The South Asian Paradox

“We cannot change history, but we cannot change geography either.”

Atal Bihari Vajpayee

• South Asia is the one region where India’s power is unquestioned and its influence least secure.
• India holds over 75% of the region’s GDP and over 70% of its population → an asymmetry that produces dependence and resentment together.
• Muchkund Dubey: a country’s foreign policy can be judged by its relations with its neighbours.
• Shyam Saran (How India Sees the World: From Kautilya to the 21st Century) → friendly relations with neighbours reduce India’s security dilemmas; the logic of geography is unrelenting.
• Kautilya’s formulation treats immediate neighbours as natural enemies. In an age of complex interdependence that premise has to be reworked — not discarded.
• The region is described as an “arc of instability” — three unsettled boundaries, two nuclear rivals, several fragile democracies, and a rising extra-regional power with money and patience.

Neighbourhood First — design and purpose

Background

• Neighbourhood policy has always been central to India’s foreign relations; fresh momentum after 2014, roots much earlier.
• Rests on three legs — civilisational thought (Kautilya’s raja-mandala), the Gujral Doctrine of non-reciprocity, and post-liberalisation economic logic.

The policy

• Took shape around 2008 → strong neighbourhood relations on a consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented approach.
• Deliverables: connectivity, infrastructure, energy, security cooperation, disaster response.
• The maritime extension is MAHASAGAR — Modi, Malé, July 2025: the Maldives “holds an important place in India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and ‘MAHASAGAR’ vision.”
• Has no formal institutional structure → precisely what makes it a convenient instrument for India to work across South Asia while bypassing Pakistan.

Significance — seven heads

The Five Principles

Influence through cooperation rather than coercion. Samman (Respect — all neighbours equal partners regardless of size) → Samvad (Dialogue — sustained talks, summits, people-level contact) → Shanti (Peace — regional stability, counter-terrorism, border management) → Samriddhi (Prosperity — trade, aid, connectivity; blunts external influence) → Sanskriti (Culture — shared heritage, language, tradition as a base for trust)

• Samman carries forward the Gujral Doctrine of non-reciprocity — India offers without expecting immediate return.
• Samvad → Shyam Saran: geographical closeness is not by itself enough.

Concerns in the Neighbourhood Policy

Strategies for Strengthening Relations

Views of Scholars — the differentiated approach

• Shyam Saran — the Indian subcontinent is a cohesive geopolitical and ecological space, marked by shared history, cultural bonds and economic interdependence.
• C. Raja Mohan — India’s challenge is not to compete with China in South Asia but to manage complex interdependence with its neighbours; strategic vision must be joined to tactical finesse.
• Constantino Xavier — the region is poorly connected and the India–Nepal border is open “mostly on paper”. India must move from a “right of first refusal” to a “capacity of first delivery”; there are no permanent pro-India factions, only leaders balancing several powers at once.

Rajiv Sikri — one size does not fit all

A peaceful neighbourhood is the precondition for India to concentrate on its global ascent.

Foundations, Objectives, Principles

• Interdependence Theory holds that economic and political connections between states reduce the likelihood of conflict; Communication Theory stresses dialogue and mutual understanding in resolving disputes and improving regional cohesion. SAARC embodies both.
• Established with the signing of the SAARC Charter in Dhaka, 1985; Secretariat at Kathmandu. It operates in a conflict-prone region often called the “arc of instability”.
• Seven founding members — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Afghanistan joined as the eighth in 2007.
• Objectives → promote peace and prosperity in South Asia; raise living standards by encouraging self-sufficiency and mutual assistance; strengthen cooperation with other regional and global organisations.
• Foundational principles → Panchsheel — mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence; and the principle of consensus, ensuring collective and unanimous decision-making.

“I dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived, and that is how I want our grandchildren to live.”

