"n-sch\">Kabir Taneja<\/span> likens Israel to a one-stop shop for advanced military technology.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Gaza ceiling<\/span> \u2014 the convergence still has limits. Taneja reports that even Israel\u2019s admirers in India recoiled at the scale of destruction in Gaza and that New Delhi has privately conveyed concern; India declined Israeli requests to ban Hamas, citing legal grounds and a large domestic Muslim population.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The Israel\u2013Lebanon front<\/span> \u2014 a November 2024 ceasefire followed the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah\u2019s retreat north of the Litani; a US-brokered Framework Agreement in June 2026 opened the first direct Israel\u2013Lebanon talks since 1983.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Beyond defence \u2014 connectivity and geo-economics<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">IMEC<\/span> links India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel \u2014 rail, road, port, energy and data \u2014 bypassing Suez as an alternative to the Belt and Road.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">I2U2<\/span> (India, Israel, UAE, US) broadens cooperation to water, energy, transport, space, health and food security. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sameena Hameed<\/span> reads I2U2 and IMEC together as India\u2019s shift from bilateral dealings to minilateral connectivity.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s acquisition of <span class=\"n-term\">Haifa Port<\/span> gives a logistics foothold on IMEC\u2019s Mediterranean end; Indian firms now run the Haifa container terminal once managed by China.<\/li>\n<li>Trade climbed from US$200 million (1992) to US$4.82 billion \u2014 India Israel\u2019s seventh-largest trading partner and third-largest in Asia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-lab\">Assessment<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>Israel is \u201cin many ways as perhaps our most trusted and innovative partner.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar (2021)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>A \u201cmarriage made in heaven being implemented here on Earth.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Benjamin Netanyahu<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The idea of <span class=\"n-term\">I2T2<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s talent and Israel\u2019s technology \u2014 points to its future orientation; Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam in India mirrors \u2018Tikun Olam\u2019 (\u201cheal the world\u201d) in Israel. <span class=\"n-sch\">Kanchi Gupta<\/span> cautions that India will not abandon its traditional support for Palestinian statehood \u2014 domestic politics and ideology still shape the policy.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2020 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Identify the key sectors of cooperation between India and Israel since 2014. Examine their significance in strengthening the bilateral ties between the two countries.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/identify-the-key-sectors-of-cooperation-between-india-and-israel-upsc-psir-2020-5003\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2022 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">How does India-Israel bilateral ties reflect the autonomy of India\u2019s foreign policy choices?<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/how-does-india-israel-bilateral-ties-reflect-the-autonomy-of-upsc-psir-2022-5004\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/afghanistan-iraq-and-west-asia\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia<\/b><\/a><a class=\"r\" href=\"\/psir\/notes\/vision-of-a-new-world-order\/\"><em>Next<\/em><b>Vision of a new world order<\/b><\/a><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#growing-relations-with-the-united-states\">Growing Relations with the United States<\/a><a href=\"#relations-in-the-modi-years\">Relations in the Modi Years<\/a><a href=\"#trump-2-0-tariffs-repair-and-the-hemispheric-turn\">Trump 2.0 \u2014 Tariffs, Repair and the Hemispheric Turn<\/a><a href=\"#india-israel\">India \u00b7 Israel<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Growing relations with US and Israel for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Growing relations with US and Israel Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Growing<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.8.2","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"8","fx_note_desc":"Growing relations with US and Israel for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Growing relations with US and Israel Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Growing","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3601","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3601","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3601\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3783,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3601\/revisions\/3783"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3601"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}