{"id":3602,"date":"2026-08-11T22:12:16","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T16:42:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/vision-of-a-new-world-order\/"},"modified":"2026-08-12T02:56:53","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T21:26:53","slug":"vision-of-a-new-world-order","status":"publish","type":"psir_note","link":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/notes\/vision-of-a-new-world-order\/","title":{"rendered":"Vision of a new world order"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"n-wrap\">\n<div class=\"n-shell\">\n<div class=\"n-crumb\"><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/\">PSIR Notes<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><a href=\"\/psir\/psir-notes\/#ii-b\">II-B India and the World<\/a><span class=\"sep\">\u203a<\/span><span>Vision of a new world order<\/span><\/div>\n<header class=\"n-head\">\n<div class=\"n-eyebrow\">Paper I \u00b7 India and the World<\/div>\n<h1 class=\"n-title\">Vision of a new world order<\/h1>\n<div class=\"n-syl\"><b>Syllabus \u00b7 Paper II-B \u00b7 8<\/b> \u2014 Recent developments in Indian Foreign Policy : India\u2019s position on the recent crises in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Isreal; <span class=\"cur\">Vision of a new world order<\/span>.<\/div>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"n-grid\">\n  <main class=\"n-body\"><\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-vision-of-a-new-world-order\">The vision of a new world order<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Concept and evolution<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The term \u201cnew world order\u201d gained prominence after President George H.W. Bush\u2019s 1991 speech advocating a system governed by the rule of law.<\/li>\n<li>The trajectory: Westphalian multipolarity \u2192 Cold War bipolarity \u2192 post-Cold War unipolarity.<\/li>\n<li>The world is now at a critical juncture, with the Indo-Pacific and Asia \u2014 the \u201cAsian Century\u201d \u2014 as the pivot, and the US facing rising challenges from Asian powers.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">From Westphalia to the Asian Century.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">Westphalian<\/span> (Multipolarity of sovereign states) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Cold War<\/span> (Bipolarity: US vs USSR) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Post-Cold War<\/span> (US unipolarity) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">Emerging<\/span> (Multipolarity \u2014 the Asian Century)<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s vision \u2014 multipolarity and multi-alignment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A multipolar world reflecting India\u2019s pluralistic, tolerant heritage \u2014 contrasting with China\u2019s \u201cMiddle Kingdom\u201d perspective \u2014 aiming to expand strategic space without a new hegemon or bipolar system.<\/li>\n<li>Rooted in <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span> (manoeuvrability), <span class=\"n-term\">diverse interests<\/span> (many partners) and <span class=\"n-term\">countering hegemony<\/span> (countervailing coalitions).<\/li>\n<li>Scholars: <span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> urges proactive engagement and active roles in international organisations as traditional powers decline; <span class=\"n-sch\">Veena Kukreja<\/span> sees an assertive India seizing the opening left by the end of US unipolarity; <span class=\"n-sch\">Barry Buzan<\/span> describes a \u201crise of the rest\u201d diffusing power; <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> traces the shift from non-alignment to multi-alignment; <span class=\"n-sch\">Avinash Kumar<\/span> backs multipolarity to democratise international relations; <span class=\"n-sch\">Sumit Ganguly<\/span> examines the balance between strategic independence and active diplomacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic autonomy \u2014 Nehru to Modi<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic autonomy<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Freedom to choose partners and positions by interest, not bloc loyalty \u2014 recast by S. Jaishankar from the \u201cchoice of inaction\u201d into the \u201cchoice of action.\u201d<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Vijay Gokhale<\/span> grounds autonomy in an issue-based approach rather than ideological non-alignment.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">India and Russia:<\/span> ties from April 1947; non-interference as a constant \u2014 Russian silence on Chumar, Doklam and Galwan; India\u2019s neutrality on Crimea and Ukraine. Post-2022, India became the second-largest importer of Russian oil, with almost a 600% trade rise. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> reads the Ukraine war as the most serious test of India\u2019s autonomy under Modi.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The five pillars of the India\u2013Russia partnership:<\/span> Strategic alignment \u00b7 Economic development \u00b7 Defence cooperation \u00b7 Science &amp; technology \u00b7 Cultural exchange<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic autonomy, redefined<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>CHOICE OF INACTION<\/th>\n<th>CHOICE OF ACTION<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Non-alignment as caution \u2014 standing apart from blocs<\/td>\n<td>Multi-alignment \u2014 issue-based coalitions, engaged on all sides<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span> \u00b7 NAM \u00b7 strategic restraint<\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Jaishankar<\/span> \u00b7 <span class=\"n-term\">Gokhale<\/span> \u00b7 QUAD \u00b7 SCO \u00b7 BRICS<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 20m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-\u00e0-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US\u2019 offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-continues-to-invoke-its-time-tested-policy-of-strategic-upsc-psir-2025-5007\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Contribution \u2014 G20, culture, connectivity<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Cultural heritage \u2014 multiculturalism, pluralism, tolerance, cosmopolitanism \u2014 as India\u2019s distinctive asset in shaping an inclusive order, to be matched by unity and inclusivity at home.