Who Actually Decides

The common perception is that foreign policy is made by the MEA, the PMO or the PM. In reality, no single institution or personality can complete the complex task alone.

• At different times one actor may dominate, but several contributing actors collectively build India’s Foreign Policy Consensus, backed by the political leadership across ruling and opposition ranks.
• Conventionally, European foreign policy was made by the Foreign Office in secrecy, with no role for public opinion or the legislature.
• As a parliamentary democracy, India must be considerate of the people’s will; decision-making is highly diffused and it is difficult to say who decides and at what level.
• Indian foreign policy is finalised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister.

“India’s foreign policy was always a leadership function and more often than not did not command a consensus.”

K. Subrahmanyam

• The process is actor-specific and leadership-driven, with personality and charisma playing central roles.
• The most important instrument is the Ministry of External Affairs; other agencies — the Cabinet, MoD, Ministry of Commerce, NSC, PMO and Parliament — contribute, as do non-government bodies: media, pressure groups, universities and think-tanks.

Who feeds in, who deliberates, who decides, who executes. INPUTS (Media · pressure groups · think-tanks · universities · states · business · diaspora) → DELIBERATION (MEA · NSC (SPG, NSAB, JIC) · Parliament & the Standing Committee) → DECISION (PM & PMO · Council of Ministers · Cabinet Committee on Security) → EXECUTION (MEA · Indian Foreign Service · missions abroad). Highly diffused · actor-specific · leadership-driven — no single institution completes the task.

Parliament

“I am entirely in the hands of the House.”

Jawaharlal Nehru, March 1948

• As per Rudra Chaudhuri, the Indian Parliament has demonstratively placed limitations on the executive in international affairs — but it does not dictate policy like the German Bundestag; the Indian system resembles the UK, with no legal requirement for parliamentary approval on foreign policy. Parliamentarians have grown more outward-looking over the years.
• The defining role was largely left to the Constitution → under Article 246 (Seventh Schedule) foreign policy is a Union subject; under Article 253 treaties may be entered into without a parliamentary vote, and war may be declared without formal authorisation — unlike the US, where senators wield a powerful voice.

Mechanisms available to Parliament

• No legal mechanism compels endorsement, except extreme measures such as a vote of no confidence.
• The Standing Committee on External Affairs exercises limited financial control, comments on the MEA budget, and can originate studies that shape opinion; committees cannot reshape policy but can press the government to explain itself.
• Members use motions and resolutions to push the government to justify its decisions.
• A paradox → a government with a large majority sometimes cedes to a weak opposition: Nehru accepted some demands of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, which held only 3 seats. Nehru acknowledged that “external affairs will follow internal affairs.”

Actual working experience — the record

• 1949 → Parliament scrutinised the resolution for continued membership of the Commonwealth, with criticism from within the Congress and the opposition; Nehru was only lightly checked.
• 1954 → the US–Pakistan Mutual Defense Pact; pressure from the Right and the CPI-led Left pushed Nehru to sharper statements against the pact and America.
• The PRC and Aksai Chin-for-NEFA → the government failed to win Parliament’s confidence; Nehru placed his correspondence with Zhou Enlai and a white paper before the House.
• After the 1962 war → Western pressure to negotiate on Kashmir was resisted because of opposition in Parliament, led by Vajpayee, who warned the US and UK against interfering.
• The exchange of enclaves with Bangladesh and the Land Boundary Agreement required a constitutional amendment, passed in 2015.
• The Civil Nuclear Deal (2008) → four Left parties threatened to withdraw support from the UPA (the BJP also opposed), leading to a no-confidence motion. While passing the Nuclear Liabilities Bill, the opposition pushed sections 17(b) and 46 to allow action against suppliers — the value of parliamentary oversight and the Standing Committee.

Parliamentary diplomacy

• Parliamentary diplomacy → the involvement of legislators in international affairs, extending beyond executive-driven foreign policy through delegations and dialogues.
• Shashi Tharoor → parliamentarians bring a more democratic and representative dimension, bridging political divides and building bipartisan support.
• Parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence allow MPs to scrutinise and influence policy in line with national interest; it projects India’s democratic values and pluralistic ethos on the global stage.
• Engagement with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) demonstrates India’s commitment to multilateralism.
• C. Raja Mohan → such participation amplifies India’s voice and cultivates bilateral and regional relationships. Interaction between Indian MPs and their counterparts promotes mutual understanding on climate change, terrorism and development.
• Assessment → it integrates democratic oversight and adds to soft power, while remaining underutilised because of executive dominance.