Manmohan Singh

Issues with SAARC Functionality

• South Asia often lacks a cohesive identity; effectiveness is impeded by structural asymmetry and geopolitical tensions.
• Structural asymmetry stems from a “negative mindset” that contests India’s regional pre-eminence rather than cooperating with it.
• India is perceived as a “bullying big brother” and an “imperialist power”, producing the “big brother, small brother” syndrome. Smaller members fear that closer integration means Indian dominance — a perception fuelled by the integration of Sikkim, the formation of Bangladesh, the IPKF mission in Sri Lanka, and blockades in Nepal and Bhutan. India in turn fears that smaller countries might collectively “gang up” against it.
• Bimal Prasad: smaller states show interest in friendly relations with India yet view it as the “main source of threat to their security”. India sees its neighbours as essential components of its security framework while they see it as a danger to theirs — a perception that has let outside powers such as China and the United States establish a presence.
• Geopolitically, SAARC is caught in the India–China rivalry, which worsens tensions and undermines cohesive integration.
• Economic asymmetry and inward-looking policies — preference for self-reliance, reluctance to engage in meaningful interdependence; SAFTA continues to languish in implementation.
• Soft power → India is often seen to lack soft power projection commensurate with its regional weight, while China’s emergence as a counterweight introduces a new dimension requiring recalibrated responses.
• Consensus requirement → any decision needs agreement from all, which prevailing mistrust makes hard to achieve. Joyeeta Bhattacharjee: at the 18th Summit in Kathmandu (2014) the signing of the SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement was stalled because Pakistan declined.
• Afghanistan — absence of consensus on recognising the Taliban makes convening a summit itself difficult.
• International alignments compel developing countries to maintain strong affiliations with developed powers; Pakistan’s need for good relations with the United States does not allow mutual trust to grow.
• In 39 years, SAARC has held only 18 summits, and could not advance beyond SAPTA (1995) and SAFTA (2004) despite an international environment favourable to regionalism.
• Charter constraint — SAARC’s mandate expressly forbids it from taking up bilateral disputes, which removes precisely the issues that matter most.
• Institutional weakness — a feeble secretariat and inadequate funding.

SAARC is a “jammed vehicle”.

S. Jaishankar

Its central dysfunction is the inability to convene regular summits — none since 2014 — which reflects institutional paralysis and erodes confidence in its capacity.

“SAARC was established to strengthen cooperation between the South Asian countries and to act as a mechanism for regional integration in South Asia. However, SAARC has always been hostage to the India-Pakistan conflict.”

Niranjan Marjani

Thirty-nine years, eighteen summits. 1985 (Charter signed at Dhaka; Secretariat at Kathmandu) → 1995 (SAPTA — preferential trade) → 2004 (SAFTA — tariff reduction) → 2014 (18th Summit, Kathmandu — the last one) → 2016 (Islamabad summit cancelled after Uri) → 2020 (Leaders’ video conference on COVID-19)

The India–Pakistan Question in SAARC

• C. Raja Mohan calls Pakistan the “camel in the caravan of SAARC” — a vivid metaphor for its role as a hindrance to the region’s progress.
• Pakistan’s socio-political condition is often described as an “identity crisis” — the struggle to reconcile competing narratives and historical legacies within its national consciousness.
• The notion that the fruition of SAARC’s objectives would imply a de facto nullification of the partition explains Pakistan’s apprehension towards initiatives that could dilute its national identity and historical narrative.
• The 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled after India refused to attend in the wake of the Uri attack, with Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan also withdrawing.
• 2025 — a SAARC instrument itself withdrawn. After the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, the CCS held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and cancelled SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES) entry for Pakistani nationals. Amal Chandra reads the treaty move as coercive treaty retaliation; Medha Bisht as coercive diplomacy displacing strategic idealism; Masha Tokas applies securitization theory — water recast from a technical matter into a security question.

Counterpoint — informal contact has delivered

Informal talks between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at the second SAARC Summit, Bangalore, November 1986, diffused tension over India’s military exercise Operation Brasstacks. India–Sri Lanka talks at the 1987 SAARC foreign ministers’ meeting led to the accord on the Tamil problem.

Achievements — the institutional record

SAFTA — tariff reduction · SAPTA — preferential trade · SATIS — services · SAARC Development Fund · SAARC University · SAARC Arbitration Council · SARSO — standards · Food Bank · Film Festival · Milk Grid · Agency for Disasters · Federation Games · SAARC satellite

• Trade architecture — SAFTA reducing tariffs; SAPTA instituting preferential trade; SATIS liberalising trade in services.
• Development and knowledge — the SAARC Development Fund supporting regional development initiatives; the SAARC University as a nexus for academic collaboration.
• Dispute and standards — the SAARC Arbitration Council for peaceful dispute resolution; SARSO standardising technical regulations to improve trade efficiency.
• Public goods — the Food Bank for food security; the Film Festival for cultural exchange; the Milk Grid optimising dairy distribution; the Agency for Disasters coordinating responses to natural calamities.
• Sport and technology — the Federation Games using sports diplomacy; the SAARC satellite improving communication infrastructure.