<\/li>\n<li>Modi at the World Economic Forum (India as a \u201cchampion of liberal international order\u201d), at the Shangri-La Dialogue (clarity on the Indo-Pacific), drawing on Lothal (ancient trade) and Buddhism (peace).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">G20 Presidency (2023):<\/span> the theme \u201cOne Earth, One Family, One Future\u201d (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam). Achievements: inclusion of the African Union; the Global Biofuels Alliance (with the US and Brazil); digital-economy and cybersecurity frameworks; a pledge to triple renewable capacity by 2030; and IMEC as a counter to the Belt and Road.<\/li>\n<li>The stated ambition: India moving from a mere \u201cbalancer\u201d to a \u201cleading state.\u201d<\/li>\n<li>Analysts: <span class=\"n-sch\">Chietigj Bajpaee<\/span> \u2014 India \u201csees itself as a bridge between the West and the Global South\u201d; <span class=\"n-sch\">Ume Farwa<\/span> traces autonomy from Nehru\u2019s non-alignment to Modi\u2019s realpolitik, warning of a China \u201csecurity dilemma\u201d and a \u201clack of real partners\u201d; <span class=\"n-sch\">Purnendra Jain<\/span> \u2014 India \u201caims to be a leading power,\u201d convening Voice of Global South summits.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">A multipolar world and a multipolar Asia<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>India envisions a multipolar Asia of shared regional leadership, reasoning that China\u2019s rise is unbalancing the regional structure and eroding India\u2019s choices.<\/li>\n<li>The essence rests on an equal distribution of power and responsibility (the AIIB, an expanded SCO and the NDB illustrate China\u2019s stature).<\/li>\n<li>Three elements: the diffusion of power interlinks Asian \u2014 especially Indian \u2014 security with global security and strengthens India at the UNSC; major and minor powers must share collective decision-making; and inclusivity, not exclusivity, should leave space for an external power like the US. In Asia, India promotes \u201cshared leadership\u201d among India, China and Japan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-and-the-emerging-world-order\">India and the Emerging World Order<\/h3>\n<p>India has traditionally supported a <span class=\"n-term\">multipolar order<\/span> over a bipolar or unipolar one, underpinned by international law and respect for sovereignty (<span class=\"n-sch\">H. V. Shringla<\/span>, CICA, 2021).<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Why the preference<\/span> \u2014 unease with balance-of-power games and arms races, and a civilisational self-image as a moral power unwilling to play second fiddle. India practises <span class=\"n-term\">contingent balancing<\/span> (<span class=\"n-sch\">Pratap Bhanu Mehta<\/span>) \u2014 reaching out to the USA after 1962, signing the 1971 treaty with the USSR when interests required.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Determinants of engagement<\/span> \u2014 primacy, though contested, in South Asia and SAARC; the rise of China and the Indo-Pacific; energy and trade interests in ASEAN, West Asia and Central Asia; growing reach into Africa and Latin America.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The vision<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span> and flexibility: multiple cooperative partnerships rather than binding alliances. A multipolar order would normalise such complexity and keep India out of any single power\u2019s sphere (<span class=\"n-sch\">Ummu Salma Bava<\/span>).<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">India\u2019s role<\/span> \u2014 pressing for fair representation and UN Security Council reform; using its IT-driven economy and young workforce; positioning itself as a responsible nuclear power. <span class=\"n-sch\">P. R. Shankar<\/span> sees a rising India, drawing on its non-alignment experience, as a potential <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cbridge and balancing\u201d<\/span> third pole between the USA and China.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">The framing to write<\/span> \u2014 non-alignment has matured into <span class=\"n-term\">strategic autonomy<\/span>: India seeks engagement with all major players in an interdependent world, working through \u201cshifting and variable coalitions rather than settled alliances\u201d (<span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span>; <em>Non-Alignment 2.0<\/em>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-place-in-the-emerging-order\">India\u2019s Place in the Emerging Order<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Devin T. Hagerty<\/span> \u2192 world politics is in transition from bipolarity to a new, as yet indeterminate order; the <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018unipolar moment\u2019<\/span> is giving way. Two futures: a <span class=\"n-term\">new bipolarity<\/span> (US and China atop the great-power hierarchy), or a <span class=\"n-term\">re-emergence of multipolarity<\/span> \u2014 historically the most common configuration \u2014 with BRICS states along with Germany, Japan and Turkey as potential poles.<\/li>\n<li>States vary on a continuum from <span class=\"n-term\">status quo<\/span> to <span class=\"n-term\">revisionist<\/span>. China\u2019s place on it is among the liveliest debates in international affairs; its projection of a <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018peaceful rise\u2019<\/span> expresses the aspiration to become a world power without threatening the US-led order, and to appear a responsible \u2018stakeholder\u2019.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Gilpin<\/span> \u2192 as new states climb the great-power hierarchy they eventually try to alter existing rules and norms \u2014 rules created by other, now declining, great powers for their own purposes. Aspiring great powers try to reshape prevailing norms to suit their interests, which can spark instability.