The States’ Impact on Foreign Policy

Under the Seventh Schedule, foreign relations lie wholly within the Union’s power — yet the states are not absent from policy-making.

“Apart from pressures at the national level, Governments at the centre find themselves susceptible to domestic compulsions in cases where state legislatures and regional political dynamics shape Foreign Policy priorities… regional preferences appear to have become that much more important to the executive at the centre.”

Rudra Chaudhuri

• Under coalition governments, regional demands cannot be wished away: PM Manmohan Singh did not attend the CHOGM (Colombo, 2013) owing to opposition from Tamil Nadu (AIADMK, DMK); the River Teesta accord (2012–13) could not be finalised because the West Bengal Chief Minister opposed it.
• There is no constitutional provision to accommodate such demands, but coalition politics and the regionalisation of the party system secure them a hearing at the Centre.
• Economic liberalisation and coalition governments together created an environment for states to engage the Centre on issues affecting their interests.
• States adjoining neighbours have a major say → the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty and the enclaves settlement needed West Bengal and Meghalaya; UP and Bihar are key for Nepal; J&K, Punjab and Gujarat for Pakistan.
• Tamil Nadu → a disproportionate influence on Sri Lanka policy (the Tamil factor); Kerala → active on NRI and Gulf issues; the north-eastern states → engagement with Myanmar.
• Tariq Karim blamed India’s cooperative federalism for the lack of progress on water-sharing.
• John Kincaid coined “constituent diplomacy” (1990) — the international activities of local governments; para-diplomacy strengthens federalism (sister cities such as Kyoto–Varanasi).
• The MEA has set up a dedicated States Division as its interface with the states; Heads of Missions are encouraged to visit relevant states.
• Efforts remain ad hoc; they need institutionalisation, with the principle of collaborative sub-regionalism trumping cooperative federalism on matters of core national interest.

The Cabinet

In parliamentary systems important decisions are taken by the cabinet. As per Tanvi Madan, the Cabinet is the political body ultimately responsible for foreign policy-making.

• It decides on external security in consultation with the MHA, MoD and MEA; on trade and investment with Commerce, Finance and the MEA.
• Tanvi Madan → the role of any minister other than the Foreign Minister varies with the power and personality of the PM and the issues involved. Nehru only informed the cabinet of decisions taken; even so, members expressed views — Sardar Patel’s differences with Nehru on China are well known.
• Under coalition governments, the views of cabinet members representing coalition partners have gained importance, especially on neighbourhood policy (Teesta, CHOGM).
• Multilateral trade negotiations cut across ministries → specialised cabinet committees resolve inter-departmental conflict.
• The Minister of External Affairs is a member of four cabinet committees — Economic Affairs, Parliamentary Affairs, Political Affairs and Security. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gives final shape to vital foreign policy and security issues, for example the surgical strikes.
• In emergencies, ad hoc committees are set up — the “Emergency Committee” after the 1962 war, and the committee on WTO matters.

Ministry of External Affairs

The MEA had a humble beginning in 1947 as the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, to steer Nehru’s vision of an independent foreign policy.

• Pallavi Raghavan → the ministry set up under Nehru was not fit to reflect India’s newly independent status, because its antecedents and traditions had been fashioned to serve the British Empire. Notable individuals who shaped early foreign policy → Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, Y.D. Gundevia, Krishna Menon and K.M. Panikkar.
• The MEA affects policy primarily at the individual level → the personality factor matters most.
• Tanvi Madan → the MEA is the lead ministry and the main instrument for formulation and implementation; it is expected to provide intelligent, accurate answers and is the storehouse of expert knowledge. It works as the foreign policy secretariat, channelling options to the Cabinet and implementing decisions.

The External Affairs Minister

• A political appointee and Cabinet member, not necessarily an expert; policies recommended by the ministry are cleared or modified by the minister before implementation.
• Sitting PMs — Nehru, P.V. Narasimha Rao, Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh — have held the office.
• Relative power varies with the PM’s preferences → under Nehru, a marked influence of his individual worldview; the trend continued under Indira Gandhi, leading to inadequate institutional development and low salience of foreign policy in public opinion.
• Many EAMs were “little more than relay systems” for their bureaucrats → with few exceptions they never emerged as autonomous sources of policymaking, vacating the arena to the PM.