SAARC During COVID-19

Despite dormancy since 2014, SAARC played a role against the pandemic. A COVID-19 Emergency Fund was established.

• Partner countries issued and followed specific guidelines, drawing praise from the World Bank for responding quickly and effectively.
• Member proposals — Afghanistan: a shared telemedicine framework; Maldives: long-term cooperation in health and economic sectors; Pakistan: video conferences of health ministers, experts and national authorities for information sharing; Sri Lanka: awareness through a single authority for exchange of information.
• The SAARC Disaster Management Centre, Gandhinagar, created a dedicated website to facilitate interaction between SAARC health and trade officials.
• India’s leadership — holding the conference despite open reservations about talking to Pakistan reflected the attitude of a leader-nation rising above bilateral animosity. India sent army teams and medical health workers to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan; dispatched a 14-member medical team to the Maldives, the first ever Indian medical team sent to another country; proposed a Rapid Response Team for Nepal; and evacuated more than 50 citizens of other countries — Maldives, Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, the United States, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, South Africa, Peru — amid its own evacuations.
• Vivek Mishra reads this period as SAARC’s Resurrection.

Revival of SAARC — the functional case

• The organisation’s raison d’être persists and is likely to be reanimated in propitious circumstances — the video conference of SAARC leaders convened at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 illustrates this.
• The environmental crisis strengthens the case. Ecological interdependence in the subcontinent requires regionally structured responses to the retreat of Himalayan glaciers and the spread of extreme weather.
• Almost 800 million people in South Asia could face a sharp decline in living conditions from rising greenhouse gas emissions; climate refugees could produce a humanitarian tragedy — challenges requiring collective action.
• The evidence has hardened: the Indus basin lost about 24.8% of perennial snow and ice cover between 2001 and 2021. Medha Bisht holds that climate stress leaves no real alternative to cooperation, whatever a treaty’s legal standing.
• Hydropower → Nepal has a potential of at least 40 GW against current capacity of a little over 1 GW; Northeast India has installed about 1.5 GW of over 58 GW of potential. This can be realised only through cross-border power exports.
• Despite widespread dissatisfaction, no member state has withdrawn. BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues for economic collaboration but cannot supplant SAARC.

Measures Needed & Way Forward

Measures needed

• Cultivate a sense of common values and acknowledge shared historical perceptions, which requires addressing intrinsic political disparities. Member states must move beyond conventional notions of sovereignty, security and national identity towards a transnational, multi-layered and multi-dimensional conception of nationhood and regional affiliation.
• Transparency in bilateral engagement — no country should act as a dominant power or obstruct progress.
• India must exhibit proactive leadership and go the extra mile, given its demographic and geographic weight.
• No member should internationalise bilateral issues beyond the SAARC forum — which keeps disputes within a framework conducive to resolution and prevents external actors from worsening tension.
• Expedite SAFTA and expand its ambit; develop hard infrastructure, streamline freight movement facilitation, augment investment opportunities.
• Integrate the energy sector through a unified electric power grid, pooling technical and financial resources.
• Facilitate freer legal movement of people for economic and cultural tourism; streamline immigration procedures to build a sense of shared identity.
• Combat transnational threats — cross-border illegal migration, terrorism, narcotics trafficking — through intelligence sharing, border security and law enforcement cooperation.

Way forward

• The pandemic underlined the need for a unified approach — collaboration over confusion, preparation over panic.
• Redefining the SAARC Charter is essential — removing excessive safeguards and incorporating the ‘SAARC Minus’ concept for greater flexibility in decision-making. Priority to trade facilitation, energy trade connectivity and other avenues of integration.
• Deeper regional cooperation to reduce the trust deficit reflected partly in defence expenditure; regional connectivity is a necessary condition for land-locked Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan, and for India’s virtually landlocked Northeast, to reach world markets.
• Change in production patterns → voluntary shifts towards areas of competitive advantage would avoid the present clash of economic interests.
• Reducing trade barriers, promoting collectivism in multilateral negotiations and at the WTO, and insulating the regional economy against external shocks.
• Confidence-building measures — easing travel and visa restrictions to promote contact between business communities.
• Drawing on Kautilya’s strategic wisdom: a country cannot thrive while neglecting the challenges faced by its neighbours. A revival of the Kautilyan approach — pragmatic and consequential decision-making — is essential.