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Scholar readings of the five relationships<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>On<\/th>\n<th>Reading<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Brahma Chellaney<\/span><\/td>\n<td>United States<\/td>\n<td>Grown from strategic partnership to a comprehensive global partnership \u2014 defence, trade, technology.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span><\/td>\n<td>China<\/td>\n<td>Deep economic ties coexist with geopolitical tension along the border; India balances economic engagement with cautious defence posturing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span><\/td>\n<td>European Union<\/td>\n<td>A critical partner in global governance reform, climate change and terrorism.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sreeram Chaulia<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Russia<\/td>\n<td>Defence technology and energy keep the relationship substantial despite shifting global alignments.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Sachin Chaturvedi<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Emerging economies<\/td>\n<td>The IBSA Dialogue Forum illustrates India\u2019s strategy of building collective influence among developing countries for a more inclusive global order.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-indian-ocean-statecraft-sagar-to-mahasagar\">India\u2019s Indian Ocean Statecraft \u2014 SAGAR to MAHASAGAR<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">SAGAR<\/span> (Security and Growth for All in the Region) was launched by PM Modi in <span class=\"n-term\">Mauritius in 2015<\/span>; it was expanded to <span class=\"n-term\">MAHASAGAR<\/span>, announced in Mauritius on <span class=\"n-term\">12 March 2025<\/span>, resting on trade for development, capacity building and mutual security.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Pooja Bhatt<\/span> \u2192 records real gains in maritime awareness, disaster relief and naval diplomacy, but finds the agenda under-institutionalised \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cmore of a guiding strategic vision than an operational policy\u201d<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Colombo Security Conclave<\/span> \u2014 an India-led Indian Ocean group whose five pillars include maritime security, counter-terrorism and disaster relief. It reached <span class=\"n-term\">six members<\/span> after Seychelles acceded at the 7th NSA meeting, New Delhi, November 2025, chaired by Ajit Doval. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy<\/span> tie its revival to the China factor and to India\u2019s role as regional <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cfirst responder\u201d<\/span>. Both MAHASAGAR and the Conclave present an inclusive alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Voice of Global South Summit<\/span> \u2014 first hosted virtually by India in <span class=\"n-term\">January 2023<\/span> on the theme \u201cUnity of Voice, Unity of Purpose\u201d, with <span class=\"n-term\">125 countries<\/span> taking part, timed ahead of India\u2019s 2023 G20 presidency. <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> reads it as statecraft rather than a revival of non-alignment: Delhi shunned the anti-Western tone of past summits, and the outreach complements rather than works against India\u2019s partnerships with the United States and Europe.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIt shall encompass the ideas of trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth, and mutual security for a shared future.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Narendra Modi on MAHASAGAR, Mauritius, 12 March 2025<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-idea-of-the-asian-century\">The Idea of the Asian Century<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The idea argues that the twenty-first century international order will be defined by <span class=\"n-term\">Asia\u2019s pre-eminence<\/span>, the way American pre-eminence defined the twentieth century and Europe the nineteenth. It is also seen as Asian countries\u2019 mutual rediscovery through reconnection and reintegration, repairing artificial divisions in Asian social, economic and cultural space created by colonial intervention.<\/li>\n<li>It appeared in the early 1990s as the world began sensing Asia\u2019s economic resurgence, facilitated by the end of the Cold War. With the growth of Asian economies, mainly China\u2019s, the share of the United States fell, leading to relative decline. After the <span class=\"n-term\">2008 global recession<\/span>, during which the Chinese economy helped stabilise the world economy, the idea gained further traction, powered by China\u2019s rise and recognition of India\u2019s progress and long-term potential.<\/li>\n<li>India and China are <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018twin engines\u2019<\/span> of the Asian Century, in geopolitical and geo-economic terms, by virtue of their geographic, demographic, economic and military profiles. The quality of no two other Asian countries\u2019 bilateral relations will be as critical to its realisation.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Challenges come more from within Asia than from outside.<\/span> China should realise that most parts of Asia show promise for growth and are interconnected; the Asian Century is not China\u2019s century alone, and its essence lies in <span class=\"n-term\">multipolar Asia<\/span>. China\u2019s conduct toward its neighbours should be more inspiring and accommodating of their rise. China\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">\u2018Asia for Asians\u2019<\/span> slogan has an exclusionary tone. The Asian Century is not about isolating Asia from the wider world, nor is it a formula to project China\u2019s leadership.<\/li>\n<li>Chinese aggression, particularly in the post-COVID order, has swept away hopes for a peaceful and cooperative Asian order. The two countries imagined as joint leaders have been locked in military conflict at their border. The hostility has spilled beyond the bilateral relationship into South Asia: as South Asian states carve their own path amid the competition, regional dynamics become geopolitical events \u2014 the Chinese ship <span class=\"n-term\">Yuan Wang 5<\/span> docking at Sri Lanka\u2019s <span class=\"n-term\">Hambantota<\/span> port, described by China as a research vessel while India raised security concerns, presented Sri Lanka with a difficult choice.