Equality — meaning, and what it is not

A central value of modern political thought. Classical and medieval thinkers treated hierarchy as natural or inevitable; modern thought begins from the premise of the equal moral worth of all human beings.

“Equality is basically a process of equalization. So, first of all equality implies the deficiency of special rights. Secondly it implies that everyone should get enough opportunities for growth.”

Harold J. Laski

Equality is not sameness. It means removal of unjust privilege, recognition of equal moral worth, and fair conditions for human development — a layered idea with legal, political, social, economic, moral and distributive faces.

How the major thinkers frame it

• Ronald Dworkin — equality is the sovereign virtue; “No other value has been under threat in Liberalism as the value of equality.”
• Ernest Barker — rights guaranteed to me must be guaranteed in the same measure to all, and rights given to others must be given to me.
• Isaiah Berlin — human dignity and equality form the core of liberalism.
• Alexis de Tocqueville — equality expands and deepens as society progresses.

Laski’s four elements of equality absence of special privilege · adequate opportunity for all to realise personality · access to social benefits without exclusion · absence of economic and social exploitation.

Liberalism ties equality to equal respect, equal concern, human dignity, equality before law and equality of opportunity. Socialist and Marxist thinkers attack this as merely formal and procedural; positive liberals answer with state action, social reform, positive discrimination and affirmative action.

Four dimensions — legal, political, social, economic

Evolution of the concept

From natural hierarchy to a constitutional human right. Aristotle (natural vs conventional inequality; justice = treat equals equally, unequals unequally) → Medieval feudalism (legal privilege by status, birth, race, sex, religion, wealth) → Renaissance / early modern (Puritans, Levellers, natural rights; Locke; Rousseau & the General Will) → 1789 (French Revolution — equality a leading ideal of the body politic) → 20th century (liberation movements; revolutions in Russia & China; UDHR, 1948)

Aristotle in the Politics reads inequality as a cause of rebellion. John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government argues the inherent equality of individuals. John Stuart Mill, Thomas Hill Green and Karl Marx deepen the legal, social and economic demands; the contemporary period recognises equality as a human right and constitutional principle.

“It is precisely because the force of things tends always to destroy equality that the force of the legislature must always tend to maintain it.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Formal vs substantive — the master split

Equality of opportunity

Fair chances to develop abilities and compete for social positions — a liberal conception concerned with initial conditions: an equal start in life, a level playing field, no discrimination in access.

• Plato — social position should rest on ability and effort; education should let every child discover talent.
• Social democrats and modern liberals treat it as the foundation of social justice; modern conservatives accept it as a classless society based on individual effort.

John Roemer’s two views

• Non-discrimination principle — in competition, judge individuals only by attributes relevant to the duty.
• Level-playing-field principle — society should reduce unequal formative conditions so all with relevant potential can compete.

D.A. Lloyd Thomas — ideal equality of opportunity means equally good, though different, opportunities for all in a resource-abundant society. Ernest Barker reads it as equal rights and abolition of privilege; John Rawls adds that advantaged positions be open not merely formally, but so each has a fair chance of attaining them. Ronald Dworkin’s resource auction and Amartya Sen’s capabilities deepen the idea.

Equality of outcome

Attention shifts from chances to results — also called outcome equality or distributive equality. It concerns income, wealth, wages, living conditions and access to material goods. The most radical and contested form of egalitarianism.

The sporting metaphor Equality of opportunity gives all runners the same start; equality of outcome expects all runners to finish together.

• Socialist / Marxist — liberal equality stops at opportunity; Marxist-Leninist thought defines equality as abolition of classes and equal social status. Outcome equality is defended as substantive equality, since dignity cannot rest on formal opportunity alone.
• Justification — Jean-Jacques Rousseau feared material inequality would enslave the poor and corrupt the rich; Richard Henry Tawney made social equality the practical base of a common culture and fellowship.

The standard criticism

• May contradict formal equality and equality of opportunity; may weaken merit and initiative; may breed stagnation and demand excessive state action.
• Friedrich A. Hayek — it “can be achieved only by treating people differently; equality before the law and material equality are in conflict.”
• Robert Nozick — “whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just.”
• Amartya Sen — the correct focus is “their capability to live a life we have reason to value, not their resource wealth.”

Equality of welfare

Advocated by utilitarians — equalise welfare, maximise pleasure, reduce disparities in well-being. The fatal problem: welfare is subjective, and the same resources yield different pleasure to different people.

Dworkin’s two-sisters objection If one sister lives simply and another lavishly, equal welfare may demand giving more resources to the lavish sister

an illogical and unjust result.

Ronald Dworkin uses this to reject welfare as the metric. John Rawls adds that the welfare of individuals and minorities cannot be sacrificed for aggregate social welfare — the core liberal-egalitarian rejection of utilitarian trade-offs.

