SAARC

Founded with the SAARC Charter, Dhaka (1985); Secretariat in Kathmandu; it operates in a conflict-prone region often called the “arc of instability.” Foundational principles: Panchsheel and consensus (unanimous decision-making).

“I dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul.”

Manmohan Singh

Impediments to functionality

• Structural asymmetry — a “negative mindset” that challenges India’s regional weight; India seen as a “bullying big brother” and “imperialist power” — the “big brother, small brother” syndrome (Sikkim’s integration, Bangladesh’s creation, the IPKF, Nepal/Bhutan blockades), while India fears smaller states will “gang up.”
• India–Pakistan — C. Raja Mohan calls Pakistan the “camel in the caravan of SAARC,” slowing the traffic; Pakistan’s “identity crisis” fears that fulfilling SAARC would be a de facto nullification of Partition.
• Economic asymmetry and inward-looking self-reliance — SAFTA languishes; intra-regional trade stays below 5%. India–China rivalry and China’s strategic entry deepen tensions. Institutional paralysis — S. Jaishankar calls SAARC a “jammed vehicle”; no summit since 2014.

Improvements, revival and measures needed

• Trade — SAFTA, SAPTA (preferential), SATIS (services). Institutions — Development Fund, SAARC University, Arbitration Council, SARSO (standards), Food Bank, Milk Grid, disaster agency, Film Festival, Federation Games, SAARC satellite.
• No member has withdrawn; BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues but cannot fully supplant SAARC. India convened a video conference of SAARC leaders during COVID-19 (2020); the Himalayan environmental crisis strengthens the case for revival.
• Measures — shared values and a transnational conception of nationhood; no internationalising of bilateral issues; India’s proactive leadership; fast-track SAFTA, a unified power grid, freer movement of people, joint action on terrorism and narcotics; a “SAARC Minus” concept for flexibility; Modi — “collaboration over confusion, preparation over panic”; a revived Kautilyan, pragmatic approach.

Foundations, Objectives, Principles

• Interdependence Theory holds that economic and political connections between states reduce the likelihood of conflict; Communication Theory stresses dialogue and mutual understanding in resolving disputes and improving regional cohesion. SAARC embodies both.
• Established with the signing of the SAARC Charter in Dhaka, 1985; Secretariat at Kathmandu. It operates in a conflict-prone region often called the “arc of instability”.
• Seven founding members — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined as the eighth in 2007.
• Objectives → promote peace and prosperity in South Asia; raise living standards by encouraging self-sufficiency and mutual assistance; strengthen cooperation with other regional and global organisations.
• Foundational principles → Panchsheel — mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence; and the principle of consensus, ensuring collective and unanimous decision-making.

“I dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived, and that is how I want our grandchildren to live.”

Manmohan Singh

Issues with SAARC Functionality

• South Asia often lacks a cohesive identity; effectiveness is impeded by structural asymmetry and geopolitical tensions.
• Structural asymmetry stems from a “negative mindset” that contests India’s regional pre-eminence rather than cooperating with it.
• India is perceived as a “bullying big brother” and an “imperialist power”, producing the “big brother, small brother” syndrome. Smaller members fear that closer integration means Indian dominance — a perception fuelled by the integration of Sikkim, the formation of Bangladesh, the IPKF mission in Sri Lanka, and blockades in Nepal and Bhutan. India in turn fears that smaller countries might collectively “gang up” against it.
• Bimal Prasad: smaller states show interest in friendly relations with India yet view it as the “main source of threat to their security”. India sees its neighbours as essential components of its security framework while they see it as a danger to theirs — a perception that has let outside powers such as China and the United States establish a presence.
• Geopolitically, SAARC is caught in the India–China rivalry, which worsens tensions and undermines cohesive integration.
• Economic asymmetry and inward-looking policies — preference for self-reliance, reluctance to engage in meaningful interdependence; SAFTA continues to languish in implementation.
• Soft power → India is often seen to lack soft power projection commensurate with its regional weight, while China’s emergence as a counterweight introduces a new dimension requiring recalibrated responses.
• Consensus requirement → any decision needs agreement from all, which prevailing mistrust makes hard to achieve. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee: at the 18th Summit in Kathmandu (2014) the signing of the SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement was stalled because Pakistan declined.
• Afghanistan — absence of consensus on recognising the Taliban makes convening a summit itself difficult.
• International alignments compel developing countries to maintain strong affiliations with developed powers; Pakistan’s need for good relations with the United States does not allow mutual trust to grow.
• In 39 years, SAARC has held only 18 summits, and could not advance beyond SAPTA (1995) and SAFTA (2004) despite an international environment favourable to regionalism.
• Charter constraint — SAARC’s mandate expressly forbids it from taking up bilateral disputes, which removes precisely the issues that matter most.
• Institutional weakness — a feeble secretariat and inadequate funding.

SAARC is a “jammed vehicle”.