Structure and composition

• The Foreign Secretary is the senior-most bureaucrat, responsible for supervision and coordination, and an important adviser to the minister.
• The MEA is largely staffed by the Indian Foreign Service, selected through the UPSC.
• MEA importance varies with the PM’s interest, and has been losing ground to the PMO. Under Nehru — PM and EAM at once — the Prime Minister’s Secretariat became the centre of decision-making.
• Since the late 1980s → economic diplomacy capabilities: the Economic Diplomacy Division, Multilateral Economic Relations, and centres for ASEAN and BIMSTEC.
• The Policy Planning and Research Division collects inputs from missions, the IDSA and ICWA, CII, FICCI and ASSOCHAM, academia and specialists.

Challenges before the MEA

“In this emerging new world, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) can no longer maintain its Cold War-era institutional infrastructure.”

Harsh V. Pant

The Indian Foreign Service · the Pillai Committee

The IFS is the permanent bureaucracy of career diplomats, working with the PMO, the NSC and others in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

• Selected through the UPSC; the Foreign Secretary is the permanent head. Embassies collect information not openly available in the host country.
• India is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country — the fewest among the BRICS. An official source puts the corps at around 1,750 officers (roughly 750 IFS Grade-A, 250 Grade-B, plus attachés).
• India’s corps is roughly equal to tiny Singapore’s; its numerical strength for projecting influence befitting an emerging power is questionable.

“India is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country, not just far smaller than the big powers but by comparison with most of the larger emerging countries.”

Shashi Tharoor

The Pillai Committee (1965)

• PM Shastri appointed a committee on the foreign service headed by N.R. Pillai in 1965 to review structure, recruitment, training and service conditions. Most of the ills it examined remain relevant.
• Four weaknesses → the corps is not large enough and lacks wide professional experience; poor coordination among officials; limited and inadequate professional training; weak inter-ministerial coordination.
• Suggestions → increase the manned force and select older professionals; revive the post of secretary-general; improve coordination, training and specialisation; strengthen economic and commercial expertise through lateral entry — climate change needs scientific expertise that generalists cannot provide.
• Shashi Tharoor → frugal staffing reveals a country punching well below its weight.

“IFS and MEA have strengths in terms of the individual level competences of its officers but also a range of weaknesses particularly at the organisational and systemic levels, the most tractable and remediable weaknesses being at the organisational level.”

Kanti Bajpai and Byron Chung

The Prime Minister’s Office

A parliamentary form of government often works like a prime ministerial one, in which the PM and the PMO are decisive. The PMO includes officials on deputation from the MEA.

• Structure → the principal secretary, the NSA, an additional PS, a secretary, two additional secretaries, five joint secretaries and others.
• Under Nehru (1947–64) the Prime Minister’s Secretariat had a low profile — he retained the MEA and handled policy himself. Shastri, less acquainted with foreign affairs, brought the Secretariat to prominence.
• PMO dominance became evident under Indira Gandhi → the PMO absorbed functions previously with other ministries, giving the PM greater control over both domestic and foreign policy.
• No PM can decide every issue alone → only issues vital to security, foreign policy goals, economic development or the party’s standing are decided in the PM’s office. The PM can appoint special envoys (climate change, the India–US nuclear talks, Af–Pak, disarmament); Indira Gandhi used an envoy for the India–Soviet Friendship Treaty (1971).
• Major initiatives have come from a leader’s political capital → Indira Gandhi’s realism and USSR ties; Rajiv Gandhi’s liberalisation and the reversal on the China border; the Gujral Doctrine; Manmohan Singh’s emphasis on a ‘multi-polar Asia’ and India as a ‘responsible’ great power; Narasimha Rao’s strategic weapons programme; Vajpayee’s economic liberalisation; Modi’s Neighbourhood First policy.
• The role of the NSA and principal secretaries has grown → Brajesh Mishra functioned as NSA even before the formal role, provoking reactions that the NSA was overshadowing the EAM.
• Harish Kapur (Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers) → since independence the MEA has largely remained secondary to the PMO, as India never had a charismatic Foreign Minister powerful enough to leave an imprint.
• NSA Ajit Doval holds a similarly powerful position today → Act East and Neighbourhood First were initiated by the PM and PMO and coordinated by the MEA, and the Pakistan policy of Offensive Defence (the Doval Doctrine) is shaped by the NSA.