<\/li>\n<li>A South Asia already carrying deep fissures along lines of migration, citizenship and religion continues to witness increasing hostility between the two Asian giants, and moves by either or both to woo or antagonise South Asian countries will not augur well for Asia as a whole.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Evidence against feasibility<\/span> \u2014 the border conflict since 2020; the breakdown of the 1988 consensus; <span class=\"n-sch\">Shashi Tharoor<\/span>\u2019s \u201ccold peace\u201d turned colder; a trade deficit of about <span class=\"n-term\">US$ 92 billion in 2024<\/span> and Indian dependence on Chinese inputs.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Structural obstacle<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Samir Saran<\/span>: China treats multipolarity as good for the world but not for Asia; \u201cOne mountain cannot contain two tigers\u201d. <span class=\"n-term\">Worldview obstacle<\/span> \u2014 <span class=\"n-sch\">Shyam Saran<\/span> on the Middle Kingdom complex against the Indian conception of <em>Bharatvarsha<\/em>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Evidence for continued feasibility<\/span> \u2014 BRICS, the SCO, the AIIB, RIC, BASIC, the COP26 alignment on coal phase-down, and trade that has kept growing despite tensions. The economic case survives; the political case depends on whether Asia\u2019s two largest powers can convert coexistence into cooperation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"india-and-other-emerging-powers\">India and Other Emerging Powers<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>India\u2019s interactions with other emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa reflect a commitment to <span class=\"n-term\">South-South cooperation<\/span>. <span class=\"n-sch\">Sachin Chaturvedi<\/span> \u2192 the <span class=\"n-term\">IBSA Dialogue Forum<\/span> illustrates India\u2019s strategy of building collective influence among developing countries to advocate a more inclusive global order.<\/li>\n<li>The <span class=\"n-term\">BRICS<\/span> countries increasingly assert influence in international finance and economic governance, seeking reform in the <span class=\"n-term\">World Bank<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">IMF<\/span>, and have created the <span class=\"n-term\">New Development Bank<\/span> and the <span class=\"n-term\">Contingency Reserve Arrangement<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>On climate, India works with Brazil, South Africa and China through <span class=\"n-term\">BASIC<\/span> and with the <span class=\"n-term\">Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>South Africa, like India, abstained at the UN on Ukraine and refused to join sanctions, on the ground that they were unilateral and imposed without UN approval \u2014 evidence that the developing-country position on the war was not an Indian peculiarity.<\/li>\n<li>India\u2019s newer trade architecture with emerging and middle powers includes agreements concluded with Australia and the UAE, and negotiations sought with the European Union, the United Kingdom and Canada.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">IBSA\u2019s four objectives<\/span> \u2014 reform of global governance, pursued alongside BRICS demands for change in the World Bank and the IMF; South-South cooperation, extending the logic India applies in BASIC and the LMDC; coalition-building on trade, pressing developed nations on their Doha Development Agenda commitments; and support for UNSC reform, complementary to India\u2019s G4 track with Japan.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Value for India<\/span> \u2014 three large democracies of three different continents, all outside the Western alliance system; a forum where India is not the junior partner, unlike groupings that include China, and one that carries no alliance obligation. <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 India must manage multiple simultaneous arrangements, from BRICS to the Quad, and IBSA is part of that portfolio rather than an alternative to it.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">BRICS and the SCO \u2014 the 2025 summits<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Forum<\/th>\n<th>Outcome<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">17th BRICS Summit<\/span> Rio de Janeiro, 6\u20137 July 2025<\/td>\n<td>Theme \u201cStrengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance\u201d. <span class=\"n-term\">Rio Declaration<\/span> adopted; India confirmed as <span class=\"n-term\">2026 chair<\/span>; separate leaders\u2019 statements on climate finance and AI governance. Xi Jinping was absent in person \u2014 his first BRICS summit as leader to miss; Putin joined only virtually owing to an ICC arrest warrant.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">25th SCO Summit<\/span> Tianjin, 31 Aug\u20131 Sept 2025<\/td>\n<td>The largest summit in SCO history. <span class=\"n-term\">Tianjin Declaration<\/span> adopted, with an <span class=\"n-term\">SCO Development Strategy to 2035<\/span> and a call for a \u201cmore just, equitable and representative multipolar world order\u201d. The Declaration condemned the <span class=\"n-term\">Pahalgam<\/span> attack; <span class=\"n-term\">India did not join the paragraph reaffirming the Belt and Road Initiative<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Membership, 2025<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Ten active full members \u2014 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, plus Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE (2024) and <span class=\"n-term\">Indonesia<\/span> (January 2025). Saudi Arabia, invited in 2023, has neither accepted nor declined. Ten <span class=\"n-term\">partner countries<\/span> were created at Kazan 2024.