Background and Working Mechanism

• The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation promotes collaboration and shared growth among littoral and neighbouring nations of the Bay of Bengal.
• Seven members — five South Asian (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) and two Southeast Asian (Myanmar, Thailand).

From BIST-EC to BIMSTEC. June 1997 (BIST-EC — Bangkok Declaration: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand) → Late 1997 (BIMST-EC — Myanmar joins) → 2004 (Nepal and Bhutan join — present name) → 2022 (BIMSTEC Charter adopted at the fifth summit)

Working mechanism

• The BIMSTEC Charter, adopted at the fifth summit, supplied the formal charter and organisational design, along with a functional framework for operational objectives and policy making.
• Policy is made through two kinds of meetings — annual ministerial meetings of foreign and commerce ministers on trade and economic matters, and summits every two years. Senior officials meet twice a year to oversee operations.
• Before its first Secretary General, the Sri Lankan diplomat Sumith Nakandala, and the establishment of headquarters at Dhaka — 2011 and 2014 — BIMSTEC had neither a formal headquarters nor a secretariat. The BIMSTEC Working Group is the coordinating body, chaired by a member nation on rotation.

The Bay of Bengal region was among the most interconnected in the world until the early twentieth century, but “the region’s sense of community has almost completely eroded” after the 1940s, when members gained independence and pursued different objectives and alliance structures.

Constantino Xavier & Riya Sinha

Significance — what the Bay delivers

• 1.68 billion people, or 22% of the world’s population, live in the BIMSTEC region, whose members generate US$ 3.697 trillion in GDP annually.
• India’s Act East policy aligns with BIMSTEC, which also serves India’s objective of becoming a significant player in trade and security in the Indian Ocean region, and serves the Quad countries’ focus on the “Indo-Pacific” idea.
• A 2021 research series by the Observer Research Foundation → Sri Lanka sees the objective of becoming a shipping hub in the Indo-Pacific, while Bangladesh may use BIMSTEC to support much-needed economic development.
• The two land-locked mountainous members, Nepal and Bhutan, use it as a route to the sea; Thailand and Myanmar may view it as a means of lowering excessive reliance on China and as a gateway to a sizeable consumer market.
• China’s gradual expansion in the Indian Ocean has helped India establish itself as a major player in the Bay and preserve peace and security. China has BRI projects in every BIMSTEC member except India and Bhutan.

Indian foreign policy objectives realised through BIMSTEC

India hosted the BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat in Goa in 2016 and the BRICS–BIMSTEC Summit the same year; the first meeting of BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs was held in New Delhi on 21 March 2017, emphasising maritime security cooperation and the Bay of Bengal as a common security space.

Challenges and Way Forward

1. India’s shifting focus from SAARC to BIMSTEC is primarily to diplomatically isolate Pakistan; since its formation in 1997, BIMSTEC has come to life mainly during periods of India–Pakistan tension.

2. Lack of efficiency and a “sluggish” pace — the grouping produced its own charter only in 2022.

3. The secretariat suffers from inadequate financial and manpower support.
4. Poor transborder trade and connectivity — India’s annual trade with BIMSTEC countries was just 4% of its total foreign trade as of 2020.
5. No Free Trade Agreement has been adopted; despite maritime trade and tourism potential, members have not built a shared and lucrative coastal shipment ecosystem.
6. Progress has been undercut by Bangladesh–Myanmar relations over the Rohingya refugee crisis, the India–Nepal border issue, and the political situation in Myanmar after the military takeover.

Way forward

• A comprehensive BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement would help businesses join global supply chains and lower trade and investment barriers, eventually producing a rules-based multilateral trading system. This requires political will and the fulfilment of “convergence criteria” — the elements tying member objectives together, to be determined over time.
• Removal of regulatory obstacles to foreign direct investment would help expansion and integration of regional and global supply chains.