Media and Pressure Groups

Media — print, electronic, internet and social — performs both information aggregation and dissemination: it conveys public demands to the leadership and carries policy to the masses, while the government seeks to build consensus.

• Against the realist view that downplays non-state actors, liberalism and constructivism value media and pressure groups in constructing perceptions and exerting soft power.
• The MEA’s Public Diplomacy Division and External Publicity Division manage what has been called India’s ‘media diplomacy’, ‘soundbite diplomacy’, ‘instant diplomacy’ and ‘real-time diplomacy’.
• Media–policy relations are a two-way street → the government guides information; the media nudges policy through reportage and commentary.
• Noam Chomsky → we live in webs of deceit, in an indoctrinated society; the principal role of media is to “manufacture consent” for foreign policy. Piers Robinson → media influences policy only when the policy is uncertain and coverage is framed to advocate a particular course.
• Hurdles → lack of expertise in reporting, poor editorial supervision, and the distortion of news to attract an audience.

Indian media and foreign policy-making

• Manoj Joshi (The Media in the Making of Indian Foreign Policy) → two phases: 1947–1990, state-controlled dissemination; 1991 onwards, ownership diversified alongside LPG and the internet, and open criticism of policy became possible.
• The Kargil conflict (1999) → private cable journalists bypassed controls, triggering a wave of nationalism and beginning the empowerment of the media.
• The 26 November 2008 Mumbai attack → uncontrolled, near real-time coverage aided the terrorists’ actions.

Evaluation

• The “CNN effect” → the ‘accelerant effect’ of a 24-hour media environment that presses on decision-making and impairs both intelligence-gathering and response formation.
• Bombardment of information and the chase for TRPs can compromise operational security (WikiLeaks and classified information).
• Media shapes the domestic image of foreign countries — the negative image of Pakistan and China. Indian media depend on foreign news agencies, buying footage and using stringers.
• With the end of consensual foreign policy (the Indo-US nuclear deal), media became an arbiter rather than a reporter among contending views.
• Media provides a forum for the diaspora (remittances, lobbying) and has become an autonomous business player, sometimes adopting contrarian positions.

Pressure groups

• Pressure groups are normally weak in influencing foreign policy compared with domestic policy, yet they sometimes matter.
• Friendship societies (the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society) maintain contacts in the MEA and Parliament.
• India delayed diplomatic relations with Israel from 1948 to 1992 owing to the activities of certain interest groups.

National Security Council

Indian national security policy-making has suffered from two drawbacks → it is highly ad hoc and lacks effective coordination.

• Dinesh Singh (EAM under Indira Gandhi) → much of foreign policy involved responding to others rather than proactive determination; the reason was the personality factor, as PMs like Nehru, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi believed they had answers to every crisis. A minister can never be an expert like a trained foreign service officer.
• The flaws of the ad-hoc setup showed in the 1962 war. K.P. Mishra and K. Subrahmanyam were among the earliest to suggest a National Security Council — Mishra also urging an Expert Advisory Committee and policy planning.
• Measures were initiated by PMs V.P. Singh and Narasimha Rao in the later 1990s, but the NSC took final shape under Vajpayee.
• Shivshankar Menon → foreign policy is MINIMAXING: minimising risks and maximising benefits; the NSC is central to protecting India’s security and strategic interests.

National Security Council — the three tiers under the Prime Minister. NSC — chaired by the Prime Minister (Ministers of External Affairs, Defence, Home and Finance · NSA (Secretary, rank of Cabinet minister) · Deputy Chairman, NITI Aayog) → SPG (Strategic Planning Group — headed by the Cabinet Secretary; topmost decision-making body at the bureaucratic level; formulates and implements strategic policy; arbitrates between ministries) · NSAB (National Security Advisory Board — professionals, academics, scientists, administrative experts, retired bureaucrats; long-term analysis and perspectives) · JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee — inputs from the IB, R&AW and military intelligence directorates; highest intelligence assessment organisation; inter-agency coordination). Deliberative, created by executive action — the executive body is the CCS.

• Mandate → advise and assist the PM; formulate national security strategies, the basis for national military strategy; integrate strategic information from agencies, the armed forces and think-tanks — as in the Balakot response.
• Growing importance of the NSA → advising on external affairs and security, balancing foreign policy and security interests, opening new channels of intelligence, and arbitrating between ministries.