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s 2026 chairship<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Assumed <span class=\"n-term\">1 January 2026<\/span> \u2014 India\u2019s fourth turn after 2012, 2016 and 2021. Theme \u201cBuilding for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability\u201d; the <span class=\"n-term\">18th Leaders\u2019 Summit<\/span> is set for New Delhi, <span class=\"n-term\">12\u201313 September 2026<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">India\u2019s proposals<\/span><\/td>\n<td>At Rio \u2014 demand-driven NDB lending, a science and research repository, secure critical-mineral supply chains and responsible AI. At Tianjin \u2014 three pillars: <span class=\"n-term\">Security, Connectivity and Opportunity (S\u2013C\u2013O)<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Financial institutions<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">New Development Bank<\/span> (2015): over <span class=\"n-term\">US$30 billion<\/span> disbursed under President Dilma Rousseff, expanding local-currency financing. <span class=\"n-term\">Contingent Reserve Arrangement<\/span> (2014): a <span class=\"n-term\">US$100 billion<\/span> pool for balance-of-payments support, <span class=\"n-term\">never activated<\/span>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">US pressure<\/span><\/td>\n<td>November 2024 and February 2025 \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">100%<\/span> tariffs threatened if BRICS created a common currency or moved to replace the dollar. 6 July 2025 \u2014 an additional <span class=\"n-term\">10%<\/span> tariff threatened on any country \u201caligning\u201d with the \u201canti-American policies\u201d of BRICS.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Internal strain, 2026<\/span><\/td>\n<td>BRICS foreign ministers meeting in New Delhi in <span class=\"n-term\">May 2026<\/span> failed to agree a full joint statement; the split centred on the West Asia crisis, with Iran and the UAE openly at odds.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Expansion, revisionism and the polarity dispute<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Ashley J. Tellis<\/span> \u2192 India values the group as a <span class=\"n-term\">status stage<\/span>, a lever for multipolarity and a route to Global South leadership; India and Brazil actively resist the anti-Western turn that Moscow and Beijing want, and multi-alignment is India\u2019s steadiest foundation in a disordered system.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Oliver Stuenkel<\/span> \u2192 membership is insurance against diplomatic isolation and a way to manage the rise of China. <span class=\"n-sch\">Tha\u00eds D\u00f3ria<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Gustavo de Carvalho<\/span> \u2192 ten members strain a consensus model designed for five; they count more than <span class=\"n-term\">180 cooperation mechanisms<\/span>, weak institutional memory and an over-stretched rotating chair, and judge that <span class=\"n-term\">consolidation, not further expansion<\/span>, should now take priority.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Alexander Gabuev<\/span> \u2192 the Kremlin treats BRICS as the base for a post-American order and a shield against sanctions. <span class=\"n-sch\">Tong Zhao<\/span> \u2192 for Beijing it is a bridge to reshape global rules, working beside the BRI and the SCO. <span class=\"n-sch\">Mihaela Papa<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Zhen Han<\/span> \u2192 BRICS restrains US power on some issues while cooperating on others \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">anti-hegemonic without seeking a clean break<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Is the order actually multipolar?<\/span> <span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Rajagopalan<\/span> \u2192 the system is <span class=\"n-term\">bipolar<\/span>: only the US and China hold first-rank power, and reading multipolarity as reality is a costly Indian illusion. <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> \u2192 the multipolar idea persists in Indian thinking even as a bipolar order forms, while official Delhi adapts nimbly in practice. <span class=\"n-sch\">Amitav Acharya<\/span> \u2192 the coming order is <span class=\"n-term\">multiplex<\/span> \u2014 post-Western and decentred, with many actors and no single dominant power, bloc or ideology.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Substance or stagecraft?<\/span> Papa and Han read the NDB and the CRA as genuine <span class=\"n-term\">institutional balancing<\/span>, while noting the reserve pool has never been drawn and the bank borrows in dollars. On the SCO, <span class=\"n-sch\">Sujan R. Chinoy<\/span> holds the forum is largely China-driven yet India\u2019s presence checks an anti-Western drift; <span class=\"n-sch\">Jason Wahlang<\/span> adds that India\u2019s position outside the BRI limits its gains from SCO economic projects.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> \u2192 enlargement has imported regional rivalries and weakened cohesion, though India\u2019s chairship holds the group to a development agenda rather than open fragmentation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cConnectivity that by-passes sovereignty, ultimately loses both trust and meaning.\u201d<\/em> \u2014 <span class=\"n-term\">Narendra Modi, 25th SCO Summit, Tianjin, 1 September 2025<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThe sooner India gives up its fantasies about multipolarity, the better.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rajesh Rajagopalan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cthe myth of multipolarity endures in Indian foreign policy discourse even as a bipolar world takes shape.