Can BIMSTEC Replace SAARC?

Two different animals

• SAARC — A naturally formed geographical identity — cultural, religious, linguistic and culinary resemblance. An absolute regional organisation. Shared developmental challenges solvable only in unity · consensus rule · charter bar on bilateral disputes
• BIMSTEC — Members lack a common identity and history — an interregional economic bloc and a bridge builder connecting South Asia with ASEAN. Sector-driven · different members lead different pillars · no FTA yet

Assessment

BIMSTEC is a complementing body to SAARC and vice versa; despite overlapping geography and priority areas, they are not equal alternatives. Insofar as their regions of interest overlap, the two complement each other in function and goal. BIMSTEC gives SAARC countries a unique opportunity to connect with ASEAN. Its success does not render SAARC pointless — it adds a new chapter to regional cooperation in South Asia. BIMSTEC has considerable potential to promote integration across South and Southeast Asia, giving India a strategic platform to interact with its neighbours, build economic development, increase connectivity and address shared issues such as disaster relief and energy security. It may become a major force behind regional stability and prosperity by fortifying its institutional structure and broadening its areas of collaboration.

Regional Integration and the Question of ‘Regionness’

• South Asia could not advance the notion of regionalism despite a common history and shared cultural traditions. The nature and circumstances of state formation during decolonisation, and the effects of the Cold War, were significant in impeding the growth of regionalism.
• The primary obstacles were the division of British India into India and Pakistan, Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan, and the wars fought during these events.
• China’s expanding geopolitical and economic commitments across South Asia have rendered a large part of the notion of regional integration obsolete; regional institutions play a smaller role as China widens its sphere of influence.
• India’s own trajectory → after initial hesitation India was positive about SAARC’s potential, gradually concluded the organisation might not be useful in accomplishing its declared objectives, and began to distance itself. Its policies after 2014 indicate a lack of interest in SAARC and a preference for two other fronts — bilateral engagement under Neighbourhood First, and bilateral and multilateral engagement beyond South Asia.
• Niranjan Marjani → India has actively sought to isolate Pakistan in the region and has stepped up engagement with other groupings such as BBIN and BIMSTEC.
• Under Neighbourhood First, India has engaged Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka while circumventing Pakistan — stress on mutually beneficial economic engagement and humanitarian assistance, most visibly during the pandemic through Vaccine Maitri, which prioritised the neighbourhood.
• Outside South Asia India has increased engagement with BIMSTEC, BRICS and the G-20, and is expanding outreach through the Act East Policy and the India–Central Asia Dialogue.

Regional integration in South Asia would go ahead “through SAARC or outside it, among all of us or some of us.”

India’s position, 18th SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, 2014

Where the Argument Stands Now — 2024 to 2026

Three smaller neighbours passed through sharp political change, and each tested the claim that Neighbourhood First converts asymmetry into influence.

The pattern: hedging, not alignment

Cheng-Chwee Kuik — hedging

“Insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-à-vis competing powers to have a fallback position.”

• Harsh V. Pant and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy (ORF) — pragmatism would prevail; “Sri Lanka will continue to balance between India and China.” A year on, Shivamurthy noted a weakening government, cancelled energy projects and criticism of the defence MoU itself.
• Gulbin Sultana (MP-IDSA) — Muizzu’s turn is a shift from an “India first” to a “Maldives first” policy aimed at cutting dependence; the recalibration “should not be seen as a zero-sum game for India”, but it is no return to the old line either.
• Nihar R. Nayak (MP-IDSA) — Nepal is a small, landlocked semi-buffer state between two Asian powers that have fought a war; its tactics have been mostly hedging in the post-Cold War period. India ties Nepal’s stability to border security and democracy, China to the One China Principle and Tibet.
• Nilanthi Samaranayake (USIP) — small-state agency is real, but it shrinks as great-power competition intensifies.
• Connectivity and sovereignty — India stayed outside the Belt and Road paragraph of the Tianjin Declaration at the SCO, September 2025. Modi there: “Connectivity that by-passes sovereignty, ultimately loses both trust and meaning.”

Read against the chapter’s own argument: asymmetry has not gone, but the smaller states now price Indian and Chinese offers against each other rather than choosing between them.