S. Jaishankar

Its central dysfunction is the inability to convene regular summits — none since 2014 — which reflects institutional paralysis and erodes confidence in its capacity.

“SAARC was established to strengthen cooperation between the South Asian countries and to act as a mechanism for regional integration in South Asia. However, SAARC has always been hostage to the India-Pakistan conflict.”

Niranjan Marjani

Thirty-nine years, eighteen summits. 1985 (Charter signed at Dhaka; Secretariat at Kathmandu) → 1995 (SAPTA — preferential trade) → 2004 (SAFTA — tariff reduction) → 2014 (18th Summit, Kathmandu — the last one) → 2016 (Islamabad summit cancelled after Uri) → 2020 (Leaders’ video conference on COVID-19)

Achievements — the institutional record

SAFTA — tariff reduction · SAPTA — preferential trade · SATIS — services · SAARC Development Fund · SAARC University · SAARC Arbitration Council · SARSO — standards · Food Bank · Film Festival · Milk Grid · Agency for Disasters · Federation Games · SAARC satellite

• Trade architecture — SAFTA reducing tariffs; SAPTA instituting preferential trade; SATIS liberalising trade in services.
• Development and knowledge — the SAARC Development Fund supporting regional development initiatives; the SAARC University as a nexus for academic collaboration.
• Dispute and standards — the SAARC Arbitration Council for peaceful dispute resolution; SARSO standardising technical regulations to improve trade efficiency.
• Public goods — the Food Bank for food security; the Film Festival for cultural exchange; the Milk Grid optimising dairy distribution; the Agency for Disasters coordinating responses to natural calamities.
• Sport and technology — the Federation Games using sports diplomacy; the SAARC satellite improving communication infrastructure.

Revival of SAARC — the functional case

• The organisation’s raison d’être persists and is likely to be reanimated in propitious circumstances — the video conference of SAARC leaders convened at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 illustrates this.
• The environmental crisis strengthens the case. Ecological interdependence in the subcontinent requires regionally structured responses to the retreat of Himalayan glaciers and the spread of extreme weather.
• Almost 800 million people in South Asia could face a sharp decline in living conditions from rising greenhouse gas emissions; climate refugees could produce a humanitarian tragedy — challenges requiring collective action.
• The evidence has hardened: the Indus basin lost about 24.8% of perennial snow and ice cover between 2001 and 2021. Medha Bisht holds that climate stress leaves no real alternative to cooperation, whatever a treaty’s legal standing.
• Hydropower → Nepal has a potential of at least 40 GW against current capacity of a little over 1 GW; Northeast India has installed about 1.5 GW of over 58 GW of potential. This can be realised only through cross-border power exports.
• Despite widespread dissatisfaction, no member state has withdrawn. BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues for economic collaboration but cannot supplant SAARC.

Measures Needed & Way Forward

Measures needed

• Cultivate a sense of common values and acknowledge shared historical perceptions, which requires addressing intrinsic political disparities. Member states must move beyond conventional notions of sovereignty, security and national identity towards a transnational, multi-layered and multi-dimensional conception of nationhood and regional affiliation.
• Transparency in bilateral engagement — no country should act as a dominant power or obstruct progress.
• India must exhibit proactive leadership and go the extra mile, given its demographic and geographic weight.
• No member should internationalise bilateral issues beyond the SAARC forum — which keeps disputes within a framework conducive to resolution and prevents external actors from worsening tension.
• Expedite SAFTA and expand its ambit; develop hard infrastructure, streamline freight movement facilitation, augment investment opportunities.
• Integrate the energy sector through a unified electric power grid, pooling technical and financial resources.
• Facilitate freer legal movement of people for economic and cultural tourism; streamline immigration procedures to build a sense of shared identity.
• Combat transnational threats — cross-border illegal migration, terrorism, narcotics trafficking — through intelligence sharing, border security and law enforcement cooperation.

Way forward

• The pandemic underlined the need for a unified approach — collaboration over confusion, preparation over panic.
• Redefining the SAARC Charter is essential — removing excessive safeguards and incorporating the ‘SAARC Minus’ concept for greater flexibility in decision-making. Priority to trade facilitation, energy trade connectivity and other avenues of integration.
• Deeper regional cooperation to reduce the trust deficit reflected partly in defence expenditure; regional connectivity is a necessary condition for land-locked Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan, and for India’s virtually landlocked Northeast, to reach world markets.
• Change in production patterns → voluntary shifts towards areas of competitive advantage would avoid the present clash of economic interests.
• Reducing trade barriers, promoting collectivism in multilateral negotiations and at the WTO, and insulating the regional economy against external shocks.
• Confidence-building measures — easing travel and visa restrictions to promote contact between business communities.
• Drawing on Kautilya’s strategic wisdom: a country cannot thrive while neglecting the challenges faced by its neighbours. A revival of the Kautilyan approach — pragmatic and consequential decision-making — is essential.