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>C. Raja Mohan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"the-balancing-vocabulary-how-scholars-classify-india-s-condu\">The Balancing Vocabulary \u2014 how scholars classify India\u2019s conduct<\/h3>\n<div class=\"n-tw\">\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Concept<\/th>\n<th>Scholar<\/th>\n<th>Content<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Soft balancing<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Robert Pape<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">T.V. Paul<\/span>; applied by <span class=\"n-sch\">Ian Hall<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Mihaela Papa<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Zhen Han<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Restraining a state through international institutions, concerted diplomacy via limited informal ententes, and economic measures rather than arms. Hall applies it to India\u2019s use of the RIC, BRICS, SCO and IBSA to constrain China; Papa and Han to BRICS as a whole.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Zone balancing<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Arzan Tarapore<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Building the capacity and resilience of other regional states to limit China\u2019s influence, without alliance commitments \u2014 no substitute for internal or external balancing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Limited hard balancing<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Jivanta Schottli<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Post-Galwan India sustains a measured hard balancing of China as part of its bid to preserve strategic autonomy \u2014 distinct from the hedging that characterised the non-aligned era.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Evasive balancing<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Rajesh Rajagopalan<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Mixing balancing with reassurance satisfies neither China nor India\u2019s partners.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Hedging<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Cheng-Chwee Kuik<\/span>; <span class=\"n-sch\">Rahul Pandey<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Insurance-seeking alignment under high uncertainty and high stakes \u2014 active neutrality, inclusive diversification and adaptive offsets; Pandey applies it to India\u2019s simultaneous engagement with the West, China and Russia.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Offshore balancing<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">John Mearsheimer<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Stephen M. Walt<\/span>; traced in the 2025 NSS by <span class=\"n-sch\">Jake Werner<\/span><\/td>\n<td>Washington forgoes remaking other societies and concentrates on preserving dominance in the Western Hemisphere while countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Spheres of influence<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Stewart Patrick<\/span>, citing <span class=\"n-sch\">Hal Brands<\/span>; <span class=\"n-sch\">Sarang Shidore<\/span><\/td>\n<td>The hemispheric turn as a revival of spheres-of-influence logic through an energised Monroe Doctrine; Shidore finds the same logic running implicitly through the NSS.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Institutional balancing<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Kai He<\/span>; applied by Papa and Han<\/td>\n<td>Setting rules and norms in multilateral institutions to maximise interests and constrain others \u2014 the NDB and CRA as exclusive institutional balancing.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Neorealism, relative gains<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Ali Emamifar<\/span>, <span class=\"n-sch\">Bahareh Sazmand<\/span> and <span class=\"n-sch\">Maziar Mozaffari Falarti<\/span><\/td>\n<td>India\u2019s move away from a weakened, China-leaning Russia read as relative-gains balancing against China and Pakistan.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><span class=\"n-term\">Multiplexity<\/span><\/td>\n<td><span class=\"n-sch\">Amitav Acharya<\/span><\/td>\n<td>A post-hegemonic order with no globally dominant country, bloc or ideology \u2014 neither conventional multipolarity nor US\u2013China bipolarity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cpost-Galwan India has sustained a level of limited hard balancing even as threat perceptions have subsided.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Jivanta Schottli, Asian Security (2026)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cIndia\u2019s evasive balancing strategy can neither balance China adequately nor accommodate it sufficiently.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rajesh Rajagopalan<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cNew Delhi is effectively hedging against the uncertainties of a fragmented global order\u2026 without becoming a subordinate ally to any one of them.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>Rahul Pandey, Valdai Discussion Club<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3 id=\"from-non-alignment-to-multi-alignment\">From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment<\/h3>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Non-Alignment 1.0 and 2.0 \u2014 what carries over<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Both are anti-violence, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial.<\/li>\n<li>Both aim to protect national interest \u2014 sovereignty and territorial integrity.<\/li>\n<li>Both reject formal military blocs and uphold an independent, autonomous foreign policy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">What changes<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1.0 \u2192 non-alignment from bloc politics; 2.0 \u2192 multiple alignment.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 emerged in the Cold War; 2.0 in the setting of globalization and liberalization.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 was largely <span class=\"n-sch\">Nehru<\/span>\u2019s personal initiative; 2.0 arose from the changing dynamics of a multipolar world.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 diluted ties with neighbours; 2.0 deepens them through <span class=\"n-term\">Act East<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">Link West<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>1.0 was strictly against military alignment; under 2.0 India has signed <span class=\"n-term\">LEMOA<\/span> and <span class=\"n-term\">COMCASA<\/span>, moving away from a purely Nehruvian posture.