Issues with the NSC

• Absence of a National Security Doctrine → the NSAB drafted national security strategy documents on four occasions, but a lingering worry about a ‘commitment trap’ delayed publication.
• The NSC rarely meets → it is an advisory body, while the CCS is the executive body.
• P.V. Narasimha Rao found the NSC pointless in India, holding that its concept suited a presidential system, whereas in India the cabinet is supreme.

Assessment

• Suggestions → the NSC should have legislative backing (as in the USA) for accountability and independence; the JIC should be one unit under an administrative body rather than a central decision-making unit.
• The NSC has brought in expert and non-official views; strategic thinking is now institutionalised; the NSAB provided support such as the draft nuclear policy of 1999.
• With external terrorism, two antagonistic neighbours and internal threats, the role of the NSA and NSC is significant — but the body needs to be more empowered by legislation and more inclusive. Final decisions rest with the PM and the CCS.

Think-Tanks and Universities

Think-tanks and universities aid policy analysis through research papers and briefs. These non-governmental, non-profit bodies carry a blend of theory and practice, staffed by researchers, former diplomats and practitioners.

• Amitabh Mattoo and Rory Medcalf → although India’s think-tanks and universities have shaped policy at decisive moments, they have generally been less influential than expected in a democracy; their research often lacks the rigour of Western counterparts.
• The overarching reasons → government apathy and secrecy; a powerful bureaucracy that guards the policy reins; and the impracticality of scholars who have distanced themselves from the hard realities of foreign policy.
• India has notionally the 4th largest number of think-tanks in the world, after the US, China and the UK — but most do not significantly influence policy, and quality is mixed and often below world standards.
• Constraints → the Official Secrets Act, no systematic timeline for declassification, and the reluctance of bureaucrats to speak candidly. Sanjay Baru → most organisations offer little in the key area of middle-level intellectual leadership; funding is another challenge.

The hubs of ‘second-track’ diplomacy — increasingly undertaken by the CII

• ICWA — Indian Council for World Affairs: the oldest, established 1943; hosted the Asian Relations Conference (1947); explored the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct (2013).
• IDSA — Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: founded 1965; India’s leading think-tank on strategic issues.
• ORF — Observer Research Foundation: funded by Reliance; a partner of choice for high-level second-track dialogues.
• The government increasingly recognises their expertise → the MEA convenes dialogue with scholars, and the NSAB engages external experts.

Universities

• Kanti Bajpai → during the Nehruvian era domestic academia feared Nehru’s aura and knowledge on International Relations and remained trapped in an intellectual vacuum, believing they could not engage him as equals → state policy was rarely analysed objectively, and academics rationalised the official position.
• Nehru was also an institution builder → under his patronage Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru founded the ICWA (1943), which helped set up the Indian School of International Studies (1955) at the University of Delhi — later the School of International Studies, JNU (1970) — the Department of African Studies at Delhi, and the Department of International Relations at Jadavpur (1956). International Studies is now taught in about 150 universities.
• Mattoo and Medcalf → individual scholars of excellence exist across India but operate solo; the scholarly activity has yet to produce the scholar-practitioners who enrich US debates.
• Indian scholars are still not able to question the state’s external policies; those with a different view fear sanction and professional disadvantage; a secretive bureaucracy withholds data, and weak infrastructure leaves India under-supplied with policy analysts.

The Private and Business Sector · the Diaspora

As per Rajiv Kumar, in the first three decades after independence — until the mid-1980s — the role of the private and business sector was marginal.

• Reasons → a closed, autarkic development model; the predominance of public-sector enterprises; a smaller private-sector share, leaving FICCI, CII and ASSOCHAM marginal; the socialist and non-aligned stance during the Cold War; and the sector’s own existential struggle.
• Post-liberalisation → with Rajiv Gandhi and the reforms the private sector sought an increased role, aided by multilateral trade negotiations, engagement with SAARC and ASEAN, and FTAs.
• Current status → the sector is still finding its place, with limited tangible influence except where it converges with the official stance. It needs higher norms of self-regulation; its protectionist and mercantilist tendencies sit uneasily with the government’s thrust towards openness.

The diaspora

• Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) have a growing role. The government treats the diaspora as an asset for promoting India’s priorities globally, and seeks to put its remittances, lobbying and representative power to work.
• Successive governments have attempted to harness the diaspora’s influence in host states.