Equality of resources & luck egalitarianism — Dworkin

Ronald Dworkin is a resource egalitarian and a luck egalitarian. He fixes on resources, not welfare, giving individuals the means to pursue their own conception of the good. The theory is inspired by John Rawls and set against Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory.

Hold people responsible for choices, not circumstances

Distribution must be ambition-sensitive and endowment-sensitive. Resources include personal resources — physical and mental health, skills, capability — so impersonal resources are adjusted for them: a person with a disability may need more than one in perfect health.

The shipwreck auction and the envy test. Equal shells (each survivor receives equal purchasing power) → Auction (resources auctioned; each bids by his conception of the good) → Envy test (distribution is fair if no one envies another’s bundle) → Hypothetical insurance (a market that adjusts for unchosen disadvantage)

Nozick’s entitlement theory (the foil)

State role limited to regulation, rectification and grievance redress — no major part in distributive justice. Property acquired by just steps is legitimate; society cannot keep compensating for historical wrongs.

Criticism of luck egalitarianism: democratic egalitarians say it fails the test of equal respect and concern — treating persons with disabilities, the untalented and the “ugly” as objects of pity, and pity is incompatible with dignity. They shift focus from correcting luck to equal social standing.

Equality of capabilities — Sen

Amartya Sen moves equality from commodities to capabilities — from means to ends. Resource egalitarianism deals with means; equal resources do not guarantee equal real freedom, because people differ in health, gender, social location, disability and environment, and so differ in their power to convert resources into a life.

Capability vs functioning Capability = the range of things a person can do. Functioning = what the person actually does. The aim of equality is not identical goods but the real ability to live a valued life.

• Takes human diversity seriously; treats people as ends of development, not means of growth.
• Poverty = absence of basic capabilities; deprivation is external (social circumstance) and internal (health, disability, emotional stability); well-being is multi-dimensional.
• Social choice looks at real persons and actual deprivation — girls in India may face greater deprivation even with equal resources.
• Realisation focus — on being and doing: fasting is a choice, hunger is deprivation. Development is defined as freedom, and freedom as capabilities and functionings.

Relational equality — Scheffler

Samuel Scheffler rejects equality as a merely distributive ideal. Equality is “a moral ideal governing the relations in which people stand to one another” — at once a moral, social and political ideal.

“As a moral ideal, it asserts that people are of equal worth… As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as citizens.”

Samuel Scheffler

Against luck egalitarianism he holds that “neither complete choice-sensitivity nor complete endowment-insensitivity seems morally plausible in its own right.” Equality should oppose excessive variation in income and wealth, and institutions that let natural and social differences translate into economic inequality. Gender, sex, race, religion, culture and ethnicity are central to human relations.

Equal treatment vs fair treatment — the fault line

The choice that runs through the whole chapter

Equal treatment values sameness in law and procedure (formal equality). Robert Nozick: “unjustly taking someone’s holdings for redistribution violates their rights”, and he likens progressive taxation to bonded labour. Its limit — people do not begin from the same position; historical discrimination leaves unequal starting points (Dalits in India, Blacks in the United States, women, persons with disabilities).

Fair treatment gives differential treatment by circumstance, need and historical disadvantage — not arbitrary, justified when it protects the weakest, and tied to distributive justice. John Rawls through the difference principle; Ronald Dworkin through resources and correction of disability; Amartya Sen through capabilities.

“Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows.”

Richard Henry Tawney

John Rawls — democratic equality

A liberal-egalitarian theory of justice that joins liberty, fair opportunity and the difference principle. Behind the veil of ignorance in the original position, parties neutralise the effects of natural and social contingency; each person is an end with the moral powers for autonomy, and justice cannot trade individual or minority welfare for aggregate welfare.

The two principles, in strict lexical order. 1 · Equal basic liberties (equal liberties & political rights for all; cannot be sacrificed for economic gain) → 2a · Fair equality of opportunity (positions genuinely open to all) → 2b · Difference principle (inequalities only if to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged)

The First Principle has lexical priority over the Second; fair equality of opportunity has priority over the difference principle. Together the three form democratic equality — connecting freedom with equality, constraining inequality, protecting the least advantaged. This is the basis of justice as fairness.

Criticism

• Richard Arneson — the difference principle only mitigates social and natural contingency.
• Amartya Sen — Rawls’s index of resources misses some inequalities; the focus should be capabilities, not primary goods.

Michael Walzer — complex equality

In Spheres of Justice (1983), Michael Walzer offers a communitarian alternative to universal theories of distributive justice. He rejects any single metric — welfare, resources or capabilities. Social goods carry different meanings; different goods need different principles; no single principle fits all spheres.