Conclusion — the political economy of separation

South Asia’s central paradox: the region with the densest civilisational, linguistic and ecological connections is the least integrated political space in the world. Intra-regional trade at about 5%, no SAARC summit since 2014, and trading costs higher than with partners on the other side of the globe are symptoms of one cause.

Three variables shape every bilateral relationship in the region. Asymmetry (Makes India indispensable and resented in equal measure) → Domestic politics (Anti-India sentiment as electoral currency — “India Out” in Malé, the Madhesi question in Kathmandu, the Tamil question in Colombo) → China (Alternative capital without conditionalities — raises the price of Indian influence even where it cannot displace it)

• The corrective is not louder assertion. Where India has lost ground, it has lost it to delay rather than to Chinese finance — Hambantota, Trincomalee and Batticaloa were offered to India first; hydropower delays in Bhutan created the debt they were meant to retire; the Teesta remains unsettled after five decades of negotiation. Delivery is the variable India controls.
• The intellectual line is consistent — Shyam Saran on the unrelenting logic of geography, C. Raja Mohan on managing complex interdependence rather than competing with China, S.D. Muni on the cost of micro-management, Rajiv Sikri on differentiated approaches, and Kanak Mani Dixit’s formulation that India must be big and a brother. All converge on one prescription: convert size into service rather than into a lever.
• The 2024–26 record cuts both ways — the island resets held and deepened, while Nepal’s nationalist turn and China’s steady economic presence mark the limits of Indian influence. Constantino Xavier’s warning stands: “India is actually doing more than ever, but it is the neighbourhood that is losing India.”
• Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s proposition remains the frame. History cannot be changed and geography cannot be changed; what can be changed is whether proximity is treated as an inheritance to be managed or a resource to be built on.

SAARC

Founded with the SAARC Charter, Dhaka (1985); Secretariat in Kathmandu; it operates in a conflict-prone region often called the “arc of instability.” Foundational principles: Panchsheel and consensus (unanimous decision-making).

“I dream of a day when, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul.”

Manmohan Singh

Impediments to functionality

• Structural asymmetry — a “negative mindset” that challenges India’s regional weight; India seen as a “bullying big brother” and “imperialist power” — the “big brother, small brother” syndrome (Sikkim’s integration, Bangladesh’s creation, the IPKF, Nepal/Bhutan blockades), while India fears smaller states will “gang up.”
• India–Pakistan — C. Raja Mohan calls Pakistan the “camel in the caravan of SAARC,” slowing the traffic; Pakistan’s “identity crisis” fears that fulfilling SAARC would be a de facto nullification of Partition.
• Economic asymmetry and inward-looking self-reliance — SAFTA languishes; intra-regional trade stays below 5%. India–China rivalry and China’s strategic entry deepen tensions. Institutional paralysis — S. Jaishankar calls SAARC a “jammed vehicle”; no summit since 2014.

Improvements, revival and measures needed

• Trade — SAFTA, SAPTA (preferential), SATIS (services). Institutions — Development Fund, SAARC University, Arbitration Council, SARSO (standards), Food Bank, Milk Grid, disaster agency, Film Festival, Federation Games, SAARC satellite.
• No member has withdrawn; BIMSTEC and BBIN offer avenues but cannot fully supplant SAARC. India convened a video conference of SAARC leaders during COVID-19 (2020); the Himalayan environmental crisis strengthens the case for revival.
• Measures — shared values and a transnational conception of nationhood; no internationalising of bilateral issues; India’s proactive leadership; fast-track SAFTA, a unified power grid, freer movement of people, joint action on terrorism and narcotics; a “SAARC Minus” concept for flexibility; Modi — “collaboration over confusion, preparation over panic”; a revived Kautilyan, pragmatic approach.

BIMSTEC

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation links South and Southeast Asia — seven members: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka (South Asia) and Myanmar, Thailand (Southeast Asia).

Evolution

• Bangkok Declaration (June 1997) created BIST-EC; became BIMST-EC after Myanmar joined, then BIMSTEC after Nepal and Bhutan joined in 2004. The BIMSTEC Charter and the Bangkok Vision mark a shift from loose consultation to rules-based regionalism; first Secretary-General, Sri Lankan diplomat Sumith Nakandala; Secretariat in Dhaka.
• Constantino Xavier and Riya Sinha — the Bay of Bengal was among the world’s most interconnected regions until the early 20th century, but “the region’s sense of community has almost completely eroded” after the 1940s.