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">The Non-Alignment 2.0 document (2012)<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Framed by <span class=\"n-term\">twelve experts<\/span> on international relations, defence and foreign policy \u2192 a prescription for India\u2019s foreign and strategic policy over the following decade.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Objectives<\/span> \u2192 identify opportunities and challenges; enhance strategic autonomy while upholding liberal values; set out a comprehensive framework built on India\u2019s economic and security capabilities.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Key formulations<\/span> \u2192 \u201cstrategic autonomy has been the defining value\u201d since independence; the goal is \u201cto give India maximum options\u201d; and knowledge is \u201cthe field that is vital to defining national power in the twenty-first century.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-lab\">Criticism<\/span> \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">Bharat Karnad<\/span> calls it a regressive roadmap, faulting its overemphasis on ideational and moral influence and questioning the revival of non-alignment when material power drives international relations.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Strategic autonomy and multi-alignment<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Terminology \u2192 the phrase <span class=\"n-term\">\u201cNon-Aligned\u201d<\/span> was first used by <span class=\"n-sch\">V.K. Krishna Menon<\/span> at the UN General Assembly in <span class=\"n-term\">1953<\/span> and by <span class=\"n-sch\">Jawaharlal Nehru<\/span> in <span class=\"n-term\">1956<\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">S. Jaishankar<\/span> \u2192 non-alignment belonged to a specific era and context, but the independence of action within it remains a thread of continuity in Indian foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Multi-alignment<\/span> \u2192 engaging several powers at once on specific interests \u2014 defence, trade, technology \u2014 without a single alliance.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Nirupama Rao<\/span> \u2192 strategic autonomy is now driven by sustained economic growth, energy and maritime security, and access to technology and innovation, pursued through \u201cwell-rounded strategic relationships and partnerships with all the major powers.\u201d<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-sch\">Tanvi Madan<\/span> \u2192 India\u2019s NAM heritage still supplies diplomatic flexibility, letting it engage many states without binding itself to one bloc.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThis is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>S. Jaishankar (2020)<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Multi-alignment \u2014 many partnerships, one decision-maker.<\/span> <span class=\"n-term\">PARTNERSHIPS<\/span> (Quad \u00b7 BRICS \u00b7 SCO \u00b7 INSTC \u00b7 G20 activism \u00b7 defence and energy ties with Russia) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">STRATEGIC AUTONOMY<\/span> (issue-by-issue judgment; no single bloc) \u2192 <span class=\"n-term\">OUTCOMES<\/span> (maximum options \u00b7 Global South leadership \u00b7 \u201cVishwa Mitra\u201d). <em>Voice of Global South Summits \u00b7 Vaccine Maitri \u00b7 African Union into the G20 \u00b7 International Solar Alliance \u00b7 digital public infrastructure<\/em><\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"n-quote\">\n<p><em>\u201cThere is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interests. This is a bitter truth.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><cite>the Chanakya maxim invoked by India\u2019s strategic establishment<\/cite><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 1.0 against 2.0<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Shared ground \u2192 anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, protection of sovereignty, rejection of military blocs, an independent foreign policy.<\/li>\n<li>Divergence \u2192 1.0 sought distance from blocs; 2.0 seeks multiple, issue-based alignments.<\/li>\n<li>Instruments of 2.0 \u2192 LEMOA and COMCASA, Act East and Link West, and non-attendance at NAM summits mark the departure from Nehruvian practice.<\/li>\n<li>Scholarly framing \u2192 <span class=\"n-sch\">C. Raja Mohan<\/span> holds the old tenets less adequate today; <span class=\"n-sch\">Harsh V. Pant<\/span> argues India cannot be pigeonholed into a rigid non-aligned stance.<\/li>\n<li>Assessment \u2192 the grammar shifts from neutrality to engagement; the constant is autonomy in decision-making.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 debunked, or reinterpreted?<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-alignment was the cornerstone of Cold War diplomacy \u2192 autonomy through the avoidance of formal alliances.<\/li>\n<li>A de facto tilt toward the Soviet Union already qualified strict non-alignment, forced by the US posture toward Pakistan and China.<\/li>\n<li>The 1991 Soviet collapse and economic liberalization pushed a reorientation toward strategic autonomy and strategic partnerships.<\/li>\n<li>Multi-alignment reinforces autonomy by cultivating a diverse network of partnerships across the geopolitical spectrum.<\/li>\n<li>Continuity, not rupture \u2192 as at Bandung, India can still model a path for the Global South between US\u2013China confrontation.<\/li>\n<li>Assessment \u2192 \u201cdebunk\u201d overstates it; India has reinterpreted non-alignment as multi-alignment while keeping strategic autonomy intact.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span class=\"n-term\">Answer-frame \u2014 an alternative universality<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Non-Alignment 2.0 (2012) set out a framework for India\u2019s foreign and strategic policy, drawing on Nehruvian principles adapted to a multipolar world.<\/li>\n<li><span class=\"n-term\">Alternative universality<\/span> \u2192 India offering a model of order distinct from both Western liberal hegemony and rigid bloc politics.<\/li>\n<li>Strategic autonomy as the defining value \u2192 policy that gives India \u201cmaximum options\u201d while preserving the core of non-alignment.