Complex equality “No citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good.”

• Distinct social goods — family resources, wages and political office each follow their own logic.
• Autonomous principles — politics, economy, education, family, honour, love and rights each have a separate criterion.
• Blocked exchanges — money may buy a car but not a judge’s verdict; wealth must not buy power; votes are not for sale. “It isn’t only equality but freedom, too, that we defend when we block a large number of possible exchanges.”

Virtue: prevents tyranny (no monopoly in one sphere dominating the rest), promotes plural justice, protects equal citizenship — no citizen becomes an all-round loser.

Criticism & support

• Caste in India produces social, cultural, economic and political inequality at once — cumulative inequality defeats sphere separation; early social capital spills across spheres.
• Brian Barry — social meanings are necessary for distribution but may not be sufficient; Walzer replies that complex equality is future-oriented.
• David Miller supports it — an order in which “specific inequalities… do not crystallise into judgments of overall personal worth, and barriers of class do not stand in the way of mutual understanding and sympathy.”

Economic equality, citizenship, estates & the multicultural turn

Economic equality and the real value of citizenship

Democratic citizenship gives equal political status — equal vote, equal right to participate, equal standing before the state. But formal political equality rings hollow if economic inequality controls participation: wealth becomes patronage and policy capture, poor citizens hold legal rights without the capacity to use them, and a new aristocracy can form inside democracy.

• John Rawls — without economic equality political liberties become hollow; inequalities are permitted only if they benefit the least advantaged.
• Alexis de Tocqueville — extreme economic inequality distorts democracy and lets wealthy groups dominate.
• Amartya Sen — economic disadvantage cuts capability and so limits participation, civil rights and personal liberty.
• Friedrich A. Hayek (counter) — state-imposed economic equality may itself threaten liberty and market dynamism.
• Harold J. Laski — basic needs must reach all for liberty to be meaningful.

Estates, power and liberty — Harrington’s chain

The republican chain: property, power, liberty. Equality of estates (wide diffusion of property) → Equality of power (no concentration of political power) → Liberty (civic independence; “no monarchy”)

“Where there is equality of estates, there must be equality of power; and where there is equality of power, there can be no monarchy.”

James Harrington

Modern checks — land reform, progressive taxation, anti-trust law, affirmative action — prevent concentration of power; John Rawls ties the fair value of political liberty to distribution benefiting the least advantaged. But estates-equality is neither sufficient (liberty also needs independent courts, free media, constitutional safeguards, federalism) nor always necessary (some unequal societies kept liberty through institutions; caste, gender and race hierarchies can survive equal property laws). Friedrich A. Hayek: “A claim for equality of material position can be met only by a government with totalitarian powers.”

The multicultural perspective

Multiculturalism reads liberty and equality through cultural diversity — arising from migration, decolonisation and recognition of indigenous peoples. Liberal democracies start from universal individual rights; multiculturalism adds recognition of group identities.

• Will Kymlicka — liberalism and multiculturalism can coexist; minority rights can protect autonomy rather than destroy it.
• Equality — state neutrality may quietly privilege the majority culture; minorities may need special rights; equality becomes recognition plus inclusion.
• Liberty — freedom to choose, express and revise cultural identity; autonomy needs cultural context and exposure to options. Canada and New Zealand show recognition coexisting with national integration.

Justice & equality

• Equality as a component of justice — egalitarianism links justice with equal moral worth; distributive justice asks who gets what. John Rawls ties justice to benefit for the least advantaged; Bryan Stevenson connects justice with the creation of opportunity.
• Distributive justice — Amartya Sen on capabilities and functionings; progressive taxation as a working instrument.
• Social justice — economic and social equality; Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach grounds dignity and human development; civil-rights and LGBTQ+ movements express it.
• Procedural justice — fairness of processes and trials; John Rawls’s justice as fairness.
• Equality as a means to justice — equal access to education, health and economic opportunity; John Stuart Mill backs equal opportunity for individual well-being; Robert Nozick warns against redistributive coercion.

Where it plugs in — links, today, key works

Connections across the syllabus

Theories of state — feminist (patriarchy and restructured norms), Marxist (class inequality), post-colonial (colonial exploitation). Democracy — political equality as equal participation in governance. Indian thought — Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar places social justice at the centre of Indian democracy. Liberty — Harold J. Laski and Crawford Brough Macpherson argue liberty needs equality. Rawls’s difference principle permits economic inequality only where it helps the least advantaged.

Contemporary importance

Reservations in India and affirmative action in the United States · gender equality (#MeToo, UN Women — equal pay, reproductive rights, violence against women) · reviving debates on taxation and redistribution as wealth concentrates · the digital divide as a new equality issue in education, health and work · balancing individual liberty with group recognition.

Important books & contemporary works