Significance and challenges

• Aligns with India’s Act East policy; bridges SAARC and ASEAN; supports connectivity (Kaladan Multimodal, the Trilateral Highway, the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement); a counter to China’s Indian Ocean expansion and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI projects in every member except India and Bhutan).
• Challenges — India’s pivot from SAARC is partly to isolate Pakistan, so BIMSTEC often revives only during India-Pakistan tension; a “sluggish” pace (Charter after two decades); an under-staffed, under-funded Secretariat; poor transborder connectivity and low intra-regional trade; no FTA yet; setbacks from the Rohingya crisis, the India-Nepal border issue and the Myanmar junta.
• Way forward — a comprehensive BIMSTEC FTA meeting the “convergence criteria”; removal of regulatory obstacles to FDI; integration into global supply chains through a rules-based trading system.

Why Pakistan is the hard case

• Pakistan is India’s biggest foreign policy challenge — a source of threats ranging from nuclear war to lone-wolf attacks and suicide bombings, and a proxy of China. Historically India has faced its bigger threats from the western front.
• China is a greater power but a comparatively more responsible member of world politics, with some shared interests with India. Pakistan is termed a ‘mad child with loaded gun’ and an example of a rogue state; hence India’s strategic restraint. Pratap Bhanu Mehta treats such restraint not as weakness but as a measured response.

The challenges, stated plainly

• Taliban takeover of Afghanistan → Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba now have a friendly regime that may look the other way or offer safe haven. M.K. Narayanan refers to Pakistan as the ‘patron saint’ of Afghanistan’s new regime.
• Right-wing Hindu nationalism in India → Pakistan signalled a desire to improve ties in its first-ever National Security Policy while remaining concerned about Indian “military adventurism”.
• Political instability and military dominance → a deep state with a weak political regime; the military’s interest lies in keeping the situation tense. Christine Fair, Ayesha Siddiqa and Hussain Haqqani hold that the Pakistani Army derives its sustenance from the Kashmir conflict; so long as it can sustain the perception of India as an existential threat and ideological antithesis, it continues to receive state largesse and political clout.
• The obsession with Kashmir → makes long-term peace impossible; since the abrogation of Article 370, Pakistan has tried every diplomatic means to be heard.
• Chinese interference → CPEC, Chinese presence on Pakistani soil, and Beijing’s better relations with the Taliban.
• India’s idealistic foreign policy → Rajiv Dogra argues that idealist Indian leaders made repeated concessions, after which Pakistan always found new means to undermine Indian interests; India has been “hopping in confusion” over non-state actors, without an effective deterrent response or a consistent security posture.
• Absence of an innovative counter-terrorism strategy → Kanwal Sibal notes India remains in a bind, caught between peace lobbies asserting “no alternative to dialogue” and “we can choose our friends but not neighbours”, and the record of Pakistani behaviour.
• Unchanging security dilemma → neither side’s threat perception has fundamentally changed; Pakistan’s first National Security Policy mentions peace briefly and spends the rest debating New Delhi’s “hegemonic” goals.

What India should do

• Balance Pakistan in Afghanistan → engage the Taliban realistically and build security cooperation, while bracing for a heightened threat.
• Counter China → form counter-alliances on the lines of Kautilya’s raja-mandala and raise issues uncomfortable for Beijing.
• Revive SAARC → follow a functionalist approach and make Pakistan realise the benefits of cooperation, particularly while it is under economic stress.
• Use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization → both are members of a security-focused body; find ways to press Pakistan on terrorism.
• Neutralise Pakistan strategically → conventional victory has become costly and remote since Pakistan acquired credible deterrence.
• Take the first initiative under ‘Neighbourhood First’ → India, as the bigger country, should move first, but with caution.

Possibilities of cooperation

• Rajesh Basrur — systemic change has created conditions for cooperation. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons neutralised India’s conventional advantage, while India’s rising economic and political power has widened the gap between them.
• The widened gap encourages, though it does not necessitate, long-term cooperation; India needs stability in its immediate environs to play a larger role in Asia and beyond.
• Nuclear weapons and economic trans-nationalisation together → (a) give Pakistan security from attack, reducing its sense of vulnerability; (b) produce sufficient risk to make leaders rethink; (c) create stronger incentives to cooperate.