<\/li>\n<li>Emphasis on an open global order, deep economic engagement, and knowledge as the key to national power in the twenty-first century.<\/li>\n<li>A <span class=\"n-term\">polycentric order<\/span> \u2192 states coexisting and cooperating in networks rather than fixed alliances, which is what makes multi-alignment possible.<\/li>\n<li>Global South leadership \u2192 the Voice of Global South Summits and the African Union\u2019s entry into the G20 project this aspiration.<\/li>\n<li>Assessment \u2192 2.0 does frame India as a site of an alternative universality, but its credibility rests on converting convening power into concrete outcomes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2019 \u00b7 10m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Compare and contrast Non-Alignment 1.0 with Non-Alignment 2.0.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/compare-and-contrast-non-alignment-10-with-non-alignment-20-upsc-psir-2019-4003\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2024 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">\u201cIndia has, of late, chosen to debunk non-alignment in its pursuit of multi-alignment.\u201d Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/india-has-of-late-chosen-to-debunk-non-alignment-in-its-pursuit-upsc-psir-2024-4005\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<div class=\"n-pyq\"><span class=\"n-pyq-chip\">UPSC 2025 \u00b7 15m<\/span><span class=\"n-pyq-q\">Non-Alignment 2.0 underscores India\u2019s unique aspiration to emerge as a site for an alternative universality. Comment.<\/span><a class=\"n-pyq-a\" href=\"\/psir\/psir-pyq\/non-alignment-20-underscores-indias-unique-aspiration-to-emerge-upsc-psir-2025-4007\/\">Answer<\/a><\/div>\n<h3 id=\"india-s-soft-power-public-diplomacy\">India\u2019s Soft Power &amp; Public Diplomacy<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Cultural diplomacy runs through India\u2019s regional engagement: the <span class=\"n-term\">ICCR<\/span> runs scholarships and cultural programmes in Afghanistan (Culture Week 2017; ~14,000 Afghan students) and Palestine (ICCR scholarships, Kathak and martial-arts programmes).<\/li>\n<li>Public diplomacy converts values into influence \u2014 vaccine diplomacy (COVISHIELD to Saudi Arabia; doses to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover), the Voice of Global South summits, and the \u201cOne Earth, One Family, One Future\u201d G20 messaging.<\/li>\n<li>Soft power complements hard power: it sustains India\u2019s foothold without direct security involvement, though critics note it cannot secure every strategic interest on its own.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"assessment\">Assessment<\/h3>\n<p>India\u2019s recent foreign policy across its western arc pairs realpolitik with principled diplomacy. In West Asia it has moved from a provider of security toward a builder of peace, holding independent partnerships with the Gulf, Israel and Iran without being trapped by their rivalries. In Afghanistan it balances non-recognition with humanitarian engagement, denying space to a China\u2013Pakistan axis while protecting security and connectivity. Ties with the United States and Israel have deepened even as India guards strategic autonomy \u2014 refusing mediation on Kashmir, staying neutral on Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>Underlying all of it is a reformist vision of a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia, resting on strategic autonomy, multi-alignment and cultural heritage. India\u2019s ambition \u2014 from balancer to leading state \u2014 will turn on converting flexible autonomy into consistent leadership, deepening regional trust, and presenting a stable, cohesive democracy at home.<\/p>\n<div class=\"n-next\"><a href=\"\/psir\/notes\/growing-relations-with-us-and-israel\/\"><em>Previous<\/em><b>Growing relations with US and Israel<\/b><\/a><span><\/span><\/div>\n<p><\/main><\/p>\n<aside class=\"n-rail\">\n<h4>On this page<\/h4>\n<p><a href=\"#the-vision-of-a-new-world-order\">The vision of a new world order<\/a><a href=\"#india-and-the-emerging-world-order\">India and the Emerging World Order<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-place-in-the-emerging-order\">India\u2019s Place in the Emerging Order<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-indian-ocean-statecraft-sagar-to-mahasagar\">India\u2019s Indian Ocean Statecraft \u2014 SAGAR to MAHASAGAR<\/a><a href=\"#the-idea-of-the-asian-century\">The Idea of the Asian Century<\/a><a href=\"#india-and-other-emerging-powers\">India and Other Emerging Powers<\/a><a href=\"#the-balancing-vocabulary-how-scholars-classify-india-s-condu\">The Balancing Vocabulary \u2014 how scholars classify India\u2019s conduct<\/a><a href=\"#from-non-alignment-to-multi-alignment\">From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment<\/a><a href=\"#india-s-soft-power-public-diplomacy\">India\u2019s Soft Power &amp; Public Diplomacy<\/a><a href=\"#assessment\">Assessment<\/a><\/aside>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Vision of a new world order for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Vision of a new world order Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Vision of a new world ord<\/p>\n","protected":false},"template":"","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"fx_note_key":"II-B.8.3","fx_note_sec":"II-B","fx_note_point":"8","fx_note_desc":"Vision of a new world order for the UPSC PSIR optional \u2014 PSIR Notes \u203a II-B India and the World \u203a Vision of a new world order Paper I \u00b7 India and the World Vision of a new world ord","footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-3602","psir_note","type-psir_note","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3602","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/psir_note"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3602\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3782,"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/psir_note\/3602\/revisions\/3782"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forumias.com\/psir\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3602"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}