Toward a democratic peace?

• Both moved away from zero-sum approaches to Kashmir in the early twenty-first century, loosening controls on cross-LoC movement of people and goods; state-level factors kept the movement a slow crawl.
• Mansfield and Snyder — democratising states are war-prone. Pakistan’s unstable hybrid democracy, its mix of populism and military power, and parties outbidding each other in appeasing conservatives, make democratic peace difficult.

The prospects for a ‘democratic peace’ between India and Pakistan remain limited for the near future. The truism that democracies do not fight one another applies only to developed capitalist societies, and neither is anywhere close to being that.

Rajesh Basrur

Instances of cooperation, and the economics

• The Indus Waters Treaty, in force through several conflicts, seen as a model for international water-sharing; SAFTA and regional cooperation during periods of calm; cultural exchange of artists; Pakistani players in the Indian Premier League; joint hosting of the South Asian Games, 2004.
• Political tension long kept trade low because Pakistan sought to keep India at arm’s length. Trade growth does not by itself rule out political tension, as United States–China and Japan–China trade show.
• Both the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) favour more trade and investment; Basrur notes that internal pressures nonetheless held up MFN status, despite economic misfortune and IMF pressure.
• Trade figures → $521 million (2004–05) → about $2.35 billion (2012–13) → $329.26 million (2020–21) → $1.35 billion in April–December 2022 against $516.36 million in all of 2021–22. One study estimates potential growth of about tenfold.
• India imposed 200% tariffs after Pulwama and withdrew MFN status; Pakistan suspended trade after August 2019. Facilitating structures exist — the Wagah–Attari crossing and SAFTA — but advance only as far as politics allows.

The regional debate — hedging, the debt trap, Neighbourhood First

Lenses: Small-state hedging · Buffer-state theory · Neorealism

Small-state hedging

• Cheng-Chwee Kuik developed the framework for smaller states caught between great powers; the balancing logic is applied to this neighbourhood by Aditya G. Shivamurthy on Sri Lanka’s course and by Nilanthi Samaranayake on island-state agency in the Indian Ocean.

“I define hedging as insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-à-vis competing powers to have a fallback position.” — Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘Getting Hedging Right: A Small-State Perspective’, China International Strategy Review, 2021, p. 300

The debt-trap thesis and its rebuttal

Hambantota — strategic seizure, or a domestic failure?

• The thesis — Hambantota as strategic seizure — Brahma Chellaney, and the ‘String of Pearls’ reading
• The rebuttal — A Rajapaksa ‘white elephant’ — Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri; a commercial lease, not a seizure

Nilanthi Samaranayake and colleagues — small-state agency is real, but it shrinks as great-power competition intensifies

• The thesis in practice — N. Sathiya Moorthy treats the research-vessels question as a test of exactly this anxiety.
• The evidence against — Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri show that Sri Lanka’s debt crisis came mainly from Western-market borrowing, and that the port now hosts Sri Lanka’s own southern naval command.

“The Hambantota Port case shows little evidence of Chinese strategy, but lots of evidence for poor governance on the recipient side.” — Shahar Hameiri, ‘Debunking the Myth of China’s Debt-trap Diplomacy’, Lowy Institute, 9 Sep 2020

“The story of Hambantota Port is, in reality, a narrative of political and economic incompetence, facilitated by lax governance and inadequate risk management on both sides.” — **Lee Jones & Shahar Hameiri, Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’, Chatham House, Aug 2020**

Neighbourhood First — adaptation or structural strain?

“India is actually doing more than ever, but it is the neighbourhood that is losing India. It is the countries of South Asia that are moving on, escaping the traditional region called South Asia with India as its gravitational core.”

Constantino Xavier, interview in Scroll.in, 22 August 2020

• Where the record lands — the 2024–2026 evidence supports both readings: the island resets held and even deepened after Ditwah, yet Nepal’s nationalist turn and China’s steady economic presence mark the limits of Indian influence. India frames its own conduct through Neighbourhood First and the maritime vision now called MAHASAGAR.